Stalin and Europe

Stalin and Europe

Imitation and Domination, 1928–1953

Edited by

TIMOTHY SNYDER
AND
RAY BRANDON

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Contributors

Timothy Snyder is the Housum Professor of History at Yale University. He is the author of numerous articles and books on east European history, including The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (2003); Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (2005); and Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (2010). He helped Tony Judt compose Thinking the Twentieth Century (2011).

Ray Brandon is a freelance translator, historian, and researcher based in Berlin. He is coeditor (with Wendy Lower) of The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization (2008) and translator of Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein, The “Final Solution” in Riga: Exploitation and Annihilation, 1941–1944 (2009). He is working on a political biography of Dmytro Paliїv, a prominent interwar Galician-Ukrainian politician and senior officer within the SS-Division Galicia.

Sarah Cameron is assistant professor of Soviet history at the University of Maryland-College Park. She earned her PhD in history at Yale University, where her dissertation won the John Addison Porter Prize for the best dissertation in the arts and sciences and the Turner Prize for the most outstanding dissertation in European history. She is working on a book project, The Hungry Steppe: Famine, Mass Violence, and the Making of Soviet Kazakhstan.

Alex J. Kay is an independent scholar based in Frankfurt and Berlin. He is author of Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940–1941 (2006), as well as numerous articles on German occupation in the Soviet Union, and coeditor (with Jeff Rutherford und David Stahel) of Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization (2012).

Mark Kramer is director of the Cold War Studies Program at Harvard University and a senior fellow at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is the editor of the Journal of Cold War Studies and the Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series.

Hiroaki Kuromiya is professor of history at Indiana University. His publications include Stalin (2005); The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (2007); (with Andrzej Pepłoński), Między Warszawą a Tokio: Polsko-japońska współpraca wywiadowcza 1904–1944 [Between Warsaw and Tokyo: Polish-Japanese cooperation in intelligence, 1904–1944] (2009); and Conscience on Trial: The Fate of Fourteen Pacifists in Stalin’s Ukraine (2012).

Christoph Mick is associate professor of history at the University of Warwick. He is author of Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt. Lemberg, 1914–1947 [Wartime experiences in a multiethnic city: Lemberg, 1914–1947] (2010), Forschen für Stalin [Conducting research for Stalin] (2000), Sowjetische Propaganda, Fünfjahrplan und deutsche Russlandpolitik [Soviet propaganda, the five-year plan, and German policy toward Russia] (1995), as well as numerous articles on Russia, Poland, and Ukraine.

Dieter Pohl is professor of history at the Klagenfurt University, Austria. Among his publications are Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion, 1941–1944 [The rule of the Wehrmacht: German military occupation and the indigenous population in the Soviet Union, 1941–1944] (2008), Verfolgung und Massenmord in der NS-Zeit [Persecution and mass murder in the Nazi era] (2003), and Justiz in Brandenburg [Justice in Brandenburg] (2001), as well as numerous articles on the Holocaust and German occupation policy in the Soviet Union.

Timm C. Richter is a freelance historian associated with the research and educational center Villa ten Hompel, Münster. He is author of “Herrenmensch” und “Bandit”: Deutsche Kriegsführung und Besatzungspolitik als Kontext des sowjetischen Partisanenkrieges (1941–44) [“Master race” and “bandit”: German conduct of war and occupation policy as the context of the Soviet partisan war (1941–44)] (1998), as well as numerous articles on the Wehrmacht and partisan warfare during the Second World War. He is editor of Krieg und Verbrechen. Intention und Situation: Fallbeispiele [War and crime. Intention and situation: Case examples] (2006) and coeditor of Bolschewistische Herrschaft und Orthodoxe Kirche. Das Landeskonzil 1917/1918 [Bolshevik rule and Orthodox church. The all-Russian church council of 1917/1918] (2005).

Geoffrey Roberts is professor and head of the School of History at University College Cork, Ireland. An expert on Soviet military and foreign policy, he is the author of many books and articles including Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (2006) and Molotov: Stalin’s Cold Warrior (2012). His most recent book, Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov (2012), won the 2013 Society for Military History Distinguished Book Award for Biography.

Lynne Viola is professor of history at the University of Toronto. She is the author of Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (1997), The War against the Peasantry, 1927–1930 (2005), and The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements (2007), as well as numerous articles. She also coedited (with V. P. Danilov and R. T. Manning) the collection Tragediia sovetskoi derevni 1927–37: dokumenty i materialy [The tragedy of the Soviet countryside, 1927–37: documents and materials] in five volumes (1999–2003).

Marek Wierzbicki is assistant professor at the Catholic University of Lublin and the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. He also works for the Institute for National Remembrance in Poland. Among his publications are: Polacy i Białorusini w zaborze sowieckim. Stosunki polsko-białoruskie na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej pod okupacją sowiecką [Poles and Belarusians under Soviet partition. Polish-Belarusian relations in the northeastern territories of the Second Republic under Soviet occupation] (2000); Polacy I Żydzi w zaborze sowieckim. Stosunki polsko-żydowskie na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej pod okupacją sowiecką [Poles and Jews under Soviet partition. Polish-Jewish relations in the northeastern territories of the Second Republic under Soviet occupation] (2001); Związek Młodzieży Polskiej i jego członkowie. Studium z dziejów funkcjonowania stalinowskiej organizacji młodzieżowej [The Polish Youth Union and its members. A study of the history of the function of the Stalinist youth organization] (2006); and Ostatni bunt. Młodzieżowa opozycja polityczna u schyłku PRL (1980–1990). Fakty, konteksty, interpretacje [The last rebellion. Youth political opposition at the end of the Polish People’s Republic (1980–1990). Facts, contexts, interpretations] (2013).

Rafał Wnuk is a professor of history at the Catholic University of Lublin and a researcher at the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk. He is the author of “Za pierwszego Sowieta”: Polska konspiracja na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczpospolitej [“Under the first Soviet occupation”: The Polish underground in the Second Republic’s eastern borderlands] (2007) and coauthor (with Grzegorz Motyka, Tomasz Stryjek, and Adam F. Baran) of Wojna po wojnie. Antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944–1953 [The war after the war. Anti-soviet underground in northeast Europe in the years 1944–1953]. He was also the editor-in-chief of Atlas Polskiego Podziemia Niepodległościowego 1944–1956 [The atlas of the Polish pro-independence underground, 1944–1956] (2007).

Maps

Stalin and Europe

Introduction

Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928–1953

Timothy Snyder

What did Europe have to do with Stalinism, and what did Stalinism have to do with Europe?

    The contributions to this volume suggest that the quarter-century- long encounter between the Stalinist system and Europe can be divided into four stages: (1) the application of an implicitly European scheme of modernization to the Asian and European territories of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s; (2) the introduction of matured Soviet practices into the Soviet annexations permitted by the Soviet-German alliance of 1939; (3) the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, which was designed to undo the Stalinist system; and (4) the postwar remaking of eastern Europe as a buffer zone against future aggression by exporting a milder version of Stalinism to formally sovereign states. This volume apportions three chapters to each of these four stages; the purpose of this introduction is to provide a preliminary sense of the importance of each stage and each chapter.

    Stalinism was the second great Soviet transformation, a revolution in economics and society that followed by a decade the revolution in ideology and politics. The revolution made by Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Joseph Stalin, and their allies and supporters in November 1917 was itself a kind of wager made on a certain European future. The radicals who broke the Russian Empire thought that they were the avant-garde of a European revolution rather than the remakers of a Eurasian state. The First World War, they thought, was bringing revolution to Germany and to the rest of the modern world. They could believe in 1918, as Europe’s empires collapsed, that the European working classes would deliver the lands of the Russian Empire from their historical backwardness. Yet German and Hungarian Communist revolutions failed in 1919, and the Polish Army stopped the attempt to spread revolution westward by force of arms in 1920. The Russian Revolution began to take on borders not so different from those of the Russian Empire.

    The radicals had to think a bit like statesmen. In the five years between the seizure of power in November 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union in December 1922, the Bolsheviks had to downgrade their visions for total transformation to policies for ruling a state. Even without the European revolution to aid them, their achievements in this half-decade were considerable. The Bolsheviks, with their Red Army and secret police, had brought under their control almost all of the former Russian Empire, the largest country in the world, reaching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic waters to the Central Asian deserts. They were still animated by the powerful design of creating socialism, but would have to do so, as Stalin put it, “in one country.” Under Stalin’s rule in the 1930s, the Soviet Union would become an isolated “homeland of socialism,” at once a giant construction project to rush peasants and nomads forward to industrial modernity and a looming promise to bring about the justice that modernity and state control of the means of production combined were supposed to provide.

    Once the Soviet Union existed as a revolutionary state, it stood in a paradoxical relationship to Europe. On the one hand, Europe was seen as capitalist and therefore hostile. On the other hand, capitalist-style modernity was exactly what the Soviet Union itself had to achieve before socialism could be built. Marxism was of course a European idea, and Lenin in the 1920s and Stalin in the 1930s had no model of modernity aside from European (and American) capitalism. For them, as for their comrades, the model itself was seen as a matter of scientific certainty rather than a contingent result of European history. But if socialism was scientific, then the revolution in Russia had come far too early. Socialism, as Marx had seen it, began where capitalism was ended: with the effort by workers to secure the fruits of capitalism, the factories and the cities, for themselves. They would abolish private property and in this way ensure not only social justice but also the end to human alienation. This was an appealing and coherent vision, but it was to come from a place that Soviet society had not even approached: modern European capitalism.

    For Europe to be surpassed, Europe would first have to be imitated, and the centuries of history of European modernization compressed into a few decades. For a Marxist project even to begin in the Soviet Union, a country of peasants and nomads rather than workers and capitalists, industry and the proletariat would first have to be created. How could this be done? This was the central issue of the ideological arguments that gave Stalin political cover, while he outmaneuvered rivals after Lenin’s death in 1924. His answer, on which his career at first depended, was the First Five-Year Plan of 1928–32.

    As Stalin understood with ruthless clarity, the attempt to emulate European development would involve the extreme exploitation of the lower classes that Marxists had always criticized in other settings. Lenin had said that capitalism survived its internal contradictions only by the imperialist exploitation of the non-European world. Stalin explained that the Soviet Union had no foreign territories to exploit on its journey to imitate capitalist development. Therefore his basic idea was to treat the existing Soviet population as capitalist exploiters treated colonized peoples. As Lynne Viola shows in her deeply grounded and conceptually daring chapter (Chapter 1), Stalinist development in the 1930s was a kind of “internal colonization” of the Soviet Union—by the Soviet Union.

    The Soviet Union was an empire, Viola maintains, but less in the sense that we usually use the word and more in the sense that the Marxists themselves understood it. It was not so much an empire because the Bolsheviks structured relations between metropole and periphery or between dominant and subordinate nationalities, but because the Bolsheviks viewed most of the population in solely instrumental terms. Peasants belonged to the feudal era; they were not people but relics of an outdated economic arrangement. For Stalinist planners, they were a resource, writes Viola. Collectivization in the early 1930s deprived the peasants of their property, along with all the rights and privileges associated with ownership, and made them dependent upon the state. If peasants had been prosperous before collectivization, or if they were known to oppose collectivization, or if they resisted what they experienced as shocking repression, or if they were denounced, or if they seemed suspicious for any other reason, they were deported to the Gulag, the Soviet system of labor camps and settlements. A decade after collectivization began there were about three million Soviet citizens in the Gulag.

    The peasants who were not deported and who remained on the collective farms were no longer their own masters and no longer controlled the practice of agriculture, but they were at least still, in some residual sense, doing work that they knew. They themselves or their children were to become workers after collectivization reduced the need for rural manpower. But what of people who were not peasants or, from a Marxist perspective, not even peasants? The application of the European model of development was even more disruptive in Asian regions of the Soviet Union where peasant farming was not the norm and where the population knew little of sedentary agriculture.

    Sarah Cameron’s remarkable contribution on Soviet Kazakhstan during the First Five-Year Plan (Chapter 2) presents perhaps the most dramatic encounter between an idea of postcapitalism and a way of life that was seen as prefeudal. Soviet Kazakhstan was a major site of the Gulag and, in this capacity, received hundreds of thousands of European peasants. But, like all of the Soviet Union, it was also a site of Stalinist modernization. The majority of the people were not peasant farmers who could be uprooted or collectivized, but nomadic herders, who, from the Marxist perspective, had not even entered the feudal stage of history. The nomads first had to become peasants (to be “sedentarized”), and then, as peasants, they had to be collectivized.

    The unsurprising result was that Kazakh nomads tried to flee the Soviet Union, as Cameron shows, drawing largely on new documentation in Kazakh and Russian. For nomads, state borders had little significance, but for the Soviet authorities, the line between the socialist home and the capitalist abroad was essential. Flight meant a humiliating defeat for policy, and the risk of contact between Soviet citizens and hostile foreigners. Tens of thousands of Kazakhs managed to flee to the Xinjiang region of China, but thousands of them were shot by Soviet border guards in the attempt. The almost simultaneous attempt to turn nomads into peasants and then collective farmers resulted in calamity and mass starvation. More than a million Kazakhs died of starvation in 1930, changing the population balance of the republic permanently in favor of Russians and foreshadowing the collectivization famines that would soon follow in Ukraine and southern Russia.

    Stalinism, the paradoxical attempt to resist world capitalism by imitating it, meant Europeanizing a country that lay mostly in Asia. This can be seen only by broadening the history of the Soviet Union beyond Soviet Europe to the Soviet Union as a whole, as in the first three chapters of this book (Viola, Cameron, and the joint effort by Hiroaki Kuromiya and Andrzej Pepłoński). Only by overcoming the typical Eurocentric bias in Soviet studies can the European moments be precisely located and discussed.

    Stalinist modernization followed a European model and was applied chiefly in Asia, in the simple sense that most of the USSR was Asian. But its major human results, famine in 1930–33 and then state terror in 1937–38, followed a reverse trajectory, from Soviet Asia westward to Soviet Europe. Famine struck Kazakhstan in 1930 and 1931, then Ukraine and Russia in 1932 and 1933. All in all, something like seven million Soviet citizens starved to death. In the Ukrainian case, the famine was understood as such while it was taking place and was deliberately intensified, because Stalin blamed the Ukrainian nation for the catastrophe rather than his development model. Famine began in the place where the European model was most dramatically unsuited to social conditions.

    Similarly, terror began as a result of the most direct form of colonization, the mass deportations of Europeans to Asia in the Gulag. As we now know, the Great Terror was not in the first instance a series of show trials or party leaders or a purge of the party and army, but rather a series of killing and deportation actions directed against the general population. As Kuromiya and Pepłoński argue, in a chapter (Chapter 3) that unites Soviet, Polish, Japanese, and a variety of other sources, the collectivization disaster brought about a sense of heightened vulnerability, which Stalin used to justify a massive preemptive strike against espionage, the Great Terror of 1937–38. The general fear, or notion, was that imperialist enemies abroad would exploit the anger of the victims of collectivization within the USSR in a coming war. It was therefore best, in Stalin’s view, to deal with the internal enemy before the inevitable conflict. The major internal enemies, write Kuromiya and Pepłoński, were precisely the European peasants in the Gulag in Soviet Asia. Stalin believed—perhaps sincerely, and, if so, understandably—survivors of the Gulag who returned to Soviet Europe would not be supporters of the system.

    A particular Asian scenario, argue Kuromiya and Pepłoński, prompted the start of the Great Terror, as well as its largest operation. In the general capitalist encirclement feared by Stalin, Japan was the source of the greatest anxiety in the 1930s. The Russian Empire had been humiliated by Japan in 1905, and Japan was expanding into mainland Asia directly toward the Soviet Union. Japan established a satellite state called Manchukao, which was located on the Soviet border, and intervened heavy-handedly in the rest of China, which also shared a very long land border with the Soviet Union. Much of that frontier was with Soviet Kazakhstan. Those Kazakh nomads who crossed the Soviet border reached Xinjiang, where Stalin feared Japanese penetration. Those nomad refugees, went the Stalinist reasoning, might be recruited by the Japanese secret police. The major concern, however, was that the Gulag, in Soviet East Asia, would be penetrated by Japanese agents, who would recruit embittered European peasants for subversive action against the USSR. European peasants would spread sedition and chaos after their release from the Gulag and their return home. The earliest and largest mass undertaking during the Great Terror, the Kulak Operation, was inspired by reports of Japanese recruitment of Russian and Ukrainian peasants in Soviet Asia. It targeted first and foremost peasants who had already lost everything during collectivization and who had endured the Gulag. Four hundred thousand people fell victim to this operation.

    The second-largest killing operation of the Great Terror was the Polish Operation, which was directed chiefly against the Soviet Union’s Poles. It claimed more than one hundred thousand lives. The logic here was that Warsaw had at its disposal a “Polish Military Organization” inside the Soviet Union. This organization had allegedly recruited thousands of Soviet citizens and had penetrated Soviet institutions at the highest level. Nothing of the sort was in fact the case. There were Polish and Japanese attempts to use the minority question against the USSR, and there were Polish and Japanese spies in the USSR. But the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, was designed to destroy organizations: to investigate and penetrate them, and to arrest, interrogate, and deport or execute their members, but also to recruit and use the remnants of any such organization against its constituents and, if possible, the outside world. When the NKVD was tasked to destroy organizations that did not exist, as was the case during the Kulak and Polish operations, a kind of cannibalism ensued.

    Since the organizations were imaginary, they could be imagined anywhere, and the killing could be as boundless as imagination dictated. Unlimited numbers of Soviet citizens could be killed or sentenced to the Gulag without any actual spies being caught. Since there were no actual foreign intelligence organizations to penetrate and manipulate, the only way the NKVD could demonstrate any kind of success was to meet and exceed the quotas for executions and deportations that were sent from Moscow (sometimes personally signed by Stalin). And since the organizations were fictitious, they were quickly imagined within the NKVD itself, both by officers seeking promotion and by Stalin himself. In this way, what Kuromiya and Pepłoński call “total counterespionage” worked against the system itself. For 127 long days during the critical year 1938, Moscow received no foreign intelligence reports at all. Officials were afraid to commit their names to anything.

    Purging the Red Army’s officer corps in 1937–38 was a poor way to prepare for an inevitable conflict with the imperialist powers. The same can be said of the liquidation of a large part of the NKVD leadership itself. Whether or not the Great Terror was to blame, Stalin certainly made one essential mistake about the European politics of the late 1930s. He underestimated the German threat and overestimated Polish-Japanese encirclement. Within the framework of his own assumptions about Soviet security, the year 1939 offered a decisive improvement in the Soviet security position, but also a trap that he failed to grasp. In the summer of 1939, Soviet forces were able to inflict a decisive defeat on a Japanese army in a border conflict in Mongolia (at the time a Soviet protectorate). From that point on, Japan’s policy of expansion was directed toward China and then into the Pacific in ways that did not directly challenge Soviet power in Asia. In August and September, the USSR reached two agreements with Nazi Germany that seemed to do away with the perceived Polish threat. By the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Treaty on Borders and Friendship, Moscow, as Berlin’s partner, was able to destroy the Polish state.

    In September 1939, the German armed forces and, two and a half weeks later, the Soviet armed forces invaded Poland and divided the country between them. The specter of Japanese-Polish encirclement, the main justification for the murder of almost a million Soviet citizens, was thus dispelled. But the alliance with Germany also had the important consequences of creating a long German-Soviet border and moving German land forces considerably closer to Moscow. The USSR was compensated not only by eastern Poland but also by the three Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—and a part of northeastern Romania. The Soviet Union also invaded Finland and eventually managed to wrest a few concessions from that country as well. Cooperation with Nazi Germany initiated a new sort of Soviet engagement with Europe. On the surface, this amounted to participation in Nazi imperialism, as a principle in disposing of foreign territory and as an accessory in providing the food and fuel the Wehrmacht needed for its 1940 campaigns in western Europe. In a deeper sense, the division of eastern Europe between Berlin and Moscow involved the export of the Soviet political economy, developed on the basis of European theory, back westward as practice into capitalist Europe. Three chapters, by Rafał Wnuk, Marek Wierzbicki, and Christoph Mick, present important aspects of this overlooked, indeed oft-forgotten encounter between Stalinism and Europe.

    From September 1939, Stalinism encountered Europe as a problem to be solved. In a pioneering contribution, Wnuk discusses the emergence and rapid collapse of the Polish underground in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland (Chapter 4). Confronted with real rather than imaginary Polish organizations, the NKVD proved quite capable of meeting the challenge. Not only did it arrest 18,000 Polish citizens on charges of conspiratorial activity, it identified and penetrated the actual cells of the Polish resistance. By the end of 1940, most of the Polish resistance in the Soviet-annexed Polish territories had fallen under Moscow’s control and was collecting information from the Polish underground in the German zone of occupation and elsewhere in Europe for the NKVD.

    Wierzbicki (Chapter 5) shows that the Soviet economic apparatus failed to make the same headway as the Soviet police. Although eastern Poland was one of the most backward regions of capitalist Europe, its relative wealth overwhelmed Soviet soldiers and officials. Red Army soldiers, their pockets full of złoty thanks to an artificial exchange rate, went on a shopping spree. Those who lacked cash resorted to theft. In no time, consumer goods disappeared from the shelves. Small businesses and factories, often owned by Jews, were quickly expropriated. Collectivization of agriculture, the centerpiece of Soviet economic policy, was delayed and only barely initiated by June 1941. This had an important, positive consequence: a few years later, after the war, uncollectivized western Ukraine would feed eastern Ukraine, where people were once again starving.

    Soviet transformation involved the classification and removal of people, in effect the application of collective responsibility for resistance that had yet to take place. Polish citizens associated with the prewar Polish state, from mayors to foresters, were sent to the Gulag, usually to Kazakhstan. There they heard accounts of the events discussed in the first three chapters of this volume from fellow prisoners who had been deported during collectivization or the Great Terror. Polish prisoners of war were shot by the thousands, most notoriously at Katyn.

    Yet as Mick shows in his portrait of the city of Lwów (Lviv in the Ukrainian form) between 1939 and 1941 (Chapter 6), Soviet policy was perfectly capable of reassessing priorities. Lwów was a city in southeastern Poland before the war, inhabited mainly by Poles and Jews and surrounded by Ukrainians in the countryside. Soviet power first extracted the Polish elites. Then it turned on the Jews who had fled the German occupation zone of Poland. Like the Polish elites, they were deported to Kazakhstan. Although at least 10 percent of these Jews died in transports or in the camps, they made up the largest group of Polish Jews to survive the Holocaust. By contrast, the Ukrainians were at first favored, but as Soviet authorities came to suspect the Ukrainians of underground nationalist resistance, they too were deported in large numbers. Although every segment of the city’s population was dissatisfied with Soviet rule on the whole, Jews remained the least disloyal to Soviet rule, Mick argues, because they knew that the German alternative was, for them, far worse.

    The Soviet transformation of eastern Poland (and the annexed Baltic states and northeastern Romania) was incredibly rapid. The entire Soviet program, already the acceleration of European history from centuries to a single decade, was now compressed into months. Nonetheless, it was not fast enough. Wnuk, Wierzbicki, and Mick all supply evidence that Stalin reckoned with more time than was in fact at his disposal. Stalin had always believed that Hitler would betray him, and his fears began to grow after the swift collapse of France in the spring of 1940. But he was unable to believe, despite the overwhelming evidence, that Germany was planning to invade the Soviet Union in 1941.

    In this case, as Kuromiya and Pepłoński point out, Stalin’s exaggerated suspicion of his intelligence officers proved self-defeating. He preferred to believe that the indications of Hitler’s intentions were in fact evidence of an intricate British plot. As the German attack began, on 22 June 1941, Soviet freight trains full of grain and fuel lumbered dutifully toward German-controlled Europe. Operation Barbarossa, the German “war of annihilation” against the Soviet Union, was the largest invasion in the history of the world and marked the next stage of Stalin’s encounter with Europe. In Lwów, notes Mick, a pedestal meant to bear a statue of Lenin instead received a statue of Hitler.

    Hitler’s political model followed the German troops eastward into the Soviet interior. Viola argues in the conclusion of her chapter on Soviet self-colonization that the Nazis’ plans for Soviet territory shared certain features with the Stalinist political economy. Neither Hitler nor Stalin trusted the global economy; both opted instead for the pursuit of economic self-sufficiency based on radical transformation of traditional economic relations. “Autarky” was the slogan of the day. In an elegant summary of German planning for the occupation of the Soviet Union (Chapter 7), Alex Kay shows that German plans were even more radical than those of the Soviets. The Nazis aimed both to undo the Soviet experiment and to create a utopia of their own, one founded on race. They rejected the Marxism of Soviet theory: there was no class struggle that would lead to equality for the masses, but a racial struggle in which the mastery of the weak by the strong was the only justice. They spurned the Stalinist view of the Soviet Union: the USSR was not a state established in order to create the preconditions for socialism; it was a Jewish conspiracy designed to humiliate and master the Soviet population and confuse the rest of the world.

    German planners envisioned the European lands of the Soviet Union as a colony, where German settlers would farm fields with the assistance of their Slavic slaves. This pastoral vision required reversing the entire Stalinist project of modernization, which had indeed built cities and factories on a European scale. The cities were to be destroyed, and the population reduced by about thirty million, according to a “Hunger Plan.” The Germans meant to divert the food grown in fertile regions, especially Ukraine, to Germany and Europe. They would starve Belarusians, Russians, and city dwellers in general. The invasion itself depended on starvation, as the army was ordered to live from the land. In the end, starvation on such a scale proved impractical, but the Germans did kill about four million Soviet citizens by deliberate starvation: above all in the prisoner-of-war camps and in besieged Leningrad. As Dieter Pohl points out in his chapter on the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapter 8), because the vast majority of Soviet Jews lived in cities, most Soviet Jews were supposed to fall victim to the Hunger Plan. Surviving Jews, according to the plans of summer 1941, were to be deported across the Urals into Soviet Asia after the swift victory and collapse of the Soviet state.

    The killing of Soviet Jews began in summer 1941 with scores of pogroms in the zone that had just been annexed by the Soviet Union. Sometimes, the Nazis merely stood by and let the violence take its course; sometimes, they stepped in and provided some impetus. According to Nazi ideology and propaganda, the transformation of these regions between 1939 and 1941 was not the application of a model of progress toward equality, a notion Nazi ideology rejected in principle. Instead, said the Nazis, the Soviet takeovers were the colonial exploitation by the Jews of everyone else. At the ground level, this was the moral excuse that the Nazis offered to local participants in the killing. At the ideological level, this was a redefinition of the European model. Very few locals in the areas incorporated by Soviets and then invaded by the Germans would have paused to contemplate the clash of ideologies, but some of them were persuaded, unsurprisingly, that Soviet rule had been destructive rather than progressive. Others were eager to disguise their own collaboration with the Soviet regime or to vent their humiliation over the destruction of their state. Others were no doubt simply exploiting a moment of lawlessness. Scapegoating local Jews for Soviet policy was the moral cover that the Nazis offered for the pogroms, which killed about twenty thousand Jews.

    These mass killings were just the start of what we call the Holocaust. Most of these pogroms erupted and subsided with the initial incursion of German forces into those territories just taken by the Soviets. Since the Nazis really believed that Soviet power was a racial conspiracy, they were disappointed by the scale of the pogroms. Most Jews in German-occupied Soviet Ukraine were killed in mass shootings. Special German task forces (Einsatzgruppen) from the start killed select groups of Jewish males, particularly those of military age, along with communists and others deemed politically dangerous. As Pohl shows, regular German policemen and German soldiers took part in the killing as it expanded to women and children and then entire communities that autumn. Soviet citizens also joined militias organized by the Germans, which were indispensable to the mass shooting actions as they continued through 1942 and 1943. In what is today southwestern Ukraine, Romania pursued its own policy of mass murder directed at the Jews. Pohl calculates that some 1.5 million Jews were murdered on the territory of today’s Ukraine during the war. Of course, the Holocaust also proceeded wherever German power reached. Within the boundaries of the Soviet Union in 1941, after the annexations from Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries, over two million Jews were killed.

    The German invasion of the Soviet Union involved a confrontation between highly ideological and extraordinarily ambitious plans, on the one hand, and a largely unpredictable and complicated reality, on the other. None of the German war crimes represented a simple realization of earlier blueprints. The Hunger Plan killed not thirty million but four million, and the occupation netted very little food for Germany and Europe. The Final Solution, as envisioned in summer 1941, entailed the eventual deportation of the Jews over the Ural Mountains into Soviet Asia. In reality, the relocation plans gave way to physical extermination. German leaders learned that mass shooting was possible, because their own men and enough locals were willing to take part in the shootings. This made the total elimination of Jewish populations in Europe thinkable. The Holocaust then spread from the occupied Soviet territories westward to occupied Europe in 1942.

    The failure of Operation Barbarossa made itself felt in other important ways. Because the war against the Soviet Union was to be over within weeks, the Germans had failed to prepare adequately for partisan warfare. Timm Richter (Chapter 9) shows how German “antipartisan reprisals” took hundreds of thousands of lives in the Soviet Union, especially in Belarus, as a result of this unanticipated contingency. Soviet soldiers who found themselves behind the German advance quickly learned to prefer hiding in the woods to starving in the German camps. Because of its swamps and forests, Belarus was particularly suitable to guerilla tactics. The Germans responded with the massive killing of civilians, which also blurred into the Holocaust. At first, partisan resistance was blamed on the Jews; then partisans and their sympathizers were killed like the Jews: over pits and in burning barns. As the war continued and the German need for labor grew, the Germans began to seize men (and livestock), while killing the women and children. Some three hundred thousand Belarusians were killed in such operations.

    How did this violent encounter with Hitler’s “New Europe” affect Stalinism? Ideology continued to matter, in the important sense that these experiences of occupation were framed and remembered in some ways rather than others. Of the major German war crimes, the Holocaust took place in large measure inside the Soviet Union, while the starvation of prisoners of war and the reprisals almost completely within the Soviet Union (within its June 1941 borders). None of these would be commemorated as such within Stalin’s Soviet Union. The Jews would be grouped together with other “peaceful Soviet citizens” killed by the Germans on the logic that the war was one between systems and thus all Soviets were equally at risk; the prisoners of war would be ignored on the logic that they had been traitors for surrendering in the first place; and the partisan conflict would be marginalized, because it represented spontaneous action beyond the immediate control of Moscow. And of course some key reasons for the wartime catastrophe, such as the prewar terror and the alliance with the Germans, could not be mentioned.

    Indeed, the horrors of German occupation were understood as reasons to rebuild and protect the Stalinist system, rather than, say, reform it. Geoffrey Roberts’s study of Stalin’s planning for the postwar period (Chapter 10) is entirely a study in foreign policy, which by its nature assumes the static character of the domestic order. As Roberts shows, revenge was on Stalin’s mind in his planning for the peace, but revenge had to yield pride of place to stability. A repetition of such a violent encounter with Europe had to be prevented, but no diagnosis of the war’s causes could be contemplated. The war only confirmed the centrality of state security (as opposed to revolution) in Stalin’s thinking and strengthened his view that ethnic cleansing could serve that end. The killing operations of 1937 and 1938 and the deportations of 1940 and 1941 were followed, after the war, by the mass deportations of entire Soviet ethnicities from Europe to Asia. In the southern reaches of Soviet Europe, on the Crimea and in the Caucasus, the NKVD rounded up entire nationalities, treated them as collectively responsible for collaboration with the Germans, and deported them east. Stalin insisted on and received essentially the same western border granted by Hitler in 1941, which meant once again the inclusion of large Polish populations. This time, it was not just the Polish elites who were deported; this time, the entire Polish population was “repatriated” to a more westerly Poland, while Ukrainians were deported from Poland to Soviet Ukraine. Similar exchanges were carried out between Poland and Soviet Lithuania and Soviet Belarus.

    Homogeneity, argues Roberts, was not just the absence of ethnic problems but a good in and of itself. Stalin imagined eastern Europe as a kind of zone of pan-Slavic peace, where the removal of Germans and Jews would favor future understanding and stability. He also expected that his American and British wartime allies would accede to this model and join the USSR in some kind of world entente or even a global police force.

    As Mark Kramer demonstrates in his thoroughly documented history of the Communist takeovers of 1945–48 (Chapter 11), Stalin’s expectation of a global understanding with Washington and London was confounded by the political means used to seek stability—or rather domination—in eastern Europe. Soviet behavior during the late stages of the war, such as the betrayal of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944 and the destruction of the (anti-German and western-oriented) Polish Home Army demonstrated to more alert American and British observers that a clash would be quick in coming. While carrying out ethnic cleansings in and around Poland, the Soviet Union created the conditions for the establishment of a highly unpopular communist regime in Warsaw. From Stalin’s point of view, this was the only way to secure the corridor between Berlin and Moscow; the same logic could be applied, as Kramer notes, to Hungary and Romania, which had joined Germany in invading the USSR. In each communist takeover, there were different mixes of planning and contingency, and different levels of Soviet involvement and Western interest, which Kramer discusses at a level of detail made possible only by extraordinary finds in east European and Russian archives.

    The buffer zone was itself of course a new problem. Security meant domination, and domination meant one-party communist rule in multiple states. Moscow now had an external empire, which brought complex problems of ideological orchestration. There was no more “socialism in one country,” since the satellites—Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia—were formally sovereign states, and thus different countries. They were placed on the same historical track as the USSR (though of course following its lead). There was as always something paradoxical about this, since these countries were all, even the poorest ones, more prosperous than the Soviet Union itself. Czechoslovakia, to take the extreme example, was one of the richer countries in Europe. But all of them were now to follow the Soviet model of development, which was designed to take a backward country, place it on the fast track of history, and force it forward to a destination that was implicitly modeled on European modernity—something that Czechoslovakia had already achieved. Of course, the paradox evaporates if we consider politics rather than economics, power rather than progress. The very difficulties of the Soviet model had confirmed the importance of party rule and the centrality of the secret police, the levers that were to ensure the stability of the new satellite states.

    So the Soviet model was now imposed in Europe for essentially pragmatic reasons. In the USSR itself, a European idea became Soviet development practice and was enforced by state terror. In the outer empire, the sequence was rather reversed: state power was needed for an approximation of the mature Stalinist system to be created, whereby the ideas were of less importance and their original European character ignored. The road to socialism was no longer a preparation for utopia, but a procedure for security. The Soviets who orchestrated the “revolutions” of the second half of the 1940s were far more concerned with traditional security than they had been in 1939, and far more so than the earlier generation of Bolsheviks had been in 1917. Stalin now united in his own person two whole generations of experience, that of revolution and that of defense. But ideology and even revolutionary fervor could not be made to disappear, because of lessons learned within the Soviet Union and for the Soviet Union. Indeed, east European communists in power after 1945 were often motivated by real convictions, which they saw as consistent with obedience to Moscow. In time, this would appear as a contradiction. In the satellite states, some of the first oppositionists were those who took Marxism too seriously—the “revisionists” of the 1950s and 1960s.

    The problem of revolution arose immediately in a communist country that had made its own. Yugoslav communist partisans sincerely believed in the Stalinist model; but they chose it for themselves, which made them problematic partners for Stalin. Yugoslavia was an eastern European socialist state whose regime owed only moral and intellectual rather than military and existential allegiance to Moscow. Kramer provides extraordinary detail, in Chapter 12, about Yugoslav designs in Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece. Stalin had no interest in the larger south Slavic state that seemed to preoccupy Yugoslav leader Josip Tito, and he was decidedly opposed to Yugoslav support for communist insurgents in Greece. Stalin was willing to risk American and British dissatisfaction to secure the crucial territories annexed before June 1941. A communist takeover in Greece, however, could provoke British and American intervention and a new war. The break between Stalin and Tito in April 1948 shattered the illusion that Moscow could control communist states after the Second World War. Anxieties about the future of the satellites lay behind the show trials of “nationalists” and “right-wing deviationists” that followed in east European capitals. These were echoes of the defensive Stalinism of the era of the Great Terror, and the scripts of the show trials were often eerily similar to those in Moscow a decade before. But they were not, this time, accompanied by campaigns of mass shooting, nor was collectivization in eastern Europe allowed to lead to mass starvation. As Kramer shows, Stalin did force the east European allies to join in an extraordinarily rapid rearmament campaign, perhaps in preparation for an invasion of Yugoslavia.

    The language used in the purges reveals the postwar global position of the Soviet Union, as understood at least by Stalin. The purges of the national “right-wing deviation,” prompted by Tito’s national Yugoslav road to socialism, were followed almost immediately by purges and show trials for the “left-wing deviation” of “cosmopolitanism,” an accusation leveled at communists of Jewish origin—and recalling Nazi language. The Holocaust was a political problem for Stalin, because the special German policy of exterminating Jews made it hard to describe the war as a conflict between communism and capitalism, and because the crime itself and its commemoration crossed the Soviet border and therefore escaped Soviet memory politics. As the Soviet Jewish poet Peretz Markesh put it: “One cannot divide the Jewish peoples into Polish Jewry, Soviet Jewry, and American Jewry. One cannot divide a heart. One can only break it.” This very sense of common nationality was what, to Stalin’s mind, constituted a threat. Jews now became what Poles had been in the 1930s, a suspicious nationality with an external patron linked to the world imperialist conspiracy. As Israel tilted away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States, Stalin spoke of a Jewish-capitalist threat from the West. This rhetoric was rather redolent of National Socialism and might be considered one of the consequences of the encounter with German policy. Meanwhile, Tito himself sought and found support from the West. Thus the purges, although seemingly directed only at political “deviations” within the east European communist parties, in fact reflected greater international challenges. In the last years of Stalin’s life, the Cold War became global and the communist world became plural.

    The five years between the split with Tito in 1948 and Stalin’s death in 1953 were also a time of increasingly global problems. The Soviet victory over Germany in the war in Europe had created the possibility for the problematic buffer zone of communist states. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Red Army was absent, the fact of Soviet victory seemed to indicate that Moscow could be trusted and communism could be triumphant. During the war, it had been much to Stalin’s advantage that he did not have to fight on an Asian front against Japan. But this also meant that, in the early postwar years, the correlation of forces in Asia was quite different than the correlation of forces in Europe. In Europe, the Soviets did most of the fighting and the Americans arrived late; in Asia, it was the other way around. The American victory over Japan in the Pacific theater had established the United States as the dominant Asian power. The Cold War began in Europe, where Stalin had much the stronger position; but it spread to Asia, where this was not the case.

    Japan’s defeat also created the conditions for a communist revolution in China. Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland had defeated republican forces in a last major offensive before the general surrender. In the end, it was Mao and his Communist Party who profited, winning a civil war and establishing the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Perhaps the most important consequence of this was the application of the Stalinist model of development in another peasant country, with similar results: first, famine, this time killing tens of millions, and then, terror. In the short term, Mao created for Stalin problems in Asia not so different, though on a larger scale, than Tito in Europe. Chinese support for North Korean communism probably led Stalin to involve himself more quickly and deeply in the Korean conflict than he otherwise would have done. The massive arms buildup discussed by Kramer can plausibly be associated not just with the loss of Yugoslavia but also with Stalin’s concerns during the Korean War about a possible conflict with the United States in Europe and Asia simultaneously.

    By the time of Stalin’s death, Soviet preoccupations were globally dispersed, and the role of Europe had receded. It was the rise of Nazi Germany, first as Soviet partner and then as Soviet enemy, that forced Europe to the center of Soviet preoccupations and defined the second half of Stalin’s rule. With the defeat of Germany, Soviet intellectual geography returned to the norm, which was global.

    In the scope and design of this book, the editors and authors have sought to overcome certain traditional divides involving period, place, and ideology. Chapters on the global history of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, by Viola and by Kuromiya and Pepłoński, allow us to see when Europe was distinctly important and when it was not, and to chart the spread of a European model into Asia (and then back). The juxtaposition of the Viola and Kay chapters allows a comparison of two different colonial visions of autarky, the Soviet and the German, that, as it happened, were successively applied to certain territories within the European lands and the Soviet Union. The juxtaposition of the Cameron and Kay chapters allows a comparison of two policies that led to famine and starvation: in the German case, on a smaller scale than was in fact intended; in the Soviet case, as an unintended effect of policy (which, in Ukraine, was blamed on the population and then accordingly exacerbated).

    The insertion of three chapters on the German occupation of the western Soviet Union into the middle of Soviet history simply corresponds to a fundamental reality. Soviet history is often written as though the war can be bracketed as combat or as memory. But for years, it was the central experience of Soviet citizens, especially for those who experienced German occupation. The chapters by Kay, Pohl, and Richter permit a sense of the legitimacy of Stalin’s fears of Europe (though he feared Poland too much and Germany too little). They also of course give a sense of the scale of the suffering of the civilian population under German rule. Thus the encounter with Europe placed the memory of collectivization and terror in a comparative perspective that was, in one respect, quite useful for Stalin. After the war, he would always be able to argue that all the pain was necessary as preparation for the war, and his citizens would generally remember the German occupation better than the 1930s.

    The chapters here on the 1930s (Viola, Cameron, and Kuromiya and Pepłoński) and the 1940s (Kramer’s two and Roberts) permit a comparison of the prewar and the postwar approaches to Europe and Europeans, and the consideration of the importance of the devastating German interval. The special attention to the interval of 1939–41, when German power permitted a first Soviet expansion into Europe, is needed for the continuity of all of these arguments and comparisons. It also marks the crucial axis. In the 1930s, Soviet modernization and terror were most dramatically on display in Asia, or with respect to Asia. Famines and mass shootings related to Asia preceded those related to Europe. But with the rise of Germany, first as partner and then as enemy, Europe became, for a time, a special preoccupation. Those three chapters (Wnuk, Wierzbicki, and Mick) also most prominently display a new possibility for social and local history in the study of the Soviet past. Here, the relationship between Stalin and Europe is not only a matter of high politics but also of human experience.

    Aside from the attempt at global comparisons and chronological continuity, the editors and authors have also sought to embrace, within the single volume, research that might ordinarily fall within four distinct fields: Soviet history, east European history, German history, and the history of the Holocaust. The historians who have contributed come from both eastern and western Europe (as well as North America), and represent in many cases a new generation whose careers have been built from the new east European sources. This effort at synthesis has involved several stages of labor. These papers were drawn from four of the seven workshops held thus far under the auspices of the ongoing project “United Europe/Divided Memory” at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. In a series of reviews of the texts, the editors have sought to generate a natural continuity between the chapters, as well as a harmony among the different national styles of historiography. They are grateful for the indulgence of all involved for their insistent interventions, and hope that authors and readers alike will find the final product to be not only innovative in its approach and interesting in its arguments but also coherent in its form.

    A brief overview such as this can only sketch some themes and signal some intentions. The richness of the volume of course rests in the discoveries, arguments and provocations to be found in the individual texts.

1

Stalin’s Empire

The Gulag and Police Colonization in the Soviet Union in the 1930s

Lynne Viola

The history of Russia is the history of a country that colonizes itself.

V. O. Kliuchevskii

We need to turn the camps into colonization villages without any expectation of a set period of imprisonment.

Genrikh Iagoda

The Soviet Union developed within the context of what the Bolsheviks called “capitalist encirclement.” Fear of war permeated the entire system, transforming the country into a siege state as it rushed to modernize. Rapid industrialization was seen as the key to survival. The plan for achieving this goal—the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932)—was everything, and the price of the plan was paid in enormous numbers of human lives, for under Stalin, power, state building, and industrialization depended upon repression. Consequently, most of the decade before the Second World War was a continuum of violence beginning with the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture in the winter of 1929–30 and ending with the Great Terror of 1937–38. Industrialization for its part depended on the opening of the most remote territories of the Soviet interior and the extraction of the natural resources found there. This in turn was linked directly to the empire of forced labor known as the Gulag, the Russian bureaucratic shorthand for the Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps (Glavnoe upravlenie ispravitel’no-trudovykh lagerei).

    The First Five-Year Plan served as the foundation for both the Stalinist development of the economy and the growth of the Gulag. The twin pillars of the First Five-Year Plan were industrialization and collectivization. Rapid industrialization aimed to create the prerequisites for “socialism in one country” and to build a powerful military to defend the Soviet Union against capitalist encirclement. Collectivization was intended to free up resources for industry: grain for export (to raise cash to buy machinery abroad) and labor for industry (to man the factories). Collectivization was accompanied by the liquidation of the “kulaks” as a class. In theory, the kulaks were well-off capitalist farmers; in fact, there were few actual kulaks in the impoverished and backward countryside of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, as many as five million people were subjected to some form of “dekulakization” in the early 1930s, ranging from property expropriation and resettlement to internment and execution.

    In turn, the First Five-Year Plan and the upheaval it unleashed, also known as the “Stalin revolution,” fueled the growth of the Gulag. Although concentration camps had existed in the Soviet Union ever since the Bolsheviks seized power, it was in the years 1928–32 in particular that those penal institutions were transformed into a veritable empire of camps Stalin. They served as an instrument of repression (to receive, for example, the “dekulakized” peasants and other class enemies) and a reservoir of forced laborers (to populate the Russian interior and to extract the resources located there). And it was during the First Five-Year Plan that Stalin applied terror on a massive scale so as to guarantee the Gulag had the manpower planners considered necessary.

    Terror, in fact, was the sine qua non of Stalinism. Beginning with the First Five-Year Plan, it came in almost regular waves throughout the 1930s. Collectivization and dekulakization formed the cornerstone of Stalinist repression during these years. The liquidation of the kulak as a class in 1930–31 resulted in the execution of some 30,000 peasants and the forced deportation of close to two million peasants (in family units) into the Soviet interior.¹ In 1932–33, terror assumed the form of famine—a direct consequence of collectivization—taking perhaps as many as six million to seven million (mainly peasant) lives throughout the Soviet Union.² In the mid-1930s, terror included increasingly ethnic deportations in the Soviet west. In 1937 and 1938, some 700,000 Soviet citizens were shot in a series of operations directed against putatively threatening groups, chiefly peasants (“kulaks”) and members of certain national minorities.

    The First Five-Year Plan—crash industrialization and forced collectivization (along with the famine caused by the latter)—resulted in the massive uprooting of people. Millions of peasants fled to the cities from the countryside out of fear or hunger; thousands of homeless children orphaned by the arrest of their parents or by famine congregated at railway stations and in cities; fugitive kulaks formed gangs to survive in the depths of the countryside; and factory workers moved from job to job in this time of unprecedented, spontaneous labor turnover. The result was an extraordinarily high level of crime and disorder, which in turn led to large-scale police actions against “counterrevolutionaries” and “socially dangerous elements,” especially in urban areas and frontier zones.³ Between 1930 and 1936, according to statistics that are likely incomplete, a total of 1,391,093 people received sentences of exile, imprisonment, death, or other punishments—a figure that does not include the much larger number of kulaks deported by administrative fiat.⁴ The vast majority of those repressed through 1933—“kulaks,” “counterrevolutionaries,” and “socially dangerous elements”—were sent not to labor camps, but to an evolving system of special (later labor) settlements, which, starting in July 1931, fell under the jurisdiction of the Gulag administration.

    As of 1 January 1933, the population of the labor camps consisted of 334,000 people, although that number would more than double to 777,000 that same May.⁵ The terror of 1937–38 netted 1,575,259 convictions by the Soviet secret police alone; at the same time, over 680,000 people were sentenced to death.⁶ By this point, the Soviet Union maintained as many as 476 separate camp complexes, many of which contained multiple smaller units.⁷ The labor camp population had in the meantime continued to swell, reaching 1.5 million by 1 January 1941, with approximately the same number in the labor settlements.⁸ By the end of the Stalin era, there were roughly equal numbers of penal laborers in the camps and in the special settlements.⁹

    Precise empirical data on Stalinist repression and the Gulag became available to scholars only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Before that momentous event, information on Stalinist repression and the Gulag was subject to the highest level of classification in Soviet archives. Scholars could only guess at numbers. Little was known about the true scope and different forms of terror. For instance, the Great Terror of 1937–38 was long assumed to be a purge of the Soviet elite that targeted mainly members of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. We now know that during the Great Terror “mass operations” were directed against “kulaks,” “criminal recidivists,” “socially dangerous elements,” and a number of mainly diaspora nationalities (Poles, Germans, Latvians, Finns, Koreans, etc.), in addition to the arrests of large numbers of party and state cadres. These mass operations netted the largest number of victims during the 1937–38 terror.¹⁰ Scholars have also learned that the terror was not a single police action, but a series of assaults against targeted enemies, extending all the way back to 1930.¹¹ Much more information about how these operations were carried out has come to light.¹² For example, the Gulag was not made up of “just” labor camps, but involved a variety of penal institutions.¹³ Stalin, it has been shown, took a great deal of interest in the terror and assumed a leading role in formulating policy and legislation.¹⁴

    Although there is still no clear consensus around our understanding of the terror, most historians have moved beyond the Totalitarian Model of the Cold War era and its fixation on ideology as the predominant causal factor of Stalinist repression. Newer studies emphasize multicausal explanations revolving around ideology, various issues of contingency, and the role of personality (i.e., Stalin’s), as well as state building, law and order campaigns, economic development, and—perhaps most widespread—the elimination of potential “fifth columns” in the event of war, something Stalin believed to be inevitable.¹⁵

    This chapter aims to add a slightly different element to the multifactorial approach to explaining Stalinist repression by contextualizing the terror within a broader structural argument. By highlighting issues of geography, resource extraction, and colonization organized primarily by the secret police, it suggests dimensions of similarity with the Nazis’ plans for the east after a German victory in the Second World War. Soviet internal colonization was less about subduing native peoples—indeed, they were often ignored in the top-level discussions about the Gulag—than about populating the hinterlands, creating infrastructure (roads, railroads, hydroelectric dams, etc.), and obtaining raw materials. The manpower for internal colonization would come from the peasantry. The Soviet Union had an abundance of labor in the form of peasants living in the more habitable regions of the country. It also had an abundance of rich, natural resources in its most remote and uninhabitable regions. Dekulakization freed up a massive labor force for the internal colonization of these regions. The remainder of the peasantry would work on the new collective farms, which were to be mechanized and would thus enable the state to extract the maximum amount of agricultural produce. The collective farms would therefore free up a part of the peasantry for employment in industry. The peasantry, both in and outside of the Gulag, became an exploitable resource used in the interests of state building and economic development, and was relegated to a distinctly subordinate status. Collectivization was the foundation for this system in the 1930s, the inaugural event in the developing system of Stalinist repression. Indeed, even after collectivization came to an end, police colonization continued through the institution of the Gulag.

    The system that developed in the Soviet Union was in some ways an inversion of Hitler’s empire-building effort. Unlike the great European powers surrounding them, neither Germany nor the Soviet Union was able to rely on outside colonies for continued economic growth. Since the early 1990s, historians of the “Third Reich” have been documenting German plans to seize resources (mostly foodstuffs and oil), to destroy, decimate, or deport certain ethnic groups, and to colonize the east, and have been exploring the extent to which the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe” fit in with or was influenced by these plans and efforts to implement them.¹⁶ German planners dreamed of an agricultural economy in the territories of the Soviet Union run by German settlers and worked by Slavic slaves. While Germany turned eastward, the Soviet Union turned inward in its quest for resources, pursuing an internal colonization based largely on the Gulag.

The Extraction State

When the Bolsheviks finally emerged victorious from the Russian Civil War in 1921, they found themselves confronted with many of the same structural, geographical, and developmental constraints that the tsars had faced. Unsurprisingly, the new rulers of Russia fell back in part on the methods and examples of their predecessors.

    The history of the Muscovite and Imperial periods is very much a history of state building from the center outward. The Muscovite princes “gathered” the lands (and the revenues); the tsars extended their reign by geographical expansion and (often failed) administrative reform. State building emanated from the center; power was centrifugal. The absence of natural geographical boundaries and the need for a strong military pushed state building and expansion. Newly acquired territories were peopled by a continuous process of migration and colonization, voluntary and involuntary, while borders were shored up by the strategic placement of service gentry in those territories through land grants.¹⁷ In the Imperial period, state building and expansion in Russia often evolved in response to the West, meaning England, France, Austria, and Prussia. Russia was continually playing catch-up with its economy in order to compete with western Europe on the world stage.

    The state was the main player in economic modernization during the periods of greatest momentum. Economic development in turn bolstered state building as the state strengthened its administrative and military power in conjunction with economic progress. Economic development also facilitated expansion as the state sought outlets to ports and access to natural resources, which in turn encouraged more colonization.

    In Russia, state building, economic modernization, and expansion depended upon the extreme centralization of resources. The Russian state became an extraction state, dependent upon the countryside and the villages for revenue, a condition compounded by the slow development of urbanization and the country’s largely agrarian economy. Both the state and towns developed in an exploitative symbiosis with the countryside, which found itself in an increasingly subordinate economic position. Taxes and grain, labor and soldiers were siphoned from the countryside as the Russian state developed.

    As the towns grew, cultural westernization came to accompany economic modernization. Rural Russia fell behind culturally, as well as economically, giving rise to a cultural gulf between town and countryside. In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the peasantry came to be viewed as the “other,” whether defined in terms of its maintenance of tradition, its primitivism, its inherent “revolutionary instincts” (à la political theorist Mikhail Bakunin), or its supposed destiny to disappear with the advent of a modern industrial society. Both the state and the radical intelligentsia increasingly attempted to “civilize” the peasantry. For the state, though, the peasantry remained first and foremost an economic resource upon which to base development.

    Soviet planners, once in power, also faced the daunting task of developing a backward economy in their efforts to restore Russia’s place on the world stage. They too combined extreme centralization with the mobilization of all resources, human and material, to develop the nation’s economy. They too viewed the peasant as “other.” They too desired to tap the rich natural resources of Russia’s far east and north for industrialization. The problem was of course that Russia’s most important mineral and natural resources were located in geographically and climatically hostile areas that lacked even the most elementary infrastructure to maintain a labor force.¹⁸ Attracting a permanent labor force to these areas had been a perennial problem for the Russian Imperial government. Since the time of Peter the Great, the state had used colonization, administrative exile, and serf or penal labor to try to solve the labor shortage in these areas.¹⁹ In the 1920s, Soviet economic planners would again look to these solutions as a means for opening up the Soviet interior.

    In 1925, Georgy Piatakov, then deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, penned a secret report for his chairman Feliks Dzerzhinsky, who was also still the chairman of the Soviet secret police, the Unified State Political Administration (Ob’edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, OGPU). In his report, Piatakov outlined a plan to use penal labor for the extraction of mineral resources in a series of remote regions above the Arctic Circle, in the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), in Nerchinsk, and on the Sakhalin Islands. The report built on existing legislation, which included as standard penal practice compulsory labor for inmates in places of detention (from 1918) and the use of administrative exile (from 1922).²⁰ In fact, as early as 1923, Dzerzhinsky had insisted:

    we will have to organize forced labor (penal servitude) at camps for colonizing underdeveloped areas that will be run with iron discipline. We have sufficient locations and space...the republic cannot be merciful toward criminals and cannot waste resources on them; they must cover the costs associated with their care with their own labor.²¹

    In 1928, People’s Commissar of Justice Nikolai Ianson reiterated these ideas in a proposal to use penal labor in the northern timber industry to boost the hard-currency-earning timber export industry. His recommendations apparently seemed practical, given the unreliability of peasant seasonal labor in the north and general prison overcrowding in what had become a very costly institution to maintain. Furthermore, forced labor had already been employed in gold mining in 1927, in what was deemed a successful endeavor. Ianson made his suggestions amid a fierce, ongoing battle for control of the penal population between the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD RSFSR) and Ianson’s temporary ally, the OGPU (which was directly subordinate to the Council of People’s Commissars until relocated to a newly created all-Union NKVD in 1934). Ianson—and others—saw the OGPU system of penal labor camps as a solution to a variety of problems, ranging from prison overcrowding and reform to colonization and economic development.²²

    The introduction of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928 pushed the issue of penal labor to the top of the agenda for Soviet planners. De facto OGPU chief Genrikh Iagoda spearheaded these initiatives. In April 1929, the people’s commissariats of justice and internal affairs and the OGPU submitted a joint report calling for the creation of a network of self-supporting labor camps based on labor service rather than just isolation. The report’s authors recommended that all prisoners serving sentences of three or more years should be transferred to such camps.²³ One month later, the Politburo endorsed most of the report’s conclusions and in late June 1929 issued an extremely important decree calling for the expansion of the existing camp system, the creation of additional facilities, and the transfer of all prisoners serving more than three years to the OGPU in order to help the secret police with its plans to colonize and exploit a number of northern and eastern territories.²⁴ With the First Five-Year Plan just getting underway, the OGPU had bested its institutional rivals and taken control of what was about to become a rapidly expanding penal population and forced labor system.

    The goal of the First Five-Year Plan was to create an autarkic economic system. Under that plan, the development of new industries would take place deep in the Soviet Union’s interior, far from the borders and any threat of invasion. Although not solely in charge, the OGPU had gained the upper hand in developing and colonizing the far north and east, in addition to “cleansing” the borderlands of suspect class and national elements. Paramount to meeting the demands of extraction was the mobilization of human resources to those regions that were to be developed. Industrial development went hand-in-hand with territorial colonization.

Collectivization and Internal Colonization

The notion of the Soviet Union as an empire is generally associated either with its relations with the satellite states of Central Europe after 1945 or the national minorities within the Soviet Union itself. But the Soviet Union was an empire in another, equally important sense. Historian Ronald Grigor Suny has defined empire as:

    a composite state structure in which the metropole is distinct in some way from the periphery and the relationship between the two is conceived or perceived by metropolitan or peripheral actors as one of justifiable or unjustifiable equity, insubordination, and/or exploitation.²⁵

    Moscow’s relations with its peasantry fit well within this definition. Laborers were needed both to work the collective farms in the countryside and to develop and populate the Soviet interior. The Soviet Union had an abundance of peasants that could fulfill that need. The peasantry therefore became an exploitable resource to be used in the interests of state building and economic development. The bulk of the peasantry, its un-dekulakized part, was relegated to the distinctly subordinate status of collective farmer, and denied internal passports (after Stalin introduced them in late 1932). Among the peasants, the kulak remained largely unassimilable, condemned to a life of “eternal exile.”

    In this sense, the Soviet empire exhibited commonalities with other empires, most notably some of Europe’s overseas colonial ventures. The features of the Soviet internal colony were dehumanized national peasantries, the exploitation of their labor under horrendous conditions, and the brutal regimentation of their existence in the pursuit of extracting raw materials and natural resources. At the same time, the Soviet exercise in colonization departed from its European counterparts by substituting a native peasantry for foreign aboriginals, class for race, “socialist reeducation” for “Christian” enlightenment, and the use of the colonized as colonizers in opening up the great expanses of the north. The Soviet Union was different in other ways as well: in its status as an empire of peasantries and non-Russian nationalities, its relative underdevelopment and agrarian character, its geographical breadth and seemingly endless possibilities for internal expansion, and the persistence of inadequate government in the countryside and in the periphery.

    In the case of the Soviet Union, the peasantry was to serve as the fulcrum of modernization in what was one of the most radical transformations of modern history. It would remain an internal resource for capital (via grain) and labor to fuel Soviet development throughout the Stalin era, if not the Soviet epoch as a whole. Stalin said as much in 1928, when he called for the peasantry to pay a “tribute” to finance Soviet industrialization, equating the peasants with the overseas colonies he claimed financed British economic development.²⁶

    To collect that “tribute,” Stalin introduced the policy of wholesale collectivization. The goal of collectivization was the formation of large, mechanized farms, on which labor, machinery and equipment, animal husbandry, and agriculture were to be socialized, replacing communal land tenure and family labor. The collective farm was intended to yield larger harvests for the state and to serve as a mechanism to control the rural population and economy: approximately 250,000 collective farms would replace 25 million peasant households.

    In January 1930, a Politburo directive set out the plan for the collectivization of agriculture. The country’s most important grain-growing regions were to be collectivized by fall 1930, spring 1931 at the latest; other grain-growing regions were to complete collectivization by fall 1931, or spring 1932 at the latest. The decision to transform a traditional peasantry was radical; the breakneck tempo ensured violence of an unprecedented nature.

    The state mobilized tens of thousands of urban Communists and industrial workers to carry out collectivization in what resembled a military campaign. Peasants were forced, sometimes at gunpoint, to sign up for the collective farms. Livestock and grain were seized. The rudiments of a new collective economy were planted. Violence, arbitrariness, and excesses (peregiby, a sanitized regime euphemism) would be everywhere, reaching nightmare proportions and sparking massive village unrest that would force Stalin to call a temporary retreat in early March 1930. Blaming the excesses of collectivization on local cadres “dizzy with success,” Stalin announced that collectivization henceforth would be voluntary. Of course it was not. Collectivization would be resumed that autumn with less violence, but it was certainly not voluntarily. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932, the main grain-growing regions of the country would be fully collectivized, with other regions following in their wake.

    The policy of the “liquidation of the kulak as a class” was carried out with extreme violence. The OGPU was in charge of arrests, working with a mixed contingent of raion (sub-regional administrative district) officials and village activists. The OGPU men and their auxiliaries frequently arrived in the dead of night, banging on doors and windows, waking terrified families from their sleep. They rounded up the men and herded them into a makeshift prison in order to prevent resistance. The remaining family members watched helplessly as their possessions were ransacked and inventoried for expropriation. In many villages, the dekulakization teams “took absolutely everything, right down to children’s dirty underclothing.” In one raion, they were even instructed, “the main thing is not to be afraid of excesses.”²⁷

    Kulak families were divided into three categories. The first category was considered to be the most dangerous, made up of what were dubbed “counterrevolutionary kulak activists.” Heads of households were subject to immediate arrest and interned in labor camps.²⁸ Rebels and leaders could be put to death.²⁹ The remaining family members of the first category, along with all of category two—the remainder of the kulak activists and the “most prosperous” farmers—were forcibly deported from their villages. The third category of kulaks—the majority—were partially expropriated and resettled locally. Most of this category gradually fled to the cities or were deported in the second year of the dekulakization campaign.³⁰

    Peasants designated as kulaks by the regime and subject to internal deportation were sent to the far north and east to build the “special settlements,” distant, tiny villages that the Soviets used to house this first generation of Stalinist forced labor. Originally under the jurisdiction of NKVD RSFSR, in mid-1931, the OGPU took over management of the special settlements and placed them under the control of the Gulag administration. The peasants and their families had to build these settlements from scratch under indescribable conditions. They were soon joined by an assortment of other, largely declassé social elements and political prisoners who were to sacrifice themselves in the Soviet Union’s pharaonic enterprise of “building socialism.”

    Thus the peasantry became the Soviet Union’s “internal colony,” a resource to be tapped in the interests of Moscow. The labor power of the countryside was, in part, redeployed in the interests of Soviet industrial development—to the cities, the giant construction projects, the logging and road construction camps, and the Soviet hinterlands. Rural labor was also channeled into the military to provide the army with soldiers.³¹

    Collectivization and dekulakization also served another purpose, however. Like its European counterparts, the Soviet Union proclaimed a civilizing mission for its “dark masses” (temnye liudi), a term sometimes used for the Soviet peasantry. The party considered the peasantry either “backward” or “counterrevolutionary,” despite official Marxist-Leninist prognostications regarding the political attitudes and behavior of peasants based on their class status, whether they be poor peasants, middle-income peasants, or kulaks. In this sense, the kulak was little more than a symbol and scapegoat for all peasants within an ideology that could not be explicitly antipeasant.

    In Soviet theory, the collective farm was to provide the foundation for the socialist reeducation of the peasantry at large, for ridding peasants of their “individualistic, petit-bourgeois instincts” and transforming them into collective farmers. The special settlements were to serve a similar purpose for kulaks, or at least for those who were still thought to be redeemable. In both cases, socialist labor was to provide the basis for reeducation. The reality was different. More universal socializing agents like education, military training, and migration to the cities would play a greater role in transforming peasants into collective farmers and Soviet citizens than work on the collective farm.

    In the main, however, the Soviet “civilizing mission” remained locked in a rhetoric that was seldom more than superficial in actual practice. In any event, the punitive aspects of special resettlement trumped reeducation. In the end, special settlement was primarily about colonization, punishment, isolation, and the most brutal and distinctly noneducational exploitation of labor. For the kulak, there was little room for reeducation through labor, although perhaps somewhat more in the case of youth by way of school and military service.

    Ultimately, some 1.8 million other peasants were packed into cattle cars for deportation to the north in 1930 and 1931. Conditions en route were horrendous. The duration of travel could be two weeks or more, depending upon destination.³² Their belongings pillaged during the expropriation process prior to deportation, many families were left without necessary food supplies and warm clothing for the trip.³³ Given the rapidity of the operation, families became separated from one another, children from parents, wives from husbands. As no time was given to determining who was fit and able-bodied, the infirm and the elderly were also forced into the transports. One OGPU official wrote to his superior, “it is hard to imagine that eighty- and ninety-year-olds represent a danger to the revolutionary order,” and it was “completely incomprehensible” that families should be deported without the head of household.³⁴ Most families had no idea where they were going or what they were to do once they arrived at their destination. Planners in Moscow and officials on the ground in the territories to be settled were themselves not certain what to do with the arriving settlers.

The Special Settlements and Forced Labor

On 11 January 1930, Iagoda, still deputy chief of the OGPU, queried his subordinates as to the feasibility of organizing special settlements where the kulaks could work without guards.³⁵ Three months later, on 12 April, he wrote a memorandum in which he raised the issue of “transforming the camps to a new arrangement.” He elaborated on this at length, noting:

    Now the camps are only holding pens for prisoners whose labor we use only for today.…We need to turn the camps into colonization villages [kolonizatsionnye poselki] without any expectation of a set period of imprisonment. The philanthropic stimulus of shortening sentences for good behavior is not only unsuitable but even often harmful. It (this stimulus) gives the false impression of the “correction” of the prisoners, a hypocritical kind of penance [poslushanie] necessary to bourgeois society but not to us.…We need to colonize [kolonizirovat’] the North in the fastest of tempos.…We need to do this: we will give groups (1,500 people) of selected prisoners in various regions lumber and have them build huts where they will be able to live. Those who wish can send for their families. A commandant will manage [the settlements]. The settlements will have from 200 to 300 families. In their free time, when forestry work is complete, they, especially the weaker ones, can raise pigs, mow hay, catch fish. In the beginning, they will live on rations, later [they will live] on their own account.…In the winter, the entire population will go to forestry work or other work that we assign.…[And] instead of the 10–15 people who guard now the thousands [of prisoners], there will be one commandant.…We must do this now, immediately.³⁶

    The date of this memorandum is significant. The “confiscative–repressive” nature of dekulakization had meant that the focus was on purging the countryside of kulaks. Therefore little attention had been paid to concrete planning for the resettlement and employment of the kulaks. Like the memorandum by Iagoda, plans for the massive resettlement of the kulaks were surfacing slowly and, to use a refrain from the complaints of provincial bureaucrats, on the fly (na khodu), at the very time that tens of thousands of peasant families were already in transit or in temporary housing in the exile towns.

    On 11 February 1930, while the kulak families were en route in cattle cars, Iagoda’s lieutenant, Efim Evdokimov, the head of the OGPU Secret-Operational Administration, wrote to the Northern Krai (territory) secret police plenipotentiary, Rudolf Austin, asking for a “concrete plan” for the employment of kulak labor. The first party secretary of the Northern Krai party, Sergei Bergavinov, had been calling for the creation of a permanent cadre of forestry workers to replace unreliable seasonal labor since at least mid-1929.³⁷ Ivan Kabakov and Robert Eikhe, party chiefs in the Urals Oblast (region) and the Siberian Krai, shared Bergavinov’s vision of regional development, although neither was enthusiastic about “importing” vast numbers of forced laborers in such a compressed time period.³⁸ Beyond this, there was a good deal of confusion over how best to utilize this seemingly endless supply of unfree labor.

    The earliest plans foresaw kulak labor in the Northern and Siberian krais employed primarily in agricultural pursuits, working seasonally in forestry. In the Urals Oblast and Kazakh ASSR, the special settlers were to be used primarily in forestry and industry, while in the Far Eastern Krai they would work in the gold mines.³⁹ The party leadership in the Urals Oblast in particular was determined to “break” the “kulak mentality” and to exploit the kulaks’ labor to maximum advantage by preventing them from engaging in any agricultural work, thus ensuring that they were materially dependent on their industrial jobs.⁴⁰ In the Northern Krai, it was not clear what role the special settlers would play in agriculture and “agricultural colonization.” Initially, only about 15 percent of the settlers—mainly in the Vologda area, where colonization land funds had been made available—were to work solely in agriculture. Most of the rest would work primarily in forestry, with a little farming “on the side” to supplement their diet and income.⁴¹ By 1 April, however, the Council of People’s Commissars was insisting that it was “impossible” to use the kulaks as a permanent labor force in forestry; instead, they were to be settled in unchartered (neustavnye) collective farms, which they could leave for forestry work on a seasonal basis.⁴²

    This uncertainty continued through the summer of 1930, changing only in mid-August. At this time, the Council of People’s Commissars ruled that only those settlers who were unable to work in forestry could be employed exclusively in agriculture.⁴³ The ruling seemed to fit well with the ongoing activities of most okrug (regional) and raion party, government, and forestry agencies, which had been settling kulak families on lands poorly suited for agriculture anyway, usually in the midst of the forests they were to clear.⁴⁴

    By late October 1930, it had been established that resettlement in the Northern Krai was to have an “industrial character” in order to provide a year-round labor force for the forestry industry. Special settlements were to be set up near forestry industry enterprises. Agricultural pursuits were to be strictly supplementary for all but those who were not able-bodied.⁴⁵ Bergavinov summed it up well when he told his subordinates:

    [The kulaks] can be an enormous labor and economic factor in the development of the productive forces of the region...a direct economic benefit for the country and the region...for in this way we will resolve the colonization question and surmount the sharp deficit in labor power and open up new areas of the North.⁴⁶

    By 1931, debate had ceased on the nature of special settler employment: the kulaks deported into the Soviet interior were intended to serve as an unfree labor force for colonization and the extraction of the Soviet Union’s vast natural resources. Consideration of special settlement issues from here on was linked directly to labor resource needs. According to a 1932 report on special settlers working in the Urals’ forestry industry:

    the basic and main aim of the permanent settlement of exiled kulak families in forest areas is the colonization of underpopulated and weakly exploited forests by way of drawing in special settlers to forestry work and creating from them a permanently settled forestry labor force.⁴⁷

Although camp labor was increasingly used in these same pursuits, it was assumed to be far less costly to maintain the special settlements, given the relatively low costs of supporting their administrative structure.⁴⁸ And by deporting entire families for an as yet undefined time period that, for most, would soon turn into what the settlers themselves called “eternal exile,” the state would ensure the continuing replenishment of its labor force while at the same time “tearing the evil” of kulakdom from its very roots.⁴⁹

The Gulag’s First Inhabitants

The first stop for the kulaks was temporary housing in the towns and cities of the various exile regions. As the first trainloads of kulaks reached their final destination in the middle of winter 1930, weather prevented transport to their actual places of special settlement. In some cases, the men were sent ahead to begin construction. In the towns and cities, peasant families soon confronted a series of horrors. Available housing was insufficient for such a large number of people. As one party secretary in Tobolsk wrote, “we are freeing literally every [building] possible and even decided to close the theatre.”⁵⁰ The families found themselves in overcrowded, dark, damp, often makeshift dwellings, where there was often no access to clean water. Epidemics soon set in. In Vologda, a group of women whose husbands had already been sent into the interior wrote Mikhail Kalinin, the titular head of state and supposed representative of peasant interests, that:

    as many as 2,000 people are living in each church, in three-tiered bunks.…We are all ill from such bad air and drafts, and children under fourteen are falling like flies and there is no medicine for so many sick.…In one and one-half months, [they] have buried up to 3,000 children in the Vologda cemetery.⁵¹

A doctor sent to deal with a typhus epidemic in Vologda wrote about what he saw when he arrived at the church where one group of settlers was housed:

    A guard stood at the church, and behind the door—groans and cries. They opened the doors. And there I saw hell. The sick, the healthy, the dying—men, women, old people, children. And the live ones cried out and raised their arms to us: “Water! Water!” I have seen many terrible things in my life but nothing like this.⁵²

In the Northern Krai alone, as many as 3132 exiles died in this early period, while 34,314 fell ill (according to undoubtedly incomplete statistics). Most of the fatalities were young children and the elderly.⁵³

    In the meantime, many of the men had begun their trek into the interior, often on foot, covering distances of 20–50 kilometers a day, over as many as eight to twenty-five days.⁵⁴ They were beaten and robbed along the way, only to arrive in the midst of desolate, uninhabited tundra where their first task would be to build accommodations for their families. “Each day we expect death,” one young man wrote home. Another wrote to his family, “no matter what, don’t come. We are dying here. Better to hide, better to die there, but no matter what, don’t come here.”⁵⁵

    The families began arriving in the summer, generally to find that their men had had little time to work on housing, because they had immediately been put to work in forestry, mining, and other types of jobs. Ekaterina Sergeevna Lukina, who ended up in Narym (West Siberian Krai), recalled:

    in the beginning we lived in shacks made from birch bark, then people began to build wooden huts. [They] gave us meager rations.…We were weak.…People began to swell and die. [They] buried them without coffins, in collective graves, which grew every day.⁵⁶

Another settler remembered, “Mosquitos ate us alive. [Our] legs and arms [turned] to bones.”⁵⁷

    The special settlers were subjected to grueling work regimens. Output norms were routinely raised, keeping the settlers at work for twelve to fourteen hours a day. All of the settlers in the Urals, wrote one OGPU boss, were forced to work in the forests, regardless of age. Twelve-year-olds and elderly men were given norms of 2–2.5 cubic meters of logs. (The average workload for grown men in the free labor force was 3 cubic meters per day.) Rations were tied to norms. Pitifully small to begin with, the rations decreased when, as was generally the case, peasants failed to fulfill their norms.⁵⁸ The commandants of the special settlements and the managers of the local mills and mines were almost uniformly cruel and generally poorly educated. Some had unsavory pasts. Special settler L. I. Ermolina remembered that the commandant’s word was law: he could even decide who was allowed to marry. Another special settler recalled, “The commandants Penizhin and Izhmaev acted like beasts.”⁵⁹ As one special settler put it many years later, “the commandant’s power was unlimited.”⁶⁰

    The special settlers were expendable in the eyes of their overseers. In fact, the state had calculated a “planned loss” of some 5 percent of the special settler population as an “acceptable” loss. The bosses in charge accepted and often surpassed the planned loss, in some instances even stockpiling coffins or digging graves in advance.⁶¹ Estimates for the number of “kulak” special settlers who died in the 1930s go as high as half a million people.⁶² Local officials often acted as if there were an endless supply of labor—and through much of the 1930s, this indeed seemed to be the case, as wave after wave of deportations of various categories of “enemies” continued to populate the special settlements.

    The brutality of the Gulag in all its manifestations was exacerbated by the necessity for the center to rule from afar. Although Moscow was responsible for general policy guidelines and their effects, it had little real control over day-to-day developments in the labor camps and special settlements. Implementation of guidelines was constrained by the inadequate administrative structures in the Soviet hinterland. This had been recognized as a chronic problem before 1917 and some reforms had been introduced, but revolution and civil war had undone most of the gains made before the Bolsheviks came to power. Consequently, Soviet planners and administrators in the center had to rely on weakly developed rural administrative structures run by poorly educated individuals who had come of age during the Russian Civil War and were steeped in the propaganda of class warfare. Separated from Moscow and the regional centers by vast distances, they often lacked the means to communicate with one another, let alone the outside world.

    The radical tempo of events determined by the Five-Year Plan and the weak administrative structures in the interior were topped off by a lack of knowledge in the center about the situation on the ground. Planners in Moscow knew next to nothing about the terrain, ecology, labor conditions, or dynamics of local industries in the distant places to which they were sending settlers. Their response to reported failings on site was to rule by abstraction and to issue an avalanche of decrees, directives, resolutions, and orders. Actual implementation, however, often depended upon coercion. Rule by repression and rule by abstraction worked in tandem with one another. This is not to say that Moscow would have created more humane conditions if it had been better informed, or if administrative possibilities had permitted. It is simply to point out the realities and limits of Moscow’s rule as metropole ruling over a far-flung and unwieldy empire. The result was a highly inefficient, short-sighted economic system, reliant on enormous quantities of unfree laborers, the economic equivalent of cannon fodder.

The Gulag and Colonization

In 1930, the largest single contingent of kulak families was deported to the Northern Krai, some 230,370 people (approximately one-third children). The Urals Oblast received 153,181 people and the East and West Siberian krais, 131,922 people. In 1931, there was a reorientation away from Northern Krai, with the result that the lion’s share of special settlers was sent to the Urals Oblast (438,908), the East and West Siberian krais (314,424), and the Kazakh ASSR (253,637). In all, 1,803,392 people were deported as kulaks in these years.⁶³

    The special settlers played a vital role in the colonization of the hinterlands. In 1930, for example, special settlers made up 19 percent of the population of the Komi Republic and even constituted the majority of the population in some of the raions there. That same year, it was estimated that the special settlers accounted for some 17 percent of the Northern Krai’s total population. In the area of the West Siberian Krai north of Tomsk, 10–11 percent of the population consisted of special settlers.⁶⁴ In 1934, special settlers made up anywhere from 40 to 80 percent of the work force in Urals industry, and between 50 and 90 percent in the Urals forestry industry.⁶⁵

    From July 1931, when the special settlements came under Gulag jurisdiction, through the first half of the 1930s, the special settlers formed the core of the Gulag, accounting for the largest contingent of forced laborers in the Soviet Union. When, in 1935, selected special settlers became eligible for “rehabilitation” and the restoration of their civil rights, their movement nonetheless remained restricted to their areas of exile. The all-Union NKVD, which had been established in 1934 and had since absorbed the OGPU, believed it “politically undesirable” for the settlers to return to their homelands; they also feared, quite correctly, that “rehabilitated kulaks” would leave their exile en masse and do irreparable harm to colonization.⁶⁶

    Not only were special settlers restricted to their areas of exile, but the second half of the 1930s also witnessed the continuation of the deportations and forced movements of entire categories of people. These included more border cleansing and deportation operations aimed at suspect national groups, climaxing in the mass operations of 1937–38 against diaspora nationalities residing within the Soviet Union. “Socially dangerous elements” were not forgotten either. Mass Operation 00447 specifically targeted the same groups that had been the subject of the urban purges earlier in the decade: former kulaks, “recidivist criminals,” and other “asocials.”⁶⁷ Most of these groups were sent to the labor camps, whose population came to rival that of the special settlements in the second half of the 1930s. Responding in part to a tense international environment, with fears of a fifth column widespread, the Great Terror fed into the Gulag “colonization” process.

    The Soviet Union also practiced “compensatory resettlement,” which sought to use politically reliable groups to repopulate borderlands and other areas emptied of their native populations. Demobilized Red Army soldiers in particular were resettled in the borderlands. It was not unusual, however, for the soldiers and their families in these new villages to abandon these sites en masse and return to their place of origin. The reason for this involved a combination of unfamiliar geography, a lack of agricultural skills, and frightening material conditions.⁶⁸

    Colonization under these conditions—by means of mass deportation and mass resettlement operations—created what geographer Judith Pallot has termed the “geography of penality.”⁶⁹ In 1935, the NKVD, listed its primary zones of exile as the West and East Siberian krais, Central Asia, the Northern Krai, and the Urals.⁷⁰ To guarantee that there would be plenty of land for settlement and the organization of logging camps, the Politburo two years later ordered the People’s Commissariat of Forestry to transfer enormous tracts of land and forests to the Gulag. Towns and cities, with free persons and released prisoners, developed around the Gulag industries, further colonizing the hinterlands. These towns and cities of the far north and far east developed in symbiosis with the Gulag and depended on the Gulag economy for work and survival.⁷¹

    By the end of 1930s—when the population of the Gulag was over 1.3 million⁷²—the NKVD’s economic empire accounted for up to 15 percent of all Soviet capital investments and dominated mining for gold, diamonds, nickel, and tin.⁷³ The development of the Gulag as an economic enterprise evolved in combination with the extraction of resources in largely uninhabitable, mostly remote territories that the special settlers had first populated.⁷⁴ The principle of self-sufficiency within the Gulag system led to a continual expansion of camp complexes, as offshoots arose in agriculture and other related areas of production in order to deal with questions of internal food supply.

    Soviet colonization, and with it the development of the “geography of penality,” were fueled by Stalin’s terror. The imperatives of colonization, in part similar to those of prerevolutionary Russia, were largely based on military considerations: the securing of borders, the development of industry in the interior, and the exploitation of raw materials. The need to fulfill these goals was driven increasingly by an unstable Europe, which was slowly coming under the sway of a rapidly militarizing Nazi Germany (especially after 1936), and by the presence of Japanese forces on the Soviet border, initially in Korea (prior to the Bolshevik revolution) and then in Manchuria (starting in 1931). The first line of defense against the Soviet Union’s legion of internal and external enemies, however, was the secret police—first in the form of the OGPU, then the NKVD—which became an instrument of repression and “mastery” (osvoenie) in the forbidding interior of the Soviet Union’s far north and east.

Conclusion

In the 1930s, the Soviet Union developed as a fortress state. The ideological tenet of inevitable war with the capitalist world and Stalin’s tyrannical inclinations combined with the upheaval created by collectivization and dekulakization to fuel the terror and fill the Gulag. The Gulag was conceived as a defensive empire, based mainly on forced internal colonization. Terror was a cudgel for establishing order, a substitute for administration (especially in rural areas), an instrument for the mobilization of labor and resources for industry, and a tool of colonization. Through the Gulag, the secret police came to control vast resources, capital, and labor. Its personnel expanded dramatically, and it began its rise as a state within the state, directly responsible to Stalin alone.

    Stalin’s Soviet Union is often compared to Nazi Germany. Both were murderous dictatorships that robbed millions of innocent people of their lives. Repression, along with various other components of the Totalitarian Model, is usually the primary basis of comparison. However, this chapter has sought to show how the push for economic autarky and the exploitation of the interior combined in the course of the Stalinist 1930s to create the Gulag as an internal empire. This recalls in several ways Nazi Germany’s drive to expand into the east and exploit its captured territories, a quest that was also based on the goal of economic autarky for Germany.

    With respect to colonization, a series of striking differences and similarities between Stalin’s Soviet Union during the 1930s and Hitler’s Germany during the Second World War suggest themselves. The Soviet Union was largely an agrarian country, using internal resources to modernize, while Nazi Germany had a far more established industrial economy and depended on external resources for its economic and military survival. The Soviet Union was future-oriented and strove to create an urban, industrial utopia, while Nazi Germany combined modern state practices with dreams of an agricultural utopia. Forced resettlement in the Soviet Union used “enemies of the people” to populate the otherwise uninhabitable interior, while Nazi resettlement plans sought to use Germans from the Reich and the diaspora to repopulate conquered territories that the SS and German police had totally “cleansed” of Jews and partially “cleansed” of other ethnic populations not considered “racially valuable.”

    In the Soviet Union, the Gulag (in all its various manifestations) was an instrument of colonization; the Nazis did not use their camps in this way. Instead, the German camps served as reservoirs of exploitable labor or sites of human destruction. The Soviet Union’s understanding of enemies was based on class and, over time, certain ethnic groups, while Nazi Germany’s enemies were based on Darwinian racial obsessions with “blood” and reproduction. Although the Bolsheviks held out the theoretical possibility of reeducation for class enemies, the Nazis had no such interest in the case of European Jewry and little interest in the peoples of the east. Finally, terror in the Soviet Union tended to be viewed as prophylactic, while in Nazi Germany it was offensive and directed outward.

    Despite differing structures, ideologies, and the very different leadership styles of Stalin and Hitler, the terror apparatus of both regimes developed to some extent in the process of the search for resources (food, labor, raw materials) and economic self-sufficiency. Encirclement and fear of war, and later war itself, served as radicalizing agents. In both cases, the secret police played a major role in planning colonization. Both regimes did not hesitate to resort to violence in realizing their plans, which in turn bred more terror. Both were based on varying forms of improvisation (Stalin’s direct interventions are quite clear in the Soviet case). Both systems aimed at “purification” of the population, whether in social or racial terms. Both exhibited some commonalities with earlier regimes in the most general aims of expansion.⁷⁵ And both made extensive use of forced labor—with Nazi Germany exceeding the numbers of forced laborers in the Soviet Union by the fall of 1944 with the employment of some 7.9 million foreign workers (civilians and POWs) as opposed to the roughly 5 million incarcerated Soviet laborers in the Gulag at its peak in the postwar years.⁷⁶ As extraction states, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany realized their ends in sometimes different way, but with tragically similar (though not equivalent) results.

    Lest this exercise assumes the appearance of a reductionist argument, it is important to emphasize that politics, ideology, and contingency determined economics, serving as primary causal factors in the development of terror in the Soviet Union and in Nazi Germany. In the case of Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism and racial hatred must be at the center of any discussion of violence. In the case of the Soviet Union, ideology, class hatred, and Stalin himself remain to the fore of discussion. Nonetheless, it is clear that economic needs, linking colonization and development, played a key role in the evolution of the Gulag in the 1930s.⁷⁷

NOTES

I would like to thank Seth Bernstein, Doris Bergen, Anna Hajkova, Dan Healey, Jennifer Jenkins, David Shearer, Susan Solomon, and Lilia Topouzova for their thoughtful comments on this chapter. I am also indebted to Timothy Snyder, Ray Brandon, and the participants in the Hitler–Stalin workshop at Yale.

        1. Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 30–32.

        2. Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag, trans. Vadim A. Staklo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 54.

        3. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 148; Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR (Budapest: CEU, 2004), 327–29.

        4. Khlevniuk, History of the Gulag, 288.

        5. Ibid., 62.

        6. Ibid., 289, 304–05.

        7. Gulag, 1917–1960: Dokumenty, ed. A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov (Moscow: Materik, 2000), lists the names of 476 individual camps and complexes.

        8. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 168.

        9. Khlevniuk, History of the Gulag, 273, 328.

        10. For the text of Order 00447, see Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy, 1927–1939, t. 5, kn. 1, ed. V. P. Danilov, R. T. Manning, and L. Viola (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004), 330–37. For the national operation orders, see Istoriia Stalinskogo Gulaga: Konets 1920-kh—pervaia polovina 1950-kh godov, t. 1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004), 267–77.

        11. See, e.g., Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–53 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

        12. The multivolume Istoriia Stalinskogo Gulaga presents the best guide to all types of police operations. Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni, t. 5, delves in detail into operation 00447.

        13. On the special settlements for “kulaks,” see Viola, Unknown Gulag; on labor settlements, see Polian, Against Their Will, and Stalinskie deportatsii, 1928–1953: Dokumenty (Moscow: Materik, 2005).

        14. Evidence of Stalin’s style of leadership can be found in The War Against the Peasantry, 1927–1930, ed. Lynne Viola, V. P. Danilov, N. A. Ivnitskii, and Denis Kozlov, trans. Steven Shabad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), chap. 4; Pis’ma I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu, 1925–1936 gg, ed. L. Kosheleva, V. Lel’chuk, V. Naumov, O. Naumov, L. Rogovaia, and O. Khlevniuk (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia, 1995); and O. V. Khlevniuk, R. U. Devis [R. W. Davies], L. P. Kosheleva, E. A. Ris [E. A. Rees], and Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska, 1931–1936 gg, ed. O. V. Khlevniuk, R. U. Devis [R. W. Davies], L. P. Kosheleva, E. A. Ris [E. A. Rees], and L. A. Rogovaia (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001).

        15. The term “fifth column” had its origins in the Spanish Civil War. This legend from the first European military clash between Fascism and Communism in the 1930s captured the imagination of Stalin. The term stood for domestic supporters of an enemy that operated against their own country. For studies that emphasize economics and forced labor, see James R. Harris, “The Growth of the Gulag: Forced Labor in the Urals Region, 1929–1931,” Russian Review 56, no. 2 (1997), 265–80; Galina Mikhailovna Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: The Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian System, trans. Carol Flath (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2000). For studies that highlight the role of the police in urban law and order campaigns, see Paul M. Hagenloh, “‘Socially Harmful Elements’ and the Great Terror,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), 286–308; and David Shearer, “Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin’s Russia: A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression,” Cahiers du Monde Russe 39, nos. 1–2 (1998), 119–48. Oleg Khlevniuk has been the most forceful advocate of the fifth-column interpretation, as well as arguing strongly against single-factored economic interpretations. See Khlevniuk, “The Economy of the Gulag,” in Behind the Facade of Stalin’s Command Economy, ed. Paul R. Gregory (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), 111–30; Khlevniuk, “The Economy of the OGPU, NKVD, and MVD of the USSR, 1930–1953,” in The Economics of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag, ed. Paul R. Gregory and Valery Lazarev (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2003), 43–66. I have made arguments about state building and the instrumentalization of terror in Unknown Gulag.

        16. For comparison, I take as a starting point recent studies that stress notions of empire and colonization in their interpretations of Nazi terror. See, e.g., National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies, ed. Ulrich Herbert (New York: Berghan, 2000), vii; Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2008); and Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Penguin, 2006). Tooze of course goes well beyond notions of empire in his brilliant and minute depiction of the evolution of the Nazi economy, looking at the ways in which pragmatic economic motives and genocidal ideology combined (669). See also Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, ed. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), especially the chapter (pp. 133–79) by Christian Gerlach and Nicholas Werth, “State Violence—Violent Societies,” 133–79, here 175, where they write that “Soviet mass violence was directed more internally than externally,” in contrast to Nazi Germany.

        17. For a recent study, see Willard Sutherland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). Also see Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

        18. This is not to say that there were no indigenous people living in these areas; Moscow, however, generally discounted them as “backward” or “hostile” and, in the case of nomadic people and hunters, not suitable for labor exploitation.

        19. For more information, see Abby M. Schrader, “Branding the Exiles ‘Other’: Corporal Punishment and the Construction of Boundaries in Mid-nineteenth-century Russia,” in Russian Modernity, ed. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (London: MacMillan, 2000), 24–25; and Richard Hellie, “Migration in Early Modern Russia, 1480s–1780s,” in Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives, ed. David Eltis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 292–323.

        20. Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism, 10, 18, 69–72. For the 1922 legislation on administrative exile, see Sbornik zakonodatel’nykh i normativnykh aktov o repressiiakh i reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressii, ed. E. A. Zaitsev (Moscow: Respublika, 1993), 12.

        21. Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism, 186.

        22. S. A. Krasil’nikov, “Rozhdenie GULAGa: diskussii v verkhnikh eshelonakh vlasti: postanovleniia Politburo TsK VKP (b), 1929–1930,” Istoricheskii arkhiv (1997), no. 4, p. 142; E. A. Rees, “The People’s Commissariat of the Timber Industry,” in Decision-making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932–37, ed. E. A. Rees (London: MacMillan, 1997), 126–31; Istoriia Stalinskogo Gulaga, t. 2 (Moscow: Rosspenn, 2004), 23–29.

        23. Krasil’nikov, “Rozhdenie GULAGa,” 143–44.

        24. Ibid., 144–6, 152–3. For the Politburo’s June decree, see Kokurin and Petrov, GULAG, 62–63.

        25. Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, ‘National Identity,’ and Theories of Empire,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23–66, here 26.

        26. Viola et al., War against the Peasantry, 98–99.

        27. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), f. 7486, op. 37, d. 122, l. 176; f. 7446, op. 5, d. 87, l. 5.

        28. Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Federal’noi sluzhby bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (TsA FSB), f. 2, op. 8, d. 329, l. 202; Sovetskaia derevnia glazami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. Dokumenty i materialy, t. 3, kn. 1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003), 313–14.

        29. Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni, t. 2, 809–10; V. P. Popov, “Gosudarstvennyi terror v Sovetskoi Rossii. 1923-1953 gg.,” Otechestvennye arkhivy (1992), no. 2, pp. 28–9.

        30. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 22–3.

        31. This argument is developed in Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

        32. TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8 d., 35, ll. 25–8.

        33. TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 840, l. 109; Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GA RF), f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, l. 20.

        34. TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 840, l. 109; GA RF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 148.

        35. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv obshchestvenno-politicheskikh dvizhenii i formirovanii Arkhangel’skoi oblasti (GAOPDF AO), f. 290, op. 1, d. 379, l. 6.

        36. A. N. Dugin, Neizvestnyi gulag: Dokumenty i fakty (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 8–9 (italics in original).

        37. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii, f. 17, op. 21, d. 192, l. 3.

        38. For more on the Urals, see Harris, “The Growth of the Gulag,” 265–80; Harris, Great Urals. According to David Shearer, in Siberia, “Eikhe wrote of settlement and economic development of Siberia’s northern regions as a process of ‘mastering’ or taming (osvoenie) the wilderness.” See David R. Shearer, “Modernity and Backwardness on the Soviet Frontier: Western Siberia in the 1930s,” in Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917–1953, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 194–216, here 215.

        39. GA RF, f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 184–90; TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 9, d. 20, ll. 52, 95.

        40. Kulatskaia ssylka na Urale, 1930–1936, ed. T. I. Slavko (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995), 89.

        41. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 379, l. 15.

        42. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 379, ll. 2–4; GA RF, f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 2–18. (Unchartered collective farms were farms lacking the charter that defined the “rights and responsibilities” of ordinary collective farmers.)

        43. GA RF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1.

        44. GA RF, f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 163–4; Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Vologodskoi oblasti, f. 399, op. 1, d. 219, ll. 163–64.

        45. RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 23a, l. 201.

        46. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 331, l. 45, and d. 379, l. 15.

        47. GA RF, f. 3316, op. 64, d. 1207, ll. 5–8.

        48. Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri, t. 3, ed. V. P. Danilov and S. A. Krasil’nikov (Novosibirsk: SO RAN, 1994), 5.

        49. S. A. Krasil’nikov, Na izlomakh sotsial’noi struktury: marginaly v poslerevoliutsionnom Rossiiskom obshchestve (Novosibirsk: Novosibirskii universitet, 1998), 53.

        50. My ne znaem poshchady...Izvestnye, maloizvestnye, i neizvestnye sobytiia iz istorii Tiumenskogo kraia po materialam VChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB, ed. A. A. Petrushin (Tiumen: Iu. Mandriki, 1999), 133.

        51. Neizvestnaia Rossiia: XX vek. Arkhivy, pis’ma, memuary, t. 1, ed. V. A. Kozlov et al. (Moscow: Istoricheskoe nasledie, 1992), 221–22.

        52. Spetsposelki v Komi Oblasti po materialam sploshnogo obsledovaniia. Iiun’ 1933. Sb. Dokumentov, ed. G. F. Dobronozhenko and L. S. Shabalova (Syktyvkar: Syktyvkarskii universitet, 1997), 8–9.

        53. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 50–51.

        54. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 378, l. 11; f. 833, op. 1, d. 70, ll. 29–31, 33, 45.

        55. GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 380, ll. 22, 25–26. Also see Viola, Unknown Gulag, 73–75.

        56. Narymskaia khronika, 1930–1945: Tragediia spetspereselentsev. Dokumenty i vospominaniia, ed. V. N. Maksheev (Moscow: Russkii put’, 1997), 36–37.

        57. Ibid., 34–35.

        58. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 96–102.

        59. Sud’by liudskie: Istoriko-dokumental’nyi ocherk, ed. V. M. Samosudov and L. V. Rachek (Omsk: OmGPU, 1998), 140–41.

        60. Slavko, Kulatskaia ssylka na urale, 151.

        61. Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri, t. 2, ed. V. P. Danilov and S. A. Krasil’nikov (Novosibirsk: SO RAN, 1993), 152–58; GA RF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 27, ll. 43–51; I.E. Plotnikov, “Kak likvidirovali kulachestvo na Urale,” Otechestvennaia istoriia (1993), no. 4, pp. 167–71.

        62. See the discussion in Viola, Unknown Gulag, 183, 245, n. 2.

        63. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 195–96.

        64. Shearer, “Modernity and Backwardness,” 201.

        65. See Dobronozhenko and Shabalova, Spetsposelki v Komi, 16; N. D. Sapozhnikova and A. G. Sapozhnikov, “Nekotorye aspekty otnosheniia vlasti k raskulachennym kresti’ianam na Urale v 29-kh—nachale 30-kh gg.,” Totalitarizm i lichnost’ (Perm: PGPI, 1994), 83; GAOPDF AO, f. 290, op. 1, d. 379, l. 5; GA RF, f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 2–18; Slavko, Kulatskaia ssylka na Urale, 124.

        66. Viola, Unknown Gulag, 150–51, 155–59.

        67. See the works cited in note 12 above.

        68. See Polian, Against Their Will, 157–64. “Free” or “voluntary” migration and resettlement occurred as well, as it did in prerevolutionary times, but the numbers were small in comparison to the numbers accruing from forced migration. See, e.g., Shearer, “Modernity and Backwardness,” 202.

        69. Judith Pallot, “Forced Labour for Forestry: The Twentieth Century History of Colonization and Settlement in the North of Perm’ Oblast’,” Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 7 (2002), 1055–83.

        70. Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism, 253–54.

        71. See in particular Alan Barenberg, “From Prisoners to Miners: The Gulag and its Legacy in Vorkuta,” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2007.

        72. Khlevniuk, History of the Gulag, 307.

        73. Istoriia Stalinskogo Gulaga, t. 1, p. 50.

        74. This is not to argue that all of the labor camps were in remote regions; in fact, there were probably more (smaller) camps located close to cities like Moscow and Leningrad, where their laborers were employed.

        75. See Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 29, where he writes, “The Kaiser and the Fuhrer shared the same focus upon eastern Europe as the critical zone for national security, the same obsession with land, colonization and racial settlement. Along with many of their followers, both believed that expanding Germany’s borders was necessary to achieve safety in a world of constant struggle against the Slavic danger from the East.”

        76. Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 516–18.

        77. The concept of “developmental violence” has been employed to explain the links between violence and modernity in both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Christian Gerlach and Nicolas Werth write that the Soviet Union, in the process of its own modernization drives, “proved incapable of integrating its millions of uprooted and impoverished other than by extreme violence.” Gerlach and Werth, “State Violence—Violent Societies,” 151, 175. See, in particular, the work of Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 1 (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 16, 175–76.

2

Violence, Flight, and Hunger

The Sino-Kazakh Border and the Kazakh Famine

Sarah Cameron

In October 1930, just before the winter’s snow would make long-distance travel impossible, forty families made up of Kazakhs and Dungans (Chinese Muslims) from different border districts, along with an individual from European Russia, gathered in the small border town of Tekeli to flee the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.¹ Their journey would take them to the east, into barren, uninhabited stretches of steppe, and finally into the Ili Valley, located in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. In preparation for the arduous trek—and perhaps in anticipation of the fact that they might never return to their homes in the Soviet Union—these families would have taken along their most valuable possessions, including horses and camels (the former primarily to transport people, the latter to transport goods). Smaller livestock—sheep, goats, and perhaps cattle, which could not have moved quickly across the rugged terrain—would have been either sold or slaughtered prior to departure.² Their journey would end, it was hoped, in a part of China closely linked to eastern Kazakhstan by geography, culture, and kinship. Though difficult, the route chosen was well traveled: it had been used for centuries by pastoral nomads engaged in regular, seasonal migration.

    However, this particular trek ended quite differently than planned: as the group approached the Chinese border, a band of pursuers, which had been following them since they left Tekeli, opened fire. Nine families managed to flee, while the rest were either killed or captured. A summary of the incident by a state oversight agency, the autonomous republic’s People’s Commissariat of the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate (Narodnyi komissariat raboche-krest’ianskoi inspektsii, NK RKI), noted that regional officials from the secret police (Ob’edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, OGPU) had offered conflicting reports on the incident: most OGPU officials identified the pursuers as state border guards. One official noted that eighteen people, including three children and some women, were killed, while another said that nineteen people, including three children and four women, were shot.³ Although one of these officials maintained that weapons, specifically three rifles and one saber, had been confiscated from the families, all of the OGPU officials interviewed pointed out that the families had failed to put up any resistance to their assailants.⁴ Summarizing reports by OPGU officials that detailed the pursuit of those who had then fled and the violence that ensued, the NK RKI report continued:

    According to the materials that we have in Karatal Raion, [the OGPU] notes that, first of all, there was no resistance on the part of those fleeing, second, that among those killed were many members of the poor, and, third, among the living several women and children were raped. And fourth, there was looting of those killed and those who remained alive, so it is necessary that we examine this affair more closely.⁵

Subsequent inquiries by additional local OGPU officials served to corroborate that those killed included poor people and those of modest means; a doctor, after examining the women and children, confirmed that many had been raped.⁶

    But this incident, which became known as the Karatal affair, was only one instance of a much broader pattern of harrowing violence along the Sino-Kazakh border during the early 1930s. Newly opened archival collections in Kazakhstan, many holding secret police reports, correspondence between regime officials, and dispatches by members of the Soviet Consulate in Xinjiang, bring to light a largely unknown fact: thousands of people seeking to escape increasingly desperate economic conditions in Kazakhstan were shot and killed in 1930–31 while trying to flee to China.⁷ Between 1928 and 1933, a far greater number of people, perhaps as many as 200,000, successfully crossed into Xinjiang.⁸

    The flight of these families, like others who crossed into Xinjiang, was prompted by the disastrous repercussions of First Five-Year Plan, Stalin’s radical attempt to remake the Soviet Union’s society and economy. By late 1930, large numbers of people in Kazakhstan had begun to starve; parts of the autonomous republic had erupted into open rebellion; and many Kazakhs, primary pastoral nomads, had taken flight. Relying on their knowledge of seasonal migration routes and on the historic connections between the Kazakh steppe and western China, starving Kazakhs thronged passages over the Soviet-Chinese border into Xinjiang.

    As efforts to halt this exodus and to lure Kazakhs back from Xinjiang failed, the Soviets responded with growing violence, using terror as a method of policing the remote borderland. This violence was a reflection of both the region’s general lawlessness, and the regime’s desperation in its struggle to transform Kazakhstan into a modern economy. Through a particularly violent enforcement of border controls, authorities in Moscow hoped to halt the republic’s economic losses, particularly the massive outflow of labor and work animals to China. But this brutality also reflected the regime’s struggle to implement its nationalities policy, to consolidate selected groups into cohesive, defined nationalities even in this complex borderland. Seeking to eliminate many preexisting markers of identity, officials used border controls in an attempt to sever “problematic” cross-border linkages, such as ties of kinship or religion.

    Rather than conceding that the policies of the First Five-Year Plan, including collectivization and high grain procurements, were to blame for this exodus, authorities in Moscow invented enemies. Though networks of rebellion did exist alongside the peaceful cross-border migrations of pastoral nomads, officials recast all cross-border traffic as the machinations of foreign spies and rebels. These brutal measures led to the deaths of thousands, ruptured many long-standing connections between the two regions, and increased tensions with the Republic of China.

Interconnected Lands

Although the Sino-Kazakh border was to become one of the Soviet Union’s more violent outposts during the First Five-Year Plan, the extent of bloodshed in this part of Central Asia during the early 1930s marked a departure in the region’s history. For centuries, until the 1930s, the lands of eastern Kazakhstan and the territory that would become known as “Xinjiang” (New Frontier) had been linked by geography, kinship, religion, and trade.

    Distance and enormous natural barriers in the form of deserts and mountains served to isolate Xinjiang, particularly its border with Kazakhstan, from the Chinese heartland. Several valleys in Zungharia, Xinjiang’s semidesert northern region, provided unimpeded access to the Kazakh steppe. The Emin Valley led into central Kazakhstan, including the city of Karaganda, while the Irtysh Valley opened up the direct route to one of Kazakhstan’s largest cities, Semipalatinsk. The fertile Ili Valley was also easily accessible from Kazakhstan and the west, while largely isolated from the rest of the Chinese province by the Tian Shan and the Borohoro Shen mountains.

    Xinjiang was located in a particularly important geographic position. In the nineteenth century, Xinjiang became a prominent theater of the “great game,” the strategic rivalry between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia. By the early twentieth century, Xinjiang bordered seven different states or Soviet republics: Russia in the north; Mongolia in the east; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in the west; and Afghanistan and India in the south. The geographer Owen Lattimore famously dubbed Xinjiang the “pivot of Asia” for its strategic position.⁹

    The territories of Xinjiang were also historically linked to the Kazakh steppe, as well as other parts of what would become Soviet Central Asia. Several empires, including the Mongolian Zhungars (1671–1760), ruled over parts of Xinjiang and Semireche (also known by its Turkic name, Zhetĭsu), a region that included part of southeastern Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan. The southern half of Xinjiang, including the Silk Road city of Kashgar, had once formed part of nomadic empires, such as the Chaghatai Khanate, which also ruled Transoxiana, the territory between the Amu and Syr Daria rivers (much of present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).¹⁰

    The Sino-Kazakh borderlands were a complicated intermixture of ethnicities and lifestyles, Muslim and non-Muslim, nomadic and sedentary.¹¹ Turkic-speaking Muslim groups, recognized by both regimes as Uyghurs and Kazakhs, populated the Kazakh-Xinjiang borderlands in large numbers.¹² These parts of Central Asia, including Xinjiang, were historically considered part of “Turkestan,” a term used to distinguish the territories of the Turkic-speaking nomads from those of Persian speakers farther south. Later, a distinction arose between “Russian Turkestan,” the territories controlled by the Romanovs to the west, and “Chinese Turkestan,” the lands held by the Qing Dynasty to the east.¹³ Xinjiang was a majority Muslim province, where Muslim groups, such as the Uyghurs, greatly outnumbered Han Chinese settlers.

    Under Romanov and Qing rule, inhabitants on each side of the border remained intimately connected with their coreligionists on the other side by means of various networks. The Sufis and scholars of Semipalatinsk, an important center of Islamic education in the eastern Kazakh steppe, were linked with the communities of Chinese Turkestan.¹⁴ Jadidism, an Islamic modernist reform movement that arose in the Russian Empire, flourished in Xinjiang due to the influence of Muslim Tatars.¹⁵ With the rise of the Republic of China and the Soviet Union, networks of pan-Turkic nationalism helped to create a sense of unity that defied national borders. Members of the guerrilla Basmachi movement of Soviet Central Asia also cultivated ties in Xinjiang and often sought refuge there.

    In contrast to nomadic or seminomadic ethnic groups, such as Kazakhs or Kyrgyz, Uyghurs engaged in settled agriculture. In Kazakhstan, Uyghurs constituted a majority in one border district, Dzharkent Raion, and made up a significant share of the population in the other nine border raions.¹⁶ Soviet officials determined that Kazakhs represented a majority in five of these nine border raions (with the remainder classified as “mixed” or “Russian”).¹⁷ Yet Kazakhs also maintained a significant presence within Xinjiang along the northwest border of that Chinese province.

    Soviet scholars further noted that several Kazakh clans, or genealogical lineages, had a significant presence on either side of the border.¹⁸ Though Soviet officials classified the vast majority of the steppe’s pastoral nomads as “Kazakhs,” most nomads continued to identify closely with a particular clan and to hold allegiances to a hereditary elite. Kinship was an important source of common identity, but also facilitated a host of economic functions critical to nomadic life. At the level of the aul, or nomadic encampment, generally consisting of somewhere between two to eight households, most members considered themselves to be members of the same clan. These ties of kinship helped to adjudicate such issues as use of pastures and the allocation of livestock.

    By the late 1920s, however, Moscow deemed kinship, and nomadic life more generally, to be exploitative. Throughout Kazakhstan, activists began to cull the rural Kazakh elites, known as bai (literally “wealthy”), in favor of the bais’ supposed class enemies, the poor peasant, the bedniak, or peasant of modest means, seredniak. Bais, officials maintained, were class exploiters who helped perpetuate kinship ties and Kazakhs’ developmental backwardness, and in the eyes of the regime, these figures resembled the Russian kulak, or wealthy, exploitative peasant. But while officials worked to eradicate clan influence inside the autonomous republic, the persistence of many of these same clan networks just across the border was particularly worrisome.

    The various cross-border groups can be mapped as follows: Kazakhs made up a national majority on the Soviet side and an important national minority in Xinjiang; Uyghurs were the majority population in Xinjiang (although only a small group within greater China) and a national minority in small parts of Kazakhstan. Various other groups, including Kyrgyz and Dungans (also known as Hui), populated both sides of the border in lesser numbers. Slavic settlers (Russians and Ukrainians) and small numbers of Siberian Cossacks also inhabited these regions.

    Under both tsarist and Soviet rule, merchants from the Kazakh steppe, as well as from Russia proper, enjoyed special financial privileges in Xinjiang’s markets. Within Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk was an important trading center for merchants traveling to and from Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan.¹⁹ By 1928, Xinjiang’s trade with the Soviet Union totaled 24 million rubles, nearly ten times the value of Xinjiang’s trade with China proper.²⁰ The introduction of ferry service along the Irtysh River, which flowed from Xinjiang to Semipalatinsk and then into Russia, helped to promote a lively cross-border exchange of goods in the 1920s.²¹ The inhabitants of Xinjiang traded raw materials, including cotton, for Soviet-manufactured goods. Xinjiang’s proximity to Kazakhstan’s railheads and its geographical separation from China’s main population made Soviet goods far cheaper than their Chinese equivalents.

    Throughout the early period of Soviet and Republican Chinese rule, numerous counterrevolutionary movements spilled over into Xinjiang and eastern Kazakhstan. Throughout the 1920s, bandits from the pan-Central Asian guerrilla Basmachi fled across the border into Xinjiang, as well as Iran and Afghanistan, from where they continued to cultivate contacts with groups in Soviet Central Asia.²² Xinjiang itself was ruled by a succession of warlords, who often chose to align the province more closely with the Soviet Union than with Chinese government. One of Xinjiang’s more colorful warlords, Sheng Shicai (who ruled from 1933 to 1944) welcomed Soviet advisors into his government and granted the Soviets economic concessions to Zungharia’s mineral wealth. In the 1930s, movements of pan-Turkic nationalism began to emerge in Xinjiang, and by 1933, separatists declared a short-lived “East Turkestan Islamic Republic.” During 1932–34, much of Xinjiang was in revolt. Soviet military intervention on behalf of Sheng Shicai, however, helped to crush these rebellions and restore warlord rule.²³

Cross-border Flight before Collectivization

The 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg formally demarcated the border between Russian Turkestan and Chinese Turkestan.²⁴ Groups that had freely crisscrossed the boundary between the two states were forced to declare loyalties and curtail their migration. Nonetheless, communities living on one side of the new division or the other continued to steal across the border to flee repression or unfavorable economic conditions. The guards who policed the borders may well have overlooked such activity on occasion, especially when the arrival or departure of a particular group was considered desirable. However, both Russia and China sought to assert control over border traffic, and at times sought the extradition of certain groups deemed to be living on the Russian or Chinese side.

    The first major cross-border flow during this era began with the closure of the border in 1881, when some 50,000 Dungans and Uyghurs fled Chinese Turkestan and Qing rule and settled in Semireche.²⁵ From 1912 to 1914, as Russian and Ukrainian settlers from European Russia poured into the Kazakh steppe, thousands of nomadic Kazakhs fled to the Ili Valley in search of pasture.²⁶ St. Petersburg sought the repatriation of many of those who fled, but Beijing insisted that the number of repatriates could not exceed 6000. Beginning with the Central Asian revolt of 1916 and continuing into the Russian Revolution and Civil War, large numbers of communities living in Central Asia fled one revolutionary regime—what was to become the Soviet Union—for another—the nascent Republic of China.²⁷ Hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Dungans, and Slavic settlers took flight from Russian Turkestan, while White Army officers set up camp in Kuldja (present-day Yining), just over the border in the Ili Valley, where they plotted raids against the Soviet government.²⁸

    Soon after the Soviets asserted power in Central Asia, however, officials in Moscow and in Kazakhstan demanded the return of many of these migrants. A bureaucrat conducting repatriation work in Xinjiang in 1925 alleged that Chinese officials were deliberately hampering these efforts:

    The Chinese government has taken measures to make the refugees citizens forever. With regard to evacuation, there were several disputes between the representatives of the NKVD [Russian Ministry of the Interior] and the Chinese. It was left to me to find out through illegal means...the number and condition of the refugees located in the Ili region.²⁹

Another bureaucrat detailed persistent rumors of Chinese maltreatment of refugees, including the enslavement of refugees and forced marriages between refugee women and Chinese men: “The Chinese took many women and children into the depths of the country. When they tried to flee, they beat them and even killed them outright.”³⁰ Of particular concern to Soviet officials supervising repatriation work in Xinjiang was a suspicion that the refugees were “communing with their relatives.”³¹ One bureaucrat voiced this concern in urgent terms: “I ask you to take all measures to free from China our refugees, who are already beginning to forget their homeland.”³²

    Many who fled to Xinjiang at this time were resorting to the option of cross-border flight established in 1881 and in 1912–14 and at the same time underscoring the long-standing interdependence of Chinese Turkestan and Russian Turkestan. Soviet officials, however, saw the departure of these groups very differently. They asserted extraterritorial custodial rights over the refugees, protesting noisily a litany of perceived abuses. Moreover, Soviet authorities seeking to bind the refugees to Moscow described the migrants who fled as “our refugees.” In their eyes, these people had fled an oppressive regime (Imperial Russia), rejected one revolutionary regime (Republican China), and were returning, they hoped, to the welcoming arms of another, the Soviet Union.³³

    Yet Soviet officials working in Kuldja found themselves caught up in a complicated war for the loyalties of nomads accustomed to using cross-border flight as a means of evading state control.³⁴ Frustrated at the mixed results of repatriation efforts (perhaps fewer than 40,000 refugees had been returned by 1924), the Soviet side sought to expedite the return process, lest the refugees become “citizens” of China or “forget their homeland.”³⁵ Soviet officials offered special dispensations for returnees, including tax incentives, state-sponsored feeding points, and guarantees that the refugees’ livestock would not be requisitioned by the state.³⁶ In addition, by strengthening oversight of the border, the authorities in Kazakhstan sought to keep returning refugees from maintaining contact with relatives in Xinjiang.

The First Five-Year Plan: From Semipalatinsk to Famine

From 1925 to 1928, pastoral nomadic groups continued to migrate over the border in limited numbers. By early 1928, however, large numbers of people began to flee Kazakhstan once again. Although the “bai confiscation” campaign, the seizure of livestock, grain, and property from Kazakh rural elites, was not formally unveiled until 27 August 1928, at least one border okrug (regional), Semipalatinsk, began confiscations in the winter and spring of 1928. In what became known as the “Semipalatinsk affair,” party officials brutally requisitioned livestock, grain, and other goods, inflicting enormous devastation on the okrug’s ethnic Kazakh community in particular. A Moscow-based investigation, the Kiselev Commission, sought to uncover the causes of the violence in Semipalatinsk and to reexamine the question of cross-border flight. According to party statistics, 423 households had fled from the Semipalatinsk Okrug to China, taking with them 22,000 head of cattle, most well before the violence began.³⁷ OGPU officials stationed in the border raions kept detailed lists of those arrested while trying to cross into Xinjiang and the amount of livestock confiscated in the process.³⁸ Officials expressed surprise that the majority of those who fled could not be considered bais, but were instead from the ranks of the poor, and they asserted that cross-border kinship networks, as well as the exploitative influence of bais had contributed to these departures. In the version of events presented by Filipp Isaevich Goloshchekin, the first secretary of the Kazakh party, and by other Soviet officials, bais coerced fellow kin-members to flee, while foreign agents engaged in smuggling.³⁹

    Relatively small in number, the number of refugees in the Semipalatinsk affair was large enough to worry party members. Despite this loss of resources (workers and cattle), top party members (including Stalin and Georgii Chicherin, the people’s commissar of foreign affairs) expressed concern about the broader political impression of flight, especially that of Kazakhs from their own autonomous republic to China.⁴⁰ At a time when the Soviet state was promoting formerly “oppressed” nationalities, such as the Kazakhs, the readiness of so many people from these ethnic groups to flee across the border to their brethren and to put themselves at the “service of Asian China” was an unintended and frustrating outcome.⁴¹ In response, party members discussed, but never implemented, the creation of a buffer zone along the Kazakh border to Xinjiang.⁴² As in the case of the 1916–20 wave of flight from revolutionary Russia, officials tried to lure these groups back to Kazakhstan. Under an amnesty program, Kazakhs and Slavic settlers were allowed to return from Xinjiang, with their cattle, through 19 February 1929.⁴³

    This instability on the Sino-Kazakh border reflected in part the kind of challenges that officials in Moscow were facing throughout the Soviet Union at the time. In late 1928, Moscow had launched the First Five-Year Plan, an ambitious effort to modernize Soviet agriculture and industry. As part of this program, brigades of party activists uprooted peasants from their land and forced them and much of their livestock onto state-run collective farms. Throughout the Soviet Union, resistance was enormous. Some peasants fled their villages before collectivization. Others abandoned their new collective farms, some fleeing to another republic or returning to their village of origin. Many joined uprisings, while others attempted to flee the Soviet Union. As movement to the borders increased, Soviet officials turned their eyes to the borders as well. They understood that flight was a means of escape, a way to avoid the collectives, the factories, or the Gulag. Furthermore, they also feared that borders might be penetrated from the other side, by foreign agents and spies seeking to incite rebellion in the Soviet Union and to encourage greater numbers of peasants to leave.

    Scholars of the western Soviet Union in particular have shown how the Bolshevik regime adopted a “carrot and stick” policy in the borderlands during the First Five-Year Plan.⁴⁴ Officials in Moscow offered special dispensations and benefits to the inhabitants of border raions, while at the same time threatening tougher measures, including intensified efforts to identify and expel class enemies.⁴⁵ As collectivization shifted into high gear in late 1929 and early 1930, security concerns mounted, and the Soviet Union’s western borderlands, especially those with ethnic groups belonging to the titular nationality of a bordering country such as Poland and Latvia, came under additional scrutiny. In March 1930, in what has been called the Soviet Union’s “first explicitly ethnic deportation,” Moscow ordered the deportation of thousands of Poles from the western borderlands into the Soviet interior.⁴⁶

    Events on the Sino-Soviet border, where the level of violence appears to have been far higher, present a striking contrast with the party’s approach in the western borderlands.⁴⁷ In the fall of 1930, large numbers of people in Kazakhstan began to starve, and, by the end of this crisis in late 1933, approximately 1.5 million people, more than a quarter of the autonomous republic’s entire population, had perished in a horrifying famine. From 1930 to 1933, over a million starving refugees fled the autonomous republic for other parts of the Soviet Union, creating an enormous humanitarian crisis. Inside Kazakhstan, the number of animals in the republic plummeted by more than 90 percent. Stripped of their means of existence as nomads, their animal herds, those Kazakhs who survived the crisis had little choice but to settle. Thus the Kazakh famine led to the displacement and forced sedentarization of millions of destitute Kazakh nomads.

    While the Kazakh famine has been largely forgotten in the West, many of its key features bear a striking resemblance to the better-known collectivization famines that afflicted other parts of the Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and parts of Russia (the Volga, Don, and Kuban regions). In Kazakhstan, like elsewhere, the regime’s brutal pursuit of grain was the primary short-term cause of famine. As in Ukraine, the Kazakh crisis disproportionately affected one ethnic group. The vast majority of those who died in Kazakhstan, perhaps as many as 1.3 million people, were Kazakhs. Studies of the Ukrainian famine note that the Kazakhs lost a greater percentage of their population due to famine than the Ukrainians.⁴⁸ The start of the Kazakh crisis in late 1930, however, preceded the onset of the collectivization famines in the Soviet Union’s west, which began in the fall of 1931, and the regime’s use of brutal tactics in Kazakhstan would presage the deployment of violent strategies toward those suffering from famine in the west.⁴⁹

    In Ukraine, as widespread collectivization began in 1929–30, many border raion inhabitants turned to smuggling for survival. Some used the privileges accorded border residents, including better access to consumer goods, to barter for food with the inhabitants of neighboring countries. Hundreds of people crossed the frozen Dniester River and fled to Romania, while others sought refuge in Poland. At times, confrontations with border guards led to isolated outbreaks of violence.⁵⁰

    But in Kazakhstan, by late 1930, the situation along the border was both more desperate and more volatile. Massive uprisings had broken out in both Kazakhstan and Ukraine by this period, but in Kazakhstan, rebels used the political instability in Xinjiang to seek cover, to regroup, and to plan attacks. Simultaneously, hundreds of thousands of starving people also began to seek relief in Xinjiang. Containing these refugees, an itinerant population accustomed to seasonal migrations with their herds, presented an entirely different challenge than controlling sedentary populations in Ukraine and Belarus. Moreover, when nomads fled Kazakhstan, they took their livestock with them. The departure of large numbers of people was itself a very worrisome political and economic development, but the loss of increasing numbers of animals needed for plowing and transportation dramatically impeded Soviet efforts to modernize the region’s agriculture.

Resumption of Flight and the Soviet Response

Despite the considerable attention given the Sino-Kazakh border during the investigation into the Semipalatinsk affair, by 1930, as the First Five-Year Plan within Kazakhstan was intensified, flight from the autonomous republic reached a critical stage. Borderland populations began to disappear, as entire auls packed up moved over the border into China. In the majority-Kazakh Zaisan Raion, 1238 households, nearly one-third of the population, left for China in 1930.⁵¹ According to incomplete data for the three border raions of the Semipalatinsk Oblast (region), in 1930 alone, border guards halted some 2481 households trying to flee with “enormous collections of livestock.”⁵² In the Kegen Raion, worried officials noted that 600 households had relocated to mountains near the border, where they waited for the arrival of spring to cross into China.⁵³ According to OGPU figures, also incomplete, 15,302 people fled in 1930 and 36,985 in 1931.⁵⁴

    This new wave of cross-border flight, Soviet bureaucrats noted, was primarily a problem among ethnic Kazakh and Uyghur communities.⁵⁵ The predominantly Kazakh border raions were losing people with increasing rapidity—“Here we have many instances of even the flight of collective farm workers, even the collective farm as a whole under the leadership of its chairman”—while in neighboring Russian border raions “no movements of out-migration” were reported.⁵⁶ Even aul Soviet leaders and Komsomol members were fleeing to China, especially Kazakhs, followed by Uyghurs.⁵⁷ Astonished state officials found themselves always one step behind the next surge of flight. Secret police reports recorded that before fleeing across the border, the members of one collective farm had scrawled a parting message across the walls of a building: “We fulfilled the Five-Year Plan in one day. Take an example from us!”⁵⁸

    Tales of a better life in Xinjiang were lent further credence by a severe shortage of household goods along the Kazakh-Xinjiang border. Basic goods, such as matches, kerosene, salt, and iron, were extremely difficult to find. Observers reported that Kazakh communities clothed themselves in sheepskin for want of anything else to wear.⁵⁹ In October 1931, OGPU reports continued to detail a severe shortage of essential products. The distribution of goods reached the absurd: While many living near the border lacked sugar or even shoes, oblast officials had delivered large shipments of perfume to several border raions.⁶⁰

    But it was a severe shortage of tea, more than any other good, that contributed to smuggling and the sustained exodus of people, party officials noted:

    To buy, for instance, a sheep for money is not easy, and you will have to pay fifty rubles for the sheep. But it is enough to have ¼ [of a brick] of tea and you can get any sheep. Horses (the most convenient form of property during a flight) are more expensive, but two bricks of tea, it is said, can be exchanged for a horse. Wealthy and famous is he who has the most tea. It is no wonder that a bai, if one were to judge his possessions by the amount of livestock, appears to be a bedniak. It is no wonder that after this, in one of the Dungan or [Uyghur] kishlaks,⁶¹ one might say that due to tea the sowing campaign was wrecked. It is no wonder that tea is the main contraband good. It is no wonder that livestock, a mobile and simple property, which can be only found among the Kazakhs, is sent with great difficulty and risk to China, so that they [Kazakhs] can trade it there for tea.⁶²

In the eyes of the regime, the overwhelming desire for tea among border communities (especially Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and Dungans) was a worrying development, especially given the mobile nature of Kazakh “wealth” (livestock). By engaging in the lucrative tea trade (rather than collecting livestock), a bai might easily disguise himself and wreak havoc in border communities more interested in trading their last animal for tea than in joining party-sponsored drives to sow the fields. And through an illegal trade network that favored tea above all else, a bai might covertly stockpile tea, rapidly exchange it for horses, assemble a group of fellow kin-members, and vanish across the border overnight. Imagined networks, such as those of tea-hoarding, border-crossing bais, came to preoccupy Soviet authorities determined to stop the refugees.

    As flight to Xinjiang intensified, officials in Almaty worked to develop strategies to halt the flow of people and livestock. An April 1930 ruling of the Kazakh Council of People’s Commissars provided that a wide assortment of groups seen as disruptive to the republic’s security would be sent 100 kilometers away from the raions bordering on China into the Kazakh interior. These included: bais and kulaks caught attempting or planning to flee, bais and kulaks whose families or property had already crossed the border, and all of the members of a bai or kulak family whose head of household had already crossed the border.⁶³ Since many officials believed cross-border ties of kinship abetted flight, plans to deport bais with family members living abroad were a logical preventative measure.

    Yet as widespread flight began to paralyze border regions and reports of bai intervention continued to emerge, desperate local officials increasingly undertook more creative measures to check flight. Significantly, raion officials, in cooperation with border guards and the OGPU, used the April 1930 ruling to collect detailed biographical sketches of suspect community members, including the amount of time they had spent abroad and the existence of familial ties in Xinjiang. At the initiative of raion officials, persons or families seen as particularly troublesome were exiled from the borderlands.⁶⁴ Local OGPU officials anxiously tried to develop indicators of flight to thwart the exodus of groups before they left for the border. Most flight, officials noted, occurred in the springtime; a sharp increase in the sale or slaughter of small livestock, such as sheep, was yet another indicator that a group might be preparing to flee to China.⁶⁵ On occasion, local officials, acting on their own, engaged in preventative raids, confiscating items essential for flight, such as horses.⁶⁶ Although some panicked raion officials proposed population transfers, such as moving groups residing near the border farther west, OGPU officials in Almaty rejected such suggestions, proposing instead a renewed focus on party work:

    Izbazarov’s proposal to move the population from the mountains into the depths of the raion should be considered incorrect. Halt the panicked mood of the party organization. Mobilize their energetic work among the collective farm workers, the poor, and peasants of modest means and organize them against the provocation of bais to cross the border. In any event, do not allow the carrying out of the plan for grain collections among the poor and those of modest means.⁶⁷

But while officials in Almaty framed energetic work among collective farm workers and the poor and renewed attention to the distribution of state grain collections as the antidote to flight, border raion officials protested that directives from Almaty, specifically onerous state-mandated grain procurements, were precisely what was driving flight. After repeated requests to lower his raion’s oat and livestock quota were turned down by officials in Almaty, an exasperated local official questioned: “Is strengthening flight to China, for the most part bedniaks, really in the interest of the party?”⁶⁸

    By March 1931, in a letter to Molotov and Stalin, Goloshchekin and Shalva Eliava, the deputy people’s commissar of foreign trade and deputy people’s commissar of light industry, respectively, proposed a number of changes, including supplying border districts with additional bread and goods. They also suggested that the party pay closer attention to the composition of state collective farms in border districts. Single-clan collective farms, or those collective farms where members were closely organized along kinship lines, were seen as particularly susceptible to cross-border flight. Goloshchekin and Eliava recommended that they be disbanded entirely. Activists would now work to replace these types of farms with “real collective farms” (deistvitel’nye kolkhozy), those organized from a multitude of different kinship lineages, while bais and clan leaders would be exiled from them altogether.

Spies and Rebels: The Search for Scapegoats

Officials in Almaty portrayed flight to Xinjiang as a “class problem” and its increase in 1930 and 1931 as a harbinger of intensifying “class war.” Migrants were described as “wealthy bais and kulaks,” fighting to keep their privileges.⁶⁹ The 1928 confiscations had been done poorly in border districts, wrote officials, hence the inordinate influence of the exploiting social classes.⁷⁰ But as bureaucrats tallied data on the social composition of would-be migrants, they again came to the disquieting conclusion: the majority of those fleeing to Xinjiang could not be classified as bais, but as people of much more modest means.⁷¹ Republic-level officials tried to rationalize this flight, arguing that bais had manipulated the “excesses” or “mistakes” of the lower-party bureaucracy so as to convince other social classes to flee with them. Yet Soviet officials also concluded that bais relied heavily on the bonds of kinship, which was a particular problem in a vast territory where state boundaries rarely coincided with familial connections.

    Bais, officials maintained, helped spread fantastical rumors about collectivization, chief among them the widespread suspicion that children would be collectivized (much like livestock) and sent away from their families. As official after official in the raions reported this misconception,⁷² policy makers in Almaty suggested a rethinking of the party’s approach toward the Kazakh population:

    At first glance, it seems absurd that such a nonsensical rumor could be taken for the truth. But if we are to take into consideration the complete unenlightened darkness and the almost full illiteracy of the population, which does not have any impression of newspapers and books nor the Soviet message, then it becomes clear, how the most foolish rumors are understood by the population, strongly worrying them and directing them toward fear.⁷³

While the rumor that the state would appropriate children was perhaps one of the most pervasive, other rumors, including one to the effect that the state would confiscate all household goods, continued to spur migration.⁷⁴ Much like during the Semipalatinsk affair, when communities fled due to rumors of a confiscation campaign, large numbers of Kazakhs departed in 1930 based on rumors about collectivization.

    Rather than addressing the root causes of these departures, including collectivization and hunger, the dissemination of rumors by “foreign agents” became one of the party’s official explanations. Officials argued that foreign agents were peddling border populations a story of a new life in China free from the burdens that a continued existence in Soviet Kazakhstan seemed to offer:

    These persons assist flight with rumors about a free life in China—where there are no poor, but all are rich, where plenty of bread [and] manufactured goods are available, and taxes are negligible, and [where] the Chinese government gives emigrants assistance, including land, all the way to placing refugees in their own independent region.⁷⁵

Many of these purported foreign agents worked in conjunction with bais, who, due to historical traditions of migration, continued to cross the Sino-Kazakh frontier freely, wrote officials.⁷⁶

    Soviet border guards stationed in the raions bordering China compiled lists of influential bais believed to be fomenting opposition or conducting armed raids into Soviet territory from the other side of the border.⁷⁷ Border guards tracked the names of clans seen as particularly troublesome, such as the Kerey, a lineage with significant cross-border presence, and the Qozha, members of a religious elite in Kazakh society who claimed they could trace their ancestry back to Muslim saints, the four caliphs, or even the prophet Muhammad himself.⁷⁸ On occasion, individuals considered particularly influential, such as Alen Chzhinsakhanovich Kugedaev, a Kerey leader who had been living in Xinjiang since the 1916 revolt, were kept under surveillance. Erroneously labeled a “Kazakh king” by the Soviet border guards who shadowed his activities in Xinjiang, Kugedaev was said to have refused “categorically” Soviet and Chinese requests for the extradition of certain Kazakh migrants, claiming that “these were his brothers.”⁷⁹ For the Soviets, Kugedaev’s invocation of kinship in conjunction with his refusal was a worrisome development. The seeming influence of this “Kazakh king” raised the possibility that the Soviets were falling behind in their battle to subordinate kinship ties to class interests.

    OGPU reports were particularly preoccupied with a group that they called kitkazakhi, Kazakhs with Chinese citizenship. The kitkazakhi, according to the police, exploited cross-border familial ties, regularly penetrating Kazakhstan’s border raions to guide their relatives to Xinjiang: “Often, there is direct assistance from Kazakhs with Chinese citizenship to those fleeing, such as sending armed gangs from abroad for assistance in crossing.”⁸⁰ Tales of “armed gangs of kitkazakhi” alarmed officials for several reasons: kitkazakhi, officials believed, operated in the murky world of clan-based ties, using bai influence to coerce their kin to flee across the border with them. These backward, clan-based forms of affiliation in turn hampered the Kazakhs in developing their own class interests in Soviet Kazakhstan, officials charged. Moreover, in the eyes of the Soviet authorities, the kitkazakhi were “Chinese,” and they were “armed.” For the Soviets, the kitkazakhi embodied two persistent yet interconnected official fears: the threat of popular rebellion and an obsession with Chinese influence in Kazakhstan.

    These fears of banditry and uprisings on the border were further magnified by a steady stream of illegal immigrants, some 150,000 people, from Siberia into eastern Kazakhstan in the spring of 1930. As Goloshchekin detailed in a telegram to Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Viacheslav Molotov, and Central Committee Secretary Lazar Kaganovich, many of these illegal immigrants—called self-settlers (samovol’tsy)—were to be classified as “kulaks” or “kulak hirelings.” Even more troubling, many of these new arrivals had begun to set up camp near the Sino-Kazakh border, where they established cross-border ties via a number of activities, including money laundering for White Army officers in western China (in one case, as much as 2000 rubles in gold and 10,000 rubles in currency). Goloshchekin reported that oblast officials had begun to ban “self-settlers” from Kazakhstan’s border raions, yet the presence of these settlers continued to cause “serious complications” for party work.⁸¹

    Throughout 1930 and 1931, the regime struggled to maintain control over the republic’s eastern border. Rebels, many armed with weapons left by White forces during the Russian Civil War, crossed into Xinjiang to regroup before reentering Kazakhstan. Desperate officials in the border raions reported that efforts to stop cross-border movement were futile. Open combat had erupted, as border guards and party activists chased down and shot armed rebels and helpless refugees alike. OGPU reports recorded an almost daily toll of violence, as border guards shadowed groups of migrants of four hundred or more. In the bloody clashes that almost inevitably followed, some emigrants were shot, while others were taken prisoner; scores more fled into the depths of the mountains to hide. Party officials seized hundreds of horses, as well as numerous rifles, munitions, and sabers.⁸²

    Blocked in their efforts to enter Xinjiang via the most direct routes, migrants from Kazakhstan frequently swung south into the Soviet autonomous republic of Kyrgyzstan in the hope of making the crossing there. The arrival of thousands of migrants alarmed Kyrgyz officials, who viewed these people as disruptive to the political balance in their own republic. Top Kyrgyz officials began to pen angry missives to Goloshchekin, charging that the migrants from Kazakhstan spread “counter-revolutionary rumors among the Kyrgyz population about famine, about massive excesses in Kazakhstan, and strengthened the mood for emigration into China.”⁸³ In the eyes of Kyrgyz authorities, Kazakhstan’s disastrous economic situation and the resultant failure of Kazakh officials to secure their own border with China had become a threat to stability and security throughout Soviet Central Asia.

    Though Goloshchekin, as well as other top republic-level officials, were aware that tens of thousands of people in Kazakhstan were starving by 1930, they continued to depict the violence directed at migrants as a means of defending the revolution, a tactic necessary to halt rebels and restore order.⁸⁴ However, members of the OGPU across the border in Kuldja recounted in 1931 that even the “most merciless measures” had failed to curtail flight along the border:

    None of the severe measures of the border guards in fighting the flow across the border produced any real results in halting the tide of flight. The measures were of the most merciless kind. Over the course of the year [1930], more than 1,000 people who were trying to flee illegally to Chinese territory were killed on the border with the Ili region.…This year, in connection with massive flight, movements of banditry strengthened. They were formed for the most part on Chinese territory from refugees from the Kazakh ASSR who were well acquainted with the border territory. These refugees carry on a strengthened agitation for flight and on the other hand carry on an invasion of the peaceful inhabitants of the border zone.⁸⁵

As these intelligence operatives portrayed the problem, flight and revolt were intimately connected. The eradication of flight was a crucial step in combating insurgency in border raions. Insurgents, it was believed, cultivated “nationalist” aims, including connections with the since-disgraced Alash Orda, a provisional Kazakh government that had ruled parts of the Kazakh steppe during the Civil War era. One of Alash Orda’s strongholds had been Semipalatinsk, and its former members were now believed to be staking out counterrevolutionary cells just across the border.⁸⁶

    The accounts of individual border incidents, to return to the Karatal affair described at the outset, provide insight into how violence was used to discourage migration. Though officials in Almaty launched an inquiry into the Karatal affair, the question of who ordered and carried out the attack on the forty families—border guards, overzealous collective farm members, or perhaps someone else altogether—remained unclear throughout the investigation. While it is perhaps unsurprising that the perpetrators in the Karatal affair did not immediately come to light, the conduct of the NK RKI investigation, particularly its tardiness and lackluster nature, is instructive. While ostensibly an investigation into identifying those responsible for the shootings, the party also sought to use the inquiry to prevent further cross-border flight. In his report, the head of the NK RKI investigation carefully noted the successful flight into China of several of the families under attack, including relatives of Seid-Akhmet Mukhamed, a powerful clan leader.⁸⁷

    The NK RKI had launched an investigation into the affair only on 24 January 1931, well over three months after incident.⁸⁸ The NK RKI representative, who signed his name simply as Panchekin, collected conflicting accounts of the affair from raion officials and charged that some OGPU officials in Karatal Raion (Taldy-Kurgan Raion after the redrawing of raion borders in late 1930) had taken charge of the investigation and had deliberately scuttled any serious inquiry. Many local officials interviewed by Panchekhin charged that bai- and clan-based connections had obstructed a full examination of the affair, because party activists from the same clan as the perpetrators sought to protect them. Moreover, as Panchekhin discovered, the bodies of those killed still lay near the border in the winter snow; raion officials rejected as “meaningless” suggestions that the bodies be examined. It was better, they concluded, to continue the party’s work with the poor. The affair was also discussed in a separate report on raion redistricting, which was sent to the party’s territorial committee (kraikom), yet this report was equally inconclusive.⁸⁹

    Some Karatal Raion officials interviewed during the NK RKI investigation insisted that the families had been armed and had therefore had been shot “correctly.” Others, however, questioned whether the families had been armed at all. They believed instead that an unrealistic grain procurement campaign, implemented by overly zealous raion officials, had left the families no other choice than to flee. The difference was one between depicting the victims as “armed rebels” or as “starving refugees.” As the Karatal affair illustrates, Soviet officials were willing to turn a blind eye to indiscriminate violence, ignoring, when expedient, real distinctions between “rebel” and “refugee,” but the dispute over defining the victims in the Karatal affair concerned more than domestic affairs.

A Diplomatic Row Ensues

It was at this same time that events in China were driving frustration among Soviet officials to new heights. During the period of high migration to Xinjiang, 1928–33, China was itself in considerable turmoil. In September 1931, Imperial Japan occupied Manchuria, while Xinjiang remained under a series of warlords. If the Soviets were engaged in a struggle to control their side of the border, then the same had to be said of the Chinese in monitoring border traffic from within Xinjiang. Soviet fears of a Chinese state too weak to patrol its borders in turn served to bolster concerns among officials in Moscow, thus helping make the Soviets more willing to resort to violence to stop the flow of migrants to the east.⁹⁰

    Other powers, such as the British and the Japanese, cultivated contacts in Xinjiang, and the possibility of interference by either power helped magnify Soviet fears over the porous 1700-kilometer border separating Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. Under Sheng Shicai, Xinjiang gained a reputation for “murder, intrigue, espionage and counter-espionage,” as the British and the Japanese competed to bring Xinjiang under their sphere of influence.⁹¹ Turkic rebels in Xinjiang sought military support from Japan, and in 1933, several Japanese generals were linked to a plot to install a puppet regime in Inner Asia, a regime that would have included Xinjiang.⁹² The possibility of British influence in Xinjiang was also a source of concern. In the late nineteenth century, the British had used the vantage point of British India to station agents in Kashgar, and they had continued to collect surveillance on Xinjiang and Soviet Central Asia throughout the early period of Bolshevik rule.

    The Soviet regime’s ever-increasing paranoia over the disorder in Xinjiang helped to bolster suspicion that those who fled were “rebels” and not “refugees.” In January 1931, OGPU reports sent to Lev Karakhan, the Soviet Union’s ambassador to China and a deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs, reported on the seeming persistence of rebel networks near the border:

    These gangs were carefully organized. They had their own organizers, connecting with separate individuals from the lower apparatus of the Chinese administration...[the Chinese contacts] conducted agitation for the departure to China of parts of the population in the Soviet border zones, offering cooperation in fleeing and assistance in getting set up on the Chinese border.⁹³

By March 1931, several months prior to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, official fears of foreign interference in Kazakhstan had reached the highest levels of the party bureaucracy. Goloshchekin and Eliava warned Stalin and Molotov that the Soviet diplomatic and trade missions in Xinjiang were “contaminated with foreign elements,” including “Russian White Army officers” who assisted the Chinese government in sponsoring flight from Kazakhstan. Soviet border officials along the Sino-Kazakh frontier, Eliava and Goloshchekin concluded, were similarly contaminated. Yet foreign interference in Kazakhstan’s affairs, they warned, could not be attributed solely to the Chinese. “We have reports that Nanking is increasing its pressure on Xinjiang province and even more strongly tying it under their influence, and, behind the back of Nanking, the English are developing a big political and trade interest in Xinjiang.”⁹⁴ As Eliava and Goloshchekin’s report reveals, the Soviets were closely following developments in Xinjiang. Attempts by the authorities in Beijing to bind the warlord-ruled province more closely to Chinese central government, and by extension to the British, were seen as interference in Soviet affairs.

    Confronted by many of the themes from the Great Game, the Soviets began to envision double agents and foreign spies at every turn. After one scare involving “agents” allegedly engaged in clandestine talks with the Chinese Consulate in Almaty, they ordered that all official correspondence be carried out only through the OGPU channels.⁹⁵ Reports in Kazakstanskaia Pravda, the republic’s main Russian-language newspaper, speculated that the British, perhaps even the Japanese, were plotting to invade the Soviet Union via Xinjiang.⁹⁶ The permeable nature of the Sino-Kazakh border alarmed Soviet authorities, who recast every incident on the border as the work of foreign emissaries.

    Diplomatic correspondence between Chinese officials in the Ili Valley and the Soviet Consulate in Kuldja in 1930–31 shows that the Soviets’ twin fears of rebellion and foreign interference on the Sino-Kazakh border had laid the foundations for an international dispute. By 1930, as the flood of refugees from Kazakhstan began to tax China’s resources, the fate of the refugees and the security of the Sino-Kazakh border became the subject of heated talks between representatives of the Soviet consular officials and Chinese diplomats. As wave after wave of migrants arrived, Chinese officials reported that Kazakhstan’s disastrous economic situation was creating a refugee problem of such enormity that it was impossible to police Xinjiang’s border effectively. Migrants from Kazakhstan, in their efforts to elude Soviet border guards, were resorting to “tiny, little paths” that were difficult to monitor or were staking out high-altitude base camps, where they waited for weeks for border patrols to pass before crossing into Xinjiang.⁹⁷

    In a series of angry letters to the Soviet Consulate in Kuldja, the Chinese Foreign Ministry alleged that Soviet officials had disrupted order and security in the region. In Kazakhstan, Soviet border guards—unable to check the flow of refugees or staunch the potential threat of counterrevolution from abroad—had begun to conduct armed raids into Chinese territory, where, according to Chinese reports, they carried out the “harshest measures” of reprisal, including the shooting of refugees, the confiscation of cattle, and the looting of the dead. In one particular case, Soviet border guards followed a group of 200–300 people into Xinjiang; once both parties had crossed the border, a bloody melee ensued.⁹⁸ In another incident, a wandering shepherd informed Chinese border guards of a mass grave in a desert region near the Soviet border. Upon inspecting the site, the bodies of over fifty Kazakh refugees, including adults and children, as well as eight dead horses, were found. Investigators determined that all had died from injuries sustained from firearms or sabers.⁹⁹

    The Chinese protested Soviet raids into Xinjiang, describing them as violations of “international law” and “Chinese sovereignty,” and warned that they posted a threat to the “friendly relations” of neighboring countries: “If our border guards had heard the gunshots and had returned fire, a great border conflict would have erupted, and responsibility for that conflict, which would be clear to everyone, would have been on the Soviet side.”¹⁰⁰ Soviet attacks on Chinese territory terrorized Xinjiang’s own people, who, Chinese officials reported, had fled areas near the border in fright, even leaving their yurts and possessions behind. Soviet diplomats, Chinese officials charged, were recalcitrant, demanding the extradition of refugees and livestock, but unwilling to return to Xinjiang and collect the bodies of those they had killed.¹⁰¹ Xinjiang officials, however, did cooperate in the Soviets’ requests for repatriation: during the spring of 1930, over 2000 people were extradited from Xinjiang.¹⁰²

    Diplomatic correspondence and OGPU reports depict an increasingly reckless Soviet regime. With Kazakhstan’s crisis spilling over the border, Soviet and Chinese officials sparred over the border instability created by the refugee problem. Increasingly, the Sino-Kazakh border involved the highest levels of the party. On 13 February 1931, Stalin and Molotov telegrammed Eliava, urging that he and Goloshchekin undertake “urgent measures.”¹⁰³ In response, on 8 March 1931, Goloshchekin and Eliava warned that the “political situation of the regions that border Kazakhstan is an emergency situation, not withstanding the measures that have been taken.” They proposed a purge of all Soviet representatives in Xinjiang, including the trade mission and consulate. Despite the armed attacks on migrants in Kazakhstan and in Xinjiang, flight in the spring of 1931 was “beginning once again to gather strength,” they warned.¹⁰⁴

Conclusions

Securing the Sino-Kazakh border presented particular challenges for Soviet officials. Along this particularly remote and porous boundary, even concerted efforts to check cross-border flight were defeated by the impenetrability of the steppe, a landscape where illegal migrants might always find yet another hiding place. While the physical environment of this borderland afforded refugees cover, the mobility of certain key resources—people and cattle—further exasperated officials intent on rooting populations in one place. The border that separated Kazakhstan and Xinjiang divided relatives and families. The Soviet regime’s attempts to police this border with violence began to tear apart those ties.

    In their attempts to secure the Sino-Kazakh border, Soviet bureaucrats confronted problems very different from those in the western borderlands of the Soviet Union, namely a highly mobile group accustomed to seasonal migration (Kazakhs), as well an economy based on an easily transportable commodity (livestock). The twin challenges of geography and lifestyle were further compounded by the emergence of a famine of staggering scale, proportionately the Soviet Union’s worst collectivization disaster. As widespread hunger set in, thousands of people, some searching for food, others cultivating rebel networks, began to cross into Xinjiang.

    Rather than deporting troublesome groups, an approach the regime had pursued in the western borderlands, officials responded with violence, killing those who attempted to cross the border. Though it is difficult to determine whether central officials ordered these killings, they tacitly endorsed them. Violence, chaos, and armed incursions across the border continued, even when they threatened to undermine the Soviet relations with China. The Soviet regime’s response was in part due to paranoia among officials about the weakness of the Chinese state and the extent of foreign influence, especially Japanese and British, within China. Recently released document collections detail that Stalin closely monitored developments on the Sino-Kazakh border, but the Soviet regime’s response to migration illustrates how nationalities policy within the Soviet Union might differ. Unlike the Poles, neither Kazakhs nor Uyghurs, the main populations crossing the border, were deemed problematic as a group. Given the weakness of the party’s control in many parts of Kazakhstan, large scale deportations might have been difficult for planners to implement. In the absence of other resources, violence, often initiated locally yet officially sanctioned, became the party’s method by default to control the border.

NOTES

        1. Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGARK), fond (f.) 44, opis’ (op.) 12, delo (d.) 492, list (l.) 53. The research and writing of this paper was supported in part by a Mellon/American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) Dissertation Completion Fellowship, a Mellon/ACLS Recent Doctorial Recipients Fellowship, a Fulbright Student grant, International Security Studies at Yale University and the Council on European Studies at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University. For comments that improved this paper, I thank Peter Perdue and Andrey Shlyakhter, as well as the participants at two workshops, “Modernity, State and Society in Central Asia,” held at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and “United Europe/Divided Memory: Stalinism and Europe, 1933–1953,” held at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, Austria.

        2. An increase in the amount of small livestock for sale in regional markets was often one indication that residents were preparing for flight, see, for instance, a report from the northeast region of Semipalatinsk in 1928: The Center for the Documentation of New History, Eastern Kazakhstan Oblast (Tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii vostochnoi kazakhstanskoi oblasti, TsDNIVKO), f. 3, op. 1, d. 25, l. 25.

        3. TsGARK, f. 44, op. 12, d. 492, l. 54, 58.

        4. Ibid., l. 54.

        5. Ibid., l. 53.

        6. Ibid., ll. 54–54r.

        7. According to several secret police reports circulated among top party officials, more than 1000 people were shot while trying to cross the border in 1930, Arkhivy Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstana (APRK), f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, ll. 1–2; this data is further confirmed by a second report, see APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 72. There are countless individual archival examples of shootings and border violence throughout 1931, while the total number of those fleeing to Xinjiang in 1931 doubled in comparison with 1930. Though I did not uncover cumulative data on border deaths for 1931, I am convinced that the level of violence was similar, if not greater than in 1930.

        8. Estimates for the numbers who fled to China vary. Robert Conquest estimates that 200,000 people fled to China during the Kazakh famine. “Zhatva skorbi,” Voprosy istorii, no. 4 (1990), 88. Talas Omarbekov argues that 60,000 ethnic Kazakhs relocated to Xinjiang during this period 1930–33. Qazaqstan tarikhïnïng XX ghasïrdaghï özektĭ mäcelelerĭ. Kömekshĭoqu qŭralï (Almaty: Öner, 2003), 272.

        9. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950).

        10. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2004), introduction; Andrew Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3–6.

        11. In 1940, Forbes calculates that Muslim nationalities in Xinjiang numbered 3,439,000, while Han Chinese settlers numbered 200,000. Of these Muslim groups, Uyghurs were estimated at 2,941,000, while Kazakhs numbered 319,000 and Kyrgyz 65,000. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims, 6. According to the 1926 census, Kazakhstan had a total population of 6.5 million with Kazakhs (57.1 percent), Russians (19.6 percent) and Ukrainians (13.2 percent) constituting the major ethnic groups. Uzbeks, Tatars, Germans, Turkic groups, such as Karakalpaki and Uyghurs, as well as Dungans also comprised small portions of the population. Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 17 dekabria 1926 g.; kratkie svodki. Narodnost’ i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Tsentral’noe statisticheskoe upravelenie, 1927), 82.

        12. Under warlord Sheng Shicai in the early 1930s and in a departure from Guomindang ideology, Xinjiang recognized fourteen ethnic categories, including Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and Taranchi (the people of northern Xinjiang, who are now also known as Uyghur). Sheng Shicai also adopted several strategies that resembled the Soviet Union’s policy of nativization (korenizatsiia), including the promotion of ethnic elites, as well as the sponsorship of education and publications in native languages. James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (London: Hurst, 2007), 207–09. On the construction of Uyghur identity by Chinese officials, see Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 4–7. In the debates surrounding the compilation of the 1926 Soviet census, Uyghurs were not immediately recognized as a nationality. Originally put on a list of “questionable” nationalities for the 1926 census (groups Soviet ethnographers believed to be of “mixed origins”), they were later given official recognition as a nationality in the final version of the list. Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 131, 133f.

        13. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, ix.

        14. Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk, ed. Allen Frank and Mirkasyim A. Usmanov (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 2001), 1.

        15. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 170–77.

        16. APRK, f. 141, op.1, d. 4577, l. 72.

        17. Ibid.

        18. Zapiski Semipalatinskogo otdela obshchestva izucheniia Kazakstana 1 (1929), 10.

        19. Frank and Usmanov, Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk, 7.

        20. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 186. On the trade networks that bound Kazakhs and Qing China, see Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 400–02.

        21. APRK, f. 141, op. 1 d. 4577, l. 22.

        22. Aleksandr Igorevich Pylev, Basmachestvo v Srednei Azii: etnopoliticheskii srez (vzgliad iz XXI veka) (Bishkek: Kyrgyzsko-Rossiiskii Slavianskii Universitet, 2006), 174.

        23. James Millward and Nabijian Tursun, “Political History and Strategies of Control,” in Starr, Xinjiang, 75–80.

        24. From 1689 to 1727, parts of this border were demarcated with similar results, see Andrey V. Ivanov, “Conflicting Loyalties: Fugitives and ‘Traitors’ in the Russo-Manchurian Frontier, 1651–1689,” Journal of Early Modern History 13, no. 5 (2009), 333–58.

        25. Scholars in Kazakhstan have represented the 1881 treaty as the moment when a “united Kazakh people” were divided into “Russian Kazakhs” and “Chinese Kazakhs,” see Kun Fy Chzhen, Istoricheskie sviazi i sovremennye otnosheniia mezhdy Kitaem i Kazakhstanom (Almaty: Tsentr sravnitel’nogo izucheniia regionov, 2001). One survivor of the Kazakh famine suggests in his memoirs that many Kazakhs continued to retain their Chinese identities throughout the Soviet period, see Mukhamet Shaiakhmetov, Sub’ba: dokumental’naia povest’, 19. Kazakhs living in China numbered over 1.1 million in 1990, constituting the largest Kazakh diaspora community, see Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China’s Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China’s Kazakhs (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1998), 110.

        26. Mendikulova, Kazakhskaia diaspora, 119.

        27. Estimates for flight from Central Asia into Xinjiang for the period 1916–20 vary. Archival sources estimate that 100,000 Kazakhs and Kyrgyz fled during the period, TsGARK, f. 938, op. 1, d. 51, l. 13. Mendikulova estimates 150,000 ethnic Kazakhs fled beginning in January 1917. Kazakhskaia diaspora, 122.

        28. On the White Army officers, see Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 185. On the flight of Dungans, see G. I. Safarov, Kolonial’naia revoliutsiia (opyt Turkestana) (Almaty: Zhalyn, 1996), 94. This 1996 edition is a reprint of the 1921 original.

        29. TsGARK, f. 938, op. 1, d. 51, l. 1.

        30. Ibid., l. 2.

        31. Ibid., l. 1.

        32. Ibid., l. 2r.

        33. Soviet historians have emphasized this very trajectory, framing the return of communities from China after the 1916 revolt as a critical event. G. F. Dakhshleiger and K. Nurpeisov, Istoriia krest’ianstva sovetskogo Kazakhstana (Almaty: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka” Kazakhskoi SSR, 1985), 6.

        34. Kazakh nomads regularly migrated to the side of the border that offered less repression and better political terms. Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers 1928–1958 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 190.

        35. Incomplete archival data suggests that 20,000 refugees were returned in 1921, 12,000 in 1922 and 6000 in June 1923. TsGARK, f. 938, op. 1, d. 51, l. 14.

        36. TsGARK, f. 938, op. 1, d. 50, l. 91.

        37. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 94, op. 1, d. 1, l. 661.

        38. TsDNIVKO, f. 338-P, op. 1, d. 188, l. 75, 75 ob. in Pod grifom sektretnosti, 16–18.

        39. On clan ties and their role in cross-border flight, see APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 1650, l. 69. On agents engaged in trafficking, see ibid., ll. 43–44.

        40. Ibid., l. 18.

        41. RGPASI, f. 94, op. 1, d. 1, l. 632.

        42. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 1650, l. 20.

        43. Yet as of October 1929, officials in Moscow claimed they had no data on exactly how many households had returned. GARF, f. r-1235, op. 140, d. 1053, l. 73.

        44. Focusing primarily on the western borderlands, Terry Martin charts a shift in policy, from an interest in exploiting cross-border ethnic ties to project Soviet influence abroad (what he terms “The Piedmont Principle”), to a preoccupation with cross-border ties as an instrument of foreign influence inside the Soviet Union. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), chap. 8. For other accounts that focus either exclusively or primarily on the western borderlands during the first Five Year Plan, see Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), chap. 5; Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Soviet Borderland to Ethnic Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), chap. 3; and Andrea Chandler, Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917–1993 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), chap. 5.

        45. The regime’s administrative definition of the “border strip” (pogranichnye polosy), as well as the benefits and punitive measures accorded to this area changed over time. At times, the border strip extended not only to those raions immediately adjacent to the border but also to the interior districts that abutted them, see Andrey Shlyakhter, “Smugglers and Commissars: The Making of the Soviet Border Strip, 1917–1939,” PhD diss., University of Chicago, forthcoming. I thank Andrey Shlyakhter for allowing me to read portions of his in-progress dissertation. Also, Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, chap. 8.

        46. Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 322.

        47. Several Kazakh scholars have examined the role of the Sino-Kazakh border during the Kazakh famine, see Talas Omarbekov, 20–30 zhïldardaghï Qasaqstan qasĭretĭ (Almaty: Sanat, 1997), 272–81, and Qazaqstan tarikhïnïng XX, 271–82. Prof. Omarbekov is one of a handful of local scholars who have been given access to the former secret police archives in Kazakhstan. The publication of his work, however, preceded the opening of important collections at the party archives in Kazakhstan, including party inspectorate commissions that I draw upon in this chapter. For a brief account of the Sino-Kazakh border with attention to the Kazakh diaspora, see Gul’nara Mendikulova, Kazakhskaia diaspora: istoriia i sovremennost’ (Almaty: Vsemirnaia Associatsiia Kazakhov, 2006), 132–36. There are also a handful of memoir accounts, including Mukhamet Shayakhmetov, The Silent Steppe: A Story of a Kazakh Nomad under Stalin, trans. John Butler (London, 2006), 39–44 (first released as Sub’ba: dokumental’naia povest’ [Almaty, 2002]); V. I. Petrov, “Introduction,” in Pod grifom sekretnosti: otkochevki Kazakhov v Kitai v period kollektivizatsii. Reemigratsiia. 1928–1957 gg. Sbornik dokumentov, ed. O. V. Zhandabekov (Ust-Kamenogorsk: Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Vostochno-Kazakhstanskoi oblasti, 1998), 1–11, and V. I. Petrov, Miatezhnoe ‘serdtse’ Azii: Sin’tszian: Kratkaia istoriia narodnykh dvizhenii i vospominaniia (Moscow: Kraft+, 2003), 324–35. Little scholarly attention has been paid to the borders of Central Asia during the First Five-Year Plan. One exception is Adrienne Edgar’s account of the Turkmen-Afghan border in Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 213–20. There does not appear to have been a similar level of violence on the Turkmen-Afghan border, perhaps reflecting Kazakhstan’s far more desperate economic plight.

        48. See United States Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine: 1932–1933: Report to Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 136. Also, Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 198.

        49. On this, see: Sarah Cameron, “The Hungry Steppe: Soviet Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Famine, 1921–1934,” PhD diss., Yale University, 2010. There are few existing studies of the Kazakh famine. Two notable exceptions: Isabelle Ohayon, La sédentarisation des Kazakhs dans l’URSS de Staline. Collectivisation et changement social (1928–1945) (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006), and Niccolò Pianciola, Stalinismo di frontiera: colonizzazione agricola, sterminio dei nomadi e costruzione statale in Asia centrale, 1905–1936 (Rome: Viella, 2009).

        50. Shlyakhter, “Smugglers and Commissars,” chap. 4.

        51. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 13.

        52. Ibid., l. 73.

        53. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, l. 93.

        54. Omarbekov, Qazaqstan tarikhïnïng XX ghasïrdaghï özektĭ mäcelelerĭ, 284.

        55. Talas Omarbekov argues that the majority of those who fled to China were ethnic Kazakhs followed by Uyghurs, Russians, and Dungans. Ibid., 272.

        56. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, l. 203.

        57. APRK, f. 141, op. 3, d. 185, l. 1.

        58. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 74.

        59. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, l. 205. On a shortage of manufactured goods in border raions, as well as tea, see also APRK, f. 719, op. 3, d. 91, l. 45.

        60. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 42, d. 34, ll. 65–72 in Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy, t. 3, ed. V. Danilov, R. Manning, and L. Viola (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001), 210–11.

        61. The term “kishlak” is often used to refer to non-Slavic settled communities in Central Asia, such as the households of the Uzbeks, Dungans, or Uyghurs.

        62. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 77.

        63. APRK, f. 719, op. 5, d. 108, l. 133.

        64. There are numerous documents from regional archives detailing this pattern in Pod grifom sekretnosti, 56–66.

        65. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, l. 203.

        66. TsGARK, f. 44, op. 12, d. 492, l. 55.

        67. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, l. 17. Many local historians maintain that Soviet officials practiced preventative shootings in Kazakhstan, slaughtering individuals or even entire groups simply on the rumor that they were preparing to flee to China, see, for instance, Maqash Tätimov, “Goloshcheekindik genotsid nemese Qazaqstandaghï “qïzïl” qïrghïn qïrsïqtarï” Zan Gazetĭ, 29 May 1996, p. 5.; also, Kh. M. Gabzhalilov, “XX ghasïrdïng 30–shï zhïldarïngdaghï Qazaqstandaghï ashtïq demografiiasïnïng zertteluĭ turalï,” QazŬU khabarshïsï. Tarikh seriiasï, no. 38, p. 12. These authors, however, do not provide archival evidence to back up their claims. Yet given that some archival documentation on the period still remains closed, it is possible that violence was more widespread than currently available archival evidence would indicate.

        68. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, l. 191.

        69. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 13.

        70. Ibid., l. 72.

        71. Using data from the secret police archives, Talas Omarbekov has revealed a regime highly preoccupied with the problem of cross-border flight and the social composition of emigrants. Qazaqstan tarikhïnïng XX ghasïrdaghï özektĭ mäcelelerĭ, 272. In October 1931, a Soviet secret police report estimated that over 80 percent of those who fled were of modest means. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 42, d. 34, l. 65–72 in Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni, t. 3, p. 209.

        72. See, for instance, APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 13.

        73. APRK, f. 141, op. 14, d. 465, l. 204

        74. APRK, f. 719, op. 3, d. 185, l. 5.

        75. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, ll. 96–97.

        76. Regime officials often noted the problem of cross-border kinship connections, see APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 21 and l. 75, and APRK, f. 719, op. 3, d. 185, l. 1.

        77. TsDNIVKO, f. 788, op. 1 d. 35, l. 107–116 in Pod grifom sekretnosti, 24–32.

        78. TsDNIVKO, f. 788, op. 1, d. 41, l. 27 in Pod grifom sekretnosti, 39.

        79. TsDNIVKO, f. 788, op. 1, d. 35, l. 10–116 in Pod grifom sekretnosti, 31. Kazakhs did not have a “prince” (kniaz’). Kazakh political culture involved a number of ties, including kinship, regional loyalties and allegiances to various noble estates.

        80. APRK, f. 719, op. 2, d. 126, l. 180.

        81. APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, ll. 43–44r.

        82. See, for example, the numerous instances of armed violence detailed in APRK, f. 141, op. 17, d. 465, ll. 307–38.

        83. Ibid., 150 and 186.

        84. Secret police reports sent to Goloshchekin in May 1930 detailed the numbers of people starving, as well as the specific regions affected by hunger. APRK, f. 719, op. 5, d. 108, l. 141.

        85. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 73.

        86. For a description of one such counterrevolutionary organization, see TsDNIVKO, f. 1-P, op. 2, d. 4981, l. 79–80 in Pod grifom sekretnosti, 65–66.

        87. TsGARK, f. 44, op. 2, d. 492, l. 53.

        88. Ibid., ll. 53–55r.

        89. TsGARK, f. 44, op. 2, d. 492, ll. 57–58.

        90. The Soviet Union broke off and resumed diplomatic relations with China several times during this period. In 1928, Stalin severed diplomatic relations, only to resume them again in 1932. During the entire time, however, Soviet officials maintained consulates in Xinjiang, see D. B. Slavinskii, Sovetskii Soiuz i Kitai: istoriia diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii, 1917–1937 gg. (Moscow: ZAO Iaponiia segodnia, 2003), and Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–1941: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude of the Pacific War (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1992).

        91. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts’ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), xii. Whiting attributes this description to Wendell Willkie, who met Sheng when he visited Xinjiang in 1942. From 1941 to 1951, Soviet, Chinese and Anglo-American policy makers again competed for influence in Xinjiang, see Justin Jacobs, “The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned: Osman Batur, Chinese Decolonization and the Nationalization of a Nomad,” American Historical Review 115, no. 5 (2010), 1291–315.

        92. Selçuk Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900–1945,” American Historical Review 109, no. 4 (2004), 1161–62.

        93. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 1.

        94. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 62.

        95. Almaty Regional Archive, f.173, op. 4, d. 9, l. 3.

        96. See, for instance, “Anglo-Iaponskoe sopernichestvo v Sin’tsziane,” Kazakstanskaia Pravda, 16 April 1933; also, “Idet podgotovka k imperialisticheskomy zakhvaty Srednei Azii,” Kazakstanskaia Pravda, 20 August 1933.

        97. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 2. For a description of one such “stake out” and chase, see Shayakhmetov, The Silent Steppe, 41–43.

        98. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 4–5.

        99. Ibid., l. 8.

        100. Ibid., l. 9.

        101. Ibid., l. 6.

        102. Ibid., l. 2. Using materials from the secret police archives in Kazakhstan, Talas Omarbekov has done considerable work on Sino-Soviet extradition programs from Xinjiang during the 1930s. In his recounting, refugee work was further complicated by Soviet officials’ refusal to accept the extradition of those considered to be bais, kulaks, and other counterrevolutionary figures. Qazaqstan tarikhïnïng XX ghasïrdaghï özektĭ mäcelelerĭ, 284. In 1946, the Soviets resumed efforts to return refugees from the Kazakh famine still residing in Xinjiang, granting returnees citizenship and passports, while forgoing the intense scrutiny of who was returning (bai or bedniak) that had accompanied repatriation efforts in the 1930s. By the end of 1956, more than 150,000 Kazakhs had been returned to Kazakhstan under this program. Pod grifom sekretnosti, 10. See also Bruce Adams, “Reemigration from Western China to the USSR, 1954–1962,” in Migration, Homeland and Belonging in Eurasia, ed. Cynthia Buckley and Blair A. Ruble (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 183–203.

        103. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 40, l. 87 in Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni, t. 3, 89.

        104. APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 4577, l. 61–63.

3

Stalin, Espionage, and Counterespionage

Hiroaki Kuromiya and Andrzej Pepłoński

Convinced that rapprochement with the capitalist powers was ultimately impossible and war with them inevitable, Stalin embarked on a massive undertaking to build a powerful state. For more than a decade before the Second World War, as shown in the previous chapters, he squeezed the Soviet people until they could be squeezed no more. Yet from his experience in prerevolutionary Russia, Stalin knew that a state, however powerful and mighty it may seem, could be plunged into chaos unless sufficient attention were given to internal and external subversion. Stalin therefore took espionage most seriously.¹ In March 1937, he declared:

    To win a battle in war, several corps of Red Army soldiers may be needed, but to ruin the victory on the front, a few spies, somewhere in army headquarters or even in division headquarters, who can steal an operation plan and pass it to the enemy, will suffice.²

Like many other political leaders, Stalin deemed the strategic use of intelligence and espionage indispensable to political life. Yet Stalin’s reliance on them reached staggering proportions. No doubt, his secret service helped him to maintain his power within the country and to deflect threats from without. It is impossible to imagine Stalin’s rule without the secret police, its tens of thousands of agents, and hundreds of thousands of informants. Indeed, Stalin’s rule amply demonstrates what intelligence both can and cannot achieve.

    By the time the Second World War began in 1939, Stalin had created highly refined espionage and counterespionage agencies, which in retrospect seem as omnipresent and skilled as they were brutal. By any standard of the trade, Stalin’s secret operations were immensely successful. For example, in the 1930s, they penetrated the foreign and intelligence services of both Britain and Germany. They also penetrated Japan’s political establishment through the spy ring run by Richard Sorge (whose key informant was Hotsumi Ozaki, a counselor to the cabinet). Other countries, such as Poland and the United States, also suffered a similar level of Soviet infiltration.³ Sergei Leonov, a Russian scholar of espionage, is almost certainly correct in stating that in the late 1930s “no other country in the world possessed such powerful and extensive intelligence as the Soviet Union.”⁴

    Nevertheless, in June 1937, Stalin bitterly complained that the Soviet Union had just been dealt a serious blow by capitalist countries in the realm of espionage. He denounced Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and numerous other Soviet military commanders who had recently been arrested as “spies.” Showing disdain for what he called the hypocritical euphemism of “informant,” used by “civilized West European countries,” he declared, “[We] know in the Russian language that this simply means a spy.” His erstwhile political rival, Leon Trotsky, then in exile in Mexico, was an ober-shpion (supreme spy), according to Stalin. Trotsky, Tukhachevsky, and others were “slaves” of the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces, which were seeking to turn the Soviet Union into another Spain, where civil war would erupt at the instigation of Fascist forces. Soviet intelligence operations, Stalin claimed, had been penetrated by German, Japanese, and Polish spies. In the domain of intelligence, he said, “we have for the first time in twenty years suffered the harshest defeat.” It was therefore necessary, Stalin continued, to restore intelligence work to its rightful place as “our eyes and our ears.” He then added that if there were even a 5 percent chance of “truth” behind the idea that Soviet intelligence had been infiltrated, it was still significant, implying that the slightest hint of political disloyalty had to be taken as treachery.⁵

    Stalin’s assertions were a pretext for terror. For most of his political life, he was cautious but confident of his actions. In domestic and international politics, Stalin sought to outmaneuver all of his rivals to gain political advantage. Indeed, as revolutionary and Kremlin tactician, he was a master of deception. He seems nevertheless to have believed that there was a 5 percent possibility that his country had been penetrated by foreign agents. He did not leave the smallest loose end open when it came to counterespionage: certain that war would come, he used mass killings in order to eliminate that contingency. Only within this context can one understand the Great Terror of 1937–38, during which nearly one million people were murdered.

    Many relevant Soviet documents on espionage and counterespionage remain closed to researchers and, given the political orientation of today’s Russia, they are unlikely to be made available in the foreseeable future. Yet foreign documents, both archival and published, along with available Soviet records, can reveal much about the subject. Before the Second World War, Stalin regarded Germany, Poland, and Japan as the Soviet Union’s major enemies. Among the available non-Soviet archival documents, those from Japan have turned out to be exceptionally illuminating. Understandably, perhaps, they have been largely ignored by historians of Europe.

    This chapter makes use of hitherto little-known Japanese documents to examine international espionage and counterespionage during the period of the Great Terror. In Stalin’s views, Japan was the linchpin of an espionage alliance involving Germany, Poland, and Japan. Stalin knew well the extensive and effective espionage network Japan used against Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. This type of espionage subsequently came to be known as “total espionage,” a term apparently coined in 1941 to alert the world to Japanese and German intelligence activity.⁶ In fact, it was Stalin’s Soviet Union that perfected total espionage. To defend against foreign espionage, in turn, Stalin used mass killings as the ultimate weapon of “total counterespionage.”

Reminders that foreign espionage posed a threat to the first “workers’ and peasants’ state” were nothing new in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Yet from 1936 on, such warnings increased dramatically in frequency and intensity. Many factors, mainly foreign, are known to have contributed to the escalation of Soviet propaganda against foreign spies.⁷ One important factor, however, has been neglected by historians of Stalin’s espionage and terror: the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact and its successive agreements. This treaty, signed by Germany and Japan in November 1936, was directed against the Communist International (Comintern), which had been established in Moscow in 1919 to promote and coordinate revolution.

    The existence of the Anti-Comintern Pact—the public treaty with its supplementary protocol and the secret supplementary treaty—is well known. The actual content of these documents, however, is known to a few specialists. The public treaty’s supplementary protocol, also signed on 25 November 1936, stipulated:

    a. The competent authorities of both High Contracting States will closely cooperate in the exchange of intelligence on the activities of the Communist International and on reconnaissance and defensive measures against the Communist International.

    b. The competent authorities of both High Contracting States will, within the framework of the existing law, take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad act in the direct or indirect employ of the Communist International or assist its subversive work.⁸

Although the public treaty and protocol spoke only of the Communist International, all those concerned (Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union) understood that the protocol was directed against the Soviet Union. The secret supplementary treaty, however, called things by name and referred explicitly to the Soviet Union. The following year, the pact was expanded to include Italy, “considering that the Communist International continues constantly to imperil the civilized world in the Occident and Orient, disturbing and destroying peace and order,” and “that only close collaboration of all states interested in the maintenance of peace and order can limit and eliminate that peril.”⁹

    Virtually unknown are the German-Japanese agreements that followed the Anti-Comintern Pact. After the pact was signed, the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, Hiroshi Ōshima, pursued an additional special agreement with Germany for closer collaboration in military intelligence against the Soviet Union. On 11 May 1937, in Berlin, Ōshima and Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Wehrmacht’s intelligence service Abwehr, signed what was called “An Additional German-Japanese Agreement on the Exchange of Intelligence concerning Soviet Russia [USSR].” In it, the two countries agreed to exchange intelligence in Berlin and Tokyo “to be dispatched immediately to the home countries.” The agreement covered all important and unevaluated (i.e., raw) intelligence concerning the Soviet Red Army and Air Force and the Soviet arms industry, as well as “pure counterintelligence” as obtained by each side. In addition to exchanging raw intelligence with one another, Germany and Japan were also to provide their views of the intelligence shared. This secret agreement was officially approved by the Japanese Army and the German Armed Forces on 7 October 1937. The agreement included clauses on annual meetings to exchange and evaluate the intelligence shared between the two countries.¹⁰

    Like the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Ōshima-Canaris Agreement also included an “Additional Protocol concerning ‘Anti-Soviet’ Plotting and Subversive Work [Bōryaku in Japanese, Zersetzungsarbeit in German].” In it, Germany and Japan agreed to collaborate in encouraging all national minority movements, promoting anti-Bolshevik propaganda, and instigating revolutionary activities, terrorist acts, and sabotage activities in the event of war. Furthermore, the additional protocol specified that the main spheres of action be divided between the two countries: the western borderlands (from Finland to Bulgaria) would belong mainly to Germany; the southwestern borderlands (Turkey and Iran) to both; and the east Asian front primarily to Japan. The protocol’s action plan covered five years from 1937 to 1941. Clause Seven of the protocol, for example, stated that in case one party was drawn into war with the Soviet Union, the other party would be obliged to escalate diversionary work “by all means possible” in its areas of primary interest (the western borderlands for Germany and the east Asian front for Japan), as well as in the area of mutual interest (the southwestern borderlands).¹¹

    The Ōshima-Canaris Agreement also included as an appendix an intriguing five-year plan of joint action in the Caucasus area. For 1937, for instance, the following was to be accomplished in Turkey: contacting and bribing important political figures, establishing contacts with “military sites” (i.e., the General Staff), and setting up clandestine stations (under the guise of commercial ventures) at several points near the Soviet borders.¹² The 1937 plan for Europe included the training of personnel recruited from the Soviet Caucasus and their infiltration back into Soviet territory. The 1938 plan for Turkey envisaged “the strengthening and increasing of border stations, the founding of communication links by means of Black Sea boats, the setting-up of courier routes, the training and placement of border crossers, and the establishment of cells in the Caucasus area and links with them.”¹³ Similar plans for Iran were drawn up for 1938. The 1939 plan for Turkey referred to the “setting-up of radio communication, a study of airport construction, and the training of cadres of the Caucasian Army (in both Turkey and Europe)”; the plan for Iran included the “establishment of links by Caspian boats and the set-up of radio communication.” The plan for the Caucasus for the same year envisaged “the setting-up of cells in Baku, Grozny, Tbilisi, Vladikavkaz, and Batumi, as well as along the oil transport lines.” In 1940, “a detailed study of military objects for air attack and the import of weapons for Turkey and Iran and preparations for a general uprising for the Caucasus region” were to be accomplished. Finally, for 1941, the plan foresaw the “completion of military preparations and the formation of cadres of the Caucasian Army for Turkey.”¹⁴ These actions were to be carried out by the “Caucasus Group,” which was led by Dagestani emigré Haidar Bammat and based in Europe and Turkey, with financial and logistical support from Germany and Japan.¹⁵

    In 1937, just as Germany and Japan began to collaborate, Poland and Japan started to work more closely with each other on anti-Soviet intelligence as well. The two countries, united by common interests, had already been cooperating with one another for some time, although unofficially. That same year, Japan began to work, if tentatively, with the Poland-sponsored Promethean movement, an “anticommunist international, designed to destroy the Soviet Union and to create independent states from its republics.”¹⁶ From Stalin’s point of view, this almost certainly signified a grand alliance of espionage between Germany, Japan, and Poland, even though, as far as can be judged, Germany and Poland were not officially collaborating in intelligence against the Soviet Union at the time. When, to Moscow’s surprise, Poland and Germany came to a rapprochement by concluding a nonaggression treaty in 1934, Stalin suspected, wrongly, that Germany and Poland had also concluded secret agreements against the Soviet Union. Stalin also knew that even after Moscow and Warsaw had concluded a non-aggression pact in 1932, Poland had continued to work with Japan’s intelligence services against the Soviet Union, seeing in it a potential threat to Poland’s existence. From Stalin’s perspective, Germany, Poland, and Japan appeared to have aligned against the Soviet Union. At least, this is the picture he presented to the Soviet nation.

    The German-Polish-Japanese nexus was the leitmotif of the Great Terror in 1937. It appears that the Ōshima-Canaris Agreement played some kind of role in setting the purge in motion.¹⁷ Given the extent to which the Soviet government had penetrated Japan’s political establishment and foreign intelligence agencies, it is almost certain that the details of negotiations between Germany and Japan and the resulting agreement were known to the Kremlin from the start. Eleven days after the Ōshima-Canaris Agreement was signed, Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky was arrested. He was swiftly tried as a German spy, convicted, and executed by mid-June. Hundreds of senior officers soon shared the same fate, resulting in the decimation of the high command.¹⁸ Five weeks after the Ōshima-Canaris Agreement, the first mass terror operation, the ROVS Operation, which was directed against a Russian emigré organization, got underway in West Siberia, where Moscow suspected Japanese and German infiltration.¹⁹ The ROVS Operation was immediately followed by other mass operations, such as the Kulak Operation, the Polish Operation, and the Latvian Operation, which were implemented throughout the Soviet Union.

    Warsaw was indeed the center of intelligence gathering, and Berlin the center of subversion. Japan’s secret operations against the Soviet Union in Europe were directed largely by a special intelligence-subversion station set up in Berlin in 1933. This clandestine station, completely separate from Japan’s diplomatic mission, worked with emigré groups to direct subversive activities in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus.²⁰ Spies were sent over the Polish-Soviet, Turkish-Soviet, and Iranian-Soviet borders into Soviet territory.²¹ Unbeknownst to Japan, its special office, like many other emigré organizations, had been penetrated by Soviet agents.²² The man who led the Berlin office from 1937 to 1939, Colonel Takanobu Manaki, had been acquainted socially with Richard Sorge in Tokyo. When Sorge was arrested as a Soviet spy in October 1941, Manaki was astounded.²³ Moreover, it appears that Manaki’s Russian mistress in Paris had been a Soviet agent as well.²⁴

    The collaboration between the Japan and Germany bore little fruit, however. The two countries were unable to overcome their mutual distrust. In the meantime, Japan and Poland continued to act in concert with one another in their opposition to the Soviet Union.²⁵ Little evidence exists that Germany and Poland ever formed a united front against Moscow: Warsaw’s “balanced diplomacy” was based on its deep mistrust of both Moscow and Berlin. Stalin knew that divergent geopolitical interests divided his enemies to one degree or another, and that the governments of the three countries were far from united. Nonetheless, Stalin suspected that, where the Soviet Union was concerned, all three capitalist countries stood together, with Japan as the linchpin.

The shadow war was so intense in the late 1930s that it was almost audible.²⁶ Japan worked equally assiduously in Europe and in east Asia, as well as in Iran (Persia) and Afghanistan.²⁷ Poland maintained a strong intelligence presence in the Far East in collaboration with Japan. Turkey attracted German, Polish, and Japanese agents as a base of intelligence targeted against the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, bordering on Soviet Central Asia and a center for anti-Soviet emigré groups of Basmachi, also became a focal point of German and Japanese intelligence work.²⁸

    Stalin suspected that Germany, Poland, and Japan practiced total espionage, an all-pervasive system of espionage on a mass scale, a system that Japan had pioneered. In the run-up to and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, Japan had established “a wide network of agents in Manchuria, Korea, and the rest of the Far East, most working under legal cover as barbers, laundry workers, photographers, opticians, merchants, prostitutes, or other members of the service professions”²⁹ (the latter phrase including priests, artists, entertainers, engineers, and professors). Japan had also pioneered the extensive use of commercial enterprises as a cover for intelligence. Moreover, Japanese preparations for the Russo-Japanese War had included efforts to exploit certain national minorities within Russia, namely diaspora groups such the Poles, Finns, and Georgians, for subversion from within. Amid the revolutionary upheaval that took place in Russia in 1905, minority unrest provided an additional diversion that made it difficult for Russia to continue the war with Japan. The vital lessons of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 were not lost on the Bolsheviks.³⁰

    The Japanese method would go on to serve as a model for authoritarian regimes of all stripes throughout the twentieth century. Originally, however, Japan had modeled its espionage practices on the German method of the nineteenth century (developed by Wilhelm Stieber under Otto von Bismarck), but the Japanese refined it. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Germans in turn emulated the Japanese, reasoning that “total war necessitated total espionage.”³¹ It was Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, and his and Hitler’s teacher, Karl Haushofer, who carried out a detailed study of Japanese intelligence.³² In 1909, shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, Haushofer was sent by the Bavarian Army to Japan as a “military observer” in order to study the Japanese Army. In 1910, he returned home to Germany, where he became a prominent Japanologist and geographer. Using Japan as an example, among others, he developed a theory of “geopolitics” and earned renown as the father of the Nazi ideal of Lebensraum. It is said that Hess studied Japanese intelligence under Haushofer from 1927 to 1929 and completed a 132-page treatise called “Japan and Espionage.” Emulating Japanese practice, it reportedly claimed: “Everyone can spy, everyone must spy.” Once Hitler came to power, Hess founded and controlled the “Liaison Staff” (Verbindungsstab), which, among other duties, oversaw the activities of German agents abroad. According to Curt Riess, Germany’s total espionage, which “began to function toward the latter part of 1934,” reached peak efficiency in mid-1937.³³

    Well aware of the threat of total espionage from abroad, Stalin had by the 1930s created a system of “total counterespionage” in the Soviet Union: ubiquitous surveillance and terror. Every contact with foreigners was watched. Every visitor to foreign consulates was investigated. Every immigrant was suspected as a possible foreign agent. The system became so elaborate and all-encompassing that there was soon little room left for foreign intelligence within the Soviet Union, with the possible exception of border areas: the western borders with Poland, the northern borders with Finland; the southern borders with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan; and the eastern borders with China, Mongolia, and Japan, in the form of the Tokyo’s puppet regime Manchukuo and Japanese-occupied Korea. However strict the Soviet border regime might have been, foreign infiltration was not impossible. For example, Japan used ethnic Koreans, and Poland used ethnic Poles, for their intelligence operations in the borderlands. But true to his word, Stalin took the 5 percent possibility of foreign penetration very seriously and targeted certain national minorities (“enemy nations”), such as Poles, Germans, Finns, Latvians, and Greeks for mass killing. Stalin judged them to be security risks; that is to say, they were potential foreign spies and agents, because of their ethnic ties to foreign countries. To ensure that no cover was possible for foreign spies in the Soviet Union, Stalin terrorized all groups that were a potential source of political instability and therefore suspect in his eyes. Beyond specific ethnic groups, those targeted included the dispossessed and exiled kulaks, former followers of Trotsky and others who had opposed Stalin, criminals, ministers of the cloth, refugees from abroad, and people with the slightest of links to foreign countries.

    Altogether nearly one million people are believed to have been executed in 1937–38. Those deemed “enemy nations” were hardest hit. The largest number of victims in the Great Terror, however, were to be found among those repressed in the Kulak Operation. In the political atmosphere of 1937–38, those kulaks who had endured the hardships of dispossession and exile during collectivization were ipso facto judged to be security risks. Owing to their experience, they appeared to Stalin to be the group most likely to succumb to foreign espionage and subversion. To this day, no evidence has come to light to suggest that foreign countries such as Germany and Japan recruited among these individuals. As a precaution, Stalin simply liquidated a very large number of them rather than keeping them isolated in labor camps and settlements. Even many of those already in camps were executed during the Great Terror. These mass killings made no economic sense whatsoever. They were patently political actions, the ultimate counterespionage weapon.³⁴

    Stalin also exported his Great Terror to the People’s Republic of Mongolia and Chinese province of Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan), both of which he controlled as if they were Soviet colonies. Had they fallen into the hands of the Japanese, reasoned Stalin, Japan would have gained unimpeded access to eastern and western Siberia, where Stalin foresaw a huge reservoir of foreign espionage and subversion among the exiled kulaks. An external invasion, he believed, would be supported by internal insurrections on the part of these exiles and other “anti-Soviet elements” in Siberia. The Great Terror in the Asian lands of Mongolia and Xinjiang was explicitly directed against alleged Japanese spies.³⁵ Stalin could not export his Great Terror to the west, to Poland or the Baltic republics, because he did not control these countries. However, he might have tried to do so had they been weaker.

    Stalin’s Great Terror and the accompanying mass killings frightened and intimidated the entire Soviet nation. It further reduced what little room still existed for foreign infiltration in the Soviet Union. Following Leonov, one can say that no other country in the world had possessed such powerful and extended counterintelligence as the Soviet Union under Stalin.

    Meanwhile, Soviet infiltration of foreign countries and organizations completely surpassed foreign infiltration of the Soviet Union. Although Stalin’s secret services were far from omnipotent, and there were notable failures in the early 1930s, it was in fact Stalin’s Soviet Union—not Japan or Germany—that ultimately developed the most draconian form of total espionage. Even the United States, with which the Soviet Union was on very friendly terms in the 1930s, was deeply penetrated by Soviet agents and subject to Soviet influence.³⁶ Soviet agent Mark Zborovsky (who had code names B-187, Mak, Kant, and Tiulpan) managed to become the most trusted man among the circle around Trotsky’s son Sedov in Paris.³⁷ The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was likewise infiltrated by Soviet agents: its leader Ievhen Konovalets was assassinated in May 1938 in Rotterdam by a trusted aid, Pavel Sudoplatov, who was in fact a Soviet spy.³⁸ The head of the Finland office of the same Ukrainian organization during the 1930s was also a Soviet agent by the name of K. Poluvedko.³⁹

    Japan and Germany had grandiose plans and schemes against the Soviet Union. Yet there is no evidence that Japan and Germany ever succeeded in coming close to realizing them: they appeared to have achieved much less than 5 percent of what they had planned. For example, whatever links Bammat’s Caucasus Group may have established among its supporters in the Soviet Union, they were tenuous and limited.⁴⁰ And as formidable as Poland’s intelligence was, there is little evidence that it ever posed a real and immediate threat to the Soviet Union.⁴¹

    There is by contrast some evidence that Stalin was in fact quite confident in 1937 when he claimed the Soviet secret service had been trounced by its capitalist enemies. On Stalin’s instructions, a number of articles on the danger of foreign espionage were published in key newspapers during the spring and summer of 1937.⁴² These articles may offer some insight into Stalin’s thinking. One article, for example, states: “The imperialists have a special taste for espionage and diversion. In each case, they are used to using ‘secret forces’ and have long come to believe in the omnipotence of espionage.”⁴³ In light of Soviet practices at the time, the passage seems more of a self-assessment of Soviet methods.

    In 1937, Germany may have posed the most serious threat to the Soviet Union in terms of espionage. Stalin certainly seems to have thought so. That May, he told People’s Commissar for Defense Kliment Voroshilov and People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Nikolai Ezhov that the main enemy was the German intelligence service, adding that Soviet military intelligence had fallen into German hands.⁴⁴ Curiously, however, the numbers of those repressed as Polish and Japanese spies and agents during the Great Terror far exceeded those repressed as German spies and agents. Soviet secret police statistics show that in 1937–38, 101,965 people were arrested as Polish spies, 52,906 as Japanese spies, and 39,300 as German spies (followed by Latvian, Finnish, Estonian, Romanian, Greek, and other “spies”).⁴⁵

    In light of Stalin’s remarks to Voroshilov and Ezhov, it seems somewhat surprising that the Soviet terror apparatus continued to concentrate on Polish and Japanese “spies” more than German ones. This may have something to do with the fact that Poland and Japan (via Manchukuo and Korea) shared borders with the Soviet Union. Therefore Moscow singled out those associated with the two countries for immediate terror. Germany did not share borders with the Soviet Union, but Soviet Ukraine, which of course bordered Poland, had almost as many ethnic Germans as ethnic Poles (approximately 400,000) in 1937. But the answer may more likely be found in Stalin’s strategic thinking.

    By 1937, Stalin had almost certainly decided to destroy Poland sometime in the future and was acting accordingly. Referring to Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, Stalin once remarked: “Piłsudski—he is Poland.”⁴⁶ After Piłsudski’s death in May 1935, Poland may have ceased to exist for Stalin. At any rate, Stalin’s private notes from the time of the Great Terror make it quite clear that he disposed of “Polish spies” with abandon. Stalin wrote on one report concerning the progress of the Polish Operation: “To [Nikolai] Ezhov. Very good! Dig up and clean out, henceforth too, this Polish espionage filth. Eliminate it in the interests of the Soviet Union.”⁴⁷ Stalin knew, however, that he could not easily destroy Germany, a much more powerful state than Poland. While preparing for the war he believed would come, Stalin was nevertheless receptive to the possibility of a temporary rapprochement with the man who had declared Bolshevism his lifelong enemy.⁴⁸ Stalin kept the possibility of an accord with Hitler open, and dealt with Germany and the Germans with caution. After August 1939 and the signing of the Treaty of Non-Aggression, Stalin went to even greater lengths not to provoke Germany politically or militarily.

    Stalin was much more forceful with Japan, which, unlike Germany or the Soviet Union, was not ruled by one man, but by an unstable and unpredictable leadership circle subject to frequent turnover. Stalin could not deal with Japan as he did Germany: there was no one clear leader with whom to strike a deal. Therefore he used force, in order to prevent any surprises on the part of Japan and to weaken the unpredictable country. In the autumn of 1937, he deported all of the ethnic Koreans in the Far East as potential Japanese spies and terrorized the kharbintsi (former Soviet employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway who were mostly ethnic Russians) as real Japanese spies. With regard to the ethnic Chinese in the Soviet Union, he showed greater restraint; China after all served as a buffer against Japan. For Japanese officials in the Soviet Union surveillance became so intrusive that embassy staff members could not speak to ordinary Soviet citizens. When Japanese officials traveled by train, they were not left alone for a second: even when they went to the restroom, they were watched from the keyhole and from the window.⁴⁹

    Stalin’s confidence regarding Japan was reflected in an article in Pravda on 9 July 1937. The article began with an assertion:

    Japan’s intelligence, compared with the espionage of other imperialist countries, plays a greater role in preparing for war and organizing it in a direction favorable to Japanese imperialism.…The relative weight of Japanese intelligence is exceptionally heavy...The Japanese imperialists intend to wage war against an enemy with far larger forces (the Soviet Union, Britain, and the USA). This is why they base their military plans on a combination of purely military operations and the disintegration and demoralization of the home front by way of diversionary and terrorist acts.⁵⁰

This article appeared two days after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, which triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War and mired Japan in conflict with China. The main consequence of the resumption in hostilities between the Chinese and the Japanese was that it distracted Tokyo’s attention from the Soviet Union. This was a welcome development for Stalin. Moscow immediately began to assist China. Stalin was almost exuberant when he told a visiting Chinese envoy in February 1938: “Japanese military leaders think that they can conquer China. In fact, they have turned out to be fools. They don’t understand [that they cannot conquer China], but they will be forced to.”⁵¹ Stalin then toasted a “strong China.” Stalin’s executioner Ezhov was also present. Stalin introduced him to the Chinese as the leader of Soviet intelligence services, the man who had arrested so many Japanese spies and whom the Japanese feared like fire.⁵² Three months later, the French ambassador in Moscow reported that Vladimir Potemkin, the deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs, had called the situation in China “splendid”: “He [Potemkin] is counting on resistance by this country [China] for several years, after which Japan will be too enfeebled to be capable of attacking the USSR. This opinion appears to be shared by the Soviet leadership.”⁵³ Confident of Japan’s foolishness, Stalin felt he could resort to heavy-handed tactics against Japan without reservation.

    Despite the smoke and mirrors, it would appear that it was Stalin who believed in the omnipotence of espionage. In 1940, he emphasized that “intelligence consists not only of maintaining a secret agent masked somewhere in France or England,” it also consists of such mundane tasks as clipping newspapers. Regarding hard intelligence, Stalin maintained that “a spy must of necessity be steeped in poison and gall and should not believe anyone.”⁵⁴ In light of the fact that Stalin maintained a spy ring inside the British government, his remark at an August 1942 Kremlin reception for British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. Special Envoy Averell Harriman appears at once devious and sincere: the Soviet dictator praised military spies as “good people” dedicated to serving their country. It was nothing but “false shame” not to mention them, for they should be “the eyes and ears” of their state. Stalin even lectured his guests on the shortcomings of British intelligence during the First World War.⁵⁵

    Following his own advice, Stalin did not trust anyone. He said in May 1937, “From the point of view of intelligence, we cannot have friends: there are clear enemies, and there are potential enemies. So we cannot reveal any secrets to anyone.”⁵⁶ According to a former Soviet secret police official,

    Stalin, who was his own intelligence boss and who liked to take a personal part in the cloak and dagger business, warned his intelligence chiefs time and again to keep away from hypotheses and “equations with many unknowns.”...He used to say: “An intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby horse on which you will ride straight into a self-made trap.” Stalin wanted raw intelligence material: he often interjected during his conferences with intelligence chiefs, “Don’t tell me what you think, give me the facts and the sources!”⁵⁷

Stalin’s right-hand man Viacheslav Molotov echoed this sentiment. He too spent half a day every day reading intelligence reports. Subsequently, recalling his work in the 1930s, Molotov insisted that it was impossible to rely on spies, who “could push you into such a dangerous position that you would never get out of it”: “You have to listen to them, but you also have to verify their information.”⁵⁸

    This probing for sources was not just an exercise to press subordinates to deliver hard information for use in shaping government policy; Stalin genuinely mistrusted his own men. He was determined to track down and eliminate the potential 5 percent possibility that his own men could be double agents. Speaking to Soviet military leaders in June 1937, Stalin reminded them that of eighteen people present at the Bolshevik’s Prague Conference in 1912, as many as six, or 33 percent, later turned out to be police provocateurs.⁵⁹ No one was above suspicion. Stalin suspected, for example, that Sorge, his spy in Tokyo, was a double agent. In 1937, Sorge refused a recall to Moscow and stayed in Tokyo, from where he continued to dispatch invaluable intelligence to the Soviet Union. That, however, did not stop Stalin from repressing almost all of Sorge’s handlers.

    During the Great Terror, Stalin ended up repressing 275 (or 61 percent) of 450 Soviet foreign intelligence officials in Moscow and abroad.⁶⁰ For 127 consecutive days in 1938, no foreign intelligence information was formally submitted to Stalin: officials were afraid to sign the reports.⁶¹ Stalin built the most powerful intelligence operation in the world, but he also nearly destroyed it.

In the 1930s, Japan played the key role in what Stalin considered a triple intelligence alliance of Germany, Poland, and Japan against the Soviet Union. The 1937 Japanese-German intelligence agreements appear to have been the immediate catalyst of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union, which spilled over to the People’s Republic of Mongolia and Xinjiang. However, Japan’s arrogance, born of its victory over Russia in 1905, eventually made it overconfident, as Stalin saw it. Japan’s total espionage was effectively stymied by Stalin’s counterespionage. Moscow in turn deeply penetrated Tokyo officialdom. Poland, Japan’s close partner, was likewise frustrated in the battle of intelligence: Stalin’s mass killings left little room for intelligence gathering and subversion. By then, Stalin was almost certainly determined to destroy Poland as it existed in the 1930s.

    In spite of his 1937 remarks about the German supremacy in intelligence, Stalin, at some point, came to see weaknesses in German military doctrines. He was critical of the nineteenth-century German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz who played down the significance of espionage. A remark Stalin made on Clausewitz after the Second World War is revealing. Without specifically questioning Clausewitz’s views on intelligence and deception, Stalin asserted in 1946 that the German strategist’s doctrine was “outdated”:

    In the course of the last 30 years, Germany has twice forced the bloodiest kind of wars upon the world, and both times it was defeated. Is this accidental? Of course not. Does this mean that not only Germany as a whole but its military ideology as well has failed to stand the test? No doubt about it...It would be ridiculous to take lessons from Clausewitz today.⁶²

Whether Hitler and his commanders actually understood and properly followed Clausewitz’s doctrine may be subject to debate, but they all certainly believed that they were disciples of Clausewitz. Even though Nazi Germany sought to utilize total espionage as a prerequisite of total war, it fell far short of doing so. Working as a spy may have entailed the highest accolades in the Soviet Union, but in Germany, intelligence work and espionage did not bring with it the same prestige as, say, operations.⁶³

    In the end, Germany could not and did not carry out total espionage. The fates of its advocates are noteworthy. Hess’s career ended with his still mysterious flight to Scotland in May 1941, just weeks before the invasion of the Soviet Union. He spent the remainder of his life in captivity. Karl Haushofer never joined the Nazi party and committed suicide after the Second World War. His son Albrecht was executed in 1945 for his involvement in the July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life. Nazi ideology itself vastly underestimated the competence of the Soviet military forces in all areas of intelligence, operations, and logistics.

    Despite his occasional alarmist warnings, Stalin was in fact confident throughout almost his entire reign. Contrary to Stalin’s assertions, few foreign agents in fact penetrated the Soviet Union. However, Stalin’s confidence, tinged with deep suspicion, doomed him to disaster on at least one important occasion, however: in 1941 Stalin distrusted his own spies and ignored their warnings that Hitler was on the verge of attacking the Soviet Union. Stalin failed to follow his own warning: “An intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby-horse on which you will ride straight into a self-made trap.” Stalin found himself in exactly such a trap in June 1941, as Wehrmacht troops crossed into the Soviet Union.

    This disaster did not diminish the extraordinary effectiveness of Stalin’s intelligence services. The Soviet practice of international espionage, more than any other country’s at the time, embodied total espionage. What truly distinguished Soviet practice, however, was its “total counterespionage.” However brutal German and Japanese counterespionage operations may have been, they came nowhere close to the extent and scope of Soviet mass killings as the ultimate weapon of counterespionage. (Wartime atrocities committed by Japan and Germany, as well as those of the Soviet Union, are a separate matter.) As Stalin made clear in 1937, he would not accept even a 5 percent chance of infiltration. Therefore, in 1937 and 1938, Stalin targeted and slaughtered en masse certain groups of people, such as former kulaks, ethnic Poles, Germans, Finns, and Latvians. He regarded anyone who showed the slightest possibility of political disloyalty as a foreign agent. The unparalleled terror that Stalin then unleashed took close to a million lives in the search for ultimate security—and nearly destroyed his own espionage machine.

NOTES

        1. For Stalin and his foreign intelligence apparatus, see Christopher Andrew and Julie Elkner, “Stalin and Foreign Intelligence,” in Redefining Stalinism, ed. Harold Shukman (London: Frank Cass, 2003), and I. A. Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka (Moscow: Veche, 2004), 69–94.

        2. I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, t. 1 (14) (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1967), 219.

        3. Tadeusz Kobylański, the former Polish military attaché in Moscow and later chief of the Foreign Ministry’s Eastern Department, is said to have been recruited by the Soviets in the 1920s. See A. Papchinskii and M. Tumshis, Shchit, raskolotyi mechom NKVD protiv VChK (Moscow: Sovremennik, 2001), 293. When his recruiter, the famous Polish spy turned Soviet agent I. I. Dobrzyński (Sosnovskii) was arrested as a Polish spy, Kobylański also became a suspect. A recent Russian account claims that Kobylański, recruited through his homosexual encounters, remained faithful to the Soviet secret service. His post-1939 fate has not been determined. Also, I. Svechenovskaia, V posteli s vragom (Moscow: Neva, 2005), 35–37.

        4. S. V. Leonov, “Istoriia sovetskikh spetssluzhb 1917–1938 gg. v noveishei istoriografii (1991–2006),” Trudy Obshchestva izucheniia istorii otechestvennykh spetssluzhb, t. 3 (Moscow: Kuchkove pole, 2007), 23.

        5. Voennyi sovet pri Narodnoi komissare oborony SSSR. 1–4 iiunia 1937 g. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008), 130–36. Stalin’s 5 percent remark even became the title of an academic book: Francis-Xavier Nérard, Cinq pour cent de vérité: la dénonciation dans l’URSS de Staline, 1928–1941 (Paris: Tallandier, 2004).

        6. Curt Riess, Total Espionage (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1941).

        7. See Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Accounting for the Great Terror,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 53, no. 1 (2005), 86–101.

        8. Here I have relied on an online translation, with some changes, from the Yale University Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/tri2.asp. The original is in Theo Sommer, Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935–1940: Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimächtepakt (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1962), 494.

        9. For an English version of the text (slightly modified here), see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/tri3.asp; the German original is in Sommer, Deutschland und Japan, 499.

        10. The original agreement is at Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjo Toshokan (Tokyo) (hereafter BBKT). See Hiroaki Kuromiya and Georges Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion: The Caucasian-Japanese Nexus,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 6 (2009), 1415–40, from which the following passages draw.

        11. Ibid., 1427.

        12. Ibid., 1427–8.

        13. Ibid., 1428.

        14. Ibid.

        15. On the Caucasus Group, see Georges Mamoulia, “L’histoire du groupe Caucase (1934–1939),” Cahiers du monde Russe 48, no. 1 (2007), 45–86.

        16. Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 40. For Japan’s engagement with the Promethean movement in 1937, see Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1971), 266–68, and Georges Targalski, “Les plans polonais concernant l’éclatement de l’URSS, le mouvement ‘Prométhée’ et le Caucase,” Bulletin de l’Observatoire de l’Asie centrale et du Caucase 3 (1997), 14, and for 1938, see Hiroaki Kuromiya and Paweł Libera, “Notatka Włodzimierza Baczkowskiego na temat współpracy polsko-japońskiej wobec ruchu prometejskiego (1938),” Zeszyty historyczne 169 (2009), 114–35.

        17. Even what appears to be the most detailed account of Stalin’s terror against the Red Army does not mention the agreement: Paweł Piotr Wieczorkiewicz, łańcuch śmierci: Czystka w Armii Czerwonej, 1937–1939 (Warsaw: Rytm, 2001). On the Polish-Japanese disinformation campaign against Tukhachevsky, see Hiroaki Kuromiya and Andrzej Pepłoński, “The Great Terror: Polish-Japanese Connections,” Cahiers du monde russe 50, no. 4 (2009), 647–670.

        18. Tukhachevsky’s execution coincided with a meeting of Canaris and Major-General Makoto Onodera, the Japanese military attaché in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. When the news of the execution reached the attaché’s office in Riga, Latvia, the office staff celebrated it as an event that signaled serious turmoil within the Soviet Union. That same day, Ōshima, Major Shigeki Usui (Colonel Takanobu Manaki’s predecessor at the special Berlin office), and Major Yoshihide Katō(military attaché in Finland) “just so happened to visit Onodera’s office.” See Yuriko Onodera, Barutokai no hotori nite: Bukan no tsuma no daitōasensō [On the banks of the Baltic Sea: The great East Asian war seen by the wife of a Military Attaché] (Tokyo: Kyōdō Tsūshinsha, 1985), 54. Canaris’s visit is mentioned in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG263 (CIA subjects file: “Japanese in Europe (World War II),” Folder II). I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey Burds for supplying a copy of the folder to me.

        19. Natal’ja Ablažej, “Die ROVS-Operation in der Westsibirischen Region,” in Stalinismus in der sowjetischen Provinz, 1937–1938: Die Massenaktion aufgrund des operativen Befehls no. 00447, ed. Rolf Binner, Bernd Bonwetsch, Marc Junge (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010), 287. ROVS refers to the emigré organization Russian General Military Union (Russkii Obshchevoinskii Soiuz), which Japan and Germany both supported. Both Japan and Germany maintained consulates in Novosibirsk, the capital of West Siberia until 1937, when they were both forced to close down.

        20. Yuriko Onodera, “Onodera Makoto Rikugun shōshō no jōhō katsudō 1935–1946” [The intelligence work of major-general Makoto Onodera] (a manuscript available at Tokyo University Historiographical Institute, Tokyo), 33

        21. For the Polish-Soviet border crossings, see “Umeda Masao ikō” [The posthumous manuscripts of Masao Umeda], vol. 3, Yasukuni Kaikō Bunko (Tokyo) and for the Turkish-Iranian-Soviet border crossings, see Mamoulia, “L’histoire du groupe Caucase,” 67–74.

        22. Onodera, Barutokai no hotori nite.

        23. Manaki’s reaction quoted in Seiichi Nakata, Tōchō Nīnīroku Jiken [Wiretapping: The 26 February incident] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 2007), 131.

        24. See Kuromiya and Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion,” 1431.

        25. Hiroaki Kuromiya and Andrzej Pepłoński, Między Warszawą a Tokio: Polsko-Japońska współpraca wywiadowcza 1904–1944 (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2009).

        26. For more, see, for example, Jeffrey Burds, “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists’: The Case of Chechnya, 1942–4,” Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 2 (2007), 267–314, and Andrzej Pepłoński, Wywiad Polski na ZSRR 1921–1939 (Warsaw: Bellona-Gryf, 1996).

        27. Tsutao Ariga, Nihon rikukaigun no jōhō kikō to sono katsudō [The intelligence structure of the Japanese army and navy and their activity] (Tokyo: Kindai bungei sha, 1994).

        28. See Johannes Glasneck and Inge Kircheisen, Türkei und Afghanistan—Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik in zweiten Weltktieg (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968). For Soviet points of view, see Iurii Tikhonov, “Deiatel’nost’; nemetskoi i iaponskoi razvedok sredi basmachstva severnogo Afganistana (1935–1943 gody),” Dialog [Moscow] 4 (2000), 66–76.

        29. Alex Marshall, “Russian Intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (2007), 693, which is the best treatment of the subject in English.

        30. Ibid. For a Russian account, see Igor’ Kravtsev, Iaponskaia razvedka na rubezhe XIX–XX vekov (Moscow: Karpov, 2004).

        31. Riess, Total Espionage, vii.

        32. On Haushofer, see Bruno Hipler, Hitlers Lehrmeister: Karl Haushofer als Vater der NS-Ideologie (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1996).

        33. Riess, Total Espionage, 86–95. According to Riess, who fled his native Germany in 1934, Hess’s treatise was classified in 1935 or 1936. As far as we can judge, this particular episode is not discussed in any of the works on Haushofer and Hess. See, for instance, Hipler, Hitlers Lehrmeister, and Kurt Pätzgold and Manfred Weissbecker, Rudolf Hess: Der Mann an Hitlers Seite (Leipzig: Militzke, 1999). We have not been able to locate Hess’s study of Japanese intelligence. It is likely that the study was actually written by Haushofer’s son Albrecht on Hess’s behalf. See Richard Deacon, Kempei tai: A History of the Japanese Secret Service (New York: Berkley, 1985), 182–83 and 283.

        34. See Kuromiya, “Accounting for the Great Terror.”

        35. On Mongolia, see Mandafu Ariunsaihan (Mandah Ariunsaihan), “Mongoru ni okeru daishukusei no shinsō to sono haikei” [The truth about the Great Terror in Mongolia and its background], Hitotsubashi ronsō 126, no. 2 (2001), 190–204; on Xinjiang, see Daoheng Lang, “Wosuo zhidao de ‘Xinjinag wang’ Sheng Shicai” [The king of Xinjiang Sheng Shicai I knew], Xinjiang Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, vol. 2, n.d., 10.

        36. See, for instance, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

        37. Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 112–37.

        38. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little Brown, 1994), 12–29.

        39. D. V. Viedenieiev and H. S. Bystrukhin, Mech i tryzub. Rozvidka i kontrrozvidka rukhu ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv ta UPA (1920–1945) (Kiev: Heneza, 2006), 122. Poluved’ko later worked in Kharkiv during the German occupation, but was later exposed as a Soviet agent and hanged.

        40. Kuromiya and Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion,” 1438.

        41. See Andrzej Pepłoński, Wywiad polskl na ZSSR 1921–1939 (Warsaw: Bellona-Gryf, 1996), and Kuromiya and Pepłoński, “The Great Terror.”

        42. Stalin’s instructions are in the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii, f. 558, op. 1, d. 1594, l. 1.

        43. K. Kirilovich, “Shpiony za rabotoi,” Izvestiia, 26 April 1937, p. 3.

        44. Nikita Petrov and Mark Jansen, “Stalinskii pitomets”—Nikolai Ezhov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008), 291.

        45. Lubianka. Stalin i Glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopasnosti NKVD, 1937–1938 (Moscow: MFD, 2004), 660.

        46. Related to a Polish diplomat by Karl Radek, see Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Warsaw), I.303.4.3158, fol. 235.

        47. Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 238.

        48. Notable in this respect is Stalin’s use of private emissary David Kandelaki in 1935–1937. See M. M. Narinskii, “Missiia D. Kandelaki v berline i sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia (1935–1937 gg.),” in 200 let MID Rossii (Moscow, MGIMO, 2003), 173–83, and N. A. Abramov and L. A. Bezymenskii, “Osobaia missiia Davida Kandelaki,” Voprosy istorii 4–5 (1991), 144–56. Bezymenskii (as Lew Besymenski) published a slightly different version of this essay in German as “Geheimmission in Stalins Auftrag? David Kandelaki und die sowjetisch-deutschen Beziehungen Mitte der dreißiger Jahre,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 40, no. 3 (1992), 339–57. The German version is online at the website of the Institute of Contemporary History (Munich): http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/1992_3.pdf

        49. A first-hand account by Saburō Hayashi, “Wareware ha donoyōni taiso jōhō kinmu o yattaka” [How we served in anti-Soviet intelligence work], available at BBKT.

        50. “Podryvnaia rabota iaponskoi razvedki,” Pravda, 9 July 1937, 4.

        51. Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XX veke, t. 4, kn. 1 (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2000), 199. Stalin’s remark was given during an informal dinner in the Kremlin. Chinese records do not contain this remark. See Zhonghua min guo zhong yao shi liao chu bian—dui Ri kang zhan shi qi. Di 3 bia, Zhan shi wai jiao [Important historical sources of the Republic of China, first series: The period of the anti-Japanese war of resistance, vol. 3] (Taipei: Jing xiao zhe Zhong yang wen wu gong ying she, 1981), 407–08.

        52. Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 200.

        53. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Unionand the Threat from the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 94.

        54. Quoted in Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead, 28–29.

        55. Kuromiya, Stalin, Profiles in Power (Harlow: Longman, 2005), 160.

        56. Petrov and Jansen, “Stalinskii pitomets,” 291.

        57. Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 10.

        58. Kuromiya, Stalin, 152.

        59. Voennyi sovet, 308.

        60. Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 205.

        61. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, t. 3 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 17.

        62. Stalin, Sochineniia, t. 3 (16) (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1967), 31–32. Despite Germany’s second defeat in a generation, Clausewitz’s reputation remained untarnished even within the Red Army, where the Prussian military theorist still had many disciples. This remark by Stalin was in fact a response to Colonel Evgenii Razin, a professor at the Frunze Military Academy, who had written to Stalin for a clarification of his views on Clausewitz. See Roy Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin: His Life, Death, and Legacy (Woodstock, NY: Overlook, 2003), 183–89.

        63. See the Epilogue in David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1978), especially 528–34.

4

The Polish Underground under Soviet Occupation, 1939–1941

Rafał Wnuk

The history of Polish resistance to the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland began on 17 September 1939, when the Red Army crossed the Polish-Soviet frontier. In the 1920s and the 1930s, neither Germany nor the Soviet Union accepted the peace settlements that had followed the First World War. For different reasons, each was a revisionist power, discontented with the European order established at the peace conferences in Paris in 1919 and in Riga in 1921. This applied especially to the treaties’ provisions concerning Polish borders, which leaders in Berlin and Moscow believed should at the very least be revised. In April 1922, by the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo, the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union agreed to normalize diplomatic relations and to “cooperate in the spirit of mutual goodwill in meeting economic needs.”¹ They mutually renounced territorial and financial claims against one other and embarked on a phase of cooperation that helped both reduce their international isolation and rebuild their economic and military potential. The Rapallo agreement thus represented a first attempt at Soviet-German cooperation, but it had largely run its course by the early 1930s.

    After Adolf Hitler came to power in late January 1933, the gradual decline in state-to-state relations between Germany and Soviet Union continued until that autumn, when the German dictator finally made it clear that contacts with Moscow were to be limited to what was necessary to keep tensions at a minimum. It had been well known of course that anti-Communism was a central tenet of Nazi ideology, but the extent to which it would affect official German foreign policy took some time to emerge. In response, Joseph Stalin introduced a change in Soviet foreign policy. In previous years, the Communist International (Comintern) had striven for ideological purity and had ordered Communist parties in Europe to struggle against other parties of the left. Starting in 1934, they were instead to build popular fronts and cooperate with other left-wing parties to protect European republics from Fascism and ultimately to protect the Soviet Union as the homeland of revolution. The enemy of the Soviet Union was defined as Fascism, represented chiefly by Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, but also by reactionary movements around the world. When civil war broke out in Spain in the summer of 1936, the Soviet Union and Germany supported opposing sides, making the conflict a kind of proxy war between two ideologies. In November of that same year, Germany and Japan signed an agreement, the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was publicly directed against the Comintern, but its secret protocol (and the protocol’s appendices) was aimed at the Soviet Union.

    The prospect of a general European war brought the Soviet Union and Germany back together. After rebuilding the German military and remilitarizing the Rhineland, Hitler began presenting himself as the protector of Germans in Europe. He was able to annex all of Austria in March 1938 and the outer rim of Czechoslovakia in November 1938 without firing a single shot. After seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia and annexing the territory known as Memelland from Lithuania in the spring of 1939, Hitler demanded the Free City of Danzig and an extraterritorial corridor across Poland. Polish leaders made clear that such territorial concessions to Germany were out of the question, and that German aggression would be met with resistance. The Polish refusal to meet these demands was backed by Britain and France, whose leaders offered guarantees to defend Poland’s independence. Hitler’s response was to renounce the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

    Throughout the summer of 1939, the possibility of war between Germany and Poland loomed large. France and Britain sought to bring the Soviet Union into some sort of arrangement against Germany, but even when acting in concert, they had little to offer Moscow by way of incentive. Poland, for its part, refused to acquiesce to the Soviet demand that Soviet troops be permitted to pass through Polish territory; it was feared that the Red Army, once in Poland, might not leave. Although negotiations continued well into August, the field was wide open for Moscow and Berlin to reach an accommodation.

    Hitler dreamed of the conquests in the Soviet Union, but in the short term, he wished to avoid repeating Germany’s mistake from the First World War, namely, a war on two fronts. The Reich also needed raw materials and foodstuffs, goods the Soviet Union could provide. Stalin, for his part, believed war to be inevitable, but wanted it to be fought among the capitalist powers in western and central Europe. If Germany, France, and Britain exhausted themselves in a major conflict, this would not only improve the Soviet Union’s overall position in Europe, but it would also open the possibility of exporting Communism to the west.

    A Soviet proposal to resume economic negotiations was accepted by the Germans in May 1939, after Stalin replaced his foreign minister Maxim Litvinov, who was of Jewish origin, with his closest associate Viacheslav Molotov, who was Russian. The turning point, however, came at a dinner meeting between German and Soviet trade officials on 26 July, when the German official present floated the idea of a German-Soviet settlement concerning their political interests and assured his interlocutors that he was speaking not only for himself.

    By this point, the Wehrmacht was fine-tuning its plans for an attack on Poland, and Hitler was increasingly in need of an agreement with Stalin. Stalin, who was in less of a hurry, chose to keep Hitler waiting until the outcome of a major offensive against Japan in the Soviet-Japanese Border War. By 22 August, the Red Army’s victory was assured. The next evening, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was in Moscow for neogtiations that ended in a ten-year nonaggression pact signed some time after midnight.

    Included in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was a secret protocol by which Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states would be divided into German and Soviet “spheres of influence.” Each power was free to seize its share without facing repercussions from the other. Berlin received Lithuania and western Poland (initially up to the San, Vistula, and Narew rivers). Estonia, Latvia, Finland, eastern Poland, and northeastern Romania (Bessarabia) fell to Moscow’s “sphere of influence.” Thus ideological enemies became political and military allies. Hitler no longer had to fear a prolonged two-front war. Against both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, the Polish Army had no chance. Hitler could feel confident that the campaign in Poland would be over before the British and French could intervene in the west. Stalin could be certain that war in the west was indeed inevitable. Both dictators had achieved their aims.

    On 1 September 1939, the Wehrmacht invaded Poland from the north, west, and south. Military aid from Britain and France did not materialize, despite assurances that such assistance would be forthcoming within two weeks. On 17 September—in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s secret protocol, but only after the Germans had already destroyed most of the Polish Army—the Red Army attacked Poland from the east. By 6 October, the invaders had gained full control over Poland. In the meantime, on 28 September, Ribbentrop and Molotov had signed the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty, which redrew the spheres of influence: Lithuania was transferred to the Soviets, and the territory between the Vistula and Bug rivers was turned over to the Germans.

    By the terms of the new agreement, both sides gained approximately half of Poland’s territory, but only somewhat more than 35 percent of prewar Poland’s population had fallen to the Soviet Union. German-occupied Poland was 85 percent Polish and 10 percent Jewish, with small groups of Germans and Ukrainians making up the rest. Soviet-occupied Poland by contrast was made up of a complex mixture of nationalities and religions. According to the 1931 census, roughly thirteen million people lived in the voivodeships (regional-level administrative units) of Białystok, Wilno, Nowogródek, Polesie, Volhynia, Tarnopol, Stanisławów, and Lwów—the voivodeships directly affected by Soviet rule²—about twelve million of which ended up under Soviet rule. The nature of the 1931 census—which was based on mother tongue and religious affiliation—and the fact that identity was very much in flux among Belarusians and Ukrainians makes it difficult to determine precisely the population of the borderlands by nationality. Of these twelve million, Poles and Ukrainians³ each accounted for roughly 35 percent, with Jews and Belarusians making up about 10 percent each. In addition, 6 percent of the population in the kresy (Poland’s eastern borderlands) defined itself simply as “people from here” (tutejsi), that is, not in terms of a nationality. The remaining population was German, Czech, Lithuanian, Russian, and Tartar.

    At the regional level, the problem was more complicated. Poles held a significant majority only in Białystok Voivodeship and a slim majority—just over 50 percent—in Wilno Voivodeship. In Volhynia, Stanisławów, and Polesie voivodeships, Poles accounted for less than 17 percent of the population. In the voivodeships of Tarnopol and Nowogródek, Poles made up just over one-third of the population. Without taking into account the Soviet-Nazi demarcation line, Poles and Ukrainians approached parity in prewar Lwów Voivodeship, although in rural areas, Ukrainians were more populous than Poles. Large urban centers, such as Lwów and Wilno, had absolute majorities of Poles, while Jews made up the second largest population group. The majority of eastern Poland’s smaller urban areas had the character of a Jewish shtetls. Throughout the voivodeships of eastern Poland, the Jewish share of the population fluctuated between 7.8 percent (Nowogródek Voivodeship) and 12.3 percent (Białystok Voivodeship).⁴

    Further complicating the situation were the different paths of development taken in the century before 1918. The northern half of Soviet-occupied Poland had been under Russian rule from 1795 until 1918, but the three voivodeships in the south had been under Austrian rule from 1772 until 1918. When the Polish border was settled in early 1922, the western Belarusian lands were cut off from most of Belarus, and Volhynia, a historically larger region in and of itself, was severed from its eastern half and the rest of Ukraine. People were forced to reorient themselves to a new country, a new government, a new economy, new rules and regulations, and new administrators. In the northern half, Belarusian speakers (or speakers of the local dialect) could not help but keep an eye on the east, although a sense of national identity was not highly developed. In Volhynia, nationally conscious Ukrainians could not help but feel out of place inside Poland. And in Galicia, interethnic tensions were especially acute after the Polish-Ukrainian War over this region in 1918–19.

    Polish nationality policy between the wars failed to find the right mixture of central government and national self-determination to convince the nationalities that they had a positive stake in the Polish Republic, as opposed to a negative one, namely, that Poland was not the Soviet Union. Well before 1939, nationalism in these eastern territories had posed a political challenge for the Polish state. Some circles among the Belarusians and Ukrainians had aspirations that went as far as statehood, which posed a threat to Poland’s territorial integrity. Neighboring Lithuania laid claim to Wilno and a strip of territory along the Polish-Lithuanian border. Like their Belarusian and Ukrainian neighbors, many Jews, especially those in the pre-1918 Russian areas of eastern Poland, did not identify strongly with the Polish state.⁵ These ethnic tensions were in turn exacerbated by the economic situation. The borderlands had an overwhelmingly agricultural economy and were among the most impoverished regions of prewar Poland. Thus, for most of the interwar era, Soviet propaganda enjoyed a certain appeal throughout the borderlands.

    With the annexation of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union, the Poles (as well as the Soviets) understood that some anti-Communist movements among the national minorities in the east had their own underground movements. These groups, whose aims could be accomplished only at the expense of the interwar Polish state, could be expected to resist the prospect of a return to Polish rule, as well as the continuation of Soviet rule. Therefore one goal of the Polish underground was to infiltrate the movements of the national minorities. Simultaneously, the Polish underground in eastern Poland, first on its own initiative, then on instructions from central headquarters in Warsaw or from the exile government in Paris (later London), sought to make contact with representatives of the national minorities, especially activists and commanders from secret anti-Communist organizations. Such efforts did not succeed.

In September and October 1939, numerous local conspiratorial organizations were formed on the territory of eastern Poland. The most important were: the Service for Poland’s Victory (Służba Zwycięstwu Polski, SZP) and the Polish Organization for the Struggle against the Enemy (Polska Organizacja Walki z Wrogiem, POWW). Starting in late 1939, the underground in the Soviet-occupied Polish territories was consolidated within the framework of a new organization, the Union for Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ), earlier than in central Poland.⁶ The first ZWZ cells in the eastern borderlands were established in December and eventually organized into two territories (obszar), one headquartered in Lwów and the other in Białystok. Within each obszar, the structure of the ZWZ was based on the country’s prewar administrative divisions. ZWZ regions (okręg) corresponded to prewar voivodeships, districts (obwód) to the counties (powiat), and the outposts (placówka) to towns (miasto) and their surrounding area or groups of villages and communities in the countryside (wioska and gmina). The Wilno Region ZWZ, which was created on the territory ceded by the Soviet Union to Lithuania, was subordinated directly to the ZWZ leadership in France (due to the exile government’s wish to control the Wilno group and to cultivate relations with Lithuania).

    Although the ZWZ network covered almost the entire expanse of occupied Poland by early spring 1940, the command in the Soviet-occupied east was never really centralized. The Polish government in exile was in Paris, but this was a poor position from which to direct ZWZ operations. Because this arrangement quickly turned out to be ineffective, the decision was made in early 1940 to create a ZWZ command in Soviet-occupied Poland. This, however, was too late in coming. The NKVD, the Soviet state police, proved able to prevent such a reorganization.⁷ Because a unified ZWZ command structure could not be established throughout the Soviet-occupied zone, and because communication with Warsaw and Paris was extraordinarily difficult, regional commanders were most influential in shaping the organization.

The Lwów Territory ZWZ

The first Polish conspiratorial cells were established in the Polish Ukrainian borderlands as early as 17 September 1939. With the surrender of Lwów to Soviet forces on 22 September, a group of conspirators under the command of General Marian Żegota-Januszajtis founded the Polish Organization for the Struggle against the Enemy (POWW). It was the first organization to plan an underground network throughout the territory that the Soviets called “western Ukraine,” lands that had been in Poland’s four southeastern voivodeships. The POWW formed a basis for what would soon become the ZWZ. In the first phase of its existence, the Polish underground was scattered, consisting of dozens if not hundreds of small groups. Finding their way to one another without running into the NKVD or competing underground operatives posed a major problem. Nonetheless, in principle at least, most of these groups were soon brought together under a single organization.

    The NKVD was very quick to collect its first information on the Polish underground. As early as 3 October 1939, Vsevolod Merkulov, the deputy people’s commissar for internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and Ivan Serov, the commissar for internal affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, informed Lavrentii Beria, the people’s commissar for internal affairs of the Soviet Union, that “through eavesdropping on conversations in the streets, it becomes clear that in Lviv [Lwów] there exists an organization preparing an armed insurrection whose commander is former general of the Polish Army and active member of the ‘Endecy’ (National Democrats)⁸ Januszajtis.”⁹ An intensive search for Januszajtis was soon underway, and by late October, he had been captured. General Mieczysław Boruta-Spiechowicz succeeded Januszajtis as leader of the POWW, but in November, he too was arrested. After Boruta-Spiechowicz’s arrest, a split occurred. Two officers—Lieutenant Colonel Władysław Żebrowski and Colonel Jerzy Dobrowolski—both aspired to command the POWW. The emergence of such competition came right at the moment of transition to the ZWZ and the arrival of envoys from two independent underground organizations in Lwów in December 1939: Alfons Klotz from SZP headquarters in Warsaw and Tadeusz Strowski from ZWZ headquarters in Paris. As a result, two rival Polish underground organizations arose in Lwów: ZWZ-1 (Żebrowski), which was loyal to Paris, and ZWZ-2 (Dobrowolski), which was loyal to Warsaw.

    The difference between ZWZ-1 and ZWZ-2 can be understood only against the backdrop of the contest between the two major political trends in Poland. Since the 1890s, Polish political life had been largely oriented around the competition between Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski. The first was associated with conspiratorial socialism, the second with nationalism and mass education. In the first years after Poland reestablished indepedence, Dmowski had led the most popular party, the National Populist Union (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy), but Piłsudski had forced his way back into power via a coup in May 1926. After Piłsudski’s death in 1935, Poland was ruled by a group of people associated with Piłsudski and his legacy. This political camp, known as the sanacja—“sanation,” meaning healing—was largely discredited by Poland’s swift defeat in 1939 and the Polish government’s flight abroad. Within the Polish government in exile, followers of Piłsudski and Dmowski each held portfolios. Back in Poland, however, the competition between the two camps often flared up and, in the case of the ZWZ in Lwów, resulted in irreconcilable differences. ZWZ-1, which was made up of adherents of Dmowski’s political thought, was a mass organization with 10,000 to 15,000 members, while ZWZ-2, which consisted of about 2,000 of Piłsudski’s followers, favored conspiracy.

    From December 1939 to March 1940, ZWZ-1 built up an organizational structure in Galicia and Volhynia, which the Soviets had since incorporated in Soviet Ukraine. Founded as a mass organization, ZWZ-1 claimed 12,000–17,000 members by spring, with cells in most former county administrative centers. The leaders of ZWZ-1 were mainly activists and sympathizers of the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN), another Dmowski-inspired party, which had replaced the National Populist Union in 1928. This party had promoted the Polonization of the Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities and had been anti-Semitic in its ideology. ZWZ-1 was formed as a Polish national movement, but because it expanded so quickly, it could not be well concealed. ZWZ-2, on the other hand, built up a skeletal structure of 1500–2000 members, primarily in Lwów and its environs. Its network was created with care, although there were some supporters of mass recruitment among the leaders of this organization. In addition, ZWZ-2 sought allies among the minorities, primarily the Ukrainians.¹⁰

    The leaders of ZWZ-1 and ZWZ-2 remained bitter rivals. In both networks, key posts were held by political activists, while professional soldiers and those who had received proper training played a secondary role.¹¹ Both organizations tried to gain political legitimization by cooperating closely with local representatives of the prewar parties working in the underground political committees. Both focused on building structures, disseminating propaganda, and engaging in intelligence work, while refraining from armed struggle.¹² The one exception was an incident in Czortków on the night of 21–22 January 1940, in which three Red Army soldiers were killed. In the days that followed, 128 conspirators were arrested, of whom at least twenty-one were sentenced to death and executed. This incident seems to have been the result of an ill-considered initiative by local leaders. A connection with either ZWZ in Lwów or any other conspiracy command has not been established.¹³ That said, the Czortków incident was the first Polish uprising of the Second World War.

    Whatever the advantages of either faction’s approach, the NKVD systematically broke up the Polish networks in the Lwów region. It achieved its first successes by gathering valuable intelligence from senior POWs in detainment. The turning point, however, came in January 1940, when NKVD border guards captured two ZWZ couriers coming from Paris to Lwów, the brothers Stanisław and Józef Żymierski. The mail they were carrying was also seized. In their exhaustive statements, the Żymierski brothers disclosed a great deal of information about the people in ZWZ-1 and its organizational structures. They also provided the codes for the radio station of ZWZ-1 in Lwów. This station, which was used to maintain contact with Polish authorities in Paris and then London, was the only ZWZ station in occupied eastern Poland.¹⁴ A later report revealed: “The statement of [the] Żymierski [brothers] enabled NKVD officials to familiarize themselves with the organizational structure of the ‘ZWZ,’ its patterns of activities, and then to plant an NKVD agent inside the organization.”¹⁵ This success (for the NKVD) was not a chance detention. Before the war, Stanisław Żymierski had been recruited by brother Michał, a former general of the Polish Army, into a Soviet intelligence network active in Poland.¹⁶ The information gained from the Żymierskis proved invaluable to the NKVD.¹⁷

    Over the course of seven months, from April to November 1940, the NKVD was able to take control of the leadership of ZWZ-1. Soviet agents were planted throughout ZWZ-1. Then the leaders of ZWZ-1 were arrested and some recruited as double-agents. The commander of ZWZ-1 (Lieutenant-Colonel Emil “Kornel” Macieliński), the chief of communications, the chief of the intelligence network, and probably a few other members of the general staff all became NKVD agents. By the end of 1940, ZWZ-1 was completely under Soviet control.

    ZWZ-2 fared little better. The NKVD also had an agent in ZWZ-2 headquarters in the person of Andrzej Gola, the chief of the group’s intelligence section. Thus the leaders of ZWZ-2 were also under constant surveillance, and the organization’s lines of communication were under Soviet control.¹⁸

    The Soviets’ long-term goal was to take charge of the Warsaw Territory ZWZ command. NKVD documents suggest that the Soviets wanted to use the ZWZ to disrupt the rear of the German armed forces in the event of war with Germany. In the longer term, NKVD agents within the ZWZ and Poles who had resigned themselves to the fact that there was no alternative to cooperation with the Soviets were to be used to create a Communist Polish state.

    The ZWZ commander in German-occupied Poland, General Stefan “Grot” Rowecki, suspected that a part of the Lwów Territory ZWZ was under NKVD control and was deeply troubled by the situation. To clarify the situation, he appointed Colonel Leopold “Mrówka” Okulicki, one of his best officers, commander of ZWZ-1 in the Soviet-occupied Polish territories and sent him to Lwów in late October 1940. Okulicki set out for the east using an illegal route prepared by Bolesław Zymon, the acting commander of the Wołyń Region ZWZ, who had probably been an NKVD informant since May. From the moment Okulicki crossed the German-Soviet border, he was under the watchful gaze of the NKVD.¹⁹

    Okulicki did not trust Macieliński, the head of the Lwów Territory ZWZ-1. When he arrived in Lwów on 2 November 1940, he avoided ZWZ-1 meeting points and refrained from making direct contact with Macieliński. Nonetheless, he did meet with some of Macieliński’s collaborators. These discussions confirmed his suspicions about Macieliński, and based on these, he demanded that ZWZ-1 staff break off contact with Macieliński.²⁰ Despite his certainty regarding Macieliński, or perhaps because of it, Okulicki was arrested in the night of 21–22 January 1941. Thus this final attempt to disrupt NKVD infiltration of the Lwów regional ZWZ failed.

    Farther north in Volhynia, a ZWZ network was established by members of the prewar People’s Association of Volhynian Youth (Ludowy Związek Młodzieży Wołyńskiej). Although technically under Lwów Territory ZWZ, this network was independent of the rival Lwów ZWZ organizations and operated de facto on its own. The political and social thinking of the leaders of this ZWZ was based on the ideas of former voivodeship governor Henryk Józewski, who had promoted a concept of political, not national, assimilation of the Ukrainians there. This ZWZ organization, under the leadership of Colonel Tadeusz “Śmigel” Majewski, defined itself in civic rather than national terms; in its network of 300–500 members, there were even several dozen Ukrainians. In May 1940, Majewski established contact with the ZWZ-1 command. A few days later, he was arrested and his network destroyed.²¹

    In the second half of 1940, ZWZ-1 and ZWZ 2 had only small networks of 100–200 people each, almost completely limited to the city of Lwów. By June 1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the Polish underground in Galicia and Volhynia had ceased to exist. After the Germans replaced the Soviets, ZWZ structures in Volhynia and Galicia had to be built from scratch.

The Białystok Territory ZWZ

In the former Białystok Territory ZWZ, the situation was different. Here the underground was set up from the start as a conspiratorial military organization and involved officers who specialized in diversion tactics. Of all the voivodeships under Soviet rule, Białystok was the most Polish. In early October 1939, the commander of the 110th Uhlan Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Jerzy Dąmbrowski, allowed the soldiers under his command to return home. With about a dozen volunteers, he formed a group of partisans in the Soviet-occupied half of what had been interwar Augustów County and organized a clandestine network to support them. This was probably the first Polish partisan unit established under Soviet occupation. Between November and December 1939, Dąmbrowski crossed over into Lithuania, where he was detained. The unit subsequently suspended operations, while its clandestine network became part of the ZWZ.²²

    Around the same time, the SZP command in Warsaw began to organize an underground network in this region. Even before the fighting had stopped in September 1939, Lieutenant-Colonel Franciszek “Krak” Ślęczka had started to organize an underground network in Białystok Voivodeship. By November, Lieutenant Antoni “Nieczuja” Iglewski was forming conspiratorial organizations in this region on behalf of the SZP.²³ With the establishment of the underground in the ZWZ, the Białystok Territory ZWZ was to be made up of the regional ZWZ organizations in the former voivodeships of Białystok, Nowogródek, and Polesie. In practice, only a Białystok Region ZWZ was developed. By the spring of 1940, its network numbered 4000–5000 people.

    In the ZWZ districts of Łomża, Augustów, Grajewo, and Bielsk Podlaski, a guerrilla movement emerged. In all likelihood, the largest ZWZ partisan camp at that time took shape in the Jedwabne area, on Kobielno, an island in the marshlands, in March 1940, where about 100 partisans were garrisoned. On 23 June 1940, the NKVD and the Red Army attacked the base, and after heavy fighting, during which the Soviets suffered heavy losses, the island was captured. Ten defenders were killed and nine captured, but the rest succeeded in retreating to the swamps and continued their struggle right up to the German invasion.²⁴ The existence of the underground and the partisans was well known among the Polish population. Their ability to elude the NKVD, their reprisals against collaborators, and their raids on the Soviet police made an enormous impression on the population. They showed that Soviet rule was not total, and that the NKVD was not omnipotent. The underground gave hope and sustained the spirit of resistance. This situation lasted from early spring to late 1940. This organization gradually declined, but it managed to survive until June 1941.

    In October 1940, the ZWZ central command sent Lieutenant Colonel J. “Maciej Samura” Spychalski and two of his staff officers, Captain Jan “Prawdzic” Szulc and Captain Władysław “Mścisław” Liniarski, to Białystok. Theoretically, Spychalski was the commander of the Białystok Territory ZWZ, but, as noted above, his command was de facto limited to the Białystok Region ZWZ. In February 1941, the NKVD arrested Spychalski and four of the five district leaders.²⁵ Szulc, and later Liniarski, served as commander of the Białystok Territory ZWZ. The organization, though weakened, nevertheless remained intact and operational until the German invasion, thus providing organizational continuity in the resistance to Soviet and then German rule.²⁶

    The Germans also exercised some influence on the evolution of the ZWZ in the Soviet-occupied Białystok area. In the Soviet half of prewar Augustów County, the Polish resistance was known as Polish Liberation Army–Union for the Armed Struggle (Polska Armia Wyzwoleńcza–Związek Walki Zbrojnej, PAW-ZWZ) after a merger of two groups in June 1940. The history of the PAW-ZWZ sheds some light on German policy toward the resistance in the Soviet-occupied territories. Most likely in May 1940, German border guards captured a group of ZWZ members attempting to flee Soviet-occupied Poland for German-occupied Poland. These men were promptly turned over to the Suwałki station of the Abwehr (German military intelligence), where they were given a choice: they could be transferred to the NKVD, or they could work for the Germans as Abwehr informants. Thus the Germans took control of this group. In August 1940, however, the Białystok Territory ZWZ headquarters realized what had happened and broke off contacts with the PAW-ZWZ until the NKVD rendered the latter inoperative in March 1941.²⁷

    In another case, the Germans pulled off a similar operation, but this time, the infiltration was thwarted. In the Białystok Region, the ZWZ had a rival in the Battalions of Death of the Borderland Riflemen (Bataliony Śmierci Strzelców Kresowych, BSSK). This group was armed and very active, with about 1000 people, mostly locals. In many villages, the BSSK made the work of Soviet officials impossible. The Abwehr managed to gain control of the BSSK, but the Białystok Territory ZWZ headquarters again managed to learn of the German penetration and took effective countermeasures. The BSSK members who had been in contact with the Germans were arrested, although some escaped to the General Government, the German-occupied lands not formally annexed to the Reich. In the spring of 1941, the BSSK was merged into the ZWZ.²⁸

    These two examples of collaboration with the Germans call to mind other Abwehr operations in eastern Europe. The Abwehr helped to develop and then to exploit underground organizations of other nationalities that fell under Soviet occupation through the partition of Poland or the annexation of the Baltic states. The Abwehr provided financial and organizational support to Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Ukrainian conspiratorial organizations. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, these organizations assisted the Wehrmacht with intelligence work, interpreting, diversionary actions, the capture of Red Army stragglers, and anti-Jewish pogroms. The BSSK and the PAW-ZWZ did provide intelligence to the Abwehr, but they did not side with the Germans in combat operations against the Soviets. There is also no evidence in the known primary sources to indicate that Polish conspirators took part in pogroms against the Jewish population, whether instigated by the Germans (often the case in prewar Polish Belarus) or by locals (often the case in prewar Polish Ukraine).

    As for the ZWZ cells in regions of Nowogródek and Polesie, they did not have any contact with the Białystok Territory ZWZ. They operated instead in conjunction with the ZWZ centers in Wilno or Lwów. Here a very large number of people identified with region or religion rather than with a nationality. Unlike in Białystok Voivodeship, where Poles enjoyed a clear majority over Belarusians (roughly 4:1), Poles were a minority vis-à-vis the Belarusians and the non-nationally conscious locals (tutejsi) in Polesie Voivodeship (roughly 1:4.5), but in Nowogródek Voivodeship, Polish speakers edged out Belarusian speakers, while Orthodox believers were more numerous than Roman Catholics. The ZWZ tried to build up an organization in Nowogródek, but with unsatisfactory results. ZWZ envoys could establish only a few units in the larger towns, but at best, these numbered perhaps 1500–2000 people. They exerted no real influence on the surrounding society.²⁹ The relative weakness of the ZWZ in Polesie and Nowogródek left room for local organizations. In early 1940, numerous small local groups with little or no connection to a central headquarters or nationwide underground structures began to appear. Conspiracy in the former Nowogródek and Polesie voivodeships thus had an insular character. The NKVD eliminated most Polish organizations, but some of them lasted until the German offensive.

    The NKVD in the Nowogródek Region planned to apply the same methods used elsewhere in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland—arrest, detain, turn—but was not always successful. For example, Colonel Adam Obtułowicz was dispatched to Nowogródek from Wilno with the task of building a ZWZ network. At the beginning of October 1940, he was arrested by the NKVD. After a few weeks, he was freed, having promised to work as an NKVD agent. Obtułowicz, however, tried to elude his NKVD “protectors” and to warn his compatriots. Before the Soviets could capture him again, Obtułowicz committed suicide.

Polish Resistance in Wilno Region

Events followed a different course in what had been Wilno Voivodeship. Wilno, the eastern borderlands’ second city in terms of size and significance, and the surrounding region were not immediately annexed by the Soviet Union. Instead, they were turned over to independent Lithuania, which had claimed these lands throughout the interwar period. Only in the summer of 1940, when Lithuania itself was annexed by the Soviet Union, did this region come under Soviet rule, remaining a part of Lithuania but within the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.

    The first Polish conspiratorial organizations in Wilno were established in September 1939 and by January 1940 had been merged into the Wilno Region ZWZ, which embraced the prewar Polish lands incorporated into Lithuania. By November, the ZWZ had built up a strong network in the greater Wilno, area numbering 4500–5000 members. It was initially led by Colonel Adam Obtułowicz (until his arrest in October 1940) and then Lieutenant-Colonel Nikodem Sulik. Although the Wilno Region ZWZ was the joint creation of several political groups, it was organized along military lines, and party activists had little influence on decision making. The structure of the ZWZ here drew on Polish Army regiments stationed in the area before the war. The city of Wilno played a central role, but the network was also very active in villages and small towns.

    In June 1940, the Red Army marched into the Baltic states and Wilno was captured by the Soviets for a second time.³⁰ Once Lithuania was integrated into the Soviet Union, there were no longer any political or diplomatic constraints to prevent the Poles from expanding the Wilno Region ZWZ network, whether in prewar Lithuanian territory or in that part of Wilno Voivodeship incorporated into Soviet Belarus. As a result, units affiliated with the Wilno Region ZWZ briefly flourished in central Lithuania and in western Belarus. In the second half of 1940, the ZWZ attempted to reach a cooperative agreement with Jewish and Lithuanian underground groups and representatives of the Belarusian elites, but only the Lithuanians were interested in anti-Soviet agitation. In the spring of 1941, the NKVD arrested several hundred ZWZ members, among them Sulik. Some people lost contact with their organizations; some went into hiding. Major Antoni Olechnowicz, the new commander, decided to suspend ZWZ activity and organizational contacts temporarily. This was the state of affairs in the Wilno Region ZWZ when Germany attacked the Soviet Union.³¹

With few exceptions, the Polish underground was not a difficult adversary for the NKVD during the first year of occupation. There are several reasons for this. For example, the networks built up in 1939 and first half of 1940 (before the fall of France) were created as a conspiratorial structure of limited perspective. ZWZ leaders in occupied Poland and the Polish exile government in Paris believed that France and Great Britain would defeat Germany in the spring of 1940, and that the war would be over by mid-1940. The NKVD was greatly aided by this conviction, as most conspiratorial networks arose on the assumption that they had to hold out only for a brief time. The result was insufficient caution and planning. Networks were allowed to develop a popular character, and conspiratorial principles were too often ignored.

    Of greater significance, however, were the features of the Communist system that broke down preexisting social ties. All aspects of daily life were under control via the nationalization of the economy, the drastic restrictions on movement beyond one’s home area, and the vast networks of NKVD informants. At the same time, the Soviets, unlike the Germans, did not isolate themselves from the local community. They gave their repression the semblance of legality. There were no executions in the streets, no public announcements of reprisals. People just disappeared. The Soviets tried to create a semblance of normality. They did not close down universities and schools. On the contrary, they opened new ones—although the education on offer included Communist indoctrination. Some people, especially those from the poorest classes, saw in Communism an opportunity to improve their lives. The Soviet system thus created a wide sphere of collaboration, a kind of “grey area,” which in turn made underground activity unusually difficult.

    Colonel Okulicki, in a January 1941 report to General Rowecki, wrote: “the NKVD governs people’s lives, and the NKVD is everywhere; it is depraving weaker people. Compared with the NKVD, Gestapo methods are childish.”³² Perhaps the opinion is unfair. Okulicki had spent a year under German occupation in the General Government and only two months under Soviet occupation. The situation of Polish clandestine organizations in the territories annexed into Germany and the situation of Polish clandestine organizations in the territories incorporated into the Soviet Union was similar for many reasons (mass deportations, the destruction of elites, the appropriation of personal and public property, repression, and surveillance). If the conditions for conspiratorial work in the General Government are compared with the conditions for conspiratorial work in the lands under Soviet occupation, Okulicki’s opinion holds.

    Between September 1939 and June 1941, about 25,000–30,000 people passed through the ranks of the Polish underground in the Soviet-occupied territories. Of these, some 80 percent were in the ZWZ and its short-lived forerunner, the SZP. The vast majority joined such organizations during the first six months of the occupation. At the start of 1940, the Polish underground in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland had forces comparable to those of the underground in the General Government. This is worth noting, because there were half as many ethnic Poles in the east as in the General Government; Poles accounted for just under 40 percent of the population in Soviet-occupied Poland, but just over 80 percent of the population in the General Government. The nature of their predicament did not escape the Poles under Soviet rule.

    The Polish underground was numerous at the beginning and then weakened over time. In some areas, it was virtually eliminated. In Galicia and Volhynia, losses occurred rapidly; in other areas, they were spread out over a longer period of time. In the winter of 1940–41, the Soviets were able to arrest most ZWZ commanders and thousands of their rank-and-file co-conspirators. Consequently, most operations were suspended, whether by decision or attrition. In the spring of 1941, networks of 1500–3000 people existed only in the Białystok and Wilno regions. Elsewhere, the Polish underground, if it existed, was only marginal. On the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Polish underground had at most 5000–6000 people at its disposal.

    NKVD operations against the Polish underground were carefully prepared and thought out. The first aim was to eliminate individuals and social groups who the Soviets considered likely to resist occupation. This aim was achieved through the arrest and deportation of social and political activists, ranking civil servants, policemen, settlers (persons, often military veterans, who had acquired land in eastern Poland), foresters, scout instructors, and other “potentially dangerous people.” At the same time, the NKVD took control of underground organizations by cultivating networks of double agents and by gleaning information from prisoners. Once the extent of a given organization was known and its members identified, the NKVD then moved to arrest the greatest possible number of commanders and rank-and-file members.

    The NKVD held rank-and-file conspirators in prisons and barracks near their area of operations. Thus it was possible to draw on them in parallel operations and investigations. Senior commanders and persons considered particularly dangerous were sent to prisons in the capital cities of the republics or to larger cities in the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian Soviet republics. There they were interrogated by more experienced NKVD officials. Polish commanders with the rank of colonel or general, after an initial investigation, were usually directed to the notorious Lubianka prison in Moscow. Thus an important objective of initial interrogations was the selection of detainees.

    Local organizations without foreign contacts were eliminated in their entirety. The ZWZ, however, was treated differently, as it was a nationwide organization and was affiliated with the Polish government in exile. In this case, the NKVD sought to take control of the organization. By using a ZWZ run by its own agents, the NKVD hoped to gain access to secret information from the ZWZ central command in Warsaw and the Polish government in exile. Cells controlled by the NKVD were to supply Polish commanders with disinformation as it suited Soviet interests. In the end, the entire ZWZ would be a Soviet puppet.³³

    A remarkably accurate analysis of the situation was provided by Colonel Marian Smoleński, a former director of military intelligence in prewar Poland. In September 1941, after analyzing the dispatches from occupied Poland and interviewing senior officers freed from Soviet prisons, Smoleński wrote:

    the NKVD was trying to infiltrate completely our conspiratorial military work under the f[ormer] Sov[iet] occupation in order to use the ZWZ in the fight against the Germans, eliminating in the process not only any kind of anti-Soviet attitude but also, what seems certain, to create a pro-Soviet orientation in the Homeland. At any rate, assisting in our organization of a conspiratorial army in Poland was definitely not in the interest of the NKVD.

Smoleński added:

    I do not doubt that the overwhelming majority of ZWZ officers imprisoned by the GPU [i.e., NKVD] will not agree to cooperate with the NKVD when they are back in Poland; knowing, however, the methods used by the NKVD, one must expect that many officers can be forced to work for the NKVD, given the threat of being betrayed to the Germans by means of a provocation. (Undoubtedly, the NKVD left behind in Poland a well-organized apparatus, which will be able to carry out its orders well.)³⁴

Only since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the release of numerous NKVD documents has it become clear just how accurate this diagnosis and prediction were.

    Did the resistance lead to excessive losses of the society? Among the conspirators, the number of those arrested was very high. However, many of those involved in the underground would have been arrested or deported for their social class or political convictions even if they had not in fact been members of the Polish underground. According to official, but probably incomplete Soviet data, during the Soviet occupation of 1939–41, the secret police deported about 315,000 Polish citizens into the Soviet interior, mainly to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Among them were 181,200 Poles (57.5 percent), 69,000 Jews (21.9 percent), 32,900 Ukrainians (10.4 percent), and 24,000 Belarusians (7.6 percent). About 100,000 Polish citizens, some 60 percent of whom were ethnic Poles, were detained in prison. The chances of arrest or deportation were quite high, especially for Poles. Jews were more likely even than Poles to be arrested and deported, although the vast majority of Jewish victims were not locals, but rather those who had fled the German occupation.

    In areas where a guerrilla movement did emerge—in the ZWZ districts of Łomża, Augustów, Bielsk Podlaski—partisan life in the forests gave a handful of men a greater chance of survival than submitting to arrest and deportation. Within Soviet-occupied Poland, the number of people deported into the Soviet interior from areas of robust conspiratorial activity, e.g., western Białystok region, does not significantly surpass the number of people deported from areas where the conspiracy functioned poorly, such as the area in and around Lwów. With regard to Soviet policy, which aimed to eliminate rival elites, active resistance did not contribute to the escalation of repressions. But only in a few cases did the underground prove an effective self-defense mechanism.

    By June 1941, the NKVD had arrested about 18,000 conspirators. More than half of the former 25,000–30,000 members of the Polish underground were dead or in prison when Germany invaded the Soviet Union.³⁵ Many conspirators captured during 1940 were categorized as “dangerous elements” and deported into the Soviet interior. A clear majority of those arrested were given sentences of at least several years in prison camps, and many of those sent to prison camps received terms as long as twelve years. Only a small percent of captured conspirators were sentenced to death. However, losses incurred as a result of prison or camp conditions could be estimated at 60–70 percent of the conspirators.

    Those who were in west Ukrainian or west Belarusian prisons in June 1941 were at particular risk when the Germans invaded. On the first day of the German-Soviet war, 108 prisoners sentenced to death were executed in Lwów. Similar executions also took place in other cities that were within range of the German air force. These mass executions resulted from a decision made by Beria, who on 24 June 1941 ordered the execution of all prisoners who had already been sentenced to death, as well as those detained for “anti-Soviet” or “counterrevolutionary” activities, “sabotage,” or “diversion.”³⁶ We do not know exactly how many people were shot as a result. In June 1941, many people were found in the prisons who were not yet listed on the register of those arrested. The NKVD destroyed a large part of its documents. Albin Głowacki estimates that the Soviets killed about 7 percent of some 16,500 prisoners (slightly more then 1,000 persons) in NKVD prisons within the territory of western Belarus; in the territory of western Ukraine, about 50 percent of approximately 20,000 detainees (10,000–11,000 persons) were killed. Fewer people were shot in the northeast, because the Germans advanced so quickly. To the number of those shot by the NKVD, we must add an unknown number of those who perished during forced marches to the east. Under strict supervision, most of the remaining prisoners were marched single-file for several days without rest. Those who could not keep up the pace were killed on the spot.³⁷

    Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and Belarusians were found among the NKVD’s victims in this final chapter of the first Soviet occupation. After all, the Polish underground had not been the only conspiratorial movement operating within Soviet-occupied Poland between 1939 and 1941. And since the annexation of eastern Poland, the NKVD had also had to deal with conspiratorial organizations in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The NKVD had to struggle on several fronts, but the existence of these groups also worked to the Soviets’ advantage. After all, the aspirations of the nationalities could be fulfilled only at the expense of the Poles, thus providing a useful lever for disinformation and provocation. The exploitation of nationalism (the unification of almost all Belarusians and almost all Ukrainians in their own single political entity) alongside a formal equality of rights for all ethnic groups (a guarantee that opened up job opportunities in the police and administration that had previously off limits to non-Poles) bred more distrust between Poles and non-Poles. The interethnic antagonisms on the ground sometimes outweighed fear of the occupier. Thus the NKVD was able to apply a similar operational pattern across the board: infiltrate, usurp control, arrest.

    Consequently, on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, the spirit of resistance among the people living in the Soviet-occupied territories had been weakened and the national underground movements had become almost “transparent” to the NKVD. As historian Wojciech Zajączkowski wrote: “If history had given the Communists a little more time—a year or eighteen months—they certainly would have succeeded in sorting out the entire western borderlands according to their own plan. But the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 thwarted those intentions.”³⁸

NOTES

        1. “German-Russian Agreement (Treaty of Rapallo),” Artcle 5, Yale Law School, Yale Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/rapallo_001.asp.

        2. Three counties from Warsaw Voivodeship with a population of 210,000 also ended up in the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941.

        3. In the census, 24.2 percent of population is described as Ukrainian and 8.8 percent as Ruthenian.

        4. In Białystok Voivodeship, Poles made up around 71 percent of the population, Belarusians 14.5 percent, Jews 11.9 percent. In Wilno Voivodeship, Poles accounted for ca. 52 percent of the population, Jews 8.5 percent, Orthodox believers (Belarusians and tutejsi) 32 percent. In Nowogródek Voivodeship, Poles constituted about 34 percent of the population, Orthodox believers (Belarusians and tutejsi) 58.3 percent, Jews 7.8 percent. In Polesie Voivodeship, Poles were 11.2–14.5 percent of the population, with the dominant element being the Orthodox population (77.4 percent), whose national consciousness leaned toward Belarusian or, less frequently, Polish identity; 19.3 percent considered themselves Ukrainians; Jews made up ca. 10 percent. In Volhynia Voivodeship, where Poles amounted to 15.5–16.5 percent of the inhabitants, Orthodox believers (mainly Ukrainians and a certain percentage of tutejsi) accounted for ca. 69 percent of the population and Jews for 10 percent. In Tarnopol Voivodeship, Poles represented 37 percent of the population, Ukrainians 54.5 percent, and Jews 10 percent. In Stanisławów Voivodeship, Poles represented ca. 16.5 percent of the population, Ukrainians 72.9 percent, and Jews 9.5 percent. In Lwów Voivodeship, Poles constituted 46.5 percent of the population, Ukrainians ca. 41.8 percent, and Jews 10.9 percent. See Jan Kęsik, “Struktura narodowościowa woj. wołyńskiego w latach 1931–1939,” in Przemiany narodowościowe na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczpospolitej 1931–1948, ed. Stanisław Ciesielski (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2003), 53–92, here 67; Grzegorz Hryciuk, “Zmiany ludnościowe i narodowościowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1939–1948,” inCiesielski Przemiany narodowościowe, 149–249, here 149–73; Aleksander Srebrakowski, “Struktura narodowościowa kresów północno-wschodnich II Rzeczpospolitej w latach 1931–1939,” in Ciesielski Przemiany narodowościowe, 127–48, here 130; Kazimierz Krajewski and Tomasz Łabuszewski, Białostocki Okręg AK–AKO VII 1944 –VIII 1945 (Warsaw: Volumen,1997), 6.; Historia Polski w liczbach. Ludność. Terytorium, ed. Andrzej Jezierski et al.(Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1994), 163; “Zachodnia Białoruś,” 17 IX 1939–22 VI 1941, t. 1: Wydarzenia i losy ludzkie 1939, ed. Bernadetta Gronek, Glina Knatko, Małgorzata Kupiecka (Warsaw: Rytm, 1998).

        5. Ezra Mendelsohn, Żydzi Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w okresie międzywojennym (Warsaw: PWN, 1992), 40, 45–46. “W czterdziestym nas matko na Sybir zesłali...” Polska a Rosja, 1939–1942, ed. Jan Tomasz Gross, Irena Grudzińska-Gross (London: Aneks, 1983), 31–33.

        6. Union of Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ) was the codename of the Polish Armed Forces during the Second World War from 13 November 1939 to 14 February 1942. Initially, the ZWZ was subordinated to the Polish government in Paris. General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who was based in Paris, oversaw the initial division of Polish underground into two parts: one in the German zone of occupation, under Colonel Stefan Rowecki, and based in Warsaw, and one in the Soviet zone of occupation, under General Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz and based in Lwów. In March 1940, Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz was arrested by the NKVD while crossing the demarcation line between the General Government and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the ZWZ command in the Soviet zone of occupation remained unoccupied. On 30 June 1940, Władysław Sikorski, the prime minister in exile, ordered the creation of the Main Command of the ZWZ at Home and appointed Rowecki its commander. This order transferred military authority to the hands of officers located in Poland. On 14 February 1942, the ZWZ was reorganized into the Home Army (Armia Krajowa).

        7. NKVD is the Russian abbreviation for the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del) and is used for shorthand to denote the Soviet secret police. In February 1941, however, the NKVD Main Directorate for State Security (Glavnoe upravlenie gossudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, GUGB) was transformed into an independent institution, the People’s Commissariat for State Security (Narodny komissariat gossudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, NKGB). After the German invasion, the NKGB was merged back into the NKVD until April 1943. Thus, for the months February 1941 to July 1941, NKGB would be technically correct, but for the sake of simplicity, NKVD is maintained throughout this chapter.

        8. The term used here, “Endecy,” was a widely used form of Polish shorthand for national democrats and was commonly applied to the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN). The party took shape in the wake of a reorganisation of the National Populist Union (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy) in 1928. In the second half of the 1930s, radicals seeking to combine Catholic principles with nationalism gained the upper hand in the party executive. SN was a strong advocate for Polonization of the non-Polish (chiefly Ukrainian and Belarusian) populations in Poland’s eastern borderlands. Anti-Semitism was an key element of SN ideology.

        9. “Dopovidna zapiska zastepnika narkoma vnutrishnikh sprav SRSR W. Merkulova ta narkoma vnutrishnikh sprav URSR I. Serova narkomu vnutrishnikh sprav SRSR L. Berii pro agenturno-slidczu rabotu w m. Lvovi, 3 zhovtnia 1939 r.,” Radians’ki Orhany Derzhavnoi Bezpeky u 1939–chervni 1941 r. Dokumenty HDA SB Ukrainy, Bil’she ne taiemno, t. 3 (Kiev: Kyievo-Mohylianska Akademiia, 2009), 214.

        10. Jerzy Węgierski, “Zdrajcy, załamani, zagadkowi (próba oceny zachowań wybranych oficerów konspiracji polskiej w Małopolsce Wschodniej aresztowanych w latach 1939–1941)” in Chmielowiec, Okupacja sowiecka ziem polskich, 17–30; Elżbieta Kotarska, Proces czternastu (Warsaw: Volumen, 1998), 72–74, 128–30.

        11. Antoni Lenkiewicz, Zapomniany Pułkownik (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Linowski i Orzechowski, 1992), 70–74; Jerzy Węgierski, Lwów pod okupacją sowiecką, 1939–1941 (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1991), 33–36.

        12. Rafał Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta, Polska konspiracja na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczpospolitej (wrzesień 1939–czerwiec 1941) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Linowski i Orzechowski, 2007), 57–58, 70.

        13. Rafał Wnuk, “‘Powstanie Czortkowskie’ 21 I 1940,” Zeszyty Historyczne 194 (2004), 23–43.

        14. “Protokół przesłuchania Łozowskiego, on-że Żymierski, Stanisław s. Wojciecha; Protokół przesłuchania Nagalskiego, on-że Żymierski, Józef s. Wojciecha,” in Polskie podziemie na terenach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi w latach 1939–1941, cz. 2: Materiały śledcze (Warsaw, Moscow: Rytm, 2001), 831–87.

        15. “Raport 4 Oddziału Zarządu NKGB ZSRS dotyczący wyników działań agenturalno-operacyjnych przeciwko polskiemu podziemiu za lata 1939, 1940, 1941, Kwiecień 1941,” in Polskie podziemie, cz. 2, 653.

        16. Jerzy Poksiński, “TUN.” Tatar-Utnik-Nowicki (Warsaw: Bellona, 1992), 208–10; Daniel Bargiełowski, Po trzykroć pierwszy. Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz Generał broni, teozof, wolnomularz, kapłan Kościoła liberalnokatolickiego, t. 2 (Warsaw: Rytm, 2001), 269.

        17. After the Second World War and the Communist takeover of Poland, Michał Żymierski was promoted to marshal, the highest rank in the Polish Army.

        18. Rafał Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta, 35–113.

        19. Studium Polski Podziemnej, BI, Protokół rozprawy odbytej dnia 21 października 1941 r. przed Sądem kapturowym dla PZP przy Komendzie Głównej w Warszawie w sprawie Bolesława Zymona “Bolka” “Waldy Wołyńskiego.”

        20. “Meldunek sytuacyjny o położeniu ZWZ na terenie okupacji sowieckiej, 10 IX 1940,” in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, 1939–1945, t. 2 (Wrocław, Warsaw, Cracow: Ossolineum, 1990), 66.

        21. Rafał Wnuk, “ZWZ na Wołyniu 1939–1941,” in Chmielowiec, Okupacja sowiecka ziem polskich, 31–51.

        22. Tomasz Strzembosz and Rafał Wnuk, Czerwone Bagno. Konspiracja i partyzantka antysowiecka w Augustowskiem, wrzesień 1939–czerwiec 1941 (Gdańsk, Warsaw: Scholar, 2009), 59–74.

        23. Zdzisław Gwozdek, Białostocki Okręg ZWZ-AK (X 1939–I 1945), t. I, Organizacja (Białystok: Biblioteka Rubieży, 1993), 14–15.

        24. Tomasz Strzembosz, Antysowiecka partyzantka i konspiracja nad Biebrzą X 1939–VI 1941 (Warsaw: Neriton, 2004), 118–85.

        25. Sergei Belchenko, “Na belostokskom napraleni,” in Front bez linii fronta (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1970), 20–21.

        26. Gwozdek, Białostocki Okręg, 128.

        27. Strzembosz and Wnuk, Czerwone Bagno, 138–45.

        28. Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta, 236–54.

        29. For more about the Nowogródek Region ZWZ see Kazimierz Krajewski, “Zarys działalności Okręgu ZWZ-AK Nowogródek,” in Dopalanie Kresów, Nowogródzki Okręg AK w dokumentach (Warsaw: IPN, Rytm, 2009), 16–21.

        30. The Soviets took Wilno for the first time in September 1939, but turned it over to Lithuania on 28 November, but maintained Red Army garrisons in the Wilno area.

        31. Longin Tomaszewski, Wileńszczyzna lat wojny i okupacji, 1939–1945 (Warsaw: Rytm, 1999), 156–57; Wanda Krystyna Roman, Konspiracja polska na Litwie i Wileńszczyźnie, wrzesień 1939–czerwiec 1941 r. (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2001), 72–76.

        32. “Po 22 stycznia 1941 r. [Moscow]. Tłumaczenie skonfiskowanego przez NKWD we Lwowie raportu sytuacyjnego L. Okulickiego dla S. Roweckiego,” Polskie podziemie, cz. 2, 475.

        33. Generally speaking, Soviet operations against the ZWZ drew heavily from their operations Trust and Syndicate against White Russian emigrés or Delo 39 against Ukrainian emigrés in Poland. These operations took place in the early 1920, see Christoper Andrew and Oleg Gordiewskij, KGB (Warsaw: Bellona, 1990), 92–102; Wasilij Mitrochin, Archiwum Mitroichna: KGB w Europie i na Zachodzie (Warsaw: Rebis, 2001), 74–79.

        34. “Płk Smoleński do gen Roweckiego: odpis instrukcji gen. Sikorskiego informującej gen. Andersa—ostrzeżenie przed NKWD,” Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, t. 2, 57.

        35. Other losses were caused by flights to the General Government, Hungary, and Romania (several hundred people) or by fighting (several dozen to 100).

        36. Albin Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków na ziemiach wschodnich II Rzeczpospolitej, 1939–1941 (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego), 299.

        37. O zjawisku mordów NKWD na więźniach poświęcona więcej patrz: B. Musiał, Rozstrzelać elementy kontrrewolucyjne! Brutalizacja wojny niemiecko-sowieckiej latem 1941 r. (Warsaw: Fronda, 2001), 93–122.

        38. Wojciech Zajączkowski, Rosja i narody. Ósmy kontynent. Szkic dziejów Eurazji (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo MG, 2009), 208.

5

Soviet Economic Policy in Annexed Eastern Poland, 1939–1941

Marek Wierzbicki

The invasion of eastern Poland by Soviet troops in September 1939 was quickly followed by the imposition of the Soviet economic system in those territories. It was a system whose main features were hardly a decade old and were in many respects still a brutal experiment, and it was a system that was completely alien to the people it affected. The result of forcing this system on eastern Poland was the mass disruption of economic life and impoverishment of the population at large in the Polish territories occupied by the Soviet Union.

    As dramatic as this development was, the economic aspect of events in eastern Poland between 1939 and 1941 has been largely neglected by historians, including those in Poland. During the Communist era, Polish historians could not conduct research on the Soviet occupation of Poland; since 1989, research on this topic has tended to focus on political and military affairs, as well as the deportations from these lands between September 1939 and June 1941. Most of the publications on the economic aspects of this chapter of Polish history appeared only in the 1990s.¹ With time, these were followed by a few microhistorical works.² Beyond Poland, these issues were also touched upon by historians in Israel, Great Britain, and Canada.³

    This post-Communist research on the economics of the Sovietization of Poland’s eastern borderlands (kresy) does not stand completely alone. This body of work was preceded mostly by a number of titles published in the Soviet Union. However, these studies presented the official economic history of the “western oblasts (regions or provinces) of the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics,” as the Soviets called the annexed territories of eastern Poland. Unfortunately, the conclusions drawn in these publications have little to do with reality, because their authors frequently omitted sources that contradicted what is a far too optimistic, if not fully distorted, version of events.⁴ Thus research into the economic history of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland remains at a very early stage.

    Over the decades since 1939–41, this lack of solid, detailed scholarly research contributed to the emergence of contradictory images of Soviet economic policy in the kresy. Poles who experienced the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in those years associate Soviet economic policy with the never-ending plunder of private and state property. They usually recall how their standard of living deteriorated significantly under Soviet rule, mentioning in particular the ubiquitous queues for goods. After nearly two years of the Soviet occupation, the kresy had been stripped and left impoverished. This negative image of Soviet economic policy is recorded in thousands of testimonies given by the former inhabitants of these territories during and after the Second World War. A completely different image of Soviet economic policy was ingrained upon the memory of Soviet society. Even two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the economic transformations that took place under Soviet rule are still positively assessed by some people in independent Belarus and Ukraine. They recall industrialization, the construction of roads and railways, the eradication of unemployment, and the rapid development of these territories vis-à-vis the progress made in the prewar Polish state.

    The image of economic history under the Soviet occupation in the historical awareness of Israeli academics contains a kind of synthesis of its positive and negative aspects. They depict the seizures, expropriations, and reprisals (all of which affected the more affluent Jews), the speculation and smuggling and the measures taken by Soviet authorities to combat such developments, and the destitution and lack of prospects for Jewish refugees from the German zone of occupation. Nonetheless, they also take note of the social promotion of poorer Jewish classes, which was connected with the opening up of job opportunities in the administration, police apparatus, and managerial offices in industry and commerce.⁵

    Which image of the Soviet economic policies is closer to the truth? How did local communities and specific groups of professions react? Why did the Soviets do the things they did?

The Interwar Period (1918–39)

The prewar Polish state was a poor, agricultural country whose pre-1914 territories—in Germany, Austria, and Russia—never fully recovered from the loss of their imperial markets and the devastation of the First World War. Polish agriculture was extremely backward and landholdings were dispersed. There were huge disparities between small, inefficient farms and large estates consisting of thousands of hectares. The agrarian reforms of 1919 and 1920 aimed to reduce the size of the larger landholdings and to enable poor, landless peasants to purchase land. However, most peasants lacked resources and credit and thus failed to respond to the reforms. The limited success of these reforms was then exacerbated by the Great Depression in the years 1929–33, which drove down food prices and led many farmers to live outside the market and to consume most of what they produced. The rural population could find little work in the cities, which themselves were burdened with high unemployment. It took until 1935 for Polish agriculture to recover from the effects of the economic crisis.⁶

    The situation in other sectors of the Polish economy was not much better. The development of a unified market and financial system took a long time. Polish industry suffered from both the Great Depression and a lack of domestic capital needed for boosting output. During the Great Depression, many foreign investors pulled out of Poland, never to return. By 1933, national income had fallen by 25 percent. In 1935, about 40 percent of the labor force was out of work despite the improving situation in the countryside. Poland returned to 1913 levels of industrial output only in 1938. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1930s, there were visible improvements in Poland’s economy. In accordance with a four-year investment plan launched in 1937, development of a Central Industrial Region (Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy) in south-central Poland, between the Vistula and San rivers, got underway. A number of huge plants were built, including armaments factories in Mielec and Rzeszów, a power plant in Rożnów, and a steel mill in Stalowa Wola. In 1938, the Polish government launched a fifteen-year plan to turn Poland into an industrialized country. This ambitious project was then preempted by the German invasion and the Second World War.⁷

    By 1939, the territories that would fall under Soviet occupation—the voivodeships of Białystok, Nowogródek, Wilno, Polesie, Volhynia, Tarnopol, Stanisławów, as well as the eastern part of Lwów Voivodeship and three counties from Warsaw Voivodeship—were inhabited by 13,199,000 people, or 37.3 percent of prewar Polish population.⁸ It was a multinational territory inhabited primarily by two larger nationalities—Ukrainians and Poles—and two smaller nationalities—Belarusians and Jews—in addition to Russians, Tatars, Armenians, Germans, Czechs, and others. The territories east of the Bug and San rivers, which would later make up most of the German-Soviet demarcation line, were characterized by specific cultural, demographic, social, and economic features. In the eastern territories, industry and transportation had developed slowly, and agriculture lagged well behind that of the western and central regions.⁹

    The backwardness of the eastern territories in comparison with the rest of the country could be seen in the low productivity of agriculture. In the eastern territories, the wheat harvest averaged 11 quintal per hectare (q/ha) of arable land while in the western voivodeships, the figure was 16.7 q/ha. The rye harvest amounted to 10.6 q/ha in the east versus 14.7 q/ha in the west. An average of 104 q/ha of potatoes were collected in the east, as compared with 119 q/ha in the west.¹⁰ The amount of agricultural machinery available in the east underscores the backwardness of these lands. Nationwide, there were on average 16.5 threshing machines, 21.7 treadmills, and 66.6 chaff-cutters for each 100 ha of arable land; in the eastern territories, there were 5.2 threshing machines, 5.7 treadmills, and 34.7 chaff-cutters for each 100 ha of arable land.¹¹

    Unsurprisingly, a significant part of the population in the eastern borderlands lived in great poverty. People there were generally forced to rely on self-sufficiency and in some areas often underwent food shortages. For example, hunger regularly befell the inhabitants of Wilno Voivodeship before the spring harvest. There were as well a few major industrial centers in this part of Poland, such as the Białystok textile district, the Borysław oil basin, and a number of timber factories grouped in and around Grodno (Wilno Voivodeship) and Pińsk (Polesie Voivodeship).

Transition Period of Soviet Rule: September–December 1939

On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a treaty of nonaggression, which included a secret protocol dividing Poland between the two signatories of the main pact.¹² In Moscow, planners rushed to prepare for the invasion. German planning had been underway since April, and Hitler had already marshaled his forces along the Polish border for an attack originally scheduled for 26 August. Striving to chart the future course of political events in the Polish territories, Stalin and his colleagues hurriedly drew up guidelines concerning a wide array of economic and social issues. Soviet Politburo documents on the invasion of Poland have yet to be released, but records from the lower levels of command and administration make it possible to reconstruct Soviet intentions.

    One of the first steps to take place after the occupation of eastern Poland was to be the reconstruction of social and economic life. According to the provisions of Directive No. 01, dated 16 September 1939, from the War Council of the Belarusian Front, Red Army political officers were to establish provisional administrations in the county and regional administrative centers. These were to supervise economic life. The directive prohibited any mention of the establishment of collective farms (kolkhozy) and ordered cash transactions for goods. Planners understood that collectivization was integral to Soviet rule, but they also understood that it would not be popular. Similarly, political considerations no doubt shaped the order for cash transactions, so that the Red Army could make a good impression.¹³

    The directive was harsh in other respects. It recommended maintenance of the official 1:1 exchange rate of Polish złoty and ruble, despite the fact that the street value of the złoty had been considered 3.3 rubles. Shops were opened, wares inventoried, and proprietors ordered to sell goods at prewar prices. Persons caught hoarding goods, or raising prices, or stealing were severely punished. These measures presumably aimed to wipe out the inflationary pressures created by the war, to calm the public, and to create an impression that a period of stabilization had begun.¹⁴ The price freeze and enforced exchange rate also made Polish goods easily available to the new arrivals from the east. Red Army soldiers descended on shops, buying up everything they could find. Soviet documents show that the scale of shopping exceeded the authorities’ expectations. In fact, the authorities were quite disturbed by this development. For one, it often involved Red Army soldiers ignoring the lines outside shops or disrupting the locals’ own shopping. It also suggested (quite correctly) that the invaders had little to buy at home. Despite attempts to counteract this situation, the shopping spree lasted into October, by which point shops had been emptied anyway and a certain Soviet standard attained.¹⁵

    On 1 October 1939, the Politburo issued an important resolution concerning western Belarus and western Ukraine. A significant portion of the resolution was devoted to economic problems. As far as the banking industry was concerned, the provisional regional administrations had to appoint commissars for each bank in order to examine every transaction. These commissars were to be overseen by two plenipotentiaries of the State Bank (Gosbank), who were to reside in Belastok (Białystok) and Lviv (Lwów) and were to conduct inventories and then to recommence normal operations, including the provision of credits to industrial and economic enterprises. The Politburo resolution also prohibited the processing of any financial operations with foreign banks until express consent was given. Bank customers could withdraw no more than 300 rubles per month from their savings—and could do so only after receiving approval from the bank’s commissar.¹⁶

    In their actions, the authorities simply glossed over the fact that the occupied territories were not yet formally a part of the Soviet Union. From the first days of October, Soviet reports indicated shortages in western Belarus and Ukraine.¹⁷ The aforementioned Politburo resolution of 1 October obliged the provisional administrations to nationalize immediately enterprises whose owners had fled abroad or had “sabotaged” their property. The resolution also ordered the submission of plans for the nationalization of large enterprises and the preparation of lists of enterprises to be nationalized. The provisional administrations were instructed to open the commercial enterprises under their purview and to ensure the “normal functioning” of shops. Prices were fixed for a select group of basic goods: a kilogram of salt was to cost 20 kopeks in western Belarus (30 kopeks in western Ukraine), a box of small matches 3 kopeks, a liter of kerosene 66 kopeks in western Belarus (65 kopeks in western Ukraine), and a 50-gram packet of tobacco 50 kopeks. These prices were extremely low in comparison with prewar Polish prices. For instance, in 1935, a kilogram of salt in Poland cost 2.10 złoty, which was, at the official exchange rate, more than ten times the new official price for salt in Belarus.¹⁸

    Although the exchange rates, the bank regulations, and price controls were to control inflation and create stability, they also indirectly extracted wealth from the new territories and their inhabitants. Other measures, such as the requisition of property, made themselves felt more directly. In western Ukraine, for example, the Soviet state seized property belonging to individuals, the state, the churches, and nonstate organizations. In the countryside, seizures encompassed produce, livestock, agricultural equipment, and tools. In the urban areas, they included industrial equipment and machinery, goods in factory warehouses, building furnishings and fittings (furniture, carpets, parquets, stove tiles, doors, windows, radiators, copper sheet from roofs, etc.), automobiles, railway cars, locomotives, and military vehicles. Some of the requisitioned goods were used on site by Soviet soldiers or administrators, but the bulk was sent east. Requisitioned goods and materials were dispatched from nearly every county. For instance, 1,500 railcars of sugar were dispatched from the sugar plant in Horodenka, while drilling shafts and other machinery were taken from Boryslav (Borysław). From Volodymyr-Volynsky (Włodzimierz Wołyński), the furnishings and fittings of the local power plant and military barracks—floors, locks, and tile stoves—were taken. A similar fate met the knitting machines of the textile district in Belastok, the furnishings and fittings of the sugar plant in Ternopil (Tarnopol), the soap factory and the sugar plant in Rivne (Równe), and a large number of machines from the cement plant in Zdolbuniv (Zdołbunow).¹⁹

    The takeover of industry took place more gradually. The first step was the establishment of factory committees (sometimes called workers’ committees) in all of the larger enterprises. These supervised the activities of management or owners (unless they had left) and took part in direct management. After the requisitioning of factories abandoned by their owners, the most important task of the Soviet authorities industry was reopening production facilities not in operation. A number of factories had been closed for want of raw materials or as a result of the war. The Soviet authorities wanted these up and running again as quickly as possible. For one, they sought to have workers in these factories in time for the (stage-managed) elections on 22 October 1939, when voters in each half of Soviet-occupied Poland would choose a people’s assembly. The Soviet authorities also wished to demonstrate the superiority of “worker and peasant” rule over that of the “bourgeois landowning” Poles. There was, however, an economic imperative as well: the rapid integration of the industrial potential of the occupied territories into the Soviet economy. The first weeks, however, did not bring much success in this respect. Some plants were opened, but a large proportion of them—it is hard to say just how many—remained closed.²⁰

    Meanwhile, industry was to be nationalized. In accordance with the logic of the Soviet regime, the impetus came from the Soviet Politburo, which in the resolution of 1 October 1939 had ordered the immediate preparation (within ten days!) of guidelines (i.e., plans, lists, and procedures) for the nationalization of industry. The orders were carried out by the Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine, probably by the stated deadline. In effect, industry had already been transferred to the state and the economic system changed before the elections to the people’s assemblies in western Belarus and western Ukraine.²¹

    It was easier to take control of the small industrial sector than it was to master the enormous agricultural sector. Here the first step was redistribution. According to Polish sources, in the Polish territories incorporated to the Belarusian SSR (BSSR), 3170 estates making up 1,650,000 hectares were requisitioned.²² Of that, 430,982 ha of land, 14,086 horses, 33,400 cows, and other farm animals were distributed among peasants.²³ By Soviet sources, 2,518,000 ha of land belonging to landowners, churches, and ranking military officers were requisitioned in the Polish territories incorporated to the Ukrainian SSR (UkrSSR). By mid-December 1939, 474,000 of the poorest peasant farms had received over one million hectares of arable land from the Soviet state, 14,707 hectares of meadows and grazing land, 296 fishponds, over 45,000 horses, nearly 2000 oxen, 75,000 cows, and over 20,000 pigs. Some estates were taken over by the Red Army.²⁴ The total area redistributed by this reform is difficult to ascertain. Even Soviet sources are not fully forthcoming in this respect. One source says that 336,000 ha were redistributed in Ternopil Oblast, whereas another mentions 200,000 ha. In Stanyslaviv Oblast, the numbers range from 111,000 to 178,600 ha.²⁵

    The decisions approved at the people’s assemblies in western Belarus (28–30 October in Belastok) and Ukraine (26–28 October in Lviv) marked the culmination of the ownership transformation process in the occupied Polish territories. The two quasi-parliaments adopted a number of resolutions that retroactively authorized the changes made in the occupied territories from the first day of the Soviet invasion. A first declaration endorsed the establishment of the Soviet authority in the occupied territories. A second requested the incorporation of the occupied territories into the Belarusian and Ukrainian republics. A third resolution confirmed the confiscation of land from estates and its redistribution among poor peasants. The fourth resolution addressed the nationalization of industry and banks.²⁶ The adoption of those declarations formally initiated the unification of the occupied territories with the Soviet Union. On 1 November, the southeastern territories of the prewar Poland (western Ukraine) and, on 2 November, the northeastern territories (western Belarus) were formally incorporated to the Soviet Union.

Full Sovietization

The incorporation of eastern Poland into the Soviet Union marked the end of the transition period and the beginning of the full Sovietization of economic life. This meant the introduction of the economic system that existed in the Soviet Union, a system that had been created mostly in the course of the previous decade and that had been shaped by great violence.

    The main features of the Soviet economy were state ownership of the means of production, centralized planning, intraindustry competition, and the close supervision of factories by Communist party cells. Private ownership in agriculture was almost nonexistent. Individual farms had been replaced—at an enormous cost in human life—by collective farms, such as the kolkhozy or the huge, state-owned farms (sovkhozy). Starting in 1928 (and lasting until 1991), the entire economy was determined by the Five-Year Plan, which purported to promote the development of heavy industry, but which did so at the expense of light industry, especially consumer goods and food products. The command economy enabled the Soviets to achieve ambitious goals, in particular in heavy industrial output. Yet the system tended to generate inefficiency, to waste raw materials, to bloat bureaucracy, to encourage corruption, and to create shortages.²⁷

    The first stage of Sovietizing the Polish economy had been nationalization, the takeover of most spheres of economic life by the state. But nationalization had also been taking place when private enterprises were transformed into cooperatives (e.g., in crafts, light industry, commerce, and agriculture), as these too were controlled and subsidized by the state. The nationalization of the economy in eastern Poland was a process, lasting a few months in some sectors (industry and commerce), while never getting very far before the German invasion in others (agriculture).

    The process of nationalizing certain sections of the industry began in the first days of Soviet rule. The people’s assemblies of western Belarus and western Ukraine then accelerated that process by passing resolutions on the nationalization of industry, railways, banks, and land. Thus, by November 1939, the first steps in nationalizing specific branches of industry had already been adopted. In total, 1700 enterprises were nationalized in western Belarus, 2218 in western Ukraine.²⁸

    At the same time, smaller enterprises and workshops of craftsmen were liquidated. On 11 December 1939, the Central Committee of the Communist party in Belarus adopted a resolution bringing craftsmen, light manufacturers, and home workers into cooperatives. Similar resolutions were also adopted in western Ukraine. Craftsmen and small manufacturers were to form cooperatives (artels) and to contribute to them their tools and available raw materials. According to Soviet data, 301 artels with 9285 craftsmen had been created in western Belarus by 1 April 1940.²⁹ More precise data on the subject exists for western Ukraine. In April 1940, there were 475 artels there with 19,700 craftsmen; that August, there were 833 artels in operation with 33,500 craftsmen. By Soviet estimates, the cooperatives of the west Ukrainian oblasts amounted to 16 percent of industrial production in those oblasts.³⁰ A few private craftsmen—cobblers, tailors, hairdressers, thatchers, plumbers, and so on—were ordered by a resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars USSR, dated 19 March 1940, to apply for registration certificates entitling them to run businesses. This in fact spelled the end of private workshops and small manufacturing in eastern Poland.³¹

    The nationalization of commerce was carried out at two levels. In November 1939, a state network was created according to the Soviet model, while private commerce was destroyed. The methods used to fight shop and warehouse owners were similar to those applied to “defiant” craftsmen who tried to circumvent the new policies. High taxes were imposed, opportunities to acquire goods were curtailed, access to credit was limited, and official prices were introduced (much lower than black-market ones). Finally, severe penalties were introduced for speculation, hoarding, price increases, and so on. The number of private shops decreased rapidly in deference to state stores and cooperatives. Many shops were “reorganized” according to the Soviet model, meaning they had to participate in the cooperative system, whether Polish (Społem, Jedność), Jewish (Hema), or Ukrainian (Maslosoiuz, Tsentrosoiuz). These cooperatives, which had existed before the war, were incorporated into the Soviet Belarusian and Ukrainian cooperative systems and placed under the control of Soviet state. Thus they lost their autonomy and became similar to state-owned commercial institutions. Gradually, private shops disappeared, while state-run shops took their place. In spring 1940, there were still 1244 private shops (of 7340 on 1 September 1939) in Lviv Oblast; one year later, there were so few private shops that they were simply omitted from Soviet statistics. By contrast, state-owned commerce, which began to emerge no later than November 1939 (in Lviv Oblast it started on 11 November), developed steadily until the summer of 1940.³²

    Special attention was given to banks and other credit-lending institutions. Control over finance was seen as a weapon against private business and a means of extracting capital for the Soviet economy at large.³³ The most important short-term measure was the withdrawal of the Polish currency from circulation. On 8 December 1939, the Soviet Politburo and the Council of People’s Commissars USSR adopted a resolution stipulating that remuneration be paid out only in rubles starting on 11 December. Effective 21 December, goods in shops had to be paid for in rubles alone. Holders of złoty accounts were allowed to make a final withdrawal of 300 złoty in rubles. Their remaining złoty holdings were eliminated. Thus the Soviet state took over private savings and struck at the roots of the private economy. The introduction of the ruble in this manner ruined hundreds of thousands of people who had deposited their life savings in Polish banks. In western Ukraine, the Soviet state took over 414 banks and 1500 other credit institutions.³⁴ There is insufficient data on this process in the western Belarus. It is only known that in Belastok Oblast ninety-five banks were nationalized and replaced by branches of Gosbank.³⁵

The Sovietization of Industry

Industrial facilities in the Soviet Union were divided into three groups depending on their importance. The most important and the biggest industries and factories belonged to the first group and were managed by trade-union commissariats (ministries); the second group was made up of factories under the supervision of the Belarusian and Ukrainian republics; and the third group consisted of factories of little economic importance or manufacturing for local needs. Factories or manufacturers working in the same sector (or cooperating with it) were organized into trusts (unions), and within these trusts, industrial complexes were established. Enterprises involved in the complete or partial manufacturing process of a given product were vertically integrated within in a single industrial complex (for example, the pharmaceutical industrial complex). Accordingly, a cellulose factory constructed in Hrodno was placed under the supervision of the People’s Commissariat of Forestry, and the distillery in Volkovysk (Wołkowysk) under the supervision of the People’s Commissariat for Food Industry. The following trusts were organized in western Belarus: the union of the tanning industry in Hrodno, the union of the woodworking industry in Belastok, Pinsk, Lida, and Volkovysk, the union of plywood manufacturing and food industry in Hrodno, and the union of textile industry in Belastok, which were in turn all subordinated to the republic-level commissariats.³⁶ Some enterprises (e.g., smaller sawmills, brickyards, tile plants, and fruit processors) that used local raw materials (local industry) were under the supervision of the industrial divisions of oblast (regional) and raion (sub-regional) executive committees (state administration). In western Ukraine, the following belonged to the first group: the extractive industry plants, that is to say, oil and natural gas wells, hard coal and potassium mines, and processing plants (e.g., refineries). Their work was directed by the following unions: Ukrneftdobytsha, Ukraneftpererabotka, and Ukrgaz.³⁷

    Using central planning and local supervision, the Soviet authorities directed industrial development. Economic planning had undeniable advantages. The most important was the means of planning the development of branches of industry, taking into account the local raw material base, especially fuel, and transportation infrastructure. A great deal of time and effort was put into the extraction and processing of raw materials and the construction and development of factories and mines. Some of the latter were built from the ground up; others, already existent but dormant in the prewar period, were reopened or redeveloped. For instance, in the first half of 1940, there were eleven light industry enterprises in Lviv Oblast, including four created after the Soviet invasion.³⁸

    One way to establish a new facility was to liquidate small workshops and factories and then merge them into larger plants. This deliberate concentration of production made possible a rapid development of industry and rationalized manufacturing costs and larger investments. The reorganization of the Belastok textile district, previously made up of fifty-one enterprises employing 4935 workers, serves as an example. Of those enterprises, only thirteen employed 100–500 workers, whereas the rest employed 20–100 workers. By reorganizing and consolidating these enterprises and small textile workshops (altogether 177), the number of enterprises decreased to ten with a full production cycle and twenty-two with a partial production cycle. Their work was supervised by the local Textile Industry Union, which was headquartered in Belastok.³⁹

    Industry in the occupied Polish lands acquired new markets in the vast territories of the Soviet Union (e.g., light industry) or abroad in Germany (e.g., oil industry), where most of the oil and oil by-products of the Drohobych-Boryslav basin were sold (in accordance with the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). Steps were taken to broaden the country’s fuel base by using local brown coal, peat, and natural gas. Peat extraction was launched in Belastok and Lviv oblasts; brown coal mines were established in Zolochiv (Złoczów; Lviv Oblast) almost immediately after the invasion. Construction work on the second line of the gas pipelines Dashava-Drohobych and Dashava-Lviv represented a serious investment.⁴⁰

    Productivity, however, was low. For instance, the cost of brick and lime production in the local industry plants in Baranovichi (Baranowicze) Oblast exceeded the official prices set for those products. In the Novohrudak (Nowogródek) Raion, the cost of manufacturing 1000 bricks amounted to 240 rubles, whereas the official sales price was 175 rubles. The manufacture of a ton of lime cost 375 rubles, while the official price was 70 rubles.⁴¹ This phenomenon appears to have been quite common, with state subsidies for industry being considered normal. In the spring of 1941, the authorities of Baranovichi Oblast demanded a state subsidy for brick production for all of the brickyards within the oblast.⁴² Bad organization and poor discipline contributed to low efficiency and high consumption in manufacturing. Shortages of raw materials, fuel, and spare parts led to stoppages. Workers were not interested in their factories’ output, as their wages were not contingent on output. As a rule, the authorities largely ignored their workers and deprived them of their ability act autonomously (e.g., by liquidating independent trade unions). Workers in turn showed little initiative and responsibility. Severe penalties for theft, tardiness, and willful abandonment of the workplace failed to improve the situation.

    This organizational chaos hindered industrial development. The available Soviet and Polish sources suggest that in general most enterprises fell short of their production quotas as stipulated in the Five-Year Plan. About two-thirds of 109 references to the plan in eastern Poland that were found by the author in primary sources such as official documents and newspaper accounts (90 percent Soviet in origin) suggest that production quotas for enterprises in the occupied territories were not met.⁴³

    To alleviate labor shortages, Soviet officials resorted to radical measures. For instance, on 19 January 1941, the authorities in the Belarusian SSR introduced compulsory paid labor in those enterprises working in timber for the period 23 January to 15 March. The oblast and raion administrations had to fell 64,000 cubic meters of wood and remove 72,000 cubic meters. The compulsory labor regime applied to kolkhoz members and individual farmers; workers and state administrators were excepted.⁴⁴ Compulsory labor was also introduced in other branches of the economy, for example, in construction, which was racing to build new fortifications and airports in the annexed territories. However, compulsory paid labor was not very effective in boosting efficiency.

    The Soviet authorities also soon discovered that they had a shortage of qualified managers in the enterprises. The problem was one that the Soviets had created for themselves. After seizing the kresy, they fired or demoted the prewar managers (inasmuch as they had not fled abroad) and promoted workers into management positions without giving any attention to their qualifications. The new managers were frequently unable to run enterprises entrusted to them. Thus, in the spring of 1941, local party organizations began organizing training courses to remedy the situation. In order to staff the factories planned for the future industrial facilities in the western oblasts of Belarusian and Ukrainian SSR, the decision was made to establish vocational schools and schools of arts and crafts. For instance, on 17 May 1941, the Council of People’s Commissars in Belarus and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus adopted a resolution to bring 2530 vocational school students from the eastern oblasts of the BSSR to Baranovichi Oblast between June and August 1941. The German invasion disrupted those plans.⁴⁵

    Another means of boosting efficiency on the factory floor was competition, that is, the Stakhanovite movement—an effort to encourage workers to meet and surpass their quota by Herculean feats. This was introduced in a majority of enterprises in the kresy as early as January 1940. However, Soviet documents suggest that such competitions (and their yields) existed solely on paper and did not significantly affect production results.

The Sovietization of Agriculture

A radical change in Soviet policy toward the villages took place in early 1940. Suddenly, in December 1939, propaganda no longer praised the advantages of individual farming and the autumn 1939 agricultural reforms. In January 1940, propaganda began to promote collective agriculture as the best form of farm management. It was also at this time that the collectivization campaign got underway. The approach adopted involved a gradual liquidation of individual agricultural farms and the creation of large farms owned either by the state (sovkhozy) or groups of village inhabitants (kovkhozy). The kovkhozy were agricultural cooperatives, but like the sovkhozy, they were totally subordinated to the state.

    The first stage of collectivization was the introduction of the machine and tractor station (Mashinno-Traktornaia Stantsia, MTS). Soviet planners foresaw 101 MTS in the Polish territories incorporated to the Soviet Belarus and 174 in the territories incorporated to the Soviet Ukraine. The main task of the MTS was to provide kolkhozy with technical support and equipment, but they also provided a means of supervising the countryside. The MTS were usually located on former Polish-owned estates and settlement farms that had been seized—together with their buildings, machinery, and other equipment—and nationalized.⁴⁶ In the case of western Belarus, these assets were complemented in the second and third quarters of 1940 by a significant injection of additional machinery and tools, including the 1000 tractors, 600 tractor ploughs, 400 cultivators, 400 seeders, and 100 threshing machines. The Soviet authorities also sent mechanics, machine operators, and managers.⁴⁷

    Parallel to the development of the MTS, the Belarusian Council of People’s Commissars in January 1940 issued the resolution “On the organization of sovkhozy in the western oblasts of the BSSR,” which ordered the establishment of twenty-four state farms in the territories incorporated into the BSSR (a number expanded to twenty-eight on 2 April 1940). On 19 February 1940, the Soviet Politburo and the Council of People’s Commissars USSR formally decided the establishment of thirty-one sovkhozy in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. The state farms were to be created on the better estates. On 17 June 1940, the Soviet Politburo and the Council of People’s Commissars USSR adopted a resolution on the organization another seven sovkhozy in the territory of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus as many as thirty-eight state agricultural farms may have been founded in western Ukraine by June 1941.⁴⁸

    Meanwhile, the kolkhozy were also introduced. Here the owners were supposed to be groups of farmers, the collective. As in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, collective farming was to lead to the liquidation of individual farming in the Polish territories. This was done in part by making it difficult for private farms to survive independently. Starting in April 1940, private farms were obliged to make compulsory deliveries of foodstuffs for the state. The size of the delivery depended on the size of the farm: the largest farms were burdened most and the poorest ones least. Those farmers who could not make delivery had to abandon their farms and join the kolkhoz. This measure was followed by the establishment of land usage norms, first in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR (24 March 1941) and then in the Belarusian SSR (18 April 1941). The maximum size of a farm was thus set at 5–15 ha (depending on location). In western Belarus, this campaign deprived affluent peasants of about 540,000 ha, which were turned over to the poor and the kolkhozy.⁴⁹

    Despite considerable financial expenditures and organizational efforts, the kolkhozy failed to meet expectations. Management was as a rule poor. The everyday work of kolkhozy and sovkhozy was marked by waste, theft, and corruption. Nevertheless, the number of kolkhozy continued to grow. On the eve of the German invasion, there were 2589 kolkhozy in western Ukraine and 1115 kolkhozy in western Belarus in June 1941, which embraced only about 4 percent of agricultural land and 13 percent of farms in western Belarus.⁵⁰ The German attack on the Soviet Union brought collectivization to an abrupt end—but only for a few years.

    Most of the borderland peasants detested the idea of collective farming. They realized that entering a collective farm meant lower living standards and the loss of independence. The only group to support Soviet agricultural policy was that of the poorest, often landless villagers who had nothing to lose. Economic incentive also played a role, but most farmers did not wish to take part in this experiment; they knew that the Great Famine in Soviet Ukraine of 1932–33 had killed millions. The attitude of the rural people in the kresy toward collectivization was revealed in the first days and weeks of the German invasion. Right after the flight of the Soviet authorities, the kolkhozy quickly dissolved, and the peasants returned to individual farming. This had important consequences for the Nazi occupation, because the Germans were unable to exploit collective farms in the prewar Polish lands as they did in the prewar Soviet lands of Ukraine and Belarus. After the war, when Soviet Ukraine was starving, the uncollectivized farms of western Ukraine fed much of the Soviet Ukrainian population.

The Sovietization of Commerce

As discussed above, at the turn of 1939–40, Soviet authorities liquidated most private businesses, replacing them with their Soviet counterparts. Retailers were often forced to accept the changes by extraordinarily high taxation, which forced them to yield. The Jews of eastern Poland were hit especially hard, as they dominated crafts. Although the transformation of ownership in commerce began in November 1939, it was only on 29 January 1940 that the Council of People’s Commissars USSR adopted the law “On the organization of state and cooperative commerce and prices in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSR.” This measure established Soviet-style businesses in the occupied territories. They were to deal with the purchase of produce, the provision of necessities (food) and industrial goods, and the organization of cafeterias, warehouses, and consignment stores. The transformation was to be completed by 15 March 1940. Foodstuffs produced on one’s own could still be sold at the markets at market prices.⁵¹

    In the meantime, the food situation in eastern Poland deteriorated from month to month. The majority of private shops were soon gone, and those that still existed suffered from the shortage of wares. The Red Army’s shopping spree in the autumn of 1939 had depleted stocks, and there was no way of replacing them. Soviet authorities tried to relieve shortages with deliveries from farther east. Oblast, raion, and municipality administrations were instructed to prepare delivery orders, which were to be fulfilled by Soviet suppliers. Starting in 1940, delivery orders were created by multiplying consumption norms per capita by the number of inhabitants living in a given oblast or raion. However, the implementation of the plans differed significantly from the delivery orders, and food shortages were widespread in the kresy throughout the first quarter of 1940.⁵²

    The most visible effect of shortages was the development of the black market. In the winter of 1939–40, the shortages became one of the most important (unofficial) elements of economic life in eastern Poland, as had long been the case in the rest of the Soviet Union. On the black market, people could acquire items that rarely, if ever, appeared in state-run stores and cooperatives. These included sugar, butter, flour, meat, dairy products, eggs, groats (kasha), pork fat, salt, potatoes, tobacco, clothes, shoes, knitting products, watches, alcohol, sweets, citruses, building materials, and so on. Although black-market activity was illegal, the Soviet authorities in fact tolerated it. The black market alleviated the shortages on the official market, and members of the Soviet elite, who could better afford black-market prices, benefited from the availability of such items from outside the official stores. However, black-market prices were often very high and fluctuated markedly.⁵³

    The standard of living deteriorated significantly in comparison with the prewar period. The wages for workers, clerks, and teachers slightly exceeded prewar levels, ranging from 80 to 250 rubles. But this meant little in the Soviet economy. In the state shops, prices may have been radically lowered, but goods were unavailable or of poor quality. On the black market, where goods were available, prices were exorbitant. The best-paid jobs were managerial and executive positions in the security apparatus, administration, and industry (600–1200 rubles); Stakhanovite workers were also better paid. They not only earned more money, they also enjoyed access to a special network of shops. There hard-to-find necessities were available even at official prices.⁵⁴ However, this group was relatively small. The average inhabitant of eastern Poland had to endure pauperization, lines, and shortages throughout the 1939–41 period.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Beyond the trauma of the double invasion and renewed partition, the years 1939–41 were also a period of economic upheaval and hardship for the population of Soviet-occupied eastern Poland. The Soviet invasion of the kresy was more than an occupation in the traditional sense, because it ultimately resulted in a revolutionary transformation of society and economic life that embraced everything from the length of the workday and workweek to currency and consumption, from wages and property ownership to the allocation of subsidies and credits.

    Why did the Soviets act the way they did? According to one hypothesis, the annexed territories were seen as a key part of a battleground in an eventual war against the Germans. This is thought to explain the extent of theft from the occupying authorities, and later the removal of machinery, plant furnishings and fittings, produce, manufactured goods, farm animals, and private property of Polish citizens to the interior of the Soviet Union, as well as the plans for the construction of military airports and land fortifications. Yet during this period, the Soviet state invested heavily in the annexed Polish territories, directing considerable resources to agriculture (machines and fertilizers), industry (construction and development of factories), transportation (railways and roads), and civil engineering. They would not have done this had they believed war was imminent. So the point of these social and economic transformations may well have been to integrate eastern Poland into the Soviet Union.

    The similarity between some aspects of Soviet and Nazi occupational policy could be interpreted as confirmation of this hypothesis. The German authorities divided Polish territory into two parts, incorporating the western part into Germany and leaving the central territory in a separate administration. The territory incorporated into Nazi Germany was quickly “cleansed” of all vestiges of Polish statehood, while Polish-owned property was confiscated and awarded to Germans. At the same time, over 400,000 Poles and Jews were uprooted from western Poland and deported to the General Government and replaced by thousands of Germans from the Baltic and eastern Poland. The purpose of these measures was to facilitate the integration of these territories into the Reich. In the east, the Soviets also tried to “cleanse” the eastern territories of Polish influence and to install institutions and practices that would facilitate the integration of the kresy into the Soviet Union. The Soviet occupation, however, went further, aiming to eliminate all elements of capitalism. Even at war’s end, Stalin would not consider returning the territories seized in the autumn of 1939 (save for most of prewar Białystok Voivodeship).

    The economic transformation of the kresy was interrupted by the German invasion on 22 June 1941. Yet, in less than two years, economic life in eastern Poland had undergone a deep transformation. The prewar structure of ownership had been destroyed, never to be revived. The integration of the economy into the Soviet state had made considerable headway through the introduction of the Soviet legal system and economic structures. The resulting lack of raw materials and goods, however, had ensured that the annexed Polish territories were subsidized. Just as interwar Polish governments had found it necessary to send raw materials and goods in short supply, sometimes even produce, from central and western Poland to eastern Poland, the Soviets quickly discovered that they had to do the same during 1939–41.⁵⁶

    Thus, not only for strictly political but also for economic reasons, the eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland quickly became a part of the Soviet empire, and their interests were subordinated to the interests of the Soviet empire. In accordance with the logic of the Stalinist system, the state took over privately owned resources, which led in turn to a “leveling” of society. Excessive government control over economic life made the state the biggest employer and arbitrarily decided the availability of work and thus the way people earned a living. The situation was exacerbated by a decrease in purchasing power, especially after the withdrawal of the złoty as a means of payment, and a prevalence of shortages. Nonetheless, the Soviet state, though its absolute achievements were limited, managed to increase its economic potential by exploiting the material resources available in the Polish territories. The period 1939–41 became a kind of hands-on civics lesson, an experience that helps explain the resistance of numerous groups within the kresy to the return of Soviet power toward war’s end.

NOTES

        1. Okupacja sowiecka w świetle tajnych dokumentów. Obywatele polscy na kresach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej pod okupacją sowiecką w latach 1939–1941 ed. Tomasz Strzembosz (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1996); Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Zagłada polskich Kresów. Ziemiaństwo polskie na Kresach Północno-Wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej pod okupacją sowiecką, 1939–1941 (Warsaw: Volumen, 1998); Michał Gnatowski, W radzieckich okowach. Studium o agresji 17 września 1939 r. i radzieckiej polityce w regionie łomżyńskim w latach 1939–1941 (Łomża: Łomżyńskie Towarzystwo Naukowe im. Wagów, 1997);“Zachodnia Białoruś” 17 IX 1939–22 VI 1941, t. 1: Wydarzenia i losy ludzkie. Rok 1939, ed. Bernadetta Gronek, Glina Knatko, Małgorzata Kupiecka (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 1998); Adam Sudoł, Początki sowietyzacji Kresów Wschodnich. Jesień 1939 (Bydgoszcz, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane WSP, 1997); Albin Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków na ziemiach wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej, 1939–1941 (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lódzkiego, 1998); Grzegorz Mazur, “Z dziejów sowietyzacji tzw. Zachodniej Ukrainy, 1939–1941,” in Studia Rzeszowskie, III (1996). One Cold War–era examination of this topic was David R. Marples, “Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia under Soviet Occupation: The Development of Socialist Farming, 1939–1941,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 27, no. 2 (June 1985), 158–71.

        2. Włodzimierz Bonusiak, “Przemiany ekonomiczne w Małopolsce Wschodniej w latach 1939–1941,” in Okupacja sowiecka ziem polskich, 1939–1941, ed. Piotra Chmielowca (Rzeszów, Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2005), 113–30; J. Jan Jerzy Milewski, “Okupacja sowiecka w Białostockiem (1939–1941). Próba charakterystyki,” in ibid.; Daniel Boćkowski, “Społeczne i gospodarcze aspekty radzieckiej okupacji Białostoccznyzny 1939–1941. Próba bilansu,” in Sowietyzacja i rusyfikacja północno-wschodnich ziem II Rzeczypospolitej (1939–1941). Studia i materiały (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu, 2003), 165–80.

        3. From Israel, Dov Levin, The Lesser of Two Evils. Eastern European Jewry Under Soviet Rule, 1939–1941 (Philadelphia, Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1995), and Ben-Cion Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); from Great Britain, Keith Sword, “Soviet Economic Policy in the Annexed Areas,” in The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939–1941, ed. Keith Sword (London: Macmillan, 1991), 86–101; and from Canada, David R. Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992).

        4. Iraida Osipovna Tsaruk, V bratskom soiuze: sotsialisticheskie preobrazovaniia ekonomiki v zapadnykh oblastiakh BSSR sentiabr 1939–iiun’ 1941 (Minsk: Izdatel’stvo BGU im. V. I. Lenina, 1976); M. K. Ivasiuta, Narys istoriï kolhosnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnikh oblastiakh Ukrains’koï RSR (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoï RSR, 1962); G. I. Kovalchak, “Rozvitok sotsialistichnoï promyslovosty w zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR u 1939–1941 rokakh,” in Iz istoriï zakhidniukrains’kykh zemel’, t. 4 (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrains’koï RSR, 1960).

        5. Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews, 50–64; Levin, Lesser of Two Evils, 65–88.

        6. A. Paczkowski, The Spring Will Be Ours. Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 15–17.

        7. Ibid., 14–15; L. Bubczyk, A History of Poland in Outline (Lublin: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 2004). See also, N. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

        8. Concise Statistical Year-book of Poland, September 1939–June 1941 (London: Polish Ministry of Information, 1941), 9.

        9. Jasiewicz, Zagłada polskich Kresów, 41–42.

        10. Ibid., 36–37. The data is from 1938.

        11. Marek Jabłonowski, Z dziejów gospodarczych Polski lat, 1918–1939 (Warsaw: Wyd. szkolne i pedagogiczne, 1992), 127.

        12. Norman Davies, Europa: Rozprawa historyka z historią (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1998), 1058–59.

        13. “Dyrektywa nr 1 Rady Wojennej Frontu Białaoruskiego określająca zasady powoływania przez armię władz tymczasowych na zajmowanch polskich teranach,” 16 September 1939, in Gnatowski, W radzieckich okowach, 195–97.

        14. “Zarządzenie przewodniczącego Zarządu Tymczasowego m. Baranowicz i Powiatu baranowickiego I. Tura w sprawie organizacji handlu,” 19 September 1939, in “Zachodnia Białoruś,” t. 1, 119. Similar orders were issued by other temporary administrations, cf. “Raport zarządu politycznego 3 armii o realizacji postanowienia rady wojennej frontu Białoruskiego Nr. 01 z 16 września 1939 roku,” 25 September 1939, in Strzembosz, Okupacja sowiecka w świetle tajnych dokumentów, 49–55.

        15. The statements cited below were given by inhabitants of the eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland. They were recorded during the war and immediately thereafter on orders from General Władysław Anders of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union. Many of the statements and questionnaires and relevant excerpts from the reports generated by their contents were arranged by county (powiat) by the office of Wiktor Sukiennicki. In 1959, these materials, together with other records of the Polish exile government’s Ministry of Information and Documentation, were deposited with the Hoover Institution (HI) in the United States. After the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe, copies of these records were made available to the Eastern Archive (Archiwum Wschodnie, AW) of the Karta Center in Warsaw. When drawing from these records, I cite both archives (AW-HI), the county, and the page number. On the Soviet shopping spree, see, for example, AW-HI, KOSTOPOL, k. 36–38, ŁUCK, k. 33–35, HOROCHÓW, k. 12, GRÓDEK JAGIELLOŃSKI, k. 11–12, LUBACZÓW, k. 13, SAMBOR, k. 17, PRZEMYŚL, k. 31–33, DOLINA, k. 27, KOŁOMYJA, k. 34, KAŁUSZ, k. 20–22, among others. Cf. Jan Tomasz Gross, Revolution from Abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 45–50, and Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 41–42.

        16. “Uchwała Biura Politycznego WKP(b) określająca scenariusz sowietyzacji wschodnich ziem Polski,” 1 October 1939, in Gnatowski, W radzieckich okowach, 204–05.

        17. “Meldunek operacyjny nr 46 ludowego komirsarza spraw wewnętrznych BSRR Ł. Canawy dla sekretarza KC KP(b) Białorusi P. Ponomarienki,” 14 October 1939, and “Meldunek operacyjny nr 54 ludowego komirsarza spraw wewnętrznych BSRR Ł. Canawy dla sekretarza KC KP(b) Białorusi P. Ponomarienki” 29 October 1939, in “Zachodnia Białoruś,” t. 1, 223–24 and 332, respectively.

        18. “Uchwała Biura Politycznego WKP(b),” 1 October 1939, in Gnatowski, W radzieckich okowach, 204–5.

        19. Mazur, “Z dziejów sowietyzacji,” k. 79; AW-HI, DROHOBYCZ, k. 18; WŁODZIMIERZ WOŁYŃSKI, k. 14; KOSTOPOL, k. 37–38; HOROCHÓW, k. 12; ŁUCK, k. 36–39; NADWÓRNA, k. 26; KAŁUSZ, k. 22; PRUŻANA, k. 25; ŁUNINIEC, k. 33; ŁOMŻA, k. 12; BRASŁAW, k. 24; NOWOGRÓDEK, k. 21; Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (IPMS), A. 9. III 2c/49, Soviet economic policy in the occupied part of Poland 1939–1941, London, November 1943, k. 49; Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 38, 42.

        20. “Meldunek operacyjny nr 44 ludowego komirsarza spraw wewnętrznych BSRR Ł. Canawy dla sekretarza KC KP(b) Białorusi P. Ponomarienki,” 13 October 1939, and “Meldunek operacyjny nr 54,” in “Zachodnia Białoruś,” t. 1, 208 and 332, respectively; AW-HI, BIAŁYSTOK, k. 72–73. Analogous problems occurred also in western Ukraine. See Adam Sudoł, Początki sowietyzacji Kresów wschodnich, 63, 67, and Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 137.

        21. “Notatka służbowa skeretarza KC KP(b) Białorusi P. Ponomarienki dla sekretarza KC WKP(b) A. Żdanowa o założeniach nacjonalizacji przemysłu,” 15 October 1939, in “Zachodnia Białoruś”, t. 1, pp. 228–29.

        22. According to prewar Polish data, there were 4695 estates in this territory, see Jasiewicz, Zagłada polskich Kresów, 95.

        23. Natsional’nyi Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus’ (NARB), fond (f.) 4, opis’ (o.) 28, delo (d.) 530, listy (ll.) 90–93, Information of the Agricultural Division of the TsK KP(b)B, [September 1940]. Soviet historiography says that about one million ha of land were given to peasants and farm hands in western Belarus, see Istoriia gosudarstva i prava Belorusskoi SSR, t. 2 (1917–1975), 63. Cf. Marek Wierzbicki, Polacy i Białorusini w zaborze sowieckim (Warsaw: Volumen, 2000), 292–94.

        24. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 130. According to other Soviet sources, the state gave away about two million ha of land, about 90,000 horses, 2000 oxen, 86,000 cows, 14,000 pigs, 32,000 sheep, farming tools. The figure of two million ha is open to question since it exceeds by a factor of two the individual totals for the oblasts of western Ukraine.

        25. See IPMS, A. 9 III 2c/49, k. 9, Soviet economic policy. The data in this study comes mostly from the Soviet press, but Mazur, in “Z dziejów sowietyzacji,” refers to data from the Soviet literature.

        26. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 67–69.

        27. R. Rutland, The Myth of the Plan: Lessons of Soviet Planning Experience (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Lynn Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

        28. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 139; Daniel Boćkowski, Na zawsze razem: Białostocczyzna i Łomżyńskie w polityce radzieckiej w czasie II wojny światowej (IX 1939–VIII 1944) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton and Instytut historii PAN, 2005), 73–76.

        29. NARB, f. 4, o. 38, d. 57, ll. 142–43, Minutes of the Meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus no. 109, 11 December 1939, k. 2; no. 110, 14 December 1939, k. 4; Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, o. 22, d. 3113, l. 57, Minutes no. 5 of the Meeting of the Oblast Bureau of the Committee of the KP(b) of Ukraine in Drohobycz, 5 February 1940; Tsaruk, V bratskom soiuze, 41.

        30. G. I. Kovalchak, “Rozvitok sotsialistichnoï promyslovosty,” in Iz istoriï zakhidniukrains’kykh zemel’, vol. 4, p. 130.

        31. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 140–41.

        32. Derzhavnyi Arkhiv L’vivs’koї Oblasti (DALO), f. 3, opys (o.) 1, sprava (s.) 13, arkush (ark.) 65–68, Report on the state of trade in L’viv Oblast since the Red Army’s entry.

        33. NARB, f. 4, o. 38, d. 59, ll. 49–51, Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Belarus, [October 1939].

        34. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 142–43.

        35. Tsaruk, V bratskom soiuze, 39.

        36. “Postanowienie Prezydium Rady Najwyższej BSSR. O nacjonalizacji zakładów przemyśłowych i instytucji na terytorium zachodnich obwodów BSRR,” 22 December 1939, in Strzembosz, Okupacja sowiecka w świetle tajnych dokumentów, 60–61.

        37. Bonusiak, “Przemiany ekonomiczne w Małopolsce Wschodniej,” 11.

        38. DALO, f. 3, o. 1, s. 2, ark. 91–92, Light Industry of L’viv Oblast; AW-HI, VI-MID-10, k. 17–20, Zestawienie wiadomości No. 9 o sytuacji w Polsce—pod okupacją sowiecką, Supplement, 2 March 1940.

        39. NARB, f. 4, o. 38, d. 57, ll. 120–24, Report on problems with the nationalization of textile industry in western Belarus [no date, probably November 1939]; Tsaruk, V bratskom soiuze, 44–45.

        40. IPMS, A. 9 III 2c/49, k. 25, Soviet economic policy; DALO, f. 3, o. 1, s. 2, ark. 177, Basic economic data on L’viv Oblast [20 Dec. 1939].

        41. NARB, f. 4, o. 38, d. 230, l. 55, information on the state of local industry in Nowogródek Raion; see also the article on the economic plan for Belastok Oblast in 1941, in Sztandar Wolności, no. 106, 8 May 1941, 2.

        42. NARB, f. 4, o. 38, d. 230, l. 21, Information for Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)B Ponomarenko on the state of the construction industry in Baranovichi Oblast, 15 March 1941.

        43. Author’s archive. See also the discussion of the plan in Boćkowski, Na zawsze razem, 166–69.

        44. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv obshchestvennykh ob’’edinenii Grodnenskoi oblasti, f. 6195, o. 1, d. 194, ll. 2–3, and l. 8, Telegram series 6, no. 608, 19 Jan. 1941, to the party oblispolkoms and obkom, on compulsory logging and response to telegram 6 for Comrade Eidinov of the TsK KP(b)B, respectively. On the use of compulsory labor in the timber industry on behalf of the military industry and other branches of economy, see, for example, AW-HI, LUBACZÓW, k. 40; PRZEMYŚL, k. 74; SANOK, k. 25–26; LUBOML, k. 13; SARNY, k. 2; KOSTOPOL, k. 94–95; ŁUCK, k. 39; BÓBRKA, k. 28; JAROSŁAW, k. 38; SAMBOR, k. 41–42; ŁOMŻA, k. 91; BRASŁAW, k. 26; NIEŚWIEŻ, k. 60; PRUŻANA, k. 36; KOSÓW POLESKI, k. 37; KOBRYŃ, k. 45–47; AW, catalog no. II/1193, Józef Abłażej, Wspomnienia wojenne “Małoletniaka”—żołnierza AK Batalionu Nowogródzkiego “Bogdanka” marzec 1939–wrzesień 1944, k. 28–29; AW, catalog no. II/1237/2k, Edward Bernolak, Pamiętnik, typescript, k. 12–16.

        45. RGASPI, f. 17, o. 22, d. 226, l. 2, Minutes no. 97 of Meeting of the Bureau of the KP(b)B, Baranovichi Oblast, 21 May 1941.

        46. Jasiewicz, Zagłada polskich Kresów, 248.

        47. Boćkowski, Na zawsze razem, 179; Tsaruk, V bratskom soiuze, 79–80; K. I. Domorad, “Bor’ba komunisticheskoi partii za kollektivizatsiiu selskogo khoziaistva zapadnikh oblastei Belorussi nakanunie Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (sentiabr’ 1939–iiun 1941),” diss. kandidat nauk, Minsk 1955, 186–87.

        48. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 134–36; Boćkowski, Na zawsze razem, 178. According to other sources, 180 sovkhozy and produce-related enterprises were established in western Ukraine in 1940 and 1941, see Ivasiuta, Narysy istoriï kolhosnoho budivnytstva, 46.

        49. NARB, f. 4, o. 28, d. 978, ll. 36–40, Report on the implementation of the SNK SSSR and TsK VKP(b) resolution of 18 April 1941, “On the establishment of the maximum norms for the usage of land per one peasant farmstead in the oblasts of Baranovichi, Belastok, Brest, Vileika, and Pinsk of the Belorussian SSR,” and NARB, f. 4, o. 28, d. 979, ll. 177–78, special dispatch no. 22 on the work of the prosecution of the BSSR in supervising the implementation of the TsK VKP(b) and the SNK SSSR resolution of 18 April 1941.

        50. Ivasiuta, Narysy istoriï kolhosnoho budivnytstva, 67; NARB, f. 4, o. 46, d. 186, l. 44, report on the reconstruction of the Soviet order in agriculture in the western oblasts of the BSSR.

        51. Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków, 144–45.

        52. Boćkowski, Na zawsze razem, 154–69; AW-HI, VI-MID-10, k. 17–20, Zestawienie wiadomości no. 9, Supplement; AW-HI, VI-MID-11, k. 11–12, Zestawienie wiadomości no. 10 o sytuacji w Polsce—pod okupacją sowiecką, 20 March 1940; AW-HI, VI-MID-11, k. 10–11, Zestawienie wiadomości no. 14 o sytuacji w Polsce—pod okupacją sowiecką, n.d. [probably 20 April 1940].

        53. Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews, 59–64; Czesław Madajczyk, “Niemieckie dokumenty o sytuacji Polaków pod okupacją radziecką w roku 1940,” in Dzieje Najnowsze, no. 3 (1991), 60, 63, 65; AW-HI, VI-MID-12, k. 12, Zestawienie wiadomości no. 12 o sytuacji w Polsce—pod okupacją sowiecką, 3 April 1940; Oksana V. Petrovskaia, “Realii sovetskoi zhizni: Kultura i byt Bresta w 1939–1941 godakh,” in Radziecka agresja 17 września 1939 r. i jej skutki dla mieszkańców ziem północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej. Studia i materiały, ed. Michał Gnatowski (Białystok: Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2000), 241–43.

        54. IPMS, A. 9 III 2c/49, pp. 43–44, Soviet economic policy; Petrovskaia, “Realii sovetskoi zhizni,” in Gnatowski, Radziecka agresja 17 września 1939 r., 239–46.

        55. Archiwum Zakladu Historii Ruchu Ludowego, catalog no. 89, 91–92, Soviet Occupation [probably the spring of 1941]; Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Ministry of Information and Documentation of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile (MID), catalog no. 36, k. 104, Report no. 80, 7 Jan. 1940, and k. 104, Report no. 91, 18 Jan. 1940; AAN, MID, catalog no. 39, k. 58, Report no. 125, 21 Jan. 1940, and k. 89, Report no. 128, 24 Jan. 1940; AAN, MID, catalog no. 40, k. 209, Report no. 160, 29 Mar. 1940; AAN, MID, catalog no. 42, k. 75, Report no. 195 of 10 May 1940; “Life under the Soviets. Destruction of Economic life in Poland,” in News from Poland, no. 212, 30 March 1940, k. 2–4; AAN, MiD, catalog no. 52, k. 94–96; AW-HI, DROHOBYCZ, k. XI–XII; GRÓDEK, k. 12; BÓBRKA, k. 28–29; DOBROMIL, k. 33; SAMBOR, k. 44; PRZEMYŚL, k. 31–34, 78; SANOK, k. 26; KOWEL, k. 60; KOSTOPOL, k. 98–99; ŁUCK, k. 36–37; BIAŁYSTOK, k. 69–70; OSTRÓW MAZOWIECKA, k. 28; ŁOMŻA, k. 94–95; WILNO, k. 40; NOWOGRÓDEK, k. 44–45; SZCZUCZYN, k. 38–39; NIEŚWIEŻ, k. 62–63; PRUŻANA, k. 36; BRZEŚĆ on the BUG RIVER, k. 52; AW, catalog no. II/1325/2k, Stanisław Klimpel, Jak przeżyłem trzy okupacje, 4–typescript, k. 41–42; AW, catalog no. II/1433/2kw, Barbara Stańko-Bródkowa, Losy Polaków z kolonii Raczyn/Ziuków/w latach 1939–1943, typescript, k. 17; AW, catalog no. II/1256/2k, Stefan Buchner, Pamiętniki. Rok pod czerwoną gwiazdą. Brody: wrzesień 1939–wrzesień 1940, typescript, k. 9; AW, catalog no. II/1328/2k, Zdzisław Koksanowicz, Wspomnienia [bez tytułu], typescript, 13–15; AW, catalog no. II/1368/2kw, Zbigniew Małyszczycki, Moje Kresy—Lubieszów. Wspomnienia z lat okupacji 1939–1944, typescript, k. 18–19; AW, catalog no. II/1239/2k, Zygmunt Bieniasz, Wspomnienia [bez tytułu], typescript, k. k. 16–18; AW, catalog no. II/1237/2k, Edward Bernolak, Pamiętnik, typescript, k. 4–6.

        56. Before the war, metallurgical products, steel, and iron, as well as lime, concrete, and bricks, were supplied to the eastern borderlands from central and western Poland, see Witold Ormicki, Życie gospodarcze Kresów Wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Cracow: Nakładem Księgarni Geograficznej “Orbis,” 1929), 182–86.

6

Lviv under Soviet Rule, 1939–1941

Christoph Mick

The November 1938 Munich Agreement signed by Germany, Italy, France, and Britain was the cause of much rejoicing among many Ukrainians in eastern Poland. They were not cheering Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia or the hope expressed by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that the agreement meant “peace in our time.” They were jubilant, because the Munich Agreement brought autonomy for Transcarpathia, a region within Czechoslovakia. In Transcarpathia, the majority of the population was made up Rusyns or Ukrainians.¹ In numerous meetings and special church services in Galicia in particular, Ukrainian leaders and Greek-Catholic (Uniate) clergy celebrated the tiny borderland’s fortune.² On 15 March 1939, however, German troops marched into the remaining Czech lands, forcing Chamberlain to realize that the Munich Agreement would not keep the peace. That same day, Slovakia and Transcarpathia declared independence. Again, spirits soared among Ukrainians in eastern Poland—but this was not to last. Although Berlin supported Slovak independence, it did not protest when, less than twenty-four hours later, Hungary annexed Transcarpathia. Ukrainian elation in Poland gave way to depression.³

    These revisions of the Treaty of Versailles were not to end with the destruction of Czechoslovakia. That same month, Lithuania bowed to German pressure and ceded the Memel territory to Germany. The next target was obvious: Poland. Adolf Hitler made clear his aim to link the German heartland with East Prussia, which were separated by a large strip of Polish territory. Hitler wanted Poland to agree to German annexation of the Free City of Danzig and to allow Germany to build an extra-territorial railway through Poland to the annexed city. On March 26, the Polish government rejected any territorial changes and ordered the partial mobilization of the Polish Army and the full mobilization of the border guard.

    The threat of war therefore loomed large in the final week of March, when the small syndicalist Union of Trade Unions (Związek Związków Zawodowych) called a public meeting in Lwów, the largest city in the eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic.⁴ About 450 workers flocked to the house of the Jewish craftsmen association Jad Charuzim. The majority of the participants were Jews, and most of the discussion revolved around two questions: In the event of war, what kind of stance should the workers take toward the Soviet Union? And what should their attitude be toward the Polish state? Was the Soviet Union the “fatherland of the proletariat” and thus deserving of their allegiance? The answer was far from clear.

    The debate was intense. One speaker criticized the repression in the Soviet Union, while another speaker defended Stalin as a “liberator of the workers.” The audience was divided. While most people applauded Stalin’s champion, others protested. Although attitudes toward the Soviet Union were ambivalent, all agreed that the Polish state had to be defended against Nazi Germany. The police informant who noted all this must have been satisfied.⁵ If Germany were to attack, Jewish and Polish workers would stand alongside the government. It was less clear what would happen in the event of a Soviet invasion, but in the spring of 1939, the idea of an alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and a renewed partition of Poland seemed far-fetched.

    The situation was different in the case of the Ukrainians, a minority in Lwów, but a majority in Poland’s southeast voivodeships (regional-level administrative units). The failure to create a Ukrainian state in 1918–20, the collapse of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic in the Polish-Ukrainian War, and the manifold discrimination experienced by Ukrainians in Poland during the interwar period had left the Ukrainian population embittered. On 3 June 1939, the German Consulate in Lwów—which the Germans had taken over from Austria—reported that Ukrainians were counting on German help to establish an independent Ukrainian state, although the leaders of the legal Ukrainian parties opposed “spontaneous uprisings and outbursts,” as they did not want to endanger the “national substance.”⁶

    The unimaginable happened on 23 August 1939, when the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression was signed. In response, a wave of patriotism swept through Poland. Tens of thousands of young men immediately joined the Polish Army. The leaders of Jewish organizations urged their members and the Jewish population at large to support Poland. The legal Ukrainian parties appealed to the Ukrainian population not to oppose the authorities, but the Polish police was taking no chances, and on the night of 31 August to 1 September, they arrested several thousand Ukrainian activists. Many were released a few days later, when the anticipated mass Ukrainian uprising failed to materialize. In a few areas, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—an illegal party, authoritarian and militantly anti-Polish and anti-Soviet—did launch a number of “uprisings” against the Polish authorities, but these were small and easily suppressed by the police. Nonetheless, the Polish population was convinced that the Ukrainians could not be trusted. In Lwów, some Poles suspected all Ukrainians of helping the Germans, and the military authorities even had several Ukrainians shot without trial.⁷ Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the head of the Greek-Catholic Church, and Vasyl Mudry, the leader of the Ukrainian bloc in the Polish parliament, released a statement on 15 September denying that the Ukrainian population was trying to harm the Polish war effort.⁸ In the first two weeks of September, more than 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers served in the Polish armed forces alongside their Polish comrades, and many of those who saw combat fought with distinction against the Germans. There is no evidence that Ukrainian soldiers refused to fight so long as the front held.⁹

    Without effective British or French help, the Polish Army could not hope to stop the German attack and the Wehrmacht was soon approaching Warsaw and Lwów. The quick advance of the German forces surprised the population. The first air strike hit the city of Lwów only a few hours after the German invasion had begun. Over the next few days, endless air raid warnings—real and false alarms—wore down the nerves of the population.¹⁰ On 12 September, German artillery began to fire into the city, which was already overcrowded with tens of thousands of refugees. Hundreds of people died daily. The hospitals quickly filled with wounded soldiers and civilians.¹¹ Two days after the shelling began, the city was without water and gas, and before the week was out, the city’s power supply broke down. By the time the Soviets invaded eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, German troops were already occupying the city’s western suburbs.

The Soviet Invasion

The collapse of the Polish state resulted in chaos and anarchy. In towns or villages with a Polish majority, militias were formed to fill the power vacuum. In other localities, Poles were defenseless, and Ukrainian peasants took revenge on Polish estate owners and Polish settlers for past grievances. But Poles were not the only victims of atrocities. Polish troops moved through the country, killing Ukrainian peasants in villages where triumphal arches had been erected to greet the Red Army, or where Poles had been attacked. The population, irrespective of nationality, eagerly awaited the restoration of order, even if it required the Red Army to do so. But there is evidence that in many villages and towns the Soviet troops quickly moved against Polish policemen, soldiers, and members of the economic and political elite. In the first days of Soviet occupation, an unknown number of Poles were killed. Political units of the Red Army exploited social and ethnic tensions and encouraged Ukrainian peasants and the lower stratum of the urban population to form committees and militias to destroy the old social and political structures “from below.” The peasants began to plunder the large estates and to redistribute land.¹²

    After a few days, the Red Army arrived on the outskirts of Lwów. Now both invading armies were besieging the city. According to Polish sources, on the evening of 21 September, General Władysław Langner, the commander of Polish forces in Lwów, decided to hand the city over to the Red Army.¹³ At first, General Langner’s decision seemed to be the right one. The Soviet high command granted the Polish officers the right to pass, but the promise was quickly broken, and 1500 were promptly arrested. Many of them would later be murdered by the Soviet secret police, the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD), in Katyn or Tver.¹⁴

    On 22 September, early in the afternoon, the Red Army marched into Lwów. All in all, the occupation went smoothly, save for a few instances of hostile fire from Polish stragglers. Soviet reports called them “bourgeois elements” resisting “the entry of our troops.”¹⁵ There were other incidents. A number of unarmed Polish policemen on their way to a registration office on Zielona Street were killed when a Soviet unit attacked them.¹⁶ One eyewitness remembered Red Army soldiers using their rifles to bludgeon wounded policemen. Some policemen were detained by Ukrainians, robbed, and then handed over to Soviet soldiers.¹⁷ Similar stories were reported about Jews. According to a 1942 report by the Polish resistance, Soviet troops had barely reached the outskirts of the city when Jews began attacking Polish soldiers, disarming and binding them.¹⁸

    The first Soviet units to enter Lwów treated the population reasonably well.¹⁹ Even the Polish underground would later note “the initially quite favorable impression of the discipline of the entering Soviet troops and their tolerant attitude toward the population.”²⁰ Most Polish and Jewish inhabitants preferred Soviet to German occupation. Lala Fishman, the daughter of an assimilated Jewish family, remembered:

    Small wonder, then, that when the Red Army entered the city, it was a gala event and the cause of much rejoicing by the populace. Thousands of Lvovians turned out to greet the Soviet troops.…The Soviets marched in columns down one of the city’s main thoroughfares, and the people who thronged the sidewalks clapped and shouted Polish hosannas while pretty girls skipped and capered alongside the soldiers, tossing flowers to them and strewing blossoms at their feet.²¹

When asked about the living conditions in the Soviet Union, the soldiers answered: “Everything is there” (vsё est), as they had been told to do by their political instructors. Their appearance, however, contradicted such statements. Their uniforms were of poor quality, often torn, and the soldiers looked malnourished.²² This was “for all us Poles a terrible sight, they looked like the last beggars, horses without saddles, soldiers carrying heavy loads, old rifles slung over the shoulder with rope, in a word, a scene of poverty and desperation.”²³ Polish eyewitnesses report that the soldiers had received a considerable advance of rubles before they entered the city to prevent looting. The prewar ruble-złoty exchange rate of 1:1 was enforced, thus giving soldiers the opportunity to buy goods on favorable terms in the shops. As Soviet citizens, the Red Army soldiers had never seen such abundance; they bought up all the consumer goods they could find—watches, jewelry, clothes—and emptied the grocery shops. But the buying spree was soon over. Cut off from the rest of Poland and the outside world, Lviv—as the city was now known—began to experience supply bottlenecks. The “grey and difficult life under occupation” was beginning.²⁴

“Liberation from the Polish yoke”

The Red Army had crossed the eastern Polish border as the “liberator of the Slavic brothers from the Polish yoke,” but according to Soviet ideology, this “yoke” was in the first instance social and only in the second instance national. The proletariat and peasantry had to be liberated from the dominance of the Polish ruling elite, from factory and estate owners, from capitalists. Consequently, Soviet propaganda took aim at the “Poland of the masters” (Pańska Polska) and not the “Poland of the people” (Polska Ludowa). The Second Polish Republic was subsequently maligned in meetings, newspapers, posters, and radio broadcasts throughout eastern Poland.

    Soviet politicians made it clear that the occupied territories would become part of the Ukrainian and the Belarusian socialist Soviet republics. Formally, the decision was left to the population and the outcome of a special election. A Soviet-style election campaign was launched. Propagandists went to restaurants, coffeehouses, and public kitchens, where they delivered lengthy speeches in Ukrainian, Polish, and Yiddish on the wonderful quality of life in the Soviet Union.²⁵ Public loudspeakers were installed to broadcast propaganda all day. Public announcements, posters, red flags, and portraits of Lenin and Stalin were everywhere.²⁶

    On 22 October 1939, the population elected a West Ukrainian National Assembly, which, unsurprisingly, voted for union with the Ukrainian SSR. The assembly’s request to join the Ukrainian SSR was promptly accepted and western Ukraine became part of Soviet Ukraine. Already before the election, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish organizations had been dissolved and replaced by Soviet organizations through which all communal activities were channeled. Mayor Stanisław Ostrowski, his three deputy mayors, and several magistrates were arrested and later deported to Moscow.

    All political parties except the Communist Party were illegal. Independent social activity was not tolerated. Soviet trade unions, youth organizations (Young Pioneers and Komsomol), and unions for artists, writers, architects, and teachers permeated society and helped control the population. Membership in such an organization meant access to certain privileges and was a precondition for continuing to work in one’s profession.

    Poles in key administrative and managerial positions were fired and replaced by newcomers from eastern Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership ordered the state and party in the eastern oblasts (regions) of the Ukrainian republic to identify cadres to be sent to the occupied territories. To avoid the impression that Soviet rule was synonymous with Russian rule, a premium was put on officials with native Ukrainian language skills. Oblast leaders, however, tried to avoid sending their best people. As a consequence, many Soviet administrators in western Ukraine were appointed to positions well above their training and experience. This contributed to the bad impression the new Soviet order made on the local population and gave rise to many complaints about the low qualifications of the Soviet personnel from the east.²⁷ Despite the sweeping dismissal of a large number of Poles from top positions, however, many experienced Polish administrators proved indispensable and remained in place, above all at the middle levels of bureaucracy.²⁸

    The integration of the eastern Polish territories into the Ukrainian SSR followed the blueprint provided by the Soviet nationality policies of the 1920s. The Ukrainians were the titular nationality, which meant that they took precedence over Poles and Jews in the administration, culture, and education. During the “national operations” against “diaspora nations” in the latter half of the 1930s, Poles in Soviet Ukraine had been classified as belonging to a newly introduced category known as “enemy peoples.” Soviet Poles lost their limited cultural and political rights of self-government, and tens of thousands were executed or deported from their ancestral homes.²⁹ By contrast, in the newly annexed territories, Poles were recognized as a national minority, whose claims to cultural and educational representation had to be accorded some degree of consideration.

    Important buildings, such as the Opera House, were nationalized and turned over to the Ukrainian SSR, but the Polish dramatic theater remained a center of Polish culture. The Jewish theater in Lviv was sovietized, but Jewish theaters in other towns were closed. Primary and secondary schools in which Yiddish had been the main language of instruction before the war were reopened, but Hebrew schools remained closed. Many, but certainly not all Polish schools were Ukrainized.³⁰ In other fields, such as education and publishing, great progress was made in the Ukrainization of public life, something that even enemies of the Soviet Union had to admit.

    The university was renamed Ivan Franko University, after a leading Ukrainian politician and writer, and Ukrainian scholars were appointed to new, more senior positions, but the administration was kept under strict Soviet control.³¹ Chairs for Ukrainian language, literature, and history were established. All official announcements were made in Ukrainian, and pressure was put on instructors to hold their lectures in Ukrainian, but Polish professors were allowed to speak Polish if they did not know Russian or Ukrainian.³² By 1941, the composition of the academic staff had changed considerably. It now consisted of 40 percent Ukrainians and 40 percent Poles; however, among professors, there were 52 Poles, 22 Ukrainians, and 8 Jews. In other academic institutions, such as the technical university, the proportion of Polish professors was even higher.³³

    The Soviets made a special effort to win the allegiance of the lower classes, the young, and parts of the intelligentsia, irrespective of nationality. Workers were promised an end to their suffering,³⁴ and the working intelligentsia was given assurances that they would receive “all opportunities for the free development of our creative powers for the best of the working people.”³⁵ As the Poles were turned out of administrative offices and law enforcement, Ukrainians and Jews were allowed to assume their positions, posts that had been closed to them under the Second Polish Republic. Jews from the lower classes and from the oft-destitute refugees in particular filled these posts.³⁶

    Among the youth, young Jewish teachers had good reason to perceive Soviet rule as a change for the better, because they could finally get a steady job.³⁷ Before the war, they had stood little chance of being employed in state schools. The Ukrainization of schools meant more jobs for Ukrainian teachers as well. In higher education, Jewish and Ukrainian students also benefited from changes in university admission policies.

    Before the war, both Ukrainians and Jews in Galicia had faced many obstacles to enrollment at a Polish university.³⁸ Under the Soviets, this changed. In December 1939, the composition of the student body at Ivan Franko University still reflected the discrimination of Jews in the prewar years.³⁹ Poles accounted for 77.9 percent, with Ukrainians and Jews making up 12.9 percent and 6.7 percent of the students, respectively.⁴⁰ By April 1941, Ukrainization and the end of anti-Jewish discrimination had dramatically altered the composition of the student body. Of the 1617 students at the university, 540 were Ukrainians (33.4 percent), 362 Poles (22.4 percent), and 715 Jews (44.2 percent).⁴¹ Leon Weliczker Wells, who survived the Holocaust in Lviv, saw the positive side of Soviet education policy:

    We children continued our school. Some of us had ambitions—to become professionals or scientists.…Schooling was not only free, but at the university one’s scholarship could be as high as an average worker’s salary. Getting into university was a matter of merit, and there was no racial, religious or social discrimination.⁴²

    In their attempts to cultivate the support of at least part of the various national intelligentsias, the Soviets met with some success. Although most Jewish and Polish authors, such as Leon Pasternak, Ostap Ortwin, and Tadeusz Hollender, rarely if ever visited the club of the Soviet Writers Union, socialist authors, such as Wanda Wasilewska, Jerzy Borejsza, Jerzy Putrament, Stanisław Jerzy Lec, and Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński, participated in union life and publicly sympathized with the Soviet Union. On the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion on 17 September 1940, fifty-eight Lviv authors joined the Writers Union.⁴³ On that same occasion, Wasilewska praised the “liberation of Western Ukraine” in the pages of Czerwony Sztandar, the Polish daily.⁴⁴ Such pro-Soviet declarations from these authors only discredited them in the eyes of most Poles. Even decades later, eyewitnesses would express their contempt for the “false artistic and scientific elite,” referring to its members as “false moral authorities.”⁴⁵

    Sovietization changed everyday life in other ways as well. The new rulers sought to leave their mark on Lviv’s public spaces. Soviet monuments were erected throughout the city. These, however, were usually made of wood or plaster. Exposed to the elements, they quickly came to look worn and shabby, giving rise to many jokes about the permanence of Soviet rule.⁴⁶ A monument of Lenin was commissioned for the plaza in front of the Opera House, but only the pedestal had been completed when the Germans attacked in June 1941. The Nazis later used it for a bust of Hitler.

    Religious and national holidays were replaced by the Soviet days of commemoration and celebration. All Saints Day (1 November) and Polish Independence Day (22 November) were usurped by May Day (1 May) and the anniversary of the October Revolution (7 November). Workers were expected to attend political rallies and to help with preparations.⁴⁷ As Weliczker Wells noted:

Before Russia’s national holidays such as May 1 or October 7 [sic], the people had to prepare slogans, posters, and large banners, after working hours, for the members of the parade, which was usually a whole-day affair. One also had to march in the parade.

⁴⁸

    In December 1939, Moscow time and a six-day work week of forty-eight hours were introduced, the latter lasting until June 1940. People had to start work two hours earlier; Sundays became work days. Both changes upset traditional patterns of life.⁴⁹ People had to get up in the middle of the night to arrive at their workplaces in time:⁵⁰ “This completely unexpected change shattered the general rhythm of life, prevented the continuation of customs that had existed since generations, of ordinary, familiar, friendly, sociable contacts.”⁵¹ Violations of work discipline were punished severely. If a worker was more than fifteen minutes late to work on three different occasions, he could be sentenced to prison. For other infringements, the offender faced a high fine. The working class was disillusioned. They had expected something else from the “fatherland of the proletariat.”⁵²

    On 11 December 1939, the ruble became the only official currency, leaving the złoty worthless and accelerating the impoverishment of the local population. People had to queue for hours for even the most basic goods.⁵³ For a loaf of bread, the normal time in line was two to three hours. For two pounds of sugar, it could be four to five hours. Because the price of sugar on the black market was twenty-five times the official price, there were “professional” linestanders, experts at pushing their way to the front of a line. The situation was worst for dry goods and shoes. Normally, people started to line up in the evening for the next day.⁵⁴ Countess Karolina Lanckorońska recalled the emergence of Soviet black marketers, describing them as “a part of Asia that had arrived in Lviv.” She regarded it as a tragic indication that the east “is overwhelming us.”⁵⁵ Weliczker Wells reflected more generally on life under Soviet rule, noting:

    All of us began to have new “values” in life. Being “happy” could now mean you had had a successful day in the sugar queue, or that you had not been interrupted by the police during the night. Above all, we were satisfied as long as the family was together.⁵⁶

    While living conditions had deteriorated, the plight of the many refugees who had come to Lviv was even worse. Even in “normal times,” the number of refugees would have had a dramatic impact on life in the city. They presented a serious problem for the Soviet authorities. Housing was unavailable, and most refugees were unemployed. Only a few took up the offer to work in other parts of the Soviet Union.⁵⁷

    By the end of 1939, the population of Lviv had grown from 333,500 to almost half a million, due mostly to Jewish refugees who had fled the German zone of occupation for a city they hoped had food and shelter, but also to Poles who had fled the Ukrainian-dominated Galician countryside for a predominantly Polish city. As a consequence, by the autumn of 1939 almost as many Jews as Poles lived in Lviv, a development that contributed to the notion that Soviet occupation was a time of “Jewish rule.” Flats and houses were overcrowded. This situation was exacerbated by the thousands of Soviet soldiers and administrators who had also come to the city:⁵⁸

    Lwów is filled with refugees. Tens of thousands of men whom the Polish military commands had sent to the east, encounter tens of thousands of men in long ragged coats who Comrade Stalin had sent to the west. Men in sports clothes and with backpacks fill the streets and cafés. There is probably not a single apartment that does not have refugees living in it.⁵⁹

Lala Fishman’s family gave shelter to dozens of refugees:

    At night the front room of our apartment was often crowded with refugees sleeping on the wood floor. In the morning and evenings, we fed them as best we could, and my mother spent most of her waking hours cooking meals and baking bread for them.⁶⁰

When a German commission arrived in Lviv in December 1939 to register the Galician Germans for resettlement, they were surprised by the number of people who wanted to leave the Soviet zone of occupation: “Poles, Ukrainians, the Dutch consul, even Jews and a Frenchman; all want to go away, just go away.”⁶¹

    On 29 November 1939, Soviet citizenship law was applied to the occupied Polish territories. Polish citizens living in western Ukraine as of 1 November and western Belarus as of 2 November 1939 were granted Soviet citizenship.⁶² This also applied to the Jewish citizens of western Poland who had fled to these territories. When the authorities began issuing Soviet passports, many (mostly Jewish) refugees from the German zone of occupation refused to register. They feared that accepting Soviet citizenship would eventually make it impossible for them to return to their villages and towns. Registering also carried with it another risk. Many residents received passports with the ominous paragraph 11, which forced them to leave Lviv and move to a place at least 100 km from the border and 30 km from an oblast administrative center. Ilana Maschler’s parents-in-law waited a long time before applying for a passport. In the end, they were forced to register so as to legalize their stay in Lviv, but received passports under paragraph 11 and were ordered to leave the city within ten days.⁶³ Most people did not know where to go. They had neither family nor friends outside the immediate Lviv vicinity. It was difficult to find accommodation or jobs. Unsurprisingly, many people tried to remain in the city illegally. If the NKVD caught them, they were deported.⁶⁴

Repression and Resistance

Sovietization did not end with the shaping of society and public life according to the Soviet model. It went further. Terror was an integral part of Stalinism, and the destruction of the “class enemy” and the neutralization of all real or potential opponents of Soviet power was a central part of Soviet occupation policy. In the first months, a large part of the social prewar elite was arrested or deported. The first wave of arrests, which took place in the last quarter of 1939, hit Polish officers, civil servants, and estate owners hardest, followed by members of the social and political elite irrespective of nationality or religion. In January 1940, the NKVD purged the intellectual and leftist scene in Lviv. Dozens of authors, journalists, and former members of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine were arrested. They and scores of Polish authors were accused of Polish chauvinism and anti-Soviet attitudes.⁶⁵ Another terror wave, which started in early 1940, primarily affected the economic elite, in particular Jews and Poles, but some Ukrainian entrepreneurs were also imprisoned or deported. Poles were again affected in numbers out of proportion to their presence in the overall population, followed by Jews.

    Two-thirds of the arrests took place in eastern Galicia. In September 1939, according to one estimate, the population of eastern Galicia was 5,105,000: 1,478,400 Poles (29 percent), 3,059,900 Ukrainians (60 percent), and 521,400 Jews (10 percent). Using Soviet sources, Grzegorz Hryciuk and Jaroslav Stoćkyj suggested that about 45,000 people were arrested in eastern Galicia (Table 6.1): 15,000 (39.5 percent) Poles, 15,000 (39.5 percent) Ukrainians and 8,000 (21 percent) Jews, many of them while they tried to cross the German-Soviet demarcation line.⁶⁶ By these estimates, the ratio of arrest to ethnic group works out to roughly 1 of every 100 Poles, 1 of every 200 Ukrainians, and 1 of every 65 Jews. Prisoners were tortured, beaten, forced to live in overcrowded prison cells, and subjected to long bouts of hunger.⁶⁷ Many were shot, others kept in prison or deported to labor camps in Russia.

TABLE 6.1 Arrests in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, September 1939 to May 1941

Grzegorz Hryciuk and Jaroslaw Stoćkyj, Studia nad demografią historyczną i sytuacją religijną Ukrainy (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2001), 23.

    Only a small number of those arrested had been members of resistance organizations, even a Polish resistance movement formed prior to the occupation of Lviv. A local group of the Polish Organization for the Struggle for Freedom (Polska Organizacja Walki o Wolność), founded by General Marian Januszajtis-Żegota, operated in Lviv between September and December 1939. The Paris-based exile government sent a delegate to Lviv in mid-December to create a local branch of the Union for Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ). A few days later, a representative of General Michał Karaszewicz-Torkarzewski arrived from Warsaw and appointed Lieutenant Colonel Jan Sokołowski head of the Service for Poland’s Victory (Służba Zwycięstwu Polski). Sokołowski, however, refused to subordinate himself to the Paris ZWZ leadership, and subsequently, two rival ZWZ organizations operated in Lviv until Sokołowski founded his own group in the spring of 1940.⁶⁸

    It proved impossible to consolidate the Polish resistance movement. Its members had little experience in conspiratorial activities, while the Soviet side was very practiced in discovering and destroying conspiracies and counterrevolutionary organizations, whether real or imagined. The NKVD relied on the willingness of opportunists and ideological fellow-travelers to divulge information, as well as torture and the duress of family members of prisoners, to create a vast network of informants. After a failed attempt to assassinate Wanda Wasilewska on 26 April 1940 and the wave of arrests that followed, the Polish underground was rendered largely inoperative until the Germans invaded.⁶⁹

    The NKVD also struck hard against local cells of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).⁷⁰ In December 1939, the OUN had some 8000–9000 members in western Ukraine, according to present-day, pro-OUN estimates. Around 5500 of them were subordinate to the OUN leadership in Lviv.⁷¹ Hundreds of OUN activists were arrested in the spring of 1940, with another series of arrests taking place in September. On 22–23 December 1940, 520 people were arrested in Lviv Oblast alone for suspected connections to the OUN. This was a major blow to the organization. Several trials were held, many of which ended with the death sentence. The most important trial was of fifty-nine mostly young members or supporters of the OUN in January 1941. When the verdict was handed down, forty-one defendants were sentenced to death, and seventeen were given ten years in prison. Of those receiving death sentences, sixteen were executed shortly thereafter.⁷² The last wave of arrests in May 1941 also targeted Ukrainian nationalists: more than 2000 family members of arrested Ukrainians were forced to leave the Lviv area.⁷³ When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, many of these Ukrainians were still in local prisons.⁷⁴ They were among the thousands of prisoners murdered by the NKVD before the Red Army left the city.⁷⁵

    Underground Zionist organizations did not fare much better when they attempted to organize the illegal emigration of Jews across the Romanian border and beyond to Palestine. At a trial held in Lviv in March 1941, seven members of the Socialist-Zionist youth organization Hashomer Hatzair received prison sentences of seven to ten years.⁷⁶ The Zionist youth organization Bnei Akiva was also persecuted and went underground.⁷⁷

    The Soviet occupiers terrorized the population not only by arrests and executions but also by mass deportations to Kazakhstan, the Russian north, or Siberia. In January 1940, the Soviet authorities deported from eastern Galicia at least 64,000 prewar Polish settlers and about 23,700 family members of those who had been arrested. Four months later, on the night of 12 April 1940, 7000–8500 Poles, mostly family members of detained officers and policemen, were deported from Lviv alone.⁷⁸ The following night, Jewish politicians and prominent Zionists were arrested and deported.⁷⁹ Then, in June, those refugees who had fled the German zone of occupation but refused to accept Soviet passports were deported. At least 38,800 refugees were deported from the Lviv area (22,000 from the city itself).⁸⁰

    On its own, the number of persons affected says little about the impact this had on life in Lviv and on the families and friends of those executed, arrested, or deported. The arrests and the deportations demoralized the population in general, and the rapid French defeat in June 1940 depressed Poles and Jews in particular; suicides were a daily occurrence. Night after night, the NKVD visited homes to arrest people. Every knock on the door could mean arrest or deportation. And night after night, Weliczker Wells and his father hid in their basement:

    for we did not know whether we belonged to the “capitalist” group or not.…During this period all of us would sit up all night, dressed and packed, so that if they came to take us away, at least we’d have with us all the essentials for the “trip.” This went on for a few weeks [in spring 1940]. Then the arrests quieted down.⁸¹

    For days and weeks after an arrest, family members went to the prisons or the NKVD offices to find out about the fate of their loved ones. Often, they returned without news. Ilana Maschler’s Uncle Samek, the former owner of a candy factory, was among those arrested:

    Aunt Bela spends many hours every day in front of the prison gate and tries without success to find out something about Uncle Samek’s fate and to drop off a packet of food for him. She shares these experiences with a group of women, Poles and Jews, whose husbands or sons have been arrested because they too had held higher positions or were officers in the Polish army.⁸²

During her visits, Bela came into contact with the wives of several leading Zionists, who had been arrested earlier. A few months later, Aunt Bela shared the fate of these women and was deported from Lviv.⁸³

    The NKVD was able to suppress active resistance fairly easily, but passive resistance to Soviet rule was widespread. Writing in January 1940, an officer of the regional command of the Polish underground noted a sustained Polish patriotism among the working class and a “determined will to perform an act of liberation” among Polish youth.⁸⁴ Jokes about the discrepancies between propaganda and reality, the idiocies of Soviet bureaucracy, and the low intelligence of Soviet bureaucrats were shared by many. The low quality of the Soviet cadres may have been an important reason for the widespread feeling of cultural superiority over the new masters. Many people in Lviv continued to sneer at the Russian lack of “culture.” One popular, oft-repeated story described the wives of Russian officers attending the opera in their newly acquired nightgowns.⁸⁵

    The passive resistance was also reflected in the determination of the Lviv population to maintain some form of religious life. Under Soviet rule, religious communities were subjected to administrative repressions such as high taxes. Monasteries were dissolved, and the theological faculty of the Jan Kazimierz University was closed. Many rabbis and priests were arrested. But despite all this, the churches were filled to capacity on Sundays, as people looked for comfort and at the same time demonstrated against the atheist system.⁸⁶ As often occurs in troubled times, hundreds of people visited miracle rabbis, believed rumors of apparitions of saints or the Virgin Mary, and made pilgrimages to holy sites. Sovietization did not reach the hearts of the people. Going to church services and synagogues and believing in miracles and apparitions went completely against the atheist ideology of the regime and can thus be seen as a form of passive resistance, but Soviet dominance of public space was also challenged in other ways.

    Many among the population listened to foreign radio broadcasts and read underground newspapers, while some hid refugees. The Polish underground attacked those it considered political collaborators. Sometimes, during public gatherings, Polish patriotism was voiced despite the potential consequences.⁸⁷ At one youth meeting, amid the usual speeches attacking the Second Polish Republic, a young man seized the microphone and began reciting the names of great events in Polish history, from the Battle of Grunwald, where the Kingdom of Poland defeated the Teutonic Order in 1410, to the “Miracle at the Vistula,” where the Poles turned back the Red Army in 1920. The Communists in the audience began singing “The International,” but the sound of their singing was drowned out by Polish youths singing “Rota” (The Oath) and “My chcemy Boga” (We Want God).⁸⁸

    In the almost hopeless situation created by Soviet rule, Poles drew inspiration and confidence from their history, in particular from the memory of the 1918 “Defense of Lwów” (Obrona Lwowa). The Soviet curriculum in the schools was counterbalanced by lessons in Polish history at home. These in turn were linked to sites of memory. In 1940, Wanda Jóźwiak began attending the Sienkiewicz school: “My father told us the story of the battle for Lviv in 1918, during which this school had been a military outpost. We were very proud to be educated there.”⁸⁹

    On 1 and 22 November—All Saints Day and Polish Independence Day, respectively—Roman Catholic churches were filled to overflowing, and a number of impromptu rallies were held.⁹⁰ The Cemetery of the Defenders of Lwów was an important site of patriotic demonstrations. In November 1939, Poles laid wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in memory of those who had fought for Polish independence. The crowd spontaneously cheered an independent Poland, France, and England, as well as Władysław Racziewicz (the president in exile), General Władysław Sikorski (the premier in exile), and General Józef Haller (whose troops defeated the Galician Ukrainians in 1919). Those in attendance sang “Dąbrowski’s Mazurka” (the Polish national anthem) twice, “Rota,” and “Boże coś Polskę” (God Save Poland). The NKVD arrested some of the participants. Similar events occurred on 1 November 1940. Throughout the Soviet occupation, an unknown person regularly laid wreaths on the graves of Polish soldiers who had died fighting the Soviets or Germans in 1939.⁹¹

Change of Policy

Once it became apparent that the aggressive strategy to win the sympathies of Ukrainians was faltering, Soviet policy changed. Lviv’s Ukrainians tended to be nationalist in the broad sense of the word, and many of them sympathized with the OUN, the only national-minded Ukrainian movement active after September 1939. At the end of summer 1940, the Soviet Union began to grant concessions to the Poles in the area of cultural policy.⁹²

    This kind of change in direction was typical of the Stalin era. All of the ethnic groups were able, at one point or another, to find some degree of space for cultural activity within the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians had benefited more from Soviet cultural policy in the first year of the Soviet interlude. As the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion approached, Stalin sought to relax the grip on Polish life in the newly annexed territories.

    Writer Wanda Wasilewska believed that she was personally responsible for convincing Stalin during a private conversation that the oblast authorities were making a mistake in their treatment of the Polish population. Whether Wasilewska was correct in her assessment is unknown, but not long after this conversation, Soviet policy toward the Poles began to change. Stalin on 3 July 1940 wrote to the Lviv Oblast party committee that reports of “unlawful” and rough behavior toward the Poles on the part of the authorities had come to his ears; the Polish language was being suppressed, and Poles were being forced to declare themselves Ukrainians. Stalin called for a policy of “Polish-Ukrainian brotherhood.” The oblast party leadership in Lviv promptly sent out the appropriate instructions to the lower levels of the party and state.⁹³

    Propaganda against the “Poland of the masters” was toned down. Poles now had better chances of getting jobs in the administration, teachers were rehired, and Polish artists in particular were courted. In the autumn, some of the families that had been deported to Kazakhstan were even allowed to return. In higher education, Polish professors no longer faced reprisals for using Polish as their language of instruction. Polish professors were invited to Moscow to learn about the Soviet university system. Much speculation was generated by the fact that former Prime Minister Kazimierz Bartel, a mathematician, also took part in the trip. Rumors circulated that he had been offered the opportunity to form a Soviet-Polish government.

    A further indication of the improved status of Poles was the expansion of Polish publications. While Czerwony Sztandar remained the only daily Polish-language newspaper, the important literary journal Nowe Widnokręgi (New Horizons) appeared in print for the first time in 1941, together with the quarterly Almanach Literacki (Literary Almanac), the Communist Union of Youth newspaper Młodzież Stalinowska (Stalinist Youth), which came out three times a week, and Pionerzy (Pioneers), a monthly for children.⁹⁴

    The most significant event in this change of policy was the celebrations commemorating the eighty-fifth anniversary of the death of Adam Mickiewicz, Poland’s national poet. At the end of August 1940, an organizational committee under the chairmanship of Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński was set up, and a series of commemorative events were held on 25 and 26 November 1940. An exhibition was opened in the former Ossolineum research institute, a three-day conference was hosted at the university, and a special gala event, attended by the top Soviet oblast officials, was staged in the Opera House. There well-known actors read passages from Mickiewicz’s works in Polish, Ukrainian, Yiddish, and Russian. The celebrations were broadcast live on Lviv radio. Polish schools and cultural centers also held programs celebrating Mickiewicz.

    This turnabout showed that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the Poles as a nationality and to grant them a degree of cultural freedom. These new policies in the summer of 1940 also indicate that at this point the Soviet government was still acting on the assumption that the Polish minority would remain in the occupied territories for a long time to come.⁹⁵

Sovietization and Interethnic Relations

Sovietization strongly affected relations between Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews. There was little solidarity based on shared suffering; instead, tensions between ethnic groups increased. The Polish underground organization accused Ukrainians of disloyalty to the Polish state and collaboration with the Soviets. Reports repeatedly mentioned that in September 1939 Ukrainians had attacked Polish soldiers and civilians.⁹⁶ The theater critic Jan Kott wrote in his memoirs that he felt watched by Ukrainians who had “turned overnight from nationalists into the most rabid Communists.”⁹⁷ The Ukrainian intelligentsia was accused of using its position as titular nation of the Ukrainian republic to drive out Poles from the administration, industry, trade, university life, and the school system.⁹⁸

    The antagonism between Poles and Ukrainians decreased slightly during the final phase of Soviet occupation, when the Soviet occupying power became a common object of hatred.⁹⁹ Ukrainian philologist Myroslav Semchyshyn noted a certain cohesion among Galicians when it came to the cadres from eastern Ukraine: “In short—it was US, and the newcomers were THEM.”¹⁰⁰ This is confirmed by Stanisław Różycki, a Jewish refugee from Warsaw, who wrote that in the spring of 1941 hatred of the NKVD, the commissars, and the party bigwigs was widespread among all ethnic groups. This general hatred of the Bolsheviks, however, also led to a sharp increase in anti-Semitism among the peasantry and the lower middle classes.¹⁰¹ The authors of underground reports repeatedly accused Jews of profiting from the misery of the Poles under Soviet rule, replacing Poles in the economy, and taking over positions in the municipal administration previously held by Poles.¹⁰²

    For the first time, Ukrainians and Poles were confronted with a sizeable number of civil servants and policemen of Jewish origin. Figures are not known to exist for Soviet hiring. Such encounters in municipal offices did not convey a full picture of course. Where “elected” bodies were concerned, for example, the Jewish population was underrepresented. According to one source, only 4 percent of the 519 members of the Lviv municipal Soviet were Jewish, while 52.8 percent were Ukrainian, 27.7 percent Polish, and 14.1 percent Russian.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, the sudden installation of Jews in administrative and law-enforcement positions appeared to confirm the Ukrainian and Polish stereotype of “Jewish Bolshevism” and reinforced their dislike of Jews.¹⁰⁴ Różycki observed that the Poles hated the Bolsheviks deeply and were suspicious of all overtures from the Soviet side, while the Ukrainians were waiting for the Germans:

    Only the Jews do not waver, regardless of their feelings or their rational and moderate attitude toward the Soviet Union. Although they suffered, their possessions were seized, and their families were deported, nonetheless they counted solely on Russia, because everything had to be better for them under the Soviets than under the Germans.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

Soviet occupation policy was based first and foremost on socio-political and power-political categories and only secondarily on ethno-political ones. The Soviets believed that they had liberated the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalist exploiters, but they also believed that they had liberated Ukrainians from Polish oppression. They tried to win over the Ukrainian population, granting certain advantages to the Ukrainian masses, while persecuting the Ukrainian economic and political elite.

    Sovietization meant imposing the Soviet order on each newly acquired territory. It was intended that the occupied lands would become indistinguishable in every respect from the Soviet Union, starting with the introduction of Moscow time and the ruble and ending with the establishment of the first collective farms. Sovietization also meant destroying the backbone of the old political and social order and eliminating all potential enemies. Poles were hit hardest by virtue of their previously dominant position in the Second Poland Republic, followed by Jews with their strong middle class and then Ukrainians. Local Ukrainians were seen as part of the titular nation of the Ukrainian SSR. Lviv was not only sovietized but also, to a certain extent, Ukrainized. Theoretically, nationality was not the reason for targeting and repressing specific groups, but in practice, Soviet authorities often merged political, national, and social categories.

    As a consequence, many Poles, and even many Ukrainians, could interpret Soviet occupation policy as a direct attack on their respective nations. Poles could perceive themselves as the main target of the Soviet terror, while Ukrainians interpreted the persecution of their national leaders as an attempt to behead the Ukrainian nation. For Jews, the situation was different.¹⁰⁶ Soviet rule protected them from racial persecution and violence from their neighbors (anti-Semitic remarks were punishable by law under the Soviets), but it did not protect them from state violence. The equal treatment of Jews and the fight against anti-Semitism played a key role in convincing most Jews in eastern Galicia to favor Soviet to German rule, despite the misery suffered by the Jewish political, social, and economic elites.¹⁰⁷

NOTES

        1. Rusyns are an Eastern Slavic ethnic group, descending—like the Western Ukrainians—from the Ruthenians. Rusyns do not see themselves as part of the Ukrainian nation, but as a distinct nation.

        2. Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukraïny, misto L’viv (TsDIAL), fond (f.) 205, opys (op.) 1, sprava (spr.) 499, arkush (ark.) 39–46, Daily police report on the political situation in L’viv, 13 October 1938.

        3. TsDIAL, f. 250, op. 1, spr. 500, ark. 22–34, Daily police report, 7 May 1939.

        4. In August 1939, L’viv had 333,500 inhabitants: Poles, 169,900 (51 percent); Jews, 104,700 (31 percent); and Ukrainians, 53,200 (16 percent).

        5. TsDIAL, f. 205, op. 1, spr. 499, ark. 125–27, Daily police report, 27 March 1939.

        6. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Konsulat Lemberg/54, März 1939–Juli 1939, German Consulate in Lwów to Foreign Office in Berlin, 3 June 1939.

        7. Dokumenty Obrony Lwowa, ed. Artur Leinwand (Warsaw: Instytut Lwowski, 1997), 53.

        8. M. Szwahulak, “Stanowisko i udział Ukraińców w niemiecko-polskiej kampanii 1939 roku,” in Polska-Ukraina: Trudne pytania, t. 4 (Warsaw: Ośrodek Karta, 1998), 53.

        9. These soldiers had been in the Polish Army before 1939 or had been mobilized after March 1939. Ryszard Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: PWN, 1993), 23–29; Oleksandr Luts’kyi and Kim Naumenko, “U roky Druhoï svitovoï viiny,” in L’viv: Istorychni narysy, ed. Iaroslav Isaievych, Feodosii Steblii, Mykola Lytvyn (L’viv: Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1996), 435–505, here 436.

        10. Ośrodek “Karta,” Archiwum Wschodni (AW), II/1773, Alma Heczko, Dziennik-pamiętnik, cz. 3, 1 October 1939–10 October 1939.

        11. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz, Lwów 1939 (Warsaw: Bellona, 2003), 91.

        12. Numerous Polish eyewitness accounts are quoted in Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, expanded ed. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 17–38; Adam Sudoł, Początki sowietyzacji kresów wschodnich (jesień 1939 roku) (Bydgoszcz and Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane WSP, 1997), 34–38, 54–55; Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy, 28–29, 38.

        13. Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 22–23. German sources say the Wehrmacht captured Lwów, see, for example, the daily public communiqués in Das Oberkommando Wehrmacht gibt bekannt, Bd. 1 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1982), and the then classified daily Wehrmacht reports in Die geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1939–1945, Bd. 1 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verl, 1995). H. F. Meyer’s Blutiges Edelweiss: die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Links, 2008), a critical study of one of the German divisions outside Lwów, suggests Polish forces sought to surrender to the Wehrmacht, but orders to withdraw prevented the Germans from accepting.

        14. Grzegorz Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 1939–1944. Życie codzienne (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2000), 15–16; Luts’kyi and Naumenko, “U roky,” 435–39; Czesław K. Grzelak, Kresy w czerwieni. Agresja Związku Sowieckiego na Polskę w 1939 roku (Warsaw: Neriton, 1998), 399–407.

        15. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 16.

        16. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 163, account (relacje) by Stefan Kuszpa (police officer); k. 166–167, account by Antoni Pater (police officer); k. 180–83, account by Eugeniusz Lipka; k. 184–6, account by Franciszek Buciow; k. 187–90, account by Franciszek Andrzej Naja-Ostromirsk; k. 424, account by Dr. Adam Papée.

        17. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 180–83, account by Lipka.

        18. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw (AAN), AK-KOL, 203, 3–4 (MF 2400/5), report by Armia Krajowa-Komenda Obszara Lwowa (AK-KOL) on Jews, summer 1942. Attacks by “Ukrainian gangs and Jews” are also mentioned in a report by General Tokarzewski for General Sosnkowski, 9 January 1940, in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, 1939–1945, t. 1 (London: Studium Polskiej Podziemnej, 1970), 64.

        19. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 439–40, account by Jan Palewicz (major); k. 464–65, account by Józef Weissenfeld; ibid., k. 468, account by Tadeusz Borkowsky.

        20. Colonel Rowecki to General Sosnkowski, 8 February 1940 (Attachment: Report on the Soviet occupation), in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945, t. 1, 106.

        21. Lala Fishman and Steven Weingartner, Lala’s Story: A Memoir of the Holocaust (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press: 1997), 98.

        22. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 158–160, account by Mieczysław Jasinski; AW, sygn. II/171, memoirs of Janina Kandeler; Karolina Lanckorońska, Wspomnienia wojenne (Cracow: ZNAK, 2003), 17 (English edition: Karolina Lanckorońska, Those Who Trespass against Us: One Woman’s War against the Nazis [London: Pimlico, 2006]); Adam Dotzauer, Lwowskie wczesne dojrzewanie (Wrocław: Oficyna Sudety-PTTK, 2000), 25; Ostap Tarnavs’kyi, Literaturnyi L’viv, 1939–1944: Spomyny (L’viv: Prosvita, 1995), 19; Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid Bol’shevykamy, ed. Milena Rudnyts’ka (New York: Naukove Tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka v Amerytsi, 1958), 28; Fishman and Weingartner, Lala’s Story, 99–100.

        23. AW, sygn. II/2696, account by Juliusz Jaszczuk (1992); Jadwiga Dabulewicz-Rutkowska, Poezja, proza i dramat. Pamiętnik nastolatki. Lwów, 1939–1941 (Wrocław: Atla 2,1998), 31.

        24. AW, sygn. II/1314, memoirs of Wanda Jóźwiak (1993).

        25. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 193–94, account by Marian Pryk; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 116–18.

        26. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 180–83, account by Eugeniusz Lipka; Fishman and Weingartner, Lala’s Story, 100–01.

        27. O. S. Rubl’ov and Iu.A. Cherchenko, Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukraïns’koï inteligentsiï (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1994), 192–93.

        28. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, pp. 41–45.

        29. Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 311–43.

        30. Report of the People’s Commissariat for the Education of the Ukrainian SSR, 30 September 1939, in Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraïny, t. 1: 1939–1953 (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1995), 52–57; order of the Ukrainian government from 19 December 1939 on cultural life in western Ukraine, 19 December 1939, ibid., 68–71.

        31. Oleksandr Luts’kyi, “Intelihentsiia L’vova (veresen’ 1939–cherven’ 1941 rr.),” in L’viv. Misto-suspil’stvo-kul’tura, t. 3, ed. Mar’ian Mudryi (L’viv: L’vivs’kyj Derzhavnyj Universytet imeni Ivana Franka, 1999), 574–91; Luts’kyi and Naumenko, “U roky,” 454–456; Lanckorońska, Wspomnienia wojenne, 24–26; Żygulski, Jestem z lwowskiego etapu, 130–32.

        32. Rudnyts’ka, Zakhidnia Ukraïna, 107, 187; Rubl’ov and Cherchenko, Stalinshchyna, 194–95.

        33. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 130–32.

        34. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 480–82, account by Bronisława Stachowicz; Lanckorońska, Wspomnienia, 18; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 42–43.

        35. From the resolution of a meeting of the intelligentsia of L’viv, 1 October 1939, in Kul’turne zhyttia, 57.

        36. Jan Gross, “The Jewish Community in the Soviet-annexed Territories on the Eve of the Holocaust,” in The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. Studies and Sources on the Destruction of Jews in the Nazi-occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945, ed. Lucjan Dobroszycki, Jeffrey S. Gurock (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 155–71.

        37. Archiwum Ringelbluma. Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy, t. 3: Relacje z kresów, ed. Andrzej Żbikowski (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczne, 2000), account 42, p. 808.

        38. Ibid., 792–95.

        39. After a numerus clausus had been introduced in prewar Poland the number of Jewish students finishing their studies at Polish universities fell from 8400 (24.6 percent) 1924–25 to 4100 (8.2 percent) in 1938–39. In 1924–25, 40.4 percent of all students at the Jan Kazimierz University were Jews, at the Polytechnic 14 percent of the students were Jews. In 1935–36 at the JKU only 20.5 percent were of Jewish faith, see Dietrich Beyrau, “Antisemitismus und Judentum in Polen, 1918–1939,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 8 (1982), 227. Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Polish Embassy, London, 17 December 1924, AAN, Ambasada RP w Londynie, 1441, k. 68–70. Skład Uniwersytetu 1935/36.

        40. Isaievych, Steblii, and Lytvyn, L’viv, 457.

        41. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 130–32.

        42. Leon Weliczker Wells, The Janowska Road (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), 30.

        43. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 100–01.

        44. Czerwony Sztandar, 17 September 1940.

        45. Kazimierz Żygulski, Jestem z lwowskiego etapu (Warsaw: PAX, 1994), 139; Mieczysław Inglot, “Obraz ojczyzny w liryce polskiej okupowanego Lwowa lat 1939–1945,” in Europa nie prowincjonalna. Przemiany na ziemiach wschodnich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej (Białoruś, Litwa, Łotwa, Ukraina, wschodnie pogranicze III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) w latach 1772–1999, ed. Krzysztow Jasiewicz (Warsaw and London: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1999), 168–80.

        46. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 33

        47. Ibid., 34–35, 60.

        48. Weliczker Wells, Janowska Road, 28.

        49. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 513–14, account by Jan Mazur; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 65–66, 144.

        50. Ilana Maschler, Moskauer Zeit. Erinnerungen (Göttingen: Steidl Verlag, 1991), 74.

        51. Żygulski, Jestem z lwowskiego etapu, 117.

        52. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 513–14, account by Jan Mazur; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 65–66, 144.

        53. AW, sygn. MINF 135, k. 470–71, account by Leon Bylicki; k. 489–91, account by Robert Pawelczyk; AW, sygn. II/1314, memoirs of Wanda Jóźwiak (1993) and memoirs of Juliusz Jaszczuk (1992); AW, sygn. II/1167, memoirs of Halina Konopińska; Rudnyts’ka, Zakhidnia Ukraïna, 30–31; Fishman and Weingartner, Lala’s Story, 102–03; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 70–72.

        54. Weliczker Wells, Janowska Road, 27.

        55. Lanckorońska, Wspomnienia wojenne, 33–34.

        56. Weliczker Wells, Janowska Road, 30.

        57. Ben-Cion Pinchuk, “Jewish Refugees in Soviet Poland, 1939–1941,” Jewish Social Studies 40, no. 2 (1978), 141–58.

        58. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 88–89; Żygulski, Jestem z lwowskiego etapu, 118.

        59. Maschler, Moskauer Zeit, 67.

        60. Fishman and Weingartner, Lala’s Story, 104.

        61. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 59/305, Bl. 8–9.

        62. These were the respective days when the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union accepted the petitions requesting the annexation of each half of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union.

        63. Pinchuk, Jewish Refugees, 151.

        64. Maschler, Moskauer Zeit, 133–34.

        65. Agnieszka Cieślikowa, Prasa okupowanego Lwowa (Warsaw: Neriton, 1997), 78–79.

        66. Ibid., 17.

        67. AW, MINF 135, k. 171–72, account by Józef Mroczkowski; k. 161, account by Krzysztof Izdebski; k. 172–74, account by Bronisław Pawlus; k. 175–76, account by Bolesław Kusiak; k. 507–08, account by Antoni Twardochleb; k. 158, account by Władysław Barski; k. 177–88, account by Wojciech Olecki; 502–04, account by Władysław Zubrzycki; k. 158–160, account by Mieczysław Jasiński. On the prisons, see Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 144–86; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 36.

        68. Grzegorz Mazur and Jerzy Węgierski, Konspiracja Lwowska, 1939–1944. Słownik Biograficzny (Katowice: Unia, 1997), 10.

        69. Sudoł, Początki sowietyzacji, 46–47, 117–18; Rafał Wnuk, “Polska konspiracja antysowiecka na Kresach Wschodnich II RP w latach 1939–1941 i 1944–1952,” in Tygiel narodów. Stosunki społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939–1953, ed. Krzysztof Jasiewicz (Warsaw, London: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2002), 157–249.

        70. The OUN, based in German-occupied central Poland, split in early 1940, but both OUN factions, the OUN-B (made up largely of the movement’s younger members and centered on Stepan Bandera) and the OUN-M (mostly made up of the movement’s older members and loyal to Andrii Melnyk) continued to strive for a united, independent Ukrainian state by joining forces with the German Reich.

        71. In the chaos that followed the German attack on the Soviet Union, several more were executed in June, but others escaped and went on to join the OUN-B and later the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Volhynia and Galicia, see Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv i Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia. Istorychni Narysy (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 2005), 15; V. Kuk, Stepan Bandera (1909–1999) (Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileia-NV, 1999), 30–32.

        72. Luba Komar, Protses 59-ty (L’viv: Naukove Tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka, 1997), 265–70.

        73. Grzegorz Hryciuk and Jaroslaw Stoćkyj, Studia nad demografią historyczną i sytuacją religijną Ukrainy (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2001), 23.

        74. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 40–41.

        75. Semchyshyn, Z knyhy Leva, 85–87.

        76. Jones, Żydzi Lwowa, 40–42.

        77. Archiwum Ringelbluma, t. 3, account 42, pp. 816, 821–22, and account 30, pp. 517–18; Jones, Żydzi Lwowa, 40.

        78. Report of a refugee from Warsaw on the situation in L’viv between 1939 and summer 1941, written in Warsaw after 7 December 1941, in Archiwum Ringelbluma, t. 3, account 36, p. 691; Hryciuk and Stoćkyj, Studia, 27–30. The AK reported that during the Soviet occupation, around 150,000 capitalists and estate owners, including their family members, had been deported. Report of the Home Army, summer 1943; AAN, AK-KOL, 203–04; 150–51 (MF 2400/8). In Soviet documents, the number of deportees from L’viv is given as 7200. Eyewitnesses speak of 16,000–30,000 deportees, Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 40.

        79. Jones, Żydzi Lwowa, 28.

        80. Archiwum Ringelbluma, t. 3, account 33, pp. 631–34. Eyewitness accounts speak of 60,000–70,000 deported refugees, the majority from L’viv (40,000). According to Soviet documents about 22,000 refugees had been deported from that city, Hryciuk and Stoćkyj, Studia, 30; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 40; Luts’kyi and Naumenko, “U roky,” 457–58.

        81. Weliczker Wells, Janowska Road, 29.

        82. Maschler, Moskauer Zeit, 93.

        83. Ibid., 130.

        84. Report from January 1940, in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, t. 1, 67.

        85. Lanckorońska, Wspomnienia wojenne, 20; memoirs of Janina Kandeler, AW, sygn II/171; Fishman and Weingartner, Lala’s Story, 103; Weliczker Wells, Janowska Road, 27.

        86. Archiwum Ringelbluma, t. 3, account 43, pp. 893–94; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 170–71.

        87. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 158–60, 172–74.

        88. Diary entry from 15 October 1939, in Jadwiga Dabulewicz-Rutkowska, Poezja, proza i dramat (Wrocław: Oficyna Artystyczno-Wydawnictwo W Kolorach Tęczy, 1998), 37–38.

        89. AW, sygn. II/1314, Memoirs of Wanda Jóźwiak (1993).

        90. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 171.

        91. Ibid., 153–54.

        92. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 44–9; Grzegorz Hryciuk, “‘Nowy Kurs’? Ewolucja Polityki Radzieckiej wobec Polaków we Lwowie (czerwiec 1940–czerwiec 1941),” in Wrocławskie Studia z Historii Najnowszej, r. 6 (1998), 47–66.

        93. Quoted in Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 44–45.

        94. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 44–46; Cieślikowa, Prasa, 91–93.

        95. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 47–48; Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy, 88.

        96. AAN, AK-KOL, 203, 20 (MF 2400/7), Report of the AK-KOL on the political situation, July 1942; AAN, zesp. 2271/4, 202/III/203, k. 1–17, Memorandum on the “Ukrainian problem,” December 1943, printed in Mikołaj Siwicki, Dzieje konfliktów polsko-ukraińskich, t. 2 (Warsaw: Zaklad Wydawniczy Tyrsa, 1992), 74; Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 18.

        97. Jan Kott, Still Alive: An Autobiographical Essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 35.

        98. AAN, AK-KOL, 203, 20 (MF 2400/7), Report of the AK-KOL on the political situation, July 1942; AAN, zesp. 2271/4, 202/III/203, k. 1–17, memorandum on “The Ukrainian problem,” December 1943, printed in Siwicki, Dzieje konfliktów polsko-ukraińskich, t. 2, 75.

        99. AAN, AK-KOL, 203, 59–60 (MF 2400/7), Report of the AK-KOL (excerpt), about December 1941.

        100. Ibid., 70.

        101. Intelligence report sent by Rowecki to Sosnkowski, 8 February 1940, in Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, t. 1, 107.

        102. AAN, AK-KOL, 203, 3–4 (on microfilm: MF 2400/5), Report of the Armia Krajowa-Komenda Obszara Lwowa (AK-KOL) on Jews, Summer 1942.

        103. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie, 25. Eliyahu Jones gives other numbers. According to his information, out of 476 deputies, 252 were Ukrainians, 121 Poles, 76 Jews (16 percent), and 27 belonged to other nationalities. But even here Jews were underrepresented. Eliyahu Jones, Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji 1939–1945 (Łódź: Oficyna Bibliofilów, 1999), 28.

        104. Dotzauer, Lwowskie wczesne dojrzewanie, 23–24.

        105. Archiwum Ringelbluma, t. 3, account 31, 542. More on interethnic perceptions in L’viv during the first Soviet occupation in Christoph Mick, “‘Only the Jews do not waver...’: L’viv under Soviet Occupation,” in Shared History—Divided Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet Occupied Poland, 1939–1941, ed. Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, Kai Struve (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 245–62.

        106. See also Dov Levin, The Lesser of Two Evils. Eastern European Jewry under Soviet Rule, 1939–1941 (Philadelphia and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1995).

        107. Archiwum Ringelbluma, t. 3, account 36, p. 694, account 30, p. 517–18, account 42, p. 816, account 31, p. 538, 543–44; Fishman and Weingartner, Lala’s Story, 97–98.

7

German Economic Plans for the Occupied Soviet Union and Their Implementation, 1941–1944

Alex J. Kay

Adolf Hitler had longed for a war against the Soviet Union and the destruction of Bolshevism since the mid-1920s, a time when his party was still a fringe movement in German politics. Given the ideological chasm that separated Nazism and Bolshevism, the signing of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 came as a real shock to National Socialists and Soviet Communists alike. This pact, however, was nothing more than a product of cynical political expediency. Both Hitler and his Soviet counterpart, Joseph Stalin, were playing for time; neither wanted a war with the other in 1939.

    A comprehensive trade treaty signed on 11 February 1940 established that each side would deliver to the other goods worth 640–660 million Reichsmark over the next two years. In a supplementary agreement signed on 10 January 1941, the Soviets promised the delivery of 2.5 million tons of grain. According to the Soviets, it would be possible to deliver such an amount only “by falling back on national grain reserves.”¹ In a telegram to the German Foreign Office, Karl Schnurre, the head of the German delegation to the negotiations that resulted in the supplementary agreement, described what Germany had obtained as “the maximum” that could have been provided by the Soviet economy, after making allowances for the Soviets’ own needs.² In the sixteen months of the trade agreement, Germany received 1.4 million tons of grain, 1 million tons of timber, large quantities of scarce metals, and 212,000 tons of supplies from Japan sent via the Trans-Siberian railway.³

    In spite of the considerable increase in the flow of goods between the two countries, the agricultural deliveries from the Soviet Union did not entirely cover German shortages, while the Soviet Union demanded in return industrial and military goods that were crucial for a country at war, such as Germany. Furthermore—and this was a fundamental factor from Hitler’s point of view—the growing German dependence on deliveries from the Soviet Union, which could theoretically be stopped at any moment, was highly undesirable.⁴ The longer the war in the west lasted, and with it the British blockade, and the weaker Germany’s strategic position became through increased U.S. support for Britain, the greater Germany’s precarious economic (and political) dependence on the Soviet Union would become.

    The difficulties involved in feeding and supplying the people of German-occupied Europe aroused fears among the German political elite of a negative impact on the public mood within the Reich. For these reasons, Berlin was willing to contemplate the loss of vital Soviet deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs by violating the nonaggression pact and launching an invasion. Memories of the First World War, more specifically what the Nazis saw as the decisive effect of the British naval blockade on the supply of food to the German home front and consequently on the population’s morale, resolve, and faith in victory, were particularly influential in shaping the German leadership’s mentality and formulating its policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.⁵

    In accordance with these considerations, Hitler’s “Directive No. 21: Case Barbarossa,” issued on 18 December 1940, instructed the German armed forces to be prepared to crush the Soviet Union in a rapid campaign the following spring. Stalin, on the other hand, was convinced that it could not be in Germany’s interest to attack the Soviet Union if Moscow faithfully complied with the trade agreements and delivered all the foodstuffs and raw materials required of it. The refusal to believe that Germany could contemplate attacking its trading partner would become an obsession with Stalin and have fatal consequences for the Soviet Union and its people.

    Thus, in addition to political, military, and ideological motives, economic considerations also played a central role in shaping the German decision to invade the Soviet Union during the first half of 1941 and framing the short- and long-term objectives of the campaign and subsequent occupation. The decree officially appointing Hermann Göring economic chief in the occupied Soviet territories empowered him to order “all measures that are required for the most extensive exploitation possible of the available supplies and economic capacities and for the expansion of economic forces in favor of the German war economy.”⁶ The aim was not to resurrect and maintain the entire Soviet economic infrastructure as soon as possible. Instead, the German agency responsible for the economic exploitation would set priorities, with the emphasis being on those few products that were of crucial importance to the German war economy: grain, oilseeds, and crude oil.⁷

    The most important single area would be food production and anything related to it, such as equipment or installations required for the manufacture of tractors, but also crude oil, on which Soviet agriculture was very dependent. The selection of which industrial plants were to be restored depended to a large extent on the conditions found by the Germans, particularly following the destruction that would inevitably be brought about by the military advance. Hence the plants were to be examined first, and the decision whether to restore them made later.⁸

    Importantly, German economic objectives in the Soviet Union varied depending on the individual territory in question. Political plans envisaged the creation of four territorial administrative entities—or Reich commissariats—after the defeat of the Red Army and the pacification of the occupied territories: “Ostland” (the Baltic countries plus most of Belarus), “Ukraine” (originally planned to stretch from Lviv in the west to Saratov in the east), “Caucasia” (the Caucasus and other parts of southern Russia), and “Russia” (north-central Russia to the Ural Mountains).⁹ By contrast, based on the varying objectives in German preinvasion plans and the resulting treatment of the economic infrastructure and the indigenous population, at least five territories can be identified. These territories are the Baltic lands, Belarus, Ukraine, northern and central Russia, and southern Russia including the Caucasus.

    Of the Soviet territories to be occupied, Ukraine was for Germany the most prized. Within the framework of the German-Soviet trade agreement, 90 percent of grain deliveries made to Germany in 1940 had come from central and southern Ukraine.¹⁰ According to German food experts, Ukraine produced forty million tons of grain annually, 40 percent of the Soviet harvest of 100 million tons.¹¹ This may have been the case, but its population made up less than 20 percent of the Soviet population,¹² which meant that Ukraine also supplied other parts of the Soviet Union with grain. Thus the additional amounts harvested by Ukraine but not consumed by the republic’s population were not surpluses intended for export; they were required in order to feed other parts of the Soviet population where agricultural surpluses did not exist.

    However, the German exploitation of agriculture in the occupied Soviet territories was based on the assumption that grain surpluses would not be determined by the size of the harvest, but by the amount of individual consumption.¹³In other words, the German occupiers intended to manipulate the distribution of grain among the Soviet population and thus create “surpluses” for themselves. German agricultural planners recognized that Germany would be likely to gain little from an attempt to reduce the consumption of the Soviet population across the board due to their inability to control either the movement of large numbers of the civilian population or trade on the black market. Economic guidelines produced one month before the invasion by the agricultural section of the Economics Staff East, which was to be responsible for exploiting Soviet resources,¹⁴ explained what the planners had in mind and the anticipated consequences of such an approach:

    b) Since Germany and Europe, respectively, require surpluses at all costs, consumption [in the Soviet Union] must be reduced accordingly...

    c) In contrast to the territories occupied so far, this reduction in consumption is also feasible, because the main surplus territory is spatially starkly separated from the main deficit territory...

    The surplus territories are located in the black earth territory (that is, in the south and the southeast) and in the Caucasus. The deficit territories are located predominantly in the forest zone of the north (Podsol soils).

    Thus: a sealing off of the black earth territories must make more or less large surpluses in these territories available to us at all costs. The consequence is the non-delivery of the entire forest zone, including the important industrial centers of Moscow and [St.] Petersburg.¹⁵

The guidelines of the Economics Staff East reflected the detailed written version of the results of a discussion three weeks earlier between the relevant representatives of the ministerial bureaucracy and the Wehrmacht. Those present concluded:

    1) The war can only continue to be waged if the entire Wehrmacht is fed from Russia [i.e., the Soviet Union] during the 3rd year of the war.

    2) In doing so, tens of millions of people will doubtlessly starve to death, if that which is necessary for us is extracted from the land.¹⁶

In the black earth areas of the south and southeast, to which Ukraine belonged, the concrete objectives of the economic operation would be to obtain grain and oil crops, especially sunflowers, and to guarantee provisions for German forces in the east. Thus around 1 million tons of bread grain, 1.2–1.5 million tons of oats, 475,000 tons of meat (for which 2.4 million tons of feed grain were needed), 100,000 tons of fat, plus the required quantities of hay, straw, fruit and vegetables, tinned fish, sugar, processed foodstuffs, and legumes (peas, beans, lentils, etc.) would have to be removed from the occupied Soviet territories in order to feed at least two-thirds of the Wehrmacht (the ground forces in the east) during the third year of the war (summer 1941 to summer 1942) and “perhaps additional years.” Only after the troops’ requirements had been met were deliveries to the German home front to commence.¹⁷

    In order to realize these objectives, the most important task would be to maintain and increase agricultural production. The prerequisite for both an increase in agricultural production in the surplus territories and the acquisition of agricultural surpluses was deemed to be the retention of the collective farms (kolkhozy), which accounted for over 95 percent of those employed in Soviet agriculture. It was feared that the potential disorder involved in converting the 250,000 collective farms into smaller, private enterprises could lead to serious disruption and would be too risky to be undertaken for the time being. At any rate, the larger the individual farm, the easier the acquisition of produce was expected to be.¹⁸

    Of the 49.3 million Soviet citizens employed in agriculture in 1940, 47 million were working in collective farms. Collective farmers therefore made up the majority of the Soviet workforce (54 percent).¹⁹ These workers had to be adequately fed—with the exception of Russians, who would be forced into the forest zone, and whose farms would be occupied by Ukrainians—in order to maintain and increase production.²⁰ Both during and after the war, the occupied Soviet territories were expected not to substitute existing German and western European food production, but rather to supplement it. Imports from the east would replace imports from overseas. By means of an intensification of agriculture and a resulting increase in yields, the Soviet surplus-generating territories were to become a lasting and substantial addition to western and central European food production.²¹

    Unlike agricultural workers in the surplus territories, captured Soviet troops were not considered to be of productive value to the Germans. From the point of view of the German leadership, given the expected swift victory, it was not necessary to bolster the German war economy with an influx of politically and racially undesirable—and militarily trained—Soviet laborers.²² Only later, when the blitzkrieg failed and the invasion became a war of attrition, did the preservation of Soviet prisoners of war (and industrial workers) become an important consideration. Neither in the economic guidelines of 23 May 1941 nor in the preinvasion plans of designated Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg was the question of labor procurement addressed in detail. Indeed, it can be stated with confidence that, during the planning phase for Barbarossa, no serious consideration was given to the employment of Soviets—whether POWs or civilians—in the Reich.²³ Furthermore, there existed an explicit ban from Hitler, no less, on the deployment of Soviet POWs for work in the Reich.²⁴ There were admittedly labor shortages in German armaments factories, but these were expected to be filled by German soldiers returning from the east after a successful military campaign.²⁵

    Hitler anticipated that it would be necessary to retain only forty to fifty divisions in the occupied Soviet territories following victory, and that the size of the German Army could be reduced accordingly.²⁶ Hitler issued guidelines which corresponded with this line of thinking: “Military control over the European area following the defeat of Russia will soon allow a significant reduction in the size of the Army.”²⁷ In mid-August 1941, the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) was still planning to dissolve fifty German divisions after the victory over the Soviet Union; as a result, 300,000 men would have been freed up for the armaments industry.²⁸ This whole approach was motivated by the firm belief that the military campaign against the Soviet Union would be successfully concluded within a matter of months.

    As an agricultural surplus territory, Ukraine was also to be exploited as much as possible for industrial production.²⁹ An early occupation of the Donets Basin, the source of 60 percent of Soviet coal, was important, as was the maintenance in this region of heavy industry in general.³⁰ Of the eighteen million tons of iron ore extracted in the European part of the Soviet Union (70 percent of the Soviet total), sixteen million tons came from Ukraine.³¹ It was left open, however, to what extent the German occupiers would succeed in maintaining all industries in Ukraine, in particular processing industries, “following the removal of those surpluses necessary for Germany.”³²

    Farther east, southern Russia and northern Caucasus constituted, like Ukraine, grain surplus territories. In addition to the agricultural value of the Caucasus, this region was also vital for Germany for its crude oil production. In the plans to seal off the deficit territories from the surplus territories, one significant exception was made: the oil-rich region of southern Caucasus (comprising present-day Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan).³³ As early as 31 July 1940, when announcing to the heads of the OKW, the Army, and the Navy, his “definite decision to deal with Russia” in the spring of 1941, Hitler included in his operational proposals a move to secure the oil center of Baku on the western shore of the Caspian Sea.³⁴

    According to a comprehensive military-geographical study of the European part of the Soviet Union produced by the General Staff of the German Army, Baku was in fact the producer of 73 percent of Soviet crude oil.³⁵ The head of the OKW’s War Economy and Armaments Office, Lieutenant General Georg Thomas, concluded in February 1941 that the first months could witness a relief for Germany on both the food front and the raw materials front, provided that the destruction of supplies could be avoided, the transport issue solved, and the crude oil region of the Caucasus—producer of 89 percent of the Soviet Union’s crude oil—seized intact.³⁶ Indeed, Thomas deemed the Caucasus to be “indispensable” for the exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories.³⁷ This region was so vital for Germany because of the latter’s precarious fuel and rubber situation. In the event of an eastern campaign, supplies of aviation fuel would last only until autumn 1941 and supplies of vehicle fuel only until mid-August.³⁸

    The crude oil of the Caucasus was required not only by the German war machine itself but also for the highly mechanized Soviet agriculture, which consumed around 60 percent of all Soviet oil production.³⁹ Thus only the securing of fuel requirements and the subsequent rebuilding of Soviet agriculture could bring about a “significant improvement” in the provisioning of Germany and German-occupied Europe with grain.⁴⁰ Thomas, his colleagues in the War Economy and Armaments Office, and Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, Hermann Göring, were of the opinion that the crude oil center of Baku had to be occupied at all costs; the occupation of Ukraine alone would otherwise be of “no value.”⁴¹ The main aim for the Caucasus was thus: “Quickest restart and increase of the crude oil production and measures for the smooth evacuation of these quantities.”⁴²

    One of the most crucial reasons why the aforementioned policy of starvation was so quickly accepted by leading party and state agencies was the perception that it was a necessary prerequisite for the success of the Wehrmacht’s operational plans.⁴³ It was abundantly clear to the military leadership that the success of the campaign depended on the speed of the German advance. The speed of the advance was in turn dependent on the ability of the supply apparatus to provide the troops with fuel, ammunition, and food. The advancing troops could only be supplied with vehicle fuel for a maximum of two months following the invasion,⁴⁴ and it was only possible to make available the 250,000 tons of diesel oil required for operations through immediate and severe cutbacks in construction, agriculture, and the economies of occupied Europe.⁴⁵

    Ironically, the bulk of the fuel to be transported eastward would be required by the trucks that were transporting it.⁴⁶ Baku, one of the major targets of the German advance, was situated on the Caspian Sea at the eastern edge of the area planned for occupation and could not be occupied in the first weeks of the campaign, if in fact at all. The Soviet rail network did not offer a solution to the Wehrmacht’s transportation problems, as the railway lines running from west to east were few in number and their capacity limited.⁴⁷ Additionally, Soviet railways had a gauge of 1.524 m, 8.9 cm broader than the 1.435 m gauge in use in most European countries, including Germany.⁴⁸ Even if combat engineers succeeded in rapidly relaying the track, this would still slow the advance—a development that could not be countenanced. Furthermore, it was by no means guaranteed that those few west-east railway lines could be protected from destruction during the initial military advance.⁴⁹ Therefore, in order to minimize the military supplies that had to be transported from central Europe and thus relieve the strain on the limited transport routes, the transportation of food supplies was to be drastically cut back and German troops were expected to feed themselves—as clearly stated at the meeting of the state secretaries on 2 May 1941—“from the land.”

    Thus Germany’s chances of victory were directly related to the extent to which the troops succeeded in providing themselves with agricultural produce from the occupied Soviet territories, clearly to the disadvantage of the indigenous population. In that sense, pursuing the starvation policy was in the interests of the Wehrmacht. This was already clear to the military at an early stage in the preparations. In February 1941, Army Quartermaster-General Eduard Wagner, the man responsible for supplying the troops, recognized and recorded the following points:

    Supplies must be limited through extensive exploitation of the land, [and] acquisition must be tightly controlled. The country’s stocks are not to be utilized through indiscriminate seizure, but rather through confiscation and enforced collection according to [a]‌ well-thought-out plan.⁵⁰

An order on the organization and tasks of the forthcoming military occupation issued on 3 April 1941 in the name of the commander in chief of the Army, Walther von Brauchitsch, made clear to the troops what was at stake. Safeguarding the major transport routes and exploiting the land were described as being “of decisive importance for operations.”⁵¹ In a letter dated 14 May 1941, Herbert Backe, the state secretary in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture and initiator of the starvation policy, reminded Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the OKW, how significant the “complete provisioning of the Army from occupied territories” was for the economic situation.⁵² Accordingly, the OKW’s “Special Instructions to Directive No. 21 (Case Barbarossa),” issued five days later, went even further in its clarity than Brauchitsch’s 3 April order:

    The exceptional conditions in the area “Barbarossa” necessitate the comprehensive and tightly conducted exploitation of the land for supplying the troops, especially in the food area.

    The troops must realize that every act of economizing in supplies, particularly in food, increases the scope of the operations.⁵³ (emphasis in the original)

Within German starvation policy, the northern and central Russian territories were the principal target when it came to victims. The aforementioned economic guidelines of the Economics Staff East stated:

    The population of these territories, in particular the population of the cities, will have to face the most terrible famine. It will be a matter of diverting the population into the Siberian spaces. Since railway transport is out of the question, this problem will also be an extremely difficult one...

    Many tens of millions of people in this territory will become superfluous and will have to die or emigrate to Siberia. Attempts to rescue the population there from death through starvation by obtaining surpluses from the black earth zone can only be at the expense of supplying Europe. They prevent the possibility of Germany holding out in the war; they prevent Germany and Europe from resisting the blockade. With regard to this, absolute clarity must reign.⁵⁴ (emphasis in the original)

Germany was interested in maintaining production in the forest zone only insofar as this was required to supply the troops stationed there. To feed these soldiers, grain and other foodstuffs, as well as animal feed, oats, hay, and straw would have to be confiscated for years to come.⁵⁵ In the words of Lieutenant General Thomas, there was to be “no accumulation of Wehrmacht tasks in the Moscow area.”⁵⁶ A July 1941 visit to Army Group Center headquarters by the commander of Einsatzgruppe B’s Advance Commando Moscow, Professor Franz Alfred Six, shed light on just why this was. According to a staff officer present:

    After an encirclement of Moscow, his [Six’s] commando was to be smuggled through the front in order to infiltrate the city and fulfill “security tasks” there. Hitler had ordered that no member of the Wehrmacht be allowed to step foot in Moscow.…He [Six] reported in the process that Hitler intended to extend the eastern border of the Reich as far as the line Baku-Stalingrad-Moscow-Leningrad. Eastward of this line as far as the Urals, a “blazing strip” would emerge in which all life would be erased. It was intended to decimate the around thirty million Russians living in this strip through starvation, by removing all foodstuffs from this enormous territory. All those involved in this operation were to be forbidden on pain of death to give a Russian even just a piece of bread. The large cities from Leningrad to Moscow were to be razed to the ground; the SS leader von dem Bach-Zelewski would be responsible for the implementation of these measures.…In order to be able to optimally carry out the industrial and agricultural exploitation of the conquered territories, the Russians were to be mere work slaves.⁵⁷

Bach-Zelewski was an SS major general and the higher SS and police leader for central Russia. He was also present at a gathering of senior SS officers on 12–15 June 1941 when Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler apparently described the purpose of the Soviet campaign as “the decimation of the Slavic population by thirty million.”⁵⁸ The anticipated figure of about thirty million Soviet deaths quoted by both Six and Bach-Zelewski (and, in the latter case, attributed to Himmler) appears in several other documents and seems to have been the standard expectation among the economic planners of the human cost of the starvation policy. The number thirty million was roughly the amount by which the Soviet population had grown between the beginning of the First World War in 1914 and the beginning of the Second World War in 1939.⁵⁹ It is worth recalling that it was in fact “in particular the population of the cities,” according to the economic guidelines of 23 May 1941, that would “have to face the most terrible famine” in the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ During a discussion in Berlin in late November 1941, Göring told Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano that certain peoples had to be decimated and twenty to thirty million inhabitants of the Soviet Union would starve during 1941.⁶¹

    Already before the war, continental Europe needed imports of twelve to thirteen million tons of grain a year, equivalent to the food requirements of over twenty-five million people.⁶² Supplying continental Europe’s inhabitants with the foodstuffs they required, making continental Europe—that is, German-occupied Europe—immune from naval blockade, and thereby preparing the German sphere of control for the looming confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon powers was the purpose of the intended starvation of thirty million Soviet citizens. In the process, the industrial and urban development that had taken place in the Russian Empire and then in the Soviet Union over the previous thirty years was to be reversed.

    As agricultural deficit territories, northern and central Russia, including the major urban centers of Leningrad and Moscow, were to be exploited industrially “only insofar as the overall situation demands.”⁶³ A large-scale dismantling operation was anticipated.⁶⁴ The guidelines of the Economics Staff East specified:

    Destruction of the Russian processing industry in the forest zone is also an absolute necessity for Germany’s future peace.…In the future, southern Russia must turn its eyes toward Europe. Its food surpluses will be able to be paid for only if it obtains its consumer goods from Germany and from Europe, respectively. The Russian competition in the forest zone must therefore fall.…The manufacturing industry in Belgium and France is considerably more important for Germany and the German war capabilities than that of Russia.…It is thus under no circumstances a case of maintaining that which exists, but rather of a conscious renunciation of that which has come to be and an incorporation of Russia’s [i.e., the Soviet Union’s] food economy into the European framework. This will necessarily result in the dying out of both the industry and a large part of the people in the hitherto deficit territories.⁶⁵ (emphasis in the original)

The intention of the German leadership to destroy large Soviet cities after starving out their inhabitants was voiced on many occasions, in particular with regard to Moscow and Leningrad.⁶⁶ For example, at the most important meeting of the party and state leadership to discuss the fate of the occupied Soviet territories, Hitler declared on 16 July 1941 that he wanted Leningrad to be “razed to the ground.”⁶⁷ A little over a week earlier, he had already announced his intention to deal with both Leningrad and Moscow in this way “in order to prevent people remaining there, whom we would then have to feed in the winter.”⁶⁸ In a letter to his wife, the Quartermaster-General Wagner wrote: “For the time being, [St.] Petersburg will just have to sweat it out[;]‌ what are we supposed to do with a city of 3½ mill. that just rests on our rations pouch. There’s no room for sentimentalities here.”⁶⁹

    With an annual shortage of 800,000 tons of bread grain,⁷⁰ Belarus, like the northern and central Russian territories, was also a deficit territory. In view of its mostly poor soil and large forest coverage, Belarus was identified by the German planners as being of greater significance to Germany for its timber industry than for its agriculture. In addition, Belarus was the Soviet Union’s pig fattening center. For this reason, the livestock was to be siphoned off early on for German purposes. Not only the Wehrmacht but also the German home front would benefit from the seizure of Soviet livestock.⁷¹ According to the guidelines of the Economics Staff East:

    While, however, the supplying of the Army must take place from all territories in the east (depending on the troops present in the individual territories), and while the export of oilseeds and grain will take place primarily from the black earth zone, the provision of meat for German purposes, indeed even for the purposes of the ongoing requirements of the Wehrmacht, must take place from the forest zone and here in turn in particular from the Belarusian territories and the central industrial territories around Moscow.⁷²(emphasis in the original)

This would relieve Germany of the burden of diverting to the front enough meat for three million soldiers, who received particularly large rations. Combat troops received 1700 g of meat per week compared with 500 g for the average consumer. Starting on 1 June 1941, these amounts were cut to 1400 g and 400 g, respectively.⁷³ The “Guidelines for the Management of the Economy in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories,” issued just six days before the invasion began, served as the official handbook for the economic administration of the occupied Soviet territories. These instructions, known as the “Green Folder” (Grüne Mappe) due to the color of their binding, identified livestock, oats, horses, and timber as the items that had to be utilized by the occupiers in Belarus.⁷⁴

    As higher SS and police leader for central Russia, Bach-Zelewski was to be responsible for the extermination of twenty million people on Belarusian and Russian territory in the wake of the German advance.⁷⁵ The fact that the responsibility fell to Bach-Zelewski for the killing of two-thirds of the envisaged thirty million who would die from starvation can be explained in that a significant chunk of the forest zone was located in his geographical area of competence.⁷⁶

    Unlike northern and central Russia and Belarus, the Baltic lands—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were not agricultural deficit territories. The three countries produced a combined annual surplus of 340,000 tons of bread grain.⁷⁷ Thus German planners intended that this region should “feed itself.”⁷⁸ As the Baltic was situated advantageously for trade with Europe, it was also anticipated that this territory would be utilized for the European food economy. The German planners identified butter, grain, root crops (carrots, turnips, parsnips, etc.), and seeds such as clover, peas, beans, and maple peas as valuable products to be obtained from the Baltic. Germany even had a “paramount interest” in the butter and seed crops produced in these territories.⁷⁹ In industrial terms, the main task in the Baltic would be the “exploitation of the shipyard and aluminum capacities and the oil deposits.”⁸⁰

    The highly questionable prerequisite for ultimate German victory in the east and the realization of German economic plans was a successful completion of the military campaign in the space of two to three months, which was in turn dependent on the effective provisioning of the troops with fuel, ammunition, and food. Furthermore, from the German perspective, the military campaign would only be regarded as completed once all Soviet territory as far east as the “AA line,” running between Arkhangelsk on the White Sea in the far north to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea in the south, a line some 300 miles (over 480 km) east of Moscow, had been occupied and pacified by German forces.

    As it turned out, the furthest extent of the German advance fell way short of this target: Moscow was not reached; Leningrad, though besieged for almost two and a half years, was never taken; and the oil-rich southern Caucasus was not occupied. Hence, Germany was perforce unable to implement a number of the central economic aims worked out during preinvasion planning. The economic authorities realized as early as late July 1941 that their plans had failed or were in the process of failing as a result of the Wehrmacht’s unexpectedly slow advance.⁸¹

    Although economic gain was the key motivation for waging war against the Soviet Union in mid-1941, the undertaking was in no way based on economic certainties. There was little or no serious attempt within the corridors of power to analyze critically the economic implications of an invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union or to develop potential alternative scenarios should the military campaign and, by extension, the program of economic exploitation falter. Given that the “immediate requirements” of the troops constituted the economic priority of the campaign,⁸² the failure to defeat the Red Army and the subsequent continuation of full-scale combat operations meant that it was never possible to readjust and fully address other, less short-term economic objectives.

    Furthermore, the sheer violence of the German occupation was counterproductive. Through their near automatic recourse to violence, the Germans sabotaged whatever chance they might have had of fulfilling some of their less radical economic goals. Some members of the German economic administration recognized early on in the campaign the limitations that this approach was placing on Germany’s ability to exert control over the economy of the occupied territories. A meeting of senior representatives of the Economics Staff East on 31 July 1941 concluded: “We cannot administer the entire country. The intelligentsia is dead, the commissars are gone. Large territories will have to be left to themselves (starve to death).”⁸³ Nevertheless, little was done to alter the basic nature of German occupation policy. This was partly because the brutal treatment of large sections of the Soviet population was inherent in Germany’s economic aims, and a fundamental change in policy would have called into question these very aims.

    The acquisition of agricultural “surpluses” to the detriment of the indigenous population remained the primary aim of German occupation policy in the Soviet Union right through to 1944.⁸⁴ Although Ukraine and part of the northern Caucasus were occupied by German forces, the anticipated 4.5–5 million tons of grain per year did not materialize.⁸⁵ Instead, over the course of almost three years, between July 1941 and March 1944, a total of only 5.65 million tons of grain went to the Wehrmacht, plus 1.16 million tons to Germany.⁸⁶ During the economic year 1943–44, total amounts of foodstuffs obtained from the occupied Soviet territories fell short of Wehrmacht requirements in all major areas except potatoes. Only 66.3 percent of bread grain, 84 percent of feed grain, 64.1 percent of meat, 44 percent of fat, 36.2 of hay, and 34.1 percent of straw requirements were obtained that year from the occupied Soviet territories.⁸⁷

    Prior to the campaign, the intention had been to retain initially the collective farms in the pre-1939 Soviet territories, as this was considered necessary for boosting agricultural production in the surplus territories and facilitating the seizure of agricultural produce. As early as July 1941, however, Göring had made it clear that the collective farms would at some point be abolished.⁸⁸ This was turned into a concrete policy with Reich Minister Rosenberg’s “New Agrarian Order” (Neue Agrarordnung), proclaimed in February 1942, which decreed: “All collective farms are to be converted to co-operative economies with immediate effect.”⁸⁹ During 1942, 100 percent of collective farms in General Commissariat White Ruthenia were converted, likewise those that fell under the supervision of Economics Inspection Center (Wirtschaftsinspektion Mitte) in military-administered Belarus. In the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, the conversion was slower (8 percent by the end of 1942, 16 percent by summer 1943).⁹⁰ Because this was the “most important agricultural surplus territory in the east,” the partitioning of the land was to be implemented here more gradually.⁹¹

    Away from the fields, the intended reforestation of Belarus, most of which was occupied for almost exactly three years, also remained on paper.⁹² Instead, the overuse of the forests that had taken place during the Soviet industrialization drive—and that had been ridiculed by German planners—was in fact intensified.⁹³ A decree issued by Göring in August 1942 explained the situation:

    The fulfillment of the wood requirements of the Wehrmacht and other consumers important for the war has been encountering such difficulties as a result of the unfavorable geographical distribution of the forests, the multiple jurisdictions, the various administrative boundaries, partisan activity in logging and timber rafting operations, the lack of sufficient laborers, and as a result of the inexpediently utilized transport possibilities that the fulfillment of the Wehrmacht’s requirements, the reconstruction of the coal mining industry in the Donetsk area, and the fulfillment of transportation requirements were called into question.⁹⁴

By 1943, the approximately nineteen million hectares of Soviet forest that had been in German hands after the 1941 summer offensive had been reduced to ten million, seven million of which were located in Reich Commissariat Ostland. The withdrawal of the front resulted in an extensive relocation of timber supplies. The occupied territories in the south, for example, became dependent on wood from central Poland.⁹⁵

    The starvation policy against the population of the deficit territories and the cities, at least in the form in which it had originally been intended, also proved unfeasible. With limited numbers of security troops and a rapidly deteriorating military situation, the Germans were unable to cordon off entire regions and make millions of people starve to death. By October 1941 at the latest, Göring had recognized that it was “absurd to erect barriers between the urban and rural populations in the vastness of the Russian territories.”⁹⁶ In fact, at no point during preinvasion planning had it been determined exactly how the Germans would apply the starvation policy. There had been no detailed implementation plan.⁹⁷

    In the event, thousands of Soviet civilians took to the country roads in search of food, and trade on the black market thrived,⁹⁸ just the thing the economic planners had sought to avoid.⁹⁹ Almost two years into the war against the Soviet Union, the desk officer for eastern questions in the Four-Year Plan organization, Dr. Friedrich Richter, sent a letter from the front in which he commented on some of the reasons for launching the campaign in June 1941 and discussed subsequent German occupation policy:

    Economic interests and, as a result of the isolation of Europe, the predicament of having to obtain yet more grain, oil crops, and oil from our own sphere of influence also brought about for many an affirmation of the campaign on economic grounds, although experts at the time pointed out that Russia already in peacetime could only fulfill German treaty obligations at the greatest cost to itself, much less so after disruption of the transport routes and economic life there. [Dr. Otto] Donner¹⁰⁰ and my office also pointed at the time to this expected deterioration.

    The Backesian thesis developed out of this situation[:]‌ one must separate the western and southern Russian territories, as main producers, from their consumer territories in central Russia and incorporate them once more into the European supply zone; a real possibility if one is militarily in a position to keep the central Russians from their fields for a long period of time and if one wins over the inhabitants of the occupied territory.¹⁰¹

By the time Richter wrote this, in May 1943, there had been attempts, albeit comparatively limited ones, to win over parts of the Soviet population, particularly the more nationalist west Ukrainians, in response to the altered war situation. In mid-1941, however, few of those in positions of influence in Germany gave any thought to how they might win over the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Thus this prerequisite for the successful implementation of the proposals of the economic planners did not exist. In any case, when Richter talked about winning over the inhabitants of the occupied territories, he clearly had neither the population of the deficit territories nor that of the cities in mind.

    The starving of Leningrad between 1941 and 1944, which resulted in the deaths of at least 800,000 people (possibly well over a million),¹⁰² was an exception and was possible on this scale only because substantial parts of the German 16th and the 18th armies were made available for the siege.¹⁰³ The high command of the 18th Army issued a paper at the beginning of November 1941 in which it described the “advantages” of the city remaining cut off and everyone starving as follows:

    a) A large part of the Communist population of Russia, which is to be found precisely among the population of [St.] Petersburg, will be thereby exterminated.

    b) We do not need to feed 4 million people.¹⁰⁴

Urban centers that German forces did succeed in occupying, such as the Ukrainian cities of Kiev and Kharkiv, also suffered a horrendous loss of human life.¹⁰⁵ Kharkiv was cordoned off by the local German military commander, which resulted in the death from starvation of many thousands of its inhabitants, 1202 people alone in the first half of May 1942.¹⁰⁶

    Ultimately, the starvation policy reaped the highest number of victims among the Soviet prisoners of war, who were viewed by German economic and military planners alike as the Wehrmacht’s direct competitors for scarce food supplies. Although they had not been targeted explicitly prior to the invasion, it was clear to those responsible just how many Soviet troops the Germans could expect to capture, and yet they neglected to make the necessary preparations for feeding and sheltering their POWs.¹⁰⁷ Far from being surprised by the capture of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers during the first weeks of the campaign (360,000 up to 11 July), the German authorities knew full well that, if military operations went according to plan, captured Soviet troops would flood German POW camps. In fact, the planners expected that as many as one to two million prisoners would have to be provided for within the first six to eight weeks.¹⁰⁸ However, the starvation policy dictated that if the German troops had to supply themselves from Soviet resources—clearly to the detriment of the Soviet population—there would be little left for Soviet troops who fell into German hands. Wherever available, surpluses would be sent to the Reich, as had been repeatedly declared before the campaign. The aforementioned OKH order of 3 April 1941 stated: “From the start, severe steps are to be taken against insubordination on the part of prisoners, while willing labor service is to be rewarded with adequate sustenance and good care.”¹⁰⁹ As the historian Christian Gerlach has pointed out, if “adequate sustenance” was to be a reward, insufficient provisioning was to be the norm.¹¹⁰

    It was easy to imagine what would happen to those prisoners unable or unwilling to work. The obvious limitations on the freedom of movement of Soviet POWs and the relative ease with which large numbers could be segregated and their rations controlled were crucial factors in the death of over three million Soviet prisoners in German captivity—the vast majority directly or indirectly as a result of undernourishment.¹¹¹ From the German point of view, the Soviet POWs became the ideal victims of a policy that sought to isolate large groups of people who would otherwise have to be fed and to let them starve.¹¹² Between the neglect of the POWs and food policy toward civilians, starvation cost the lives of several million Soviet citizens.

    By the autumn of 1941, it had become clear that the blitzkrieg had failed, and that victory in the east would not be achieved before the end of the year. It was from this point on that a change of course occurred in the question of whether to harness Soviet labor for the benefit of the German war effort. Despite the potential risks from the political and racial viewpoints of the Nazi leadership, the enormous demands on domestic manpower caused by the prolonged Soviet campaign and the reluctance to employ German women required a change of mind in this matter. Of decisive importance for the shift to using workers from the occupied eastern territories in the Reich was Hitler’s order of 31 October 1941 on the deployment of Soviet prisoners of war in the German war economy:

    The Führer has now ordered that the labor of the Russian [i.e., Soviet] prisoners of war should also be utilized extensively through large-scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. Prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment.¹¹³

At the beginning of November 1941, the Reich Ministry for Labor announced that a large number of foreign workers, including some from the occupied eastern territories, would “soon” be put to use in the Reich.¹¹⁴ At a meeting of the Economics Staff East on 7 November, Göring stated that the Soviet labor force, by order of Hitler, was to be utilized in the area of operations, in the Reich commissariats, and the General Government of occupied Poland, as well as in Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In the occupied Soviet territories, civilians would be required to carry out heavy manual labor, such as road and railway construction. German skilled workers, on the other hand, belonged in the armaments industry. Shoveling and breaking rocks was not for them, according to Göring: “that’s what the Russian is there for.” Soviet prisoners of war and Russian civilian laborers were to be deployed for work in the Reich and the Protectorate.¹¹⁵ Göring’s guidelines of 7 November 1941 gave the green light for the extensive use of Soviet workers in Germany.¹¹⁶

    On 19 December 1941, Reich Minister Rosenberg issued a general edict on labor service that compelled Soviet civilians to work for the occupation authorities.¹¹⁷ The appointment of Fritz Sauckel as general plenipotentiary for the deployment of labor (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz) in March 1942 systematized the new policy of foreign labor recruitment. In this capacity, Sauckel was responsible for providing the Reich with hundreds of thousands of forced laborers, the bulk of which, often by employing methods of extreme brutality, was obtained from the occupied Soviet territories. By the end of 1942, 1.7 million Soviet civilians or prisoners of war were at work in Germany.¹¹⁸ In spite of the high mortality among Soviet POWs, an estimated 594,000 of them were at work in Germany as of February 1944.¹¹⁹ German institutions became so reliant on Soviet forced labor that, as late as July 1944, Army Group Center felt able to request a workforce of 100,000 complete with equipment for the construction of redoubts. Work was to begin in a mere two days.¹²⁰

    Aside perhaps from sheer manpower in the form of forced labor, the occupied Soviet territories ultimately yielded far less than the German leadership had hoped and planned for. This was in large part due to the failure of the military campaign, the overarching prerequisite for the fulfillment of all German economic plans, and the inability to “pacify” or even occupy a substantial part of the territory that had been in German sights when the invasion was launched. Furthermore, due to the unprecedentedly destructive nature of combat in the east, large segments of the Soviet industrial economy had to be reconstructed in the territories occupied. A brief comparison with two other occupied territories, France and Belgium, helps to illustrate how far Germany was from achieving its economic aims in the occupied Soviet territories: in terms of the real value of economic output the Reich was able to obtain seven times as much from France than from the occupied Soviet territories. Even Belgium contributed over twice as much to Germany than could be squeezed out of the Soviet territories under occupation (roughly 9.3 billion Reichsmark by the end of March 1944 compared with about 4.5 billion Reichsmark).¹²¹

    Had Germany succeeded in its efforts to subjugate the Soviet Union and implement its far-reaching economic plans, the creation of an autarkic, united Europe under German hegemony—a greater economic area (Grossraumwirtschaft)—may well have been the end result. This would have been a Europe at least in part supplied with Ukrainian grain and coal, Baltic aluminum and seed crops, Caucasian oil, and Belarusian livestock. Soviet military victory over Germany meant that Europe was spared this fate. This victory, however, led to the division of the continent and Soviet domination over eastern Europe for over forty years.

NOTES

        1. See Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BArch-MA), RW 19/164, fol. 150, Vortrag Obstlt. Matzky, Major Knapp, Hptm. Emmerich beim Amtschef, 12 February 1941.

        2. “Die Botschaft in Moskau an das Auswärtige Amt,” 24 December 1940, Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 (ADAP), Serie D: 1937–1941, Bd. 11/2 (Bonn: Gebr. Hermes KG, 1964), 788–89, here 788. For the text of the German-Soviet trade agreements of 11 February 1940 and 10 January 1941, respectively, see “Wirtschaftsabkommen zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken,” in ADAP, Serie D: 1937–1941, Bd. 8 (Baden-Baden, Frankfurt am Main: P. Keppler, 1961), 599–605, and “Wirtschaftsabkommen zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjet-Republiken vom 10 Januar 1941,” in ADAP, Serie D: 1937–1941, Bd. 11/2, pp. 887–89.

        3. For a useful analysis of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, see Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 484–92.

        4. See Christian Gerlach, “Die Ausweitung der deutschen Massenmorde in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten im Herbst 1941: Überlegungen zur Vernichtungspolitik gegen Juden und sowjetische Kriegsgefangene,” in idem, Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord: Deutsche Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, rev. 2nd ed. (Zürich: Pendo, 2001 [1998]), 11–78, here 15.

        5. See Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft: Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda, 1939–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), 70–73. The German outward drive for autarky was reflected in many ways, and inverted, by the Soviet Union’s own inward drive for autarky, which Lynne Viola discusses in her contribution to this volume (Chapter 1).

        6. “Erlass des Führers über die Wirtschaft in den neu besetzten Ostgebieten,” 29 June 1941, in “Führer-Erlasse” 1939–1945, ed. Martin Moll (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 179–80, here 179. On the preinvasion planning process see Alex J. Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940–1941 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2006).

        7. Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch Berlin), R 26 I/13, fols. 1–4, order from Hermann Göring, 27 July 1941, here fol. 1; “Aktennotiz über Ergebnis der heutigen Besprechung mit den Staatssekretären über Barbarossa” (2718-PS), 2 May 1941, in Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg, 14 November 1945–1 Oktober 1946 (IMG) (Nuremberg: Sekretariat des Gerichtshofs, 1947–49), Bd. 31, p. 84; “Wirtschaftspolitische Richtlinien für Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost, Gruppe Landwirtschaft” (126-EC), 23 May 1941, in IMG, Bd. 36, 135–57, here 147; BArch Berlin, R 26 IV/33a, Richtlinien für die Führung der Wirtschaft in den neubesetzten Ostgebieten (Grüne Mappe), Teil I (2. Auflage), July 1941, fols. 3–4.

        8. BArch Berlin, 99 US 7/1110, fols. 175–76, postwar testimony of Hans Nagel in Nuremberg from 8 September 1948; BArch Berlin, R 26 IV/33a, fols. 3–5.

        9. Archiv des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), Nuremberg document PS-1036, fols. 1–40, “Besetzte Gebiete,” 25 June 1941, here fols. 1–15. The envisioned Reich Commissariat Russia was later renamed Muscovy, which is the more familiar designation.

        10. “Die Wehrwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer Operation im Osten,” in Georg Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918–1943/45) (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1966), pp. 515–32, here 516.

        11. BArch-MA, RW 19/473, fols. 177–79, Dr. Claussen über die Ernährungslage, 14 May 1941, signed Eicke, here fol. 178. For a figure of 120 million tons for the entire Soviet grain harvest see BArch Berlin, R 2/30921, Die sowjetische Landwirtschaft, 21 May 1941, Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung, Deutsche Reichsbank (for 1940).

        12. BArch Berlin, R 2501/7007, fols. 233–56, Zur Möglichkeit, den grossdeutschen Fehlbedarf an Getreide in Höhe von jährlich 3 Millionen t aus Sowjetrussland sicherzustellen, Referat A 4, Dr. Storm, 13 June 1941, here fols. 241, 253 and 255 (31 million from 170.5 million in 1939, 40.3 million from 193.2 million in 1940); BArch Berlin, R 2/30921 (31 million from 169 million in 1937). The second of these reports states that Ukraine produced as of 1937 only 20 percent of the entire grain harvest of 120 million tons. Compare these figures with BArch Berlin, NS 43/41, fols. 130–41, Enrico Insabato, “Die Ukraine: Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft,” Sammlung politischer und wirtschaftlicher Studien geleitet von Luigi Lojacono, n.d. (1940?), here fols. 130–31, which states that the population of Ukraine was 33.5 million and that of the Soviet Union 173 million (also around a fifth).

        13. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, p. 138.

        14. Even after the handover of territory from military rule to civil administration, personnel overlap between the Economics Staff East and the Main Department Economics within the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories enabled the former to maintain its primacy. On the Economics Staff East see Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht. Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion, 1941–1944 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 107–10.

        15. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, p. 138.

        16. 2718-PS, in IMG, Bd. 31, p. 84. See also 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 148 and 154.

        17. Ibid., 147–50.

        18. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 146 and 153; Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 517. BArch Berlin, 99 US 7/1085, fol. 141, postwar testimony of Hans-Joachim Riecke in Nuremberg from 13 August 1948; “Allgemeine Instruktion für alle Reichskommissare in den besetzten Ostgebieten” (1030-PS), 8 May 1941, in IMG, Bd. 26, pp. 576–80, here 578.

        19. Mark Harrison, Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 98, 100, 267, and 272.

        20. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 146–47, 153, and 157.

        21. Ibid., 156–57.

        22. Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 456–57; Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des “Ausländer-Einsatzes” in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Bonn: Dietz, 1999), 158; Rolf-Dieter Müller, “Menschenjagd: Die Rekrutierung von Zwangsarbeitern in der besetzten Sowjetunion,” in Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941–1944, ed. Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), 92–103, here 94.

        23. Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 156; Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941–1945, rev. 4th ed. (Bonn: Dietz, 1997 [1978]), 192.

        24. See “Vermerk über Besprechung bei Wi Rü Amt am 4.7.41, betr. Verwendung und Arbeitseinsatz der russischen Kriegsgef.” (1199-PS), 4 July 1941, in IMG, Bd. 27, pp. 63–64, here 63.

        25. Müller, “Menschenjagd,” 93.

        26. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtsführungsstab), 1940–1945: Geführt von Helmuth Greiner und Percy Ernst Schramm, Bd. I: 1 August 1940–31 December 1941, ed. Percy Ernst Schramm (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1963), 258, entry for 9 January 1941.

        27. “Richtlinien für die personelle und materielle Rüstung,” 14 July 1941, in Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1939–1945, ed. Walther Hubatsch, 2nd ed. (Erlangen: Karl Müller Verlag, 1983), 136–39, here 136. See also 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, 149.

        28. Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 158.

        29. Rolf-Dieter Müller, “Industrielle Interessenpolitik im Rahmen des ‘Generalplans Ost’: Dokumente zum Einfluss von Wehrmacht, Industrie und SS auf die wirtschaftspolitische Zielsetzung für Hitlers Ostimperium,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, Bd. 29 (1981), 101–41, here 118: “Fragen, die durch den Herrn Reichsmarschall noch befohlen bezw. beim Führer geklärt werden müssen,” 5 May 1941.

        30. Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 520, and “Weisung Nr. 21: Fall Barbarossa,” 18 December 1940, in Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen, 84–88, here 87.

        31. Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 520.

        32. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, p. 140.

        33. Ibid. The Transcaucasus also produced cotton, manganese, copper, silk, and tea.

        34. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Band II: Von der geplanten Landung in England bis zum Beginn des Ostfeldzuges (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963), 49–50, entry for 31 July 1940, here 50.

        35. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), Potsdam, unreferenced, “Erster Entwurf zu einer militärgeographischen Studie über das europäische Russland,” Generalstab des Heeres, Abteilung für Kriegskarten und Vermessungswesen (IV. Mil.-Geo.), completed on 10 August 1940, p. 18. See also BArch Berlin, R 2501/7007, fol. 249.

        36. Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 527–28; “Planungsunterlage der Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW für die Eroberung des Erdölgebiets im Kaukasus,” 4 May 1941, in Fall Barbarossa: Dokumente zur Vorbereitung der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion (1940/41), ed. Erhard Moritz ([East] Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag, 1970), 178–81, here 178.

        37. Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 531–32.

        38. BArch-MA, RW 19/185, fols. 175-176, Aktennotiz, 8 February 1941; BArch-MA, RW 19/185, fols. 170-171, Aktennotiz über Vortrag beim Reichsmarschall am 26.2.1941, 27 February 1941. See also Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Bd. I, 312–13 and 316–17, entries for 8 and 11 February 1941.

        39. Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 517 and 527; Moritz, Fall Barbarossa, 178; BArch Berlin, R 2501/7007, fol. 247.

        40. Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 517.

        41. BArch-MA, RW 19/185, fols. 175-176; BArch-MA, RW 19/164, fol. 153, Vortrag Obstlt. Tietze, Major Sadewasser, Hptm. Emmerich, Herr Biedermann beim Amtschef, 13 February 1941; BArch-MA, RW 19/185, fols. 170–71, Aktennotiz über Vortrag beim Reichsmarschall am 26.2.1941, 27 February 1941. See also Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Bd. I, 312–13 and 316–17, entries for 8 and 11 February 1941.

        42. Müller, “Industrielle Interessenpolitik,” 118.

        43. Gerlach, “Die Ausweitung der deutschen Massenmorde,” 19.

        44. BArch-MA, RW 19/185, fols. 171 and 175.

        45. BArch-MA, RW 19/164, fol. 119, Besprechung General von Hanneken und Oberst John beim Amtschef (mit Oberstlt. Tietze, Reg. Rat Mureck, Major Sadewasser), 25 January 1941.

        46. Klaus A. Friedrich Schüler, Logistik im Russlandfeldzug: Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung und Durchführung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1987), 164, 166–67.

        47. See Ihno Krumpelt, Das Material und die Kriegführung (Frankfurt am Main: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1968), 142. Dr. Krumpelt and a small staff were commissioned by Army Quartermaster-General Eduard Wagner at the beginning of October 1940 with the planning for supplying the troops during the eastern campaign; see pp. 140–56, esp. 140 and 149.

        48. BArch Berlin, R 26 IV/33a, fol. 12. See also Schüler, Logistik im Russlandfeldzug, 114.

        49. For General Thomas’s fears in this respect see BArch-MA, RW 19/185, fol. 170.

        50. Quoted in Christian Gerlach, “Militärische ‘Versorgungszwänge,’ Besatzungspolitik und Massenverbrechen: Die Rolle des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres und seiner Dienststellen im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,” in Ausbeutung, Vernichtung, Öffentlichkeit: Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Lagerpolitik, ed. Norbert Frei, Sybille Steinbacher, and Bernd C. Wagner (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2000), 175–208, here 184.

        51. “Anordnung des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres über Organisation und Aufgaben des militärischen Okkupationsregimes in den zu erobernden Gebieten der UdSSR (Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung, Teil C),” 3 April 1941, in Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung: Dokumente zur Besatzungspolitik der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf sowjetischem Territorium 1941 bis 1944, ed. Norbert Müller ([East] Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1980), 35–42, here 35.

        52. BArch-MA, RW 19/739, fols. 124–25, here 124.

        53. “Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 1 des Chefs des OKW zur Weisung Nr. 21 mit Anlagen über: Gliederung und Aufgaben der im Raum ‘Barbarossa’ einzusetzenden Wirtschaftsorganisation (1); Beute, Beschlagnahme und Inanspruchnahme von Dienstleistungen (2); Verhalten der deutschen Truppen in der Sowjetunion (3),” 19 May 1941, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 45–54, here 45.

        54. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 141 and 145.

        55. Ibid., 141–42.

        56. Müller, “Industrielle Interessenpolitik,” 118.

        57. Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Vienna: Ullstein, 1977), 93. On the identity of the visitor see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 53–54, fn. 98.

        58. IMG, Bd. 4, pp. 535–36, testimony of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski at Nuremberg, 7 January 1946.

        59. Herbert Backe, Um die Nahrungsfreiheit Europas: Weltwirtschaft oder Grossraum, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Goldmann, 1943 [1942]), 162; 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, p. 136. These are the figures the German planners were working with and believed to be true, and their near accuracy is indeed confirmed by recent German and English research. See Hans-Heinrich Nolte, Kleine Geschichte Russlands (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2003), 235; Walter G. Moss, A History of Russia, vol. II: Since 1855, rev. and exp. 2nd ed. (London: Anthem, 2005 [1997]), 336–37. On the increase in the urban population see also Peter Gatrell, “Economic and Demographic Change: Russia’s Age of Economic Extremes,” in The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3: The Twentieth Century, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 383–410, here 399; Chauncy D. Harris, “The Cities of the Soviet Union,” Geographical Review 35, no. 1 (January 1945), 107–21, here 107.

        60. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, 141.

        61. See Czesław Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik Nazideutschlands in Polen 1939–1945 ([East] Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1987), 92. There is no explicit mention in Ciano’s diary of this exchange, though Göring did inform Ciano of conditions in the prisoner of war camps (including cases of cannibalism) and compared the Soviet POWs to “a herd of ravenous animals”; see Galeazzo Ciano, Diario 1939–1943. Volume secondo: 1941–1943 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1946), 98, entry for 24, 25, 26 November 1941.

        62. Aly and Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung, 366. See also BArch-MA, RW 19/473, fols. 306–07, Die Ernährungsbilanzen Festlandeuropas (nach Berechnungen der Studiengesellschaft für bäuerliche Rechts- und Wirtschaftsordnung e.V.), Wi Rü Amt/Stab I b 5, 10 December 1940.

        63. Müller, “Industrielle Interessenpolitik,” 118.

        64. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 146.

        65. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 144–45 and 155–56.

        66. See Alex J. Kay, “‘The Purpose of the Russian Campaign is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million’: The Radicalization of German Food Policy in early 1941,” in 1941 and Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front: Total War, Genocide and Radicalization, ed. Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford, and David Stahel (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012), 101–29, here 108, 122.

        67. “Aktenvermerk” (221-L), 16 July 1941, in IMG, Bd. 38, pp. 86–94, here 90.

        68. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Band III: Der Russlandfeldzug bis zum Marsch auf Stalingrad (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964), 53, entry for 8 July 1941.

        69. Quoted in Gerlach, “Militärische ‘Versorgungszwänge,’” 196–97.

        70. BArch Berlin, R 2501/7007, fol. 240.

        71. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 142–43.

        72. Ibid., 151.

        73. BArch-MA, RW 19/473, fol. 177.

        74. BArch Berlin, R 26 IV/33a, p. 18. At the beginning of May, the head of the Economics Staff East, Major General Dr. Wilhelm Schubert had also highlighted the importance of obtaining meat, horses, and oats from Belarus; see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 140.

        75. Bundesarchiv-Zwischenarchiv, Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten (BArch D-H), ZM 1683, Bd. 1, fol. 105, postwar testimony of Friedrich Jeckeln in Riga from 2 January 1946.

        76. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 53.

        77. BArch Berlin, R 2501/7007, fol. 240.

        78. Müller, “Industrielle Interessenpolitik,” 118.

        79. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, p. 142.

        80. Müller, “Industrielle Interessenpolitik,” 118.

        81. “Niederschrift einer Besprechung beim Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes des OKW über den bisherigen Einsatz und die weitere Tätigkeit der Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost,” 31 July 1941, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 181–85, here 182.

        82. See, for example, 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, pp. 147–150 and 154; “Erlass Görings über die Ausnutzung der Rüstungs- und sonstigen gewerblichen Betriebe in den okkupierten sowjetischen Gebieten,” 28 October 1941, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 189–91, here 189.

        83. Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 182. See also “Bericht eines Rüstungs-Inspekteurs in der Ukraine an General Thomas persönlich, vom 2. Dezember 1941” (3257-PS), in IMG, Bd. 32, pp. 71–75, esp. 74–75.

        84. Christian Gerlach, “Deutsche Wirtschaftsinteressen, Besatzungspolitik und der Mord an den Juden in Weissrussland 1941–1943,” in Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939–1945. Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998), 263–91, here 273.

        85. 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, 149.

        86. “Gesamtlieferungen an Nahrungsmitteln aus der Sowjetunion von Juli 1941 bis März 1944 (in tausend Tonnen),” in Heinrich Schwendemann, Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941: Alternative zu Hitlers Ostprogramm? (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 385, Table 20c.

        87. “Statistische Aufstellung der Chefgruppe Landwirtschaft des Wirtschaftsstabes Ost über die Ausplünderung der okkupierten sowjetischen Gebiete im Wirtschaftsjahr 1943/44 (Stand vom 1.2.1944),” 12 February 1944, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 267–70.

        88. BArch Berlin, R 26 I/13, fol. 4; Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 184.

        89. “Aus dem Erlass des Reichsministers für die besetzten Ostgebiete zur Zerschlagung der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in den okkupierten sowjetischen Gebieten (Neue Agrarordnung),” 15 February 1942, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 221–24, here 221.

        90. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 356–57.

        91. Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten 1941–1943: Der Abschlussbericht des Wirtschaftsstabes Ost und Aufzeichnungen eines Angehörigen des Wirtschaftskommandos Kiew, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1991), 110.

        92. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 134.

        93. Ibid., 108.

        94. Müller, Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, 145–46.

        95. Ibid., 145 and 147.

        96. Quoted in Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 273.

        97. Alex J. Kay, “‘Viele zehn Millionen Menschen werden überflüssig.’ Gab es im Russlandfeldzug eine logistische Katastrophe oder Massenverhungern als Staatspolitik? Eine Antwort auf Stefan Scheil,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 June 2007, no. 134, p. N 3.

        98. See Gerlach, “Die Ausweitung der deutschen Massenmorde,” 30–31.

        99. See 126-EC, in IMG, Bd. 36, p. 138.

        100. Otto Donner was a finance expert and personal assistant to Erich Neumann, state secretary in the Four-Year Plan agency.

        101. BArch Berlin, R 6/60a, fols. 1–4, Auszug aus einem Feldpostbrief von Leutnant Dr. Friedrich Richter, Referent für Ostfragen vom Vierjahresplan, vom 26.5.1943, here fol. 1.

        102. Peter Jahn, “Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene und die Zivilbevölkerung der Sowjetunion als Opfer des NS-Vernichtungskrieges,” in Dimensionen der Verfolgung. Opfer und Opfergruppen im Nationalsozialismus, ed. Sybille Quack (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2003), 145–66, here 158–59; Jörg Ganzenmüller, Das belagerte Leningrad 1941 bis 1944. Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005), 238–39; Johannes Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 500.

        103. Gerlach, “Die Ausweitung der deutschen Massenmorde,” 29, fn. 48; Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, 497–507.

        104. “Studie aus dem Oberkommando der 18. Armee über Möglichkeiten zur Behandlung der Bevölkerung Leningrads,” 4 November 1941, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 75–77, here 75–76.

        105. See Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 164–86; Norbert Kunz, “Das Beispiel Charkow. Eine Stadtbevölkerung als Opfer der deutschen Hungerstrategie 1941/42,” in Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz einer Debatte, ed. Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jureit (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005), 136–44.

        106. Kunz, “Das Beispiel Charkow,” 140 and 144. Kiev and Kharkiv were the third and fourth largest Soviet cities, respectively, after Moscow and Leningrad; BArch Berlin, R 2501/7007, fol. 256.

        107. Streit, Keine Kameraden, 76; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 783; Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 156.

        108. Streit, Keine Kameraden, 76 and 83. For the erroneous assertion that “the numbers [of Soviet POWs] turned out to be much greater than [the] OKW had ever envisaged” see Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Penguin, 2008), 161.

        109. Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 41.

        110. Gerlach, “Die Ausweitung der deutschen Massenmorde,” 22.

        111. Streit concludes that 3.3 million Soviet troops died out of a total of 5.7 million captured between June 1941 and February 1945. For the calculations see Streit, Keine Kameraden, 128–37 and 244–49, esp. 244–46. More than thirty years since its first publication, Streit’s pioneering work remains the benchmark on the subject. See also Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 857–58.

        112. On the fate of Soviet POWs till the end of 1941 see Gerlach, “Die Ausweitung der deutschen Massenmorde,” 29–53.

        113. “Subject: Use of Prisoners of War in the War Industry,” signed Wilhelm Keitel, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949, vol. 8 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), 398–400, here 399; also quoted in Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 163.

        114. BArch Berlin, R 1501/3646, Betrifft: Seuchenhygienische Überwachung von Arbeitslagern, RMI, 4 November 1941.

        115. “Aufzeichnung im Wirtschaftsstab Ost über die von Göring gegebenen Richtlinien für den Arbeitseinsatz von Sowjetbürgern,” 7 November 1941, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 282–85, here 282.

        116. Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 165.

        117. Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London: Macmillan, 2000), 551; Fritz Nova, Alfred Rosenberg: Nazi Theorist of the Holocaust (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), 47.

        118. Burleigh, The Third Reich, 479.

        119. Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 1977 [1976]), 224.

        120. “Anforderung von 100 000 Arbeitskräften zum Stellungsbau durch das Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte,” 8 July 1944, in Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung, 321–22.

        121. Christoph Buchheim, “Die besetzten Länder im Dienst der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Bericht der Forschungsstelle für Wehrwirtschaft,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 34, Nr. 1 (January 1986), 117–45, here 119–20 and 123.

8

The Holocaust in Ukraine: History—Historiography—Memory

Dieter Pohl

Approximately 1.5 million of the approximately 5.7 million Jews murdered during the Holocaust came from within the borders of what is today Ukraine.¹ This amounts to every fourth victim. Ukraine was therefore a major sight of the German mass murder of Jews during the Second World War. Nonetheless, it is difficult to speak of a clearly defined “Holocaust in Ukraine,” since what is today independent Ukraine was at the time divided among six different occupation regimes: the German civilian administration known as the Reich Commissariat Ukraine; a military administered zone of occupation under the Wehrmacht (the German armed forces); District Galicia in the General Government (the German authority for central and southeast Poland); Romanian-occupied Transnistria; prewar Romanian territory in northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia, seized by Moscow in 1940 and recovered by Bucharest in 1941; and Hungarian-annexed Transcarpathia. This chapter touches on all but the last two regimes.² In addition, this chapter addresses how the historiography of the Holocaust in Ukraine has evolved and how the Holocaust is remembered in that country today.

    German plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union envisioned a broader use of lethal force against civilians and captured military personnel than was seen in the previous German campaigns of the Second World War. This was clear in the orders drawn up and issued to the Wehrmacht, as well as those of the SS and police formations that would follow behind the lines. To facilitate the swiftest resort to firearms, the Wehrmacht, in what is known as the “Jurisdiction Decree,” urged the quickest possible shooting of persons suspected of attacking German soldiers and limited the courts martial to the most glaring offences committed by German soldiers. This decree also legitimized collective reprisal measures against civilians.³ Guidelines distributed to the troops just days before the attack instructed soldiers that the campaign against the Soviet Union would require a “ruthless and energetic crackdown against Bolshevik agitators, guerillas, saboteurs, Jews and the utter elimination of every passive and active act of resistance” (emphasis in the original).⁴ In addition, the Wehrmacht had planned to shoot Red Army “political commissars,” who were considered the ideological backbone of the Soviet regime and predominantly Jews. Not only did Jews fail to constitute a majority among of political commissars, the post had in fact been eliminated in 1940. In the end, the “commissar order” was directed against Soviet party functionaries and political activists in the Red Army in general.⁵ There also exist scattered indications that at least a few Wehrmacht divisions ordered the isolation of Red Army personnel of Jewish origin, the singling out of the craftsmen among them, and the shooting of the rest.⁶

    The SS and police formations that had been integrated into the Wehrmacht security structure behind the lines had been issued similar orders for fighting “enemies of the Reich,” meaning above all Communist Party functionaries and Jews. The most notorious of these formations were the Einsatzgruppen, which were led by the Security Police (the secret and criminal investigation police) and the SD (the intelligence branch of the SS). Most historians do not believe that the Einsatzgruppen had been issued a general order to kill all Jews prior to the invasion. Nonetheless, in addition to written orders to execute “Jews in party and state positions,” the Einsatzgruppen commanders were given considerable leeway in determining what they viewed as necessary for the security of the areas where they operated.⁷

    Nazi ambitions, however, went far beyond these measures. Part of the rationale behind the invasion of the Soviet Union was the seizure of foodstuffs. In order to secure the grain, produce, and meat needed for troops and the home front, German government and military officials had colluded in drafting a plan to starve major cities throughout the western Soviet Union. Thus the Germans accepted as part of their preinvasion deliberations that several million city-dwellers in Ukraine (many millions more in Belarus and Russia) would die of hunger. Since Soviet Jews tended to live in the cities, most of the Soviet Union’s Jewish population had been sentenced to death before the first shot was fired.⁸

    The SS and police formations deployed in Ukraine were headed by the higher SS and police leader for “southern Russia” (Höhere SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, HSSPF Russia South), a post first held by Friedrich Jeckeln and then, from mid-October 1941 on, by Hans Prützmann. The HSSPFs were the representatives of Heinrich Himmler (the leader of the SS and chief of the German police). Jeckeln and Prützmann bore the most responsibility for implementing the genocide directed against the Jews in Ukraine beyond eastern Galicia (in the General Government) and Transnistria (the Romanian-occupied regions of Ukraine). The main formations under the command of the HSSPF included Einsatzgruppe C, which passed through the northern half of Ukraine, and Einsatzgruppe D, which swept through northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Odessa Oblast (region), and then advanced along the coast of the Black and Azov seas, as well as into the Crimea. In addition to the Einsatzgruppen, Jeckeln and Prützmann had at their disposal two regiments of the German Order Police, that is, the German regular police. These were the police battalions 45, 303, and 314, which made up Police Regiment South, and the police battalions 304, 315, and 320, which made up Police Regiment for Special Purposes (the latter deployed for the eventual capture of the Caucasus). All of these battalions contributed to the mass murder of Ukrainian Jews, often assisting Einsatzgruppe C in larger massacres. Einsatzgruppe D operated without the support of Order Police battalions. At the end of July, the 1st SS Infantry Brigade, a formation of the Waffen-SS, the combat arm of the SS, was assigned to the HSSPF Russia South as well.

    The speed of the German advance into Ukraine (although slower than on the central and northern sectors of the front) and the lack of preparedness on the part of the Soviet authorities prevented most Jews in Right-Bank Ukraine from escaping, especially those in the westernmost oblasts. Jews in the prewar Polish regions of Galicia and Volhynia, as well as those in the Vinnytsia and Proskuriv oblasts, lacked the time and means to flee. In the oblasts of Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Odessa, and Mykolaiv, just over half the Jews managed to escape. Elsewhere in Ukraine, above all in Left-Bank Ukraine, evacuation rates fluctuated between 75 and 90 percent.⁹ According to estimates based on Soviet statistics, 800,000–900,000 Ukrainian Jews managed to flee in 1941.¹⁰

    From the start of the invasion, the SS and German police, as well as German Army units, persecuted and murdered Jews in Ukraine. In Galicia and Volhynia, they were abetted by local inhabitants, as a wave of pogroms swept western Ukraine. In some instances, this anti-Jewish violence was spontaneous; in others, Einsatzgruppe C was also involved. The Germans had anticipated anti-Jewish violence in conjunction with the invasion, and the Einsatzgruppen had even been instructed not just to let pogroms happen but to initiate, accelerate, and steer them. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), an authoritarian, anti-Semitic underground movement, launched violent diversions in western Ukraine, including anti-Jewish actions, in part to impede the retreat of the Red Army. The extent to which these actions were coordinated between the SS and police, the Abwehr (German military intelligence), and the OUN remains unclear.

    Once it was discovered that the NVKD (the Soviet secret police) had massacred thousands of political prisoners in western Ukraine before retreating, OUN involvement in pogroms became more evident, especially in Galicia, where the overwhelming share of OUN members originated. The Germans, the OUN, and many local Ukrainians blamed these murders on Bolsheviks and NKVD officials of Jewish origin and, by extension, on all Jews. The widespread notion of Jews and Bolsheviks as synonymous provided the psychological foundation for the anti-Jewish violence that erupted in many west Ukrainian towns in June and July. At least 12,000 Jews, mostly men, fell victim to the pogroms in Galicia.¹¹ At the same time, Einsatzgruppe C started killing Jewish men in large numbers, in particular those believed to make up the intelligentsia, such as teachers, party members, and community leaders. These mass shootings were said to be reprisals for the NKVD killings, although the latter had not been directed against the Germans, but against the locals and had included Jewish victims. Outside Galicia and Volhynia, pogroms were comparatively few. By mid-July, Einsatzgruppe C had left the former Polish territories of Ukraine, having turned over Security Police operations to support troops from the General Government.

    Throughout June and July of the campaign, the general thrust of the killing was directed at males, especially able-bodied men and members of the intelligentsia, inasmuch as they possessed no other skills as craftsmen. During this phase, mass shootings usually ranged in size from fewer than a dozen to just over a thousand victims. Even though limited to mostly male victims, the cumulative death toll soared into the tens of thousands, reaching roughly 40,000 victims before the end of August. The first mass killings of Jewish women and children in Ukraine appear to have been committed by the 1st SS Infantry Brigade in and to the south of Novhorod-Volynsky between 27 and 30 July 1941.¹² A few weeks later, at the latest, Einsatzgruppe C commando leaders were informed that, in principle, Jewish women and children should be shot as well.¹³

    The evolving genocide took on a new dimension in Kamianets-Podilsky on 27–29 August 1941, when, over the course of three days, Police Battalion 320 shot 23,600 Jews, including 14,000 refugees whom the Hungarians had expelled from Transcarpathia a few weeks earlier. This operation took place under Jeckeln’s supervision and without the involvement of Einsatzgruppe C. Such large-scale shootings continued into September 1941: in Berdychiv on 12 September (12,000 victims), in Vinnytsia on 19 September (15,000 victims), and in the ravine Babi Yar in Kiev on 29–30 September. It was at the latter site that Sonderkommando 4a (a unit of Einsatzgruppe C), together with police battalions 45 and 314, shot 33,771 Jews, the largest massacre of the Holocaust. The next two large massacres in military-occupied Ukraine occurred during the German advance into Left-Bank Ukraine: in Dnipropetrovsk, where 15,000 Jews were slaughtered by Police Battalion 314 on 13–14 October, and in Kharkiv, where 12,000 Jews were murdered by Police Battalion 314 and Sonderkommando 4a in the first days of January 1942. Smaller massacres continued until December 1941, taking place on an almost daily basis, whether in the area of operations of one of the Einsatzgruppen, the police battalions, or the 1st SS Infantry Brigade.

    All of these crimes, from the pogroms to the largest massacres, were committed under the authority of the Wehrmacht. At the front, military administration was divided among the army rear area commandants of the 6th, 17th, and 11th armies. The conquered territory behind the armies was administered in turn by a commander of rear area army group, in the case of Ukraine, Rear Area Army Group South. The Sonderkommandos of Einsatzgruppe C operated within the jurisdiction of the army rear area commandants or close to the front, while its Einsatzkommandos tended to operate within the Rear Area Army Group South, as did the Order Police battalions and the SS brigade. There was of course overlap, as well as the exception of Einsatzgruppe D, which carried out its campaign of murder in the wake of the German 11th Army alone. The military administration was also the authority that introduced the first measures aimed at the disenfranchising and isolation of the Jews. These measures were similar to those that had been implemented in Nazi-occupied Poland. The Jews were placed outside the jurisdiction of the law, obliged to wear identifying armbands marked with the Star of David, and required to turn over their valuables. Men were often conscripted for forced labor. A Wehrmacht order called for the creation of ghettos, but this was apparently only implemented under civil administration.¹⁴

    As the Wehrmacht moved east, it turned over swaths of territory to the civilian authority for Ukraine, the Reich Commissariat Ukraine (Reichskommissariat für die Ukraine, RKU). The first transfer of Ukrainian territory to German civilian rule was the region of eastern Galicia, which was assigned to the General Government on 1 August 1941. The RKU was established on 1 September 1941 in western Volhynia and the Proskuriv Oblast. A second turnover on 20 October covered most of Right-Bank Ukraine down to the Cherkassy-Pervomaisk rail line. By mid-November 1941, the RKU was in charge of all of Right-Bank Ukraine, save for those lands bequeathed to Germany’s ally Romania and given the name Transnistria (most of the Odessa Oblast, just under half of the Vinnytsia Oblast, and a part of the Mykolaiv Oblast). At its greatest extent, from September 1942 to March 1943, the RKU covered just over 55 percent of what is today Ukraine.

    The transfer to civilian rule did not bring an end to the killing. The support troops that had relieved Einsatzgruppe C in Galicia and Volhynia had continued to carry out shootings throughout the autumn of 1941. In eastern Galicia, these operations peaked in the first half of October with massacres in Nadvirna on 6 October, which claimed 2,000 victims, and in Stanyslaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk) on 12 October (“Bloody Sunday”), when the local Security Police outpost and Police Battalion 133 killed 12,000 Jews.¹⁵ In the RKU, the pattern was similar. Having reached Kiev at the end of September, Einsatzkommando 5 was broken up into detachments and sent back west to Rivne, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr in mid-October, in order to establish stationary regional offices. These detachments carried out dozens of massacres west of the Dniepr before year’s end. The most notorious of these took place in Rivne on 6–9 November. There police battalions 315 and 320, together with the local Einsatzkommando 5 detachment, shot 17,000 Jews in Rivne. The orders for this shooting were connected with the establishment of the local ghetto and the desire of the occupation authorities to reduce the number of Jews in the temporary capital of the RKU.¹⁶

    In the final months of 1941, the RKU began creating ghettos in the territory under its jurisdiction. The form of those ghettos varied greatly. Sometimes, they consisted of a few fenced-off buildings; sometimes, they involved a small quarter of town that was declared a ghetto, but was not fenced in or even guarded. Within the ghettos, usually located in a part of town with a minimum of infrastructure, food and medicine were insufficient. Those Jews who lacked access to the black market or assistance from beyond the ghetto were in great danger of succumbing to malnutrition or disease. In each city or town with a large Jewish community, the creation of a Jewish Council, or Judenrat, was also mandatory. The Judenrat had to make sure that German orders were followed and to procure provisions from the German administration and distribute them to the ghetto population. The vast majority of the ghettos were established in the western lands of the RKU. In the other half—roughly the territory east of the line formed by Korosten, Zhytomyr, and Vinnitsia—the formation of ghettos there was largely superfluous, as this marked the point beyond which the Einsatzgruppen and Order Police had killed almost all of the Jews they had encountered.¹⁷

    Parallel to the events in Galicia and the RKU, in Transnistria, the Romanian authorities turned their zone of occupation into a mass graveyard for both local Jews and Jews expelled from the regions annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940. Starting in August 1941, the Romanian government had deported the Jews of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to Transnistria, where they had to live in camps and ghettos under abysmal circumstances. Not long after the massacre at Babi Yar, the Romanian army and police committed a similar crime, killing around 25,000 Jews in Odessa on 23–24 October. Most of the remaining Jews were then marched north into the ethnic German settlement areas around Berezivka, where they were killed by the ethnic German Self-defense Force (Selbstschutz), a formation of the SS Ethnic German Liaison Office (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle). In December, the Romanians murdered the inmates of the Golta camps of Akhmetchetka, Bohdanivka, and Domanivka, where tens of thousands of Jews had been incarcerated. Most of the inmates from these camps had perished by March 1942. Only in August 1942 did Bucharest turn away from active participation in the Holocaust, primarily due to disputes with the Germans over the treatment of Romanian troops on the front and intervention on the part of Romanian public figures and U.S. officials.¹⁸ Of the Bukovinan and Bessarabian Jews expelled into Transnistria, those who survived until the summer of 1942 and the end of the Romanian shootings generally had fair chance of surviving the war.

    By the spring of 1942, there were almost no Jews left alive in Wehrmacht-administered Left-Bank Ukraine. Over the course of spring 1942, the Jews who had not been killed in 1941 were murdered by Sonderkommando Plath, which was based in Kremenchuk.¹⁹ At the same time Sonderkommando Plath was completing its assignment in Left-Bank Ukraine, mass shootings resumed in Right-Bank Ukraine. All of the Jews in General Commissariat Mykolaiv had been killed by 1 April.²⁰ Farther west, in District Galicia and General Commissariat Volhynia-Podolia, the perpetrators began to classify and organize the Jews according to their “ability to work.” As a consequence, the murder of women and children was soon stepped up. On 16 March, the Germans began the deportation of Galician Jews to the Bełżec killing center (75 km north of Lviv), where they were asphyxiated gas chambers by means of carbon monoxide from tank engines.²¹ In May, a new wave of shootings began in Volhynia.²²

    In July 1942, approximately 600,000 Jews were still alive in the occupied Ukrainian lands, but in the summer of 1942, the killing was again intensified. In Galicia, about 180,000 Jews were deported to Bełżec between August and November. Among them were 60,000 Jews from Lviv: 40,000–50,000 Jews on 10–25 August and another 10,000 on 19–20 November. In December, the Bełżec camp was closed, and the police units in Galicia resumed shooting Jews near their place of residence. In June 1943, all of the remaining ghetto inhabitants were killed, and in July, almost all of the remaining forced laborers. The inmates at the Janowska Camp in Lviv were killed on 19 November. The only Jews officially remaining in Galicia were a handful of forced laborers in the Boryslav oil fields. They were evacuated to the west in 1944.²³

    In General Commissariat Volhynia-Podolia, most of the Jews fell victim to a campaign of murder that unfolded between July and November 1942. Almost every day the German police, aided by Ukrainian auxiliary policemen, killed thousands of Jews. Almost all of the Jews were annihilated and the ghettos disbanded. The biggest massacres took place in Lutsk on 19–23 August (14,700 victims), Volodymyr-Volynsky in the first days of September (13,500), and Liuboml on 1–2 October (10,000). By early 1943, only small groups of Jewish forced laborers were still alive in the RKU, mostly in camps along Thoroughfare IV (Durchgangsstrasse IV), the road from Lviv to Dnipropetrovsk. Those camps were liquidated in the course of 1943, as was the small “labor ghetto” in Volodymyr-Volynsky, whose inmates were killed on 13–14 December.²⁴

    Unlike Belarus or the Baltic republics, Ukraine was not the final destination for the systematic deportations of Jews from Germany and the Czech lands. Nonetheless, tens of thousands of foreign Jews were killed in Ukraine. Beyond the 12,000 Jews who were expelled from Hungary and murdered in Kamianets-Podilsky and tens of thousands of Romanian Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia who were expelled into Transnistria, where they either died of hunger and exposure or were shot, there was another large group of foreign Jews who were murdered on Ukrainian soil. The Hungarian forces deployed to Ukraine were accompanied by numerous companies of Hungarian Jewish forced laborers. In all, about 50,000 Jews ended up in Ukraine with the Hungarian Army. Most of them died there in combat operations or mass shootings by the German police in 1943.²⁵

    Ukraine’s Jews appear to have been taken by surprise by the humiliations, terror, and mass murder they experienced. The anti-Semitism of prewar Germany was known in the Soviet Union, but the Hitler-Stalin pact ensured that very little negative information about life in German-occupied Poland or elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe appeared in the Soviet press. Until June 1941, knowledge of the German persecution of Jews in Poland had been limited to those Jews who had fled to western Ukraine. Terrorized, destitute, and isolated, the Jews of Ukraine were quickly driven into a helpless situation. The German authorities faced little resistance to the first wave of killings. This changed somewhat in 1942, especially during the ghetto liquidations that summer and autumn. Jews tried to flee en masse to the woods or to find hiding places in the cities and towns. Armed Jewish resistance emerged in western Volhynia in autumn 1942 and later in Galicia in 1943. However, the preconditions for organized Jewish resistance in Ukraine were rather limited due to the lack of favorable terrain, especially outside the woods of Volhynia and Galicia. For the same reason, the non-Jewish resistance movement was largely restricted to western Ukraine and even then was comparatively late in emerging. A few hundred Jews survived the war by joining the partisans (mainly Soviet groups) or by finding their way to “family camps” (under the protection of Soviet partisan units). Ultimately, about 5 percent of the Ukrainian Jews who fell under German and Romanian occupation survived the war.²⁶

    While Ukraine’s ethnic German population largely harbored anti-Semitic sentiments, the general attitude of other non-Jews toward the murder of Ukraine’s Jews, especially that of the Ukrainians themselves, remains the subject of considerable debate. There certainly existed a degree of anti-Semitism among Ukraine’s non-Jewish population, especially in western Ukraine. Before the war, anti-Semitic views were common among some circles in Polish-ruled Ukraine, but these views were radicalized in large part due to Soviet rule in 1939–41. Anti-Semitism could also be found in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. According to German reports in that region, denunciations of Jews were frequent, especially during the early period of the Nazi occupation. The OUN for its part propagated anti-Semitic stereotypes in 1941 and 1942, and although the OUN officially changed its posture on minorities in mid-1943, the impact on the ground within its affiliated partisan force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraïns’ka povstans’ka armiia, UPA) was marginal. While Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia spoke out against anti-Jewish violence, some bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the RKU repeatedly expressed anti-Semitic attitudes.²⁷ Tens of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians profited from the plight of the Jews by plundering or taking over Jewish apartments, furniture, clothes, and businesses. Thousands risked their lives to hide thousands of Jews, especially in the cities and towns. Many such humanitarians were executed when caught. As of 1 January 2013, 2,441 persons from Ukraine have been recognized as Righteous among the Nations by the Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority in Jerusalem.²⁸

    There is no doubt that the murder of the Jews was committed by the “Third Reich” and organized and implemented primarily by Germans and Austrians. Nevertheless, due to the lack of manpower, the perpetrators from the Reich relied heavily on indigenous auxiliaries.²⁹ The German police had more than 120,000 auxiliary policemen at its disposal in the RKU and military-administered Ukraine, including firefighters. Many of these policemen—predominantly auxiliaries for the German Order Police—participated in the persecution and murder of Ukraine’s Jews, especially in 1942. They guarded ghettos, provided cordons for most killing actions starting in August 1941, sometimes took part in the shootings, and later helped hunt down Jews in hiding and delivered them to the German authorities for shooting. At least some of the auxiliary policemen serving in cohesive battalions (Schutzmannschafts-Bataillone) also participated in the killing.³⁰

Historiography

There is a substantial body of research on the Holocaust in Ukraine, but compared to that on Poland and the rest of central and western Europe, the historiography is relatively recent. As is well known, there were in the first decade after the war some important first efforts in Eastern and Central Europe to reconstruct the fate of Ukraine’s Jews during the Holocaust, such as the works on eastern Galicia by the Historical Commission of Polish Jews,³¹ Matatias Carp’s volume on Transnistria,³² and The Black Book by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.³³ In Soviet Ukraine, the subject was more or less silenced, despite some hints in Soviet literature or in the Yiddish-language journal Sovetish heymland. Probably one of the most important fictional treatments of the subject, Vasily Grossman’s Life and Fate, was confiscated in the early 1960s and could only be published in the west in 1980 after being smuggled out of the Soviet Union.

    Although works on the Holocaust in eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Transnistria were regularly published by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw until 1968, as well as by some survivors and homeland associations (landsmanshaftn),³⁴ modern research started only in the 1970s in Israel with the appearance of important dissertations written by survivors, in particular Aharon Weiss, who wrote about the Jewish ghetto police, including the ghetto police in Galicia,³⁵ and Shmuel Spector, who wrote about the Holocaust and Jewish resistance in western Volhynia.³⁶ Yad Vashem then also published two related volumes within its series Pinkas Hakehillot, the memorial book of communities, one on eastern Galicia and the other on Volhynia-Polesia.³⁷ Even in Israel, however, only a few attempts were made to go beyond the westernmost regions of Ukraine.³⁸

    While a wave of Holocaust awareness arose in the West at the start of the 1980s, the subject of Ukraine continued to be ignored, although it did gain some attention as a consequence of the controversies that surrounded the investigations and trials of collaborators living in North America. Only with the disintegration of the Soviet Union did the Holocaust in Ukraine start to receive adequate attention, both in the West and in Ukraine. Since then, there have been three major directions of research: First, there is an enormous effort underway inside Ukraine, as well as in Moscow, to reconstruct the fate of individual communities of Jews in certain regions and the course of the Holocaust in Ukraine in general. The National Academy of Sciences, Jewish organizations, and other historians, survivors, and activists now publish widely on the subject. Second is a wave of perpetrator research, especially in Germany and the United States, with studies on Nazi institutions and the crimes they committed in different regions.³⁹ Third, there is the inquiry into society and culture in response to the Holocaust in Ukraine, a trend more prevalent in North American historiography. In Israel, research on the Jews under occupation continues. This is but a rough categorization and does not cover all of the research that has been done in recent years.

    The Holocaust in Ukraine, as noted at the outset, is a significant part of the Holocaust in general. Nevertheless, documentation on the crime and its circumstances is comparatively small. Dutch historian Karel Berkhoff was the first to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature as of 1996.⁴⁰ In 2005, Ukraine’s State Committee on Archives (Derzhkom Arkhiviv) published an impressive overview on all occupation files in Ukrainian archives, which despite the extent of what remains rather underscores what has been lost.⁴¹ Not only were most of the key files of the Nazi regime in Berlin destroyed at the end of the war, so too were almost all of the records from the administration of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine. The same applies to the records of the killing apparatus of the SS and police. The situation is slightly better when it comes to military records, a part of which still exist, even for those military formations stationed in the civil-administrated Ukraine. Other German occupation agencies, such Organization Todt or private companies, left almost no documentation. It is therefore inevitable that we have to turn to postwar criminal investigations, especially the West German files of the 1960s and 1970s, in order to fill in the gaps in the sources. The situation is much better when it comes to Romanian records, both for those of the central agencies in Bucharest and those of the occupational apparatus in Transnistria.

    Fewer files are available on the institutions of collaboration, especially the Ukrainian auxiliary police (Schutzmannschaften of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine and the Ukrainische Hilfspolizei of Galicia) and the local-level administration. In the long run, all of the related Soviet investigations into collaboration will have to be located and made available to researchers, but such records will need to be used with great caution.

    Concerning documents created by the victims, the situation is worse. The victims were either not able to document their fate or, if they were, the documents are lost. Very little material from the Jewish councils in Ukraine still exists, and only a few scattered diaries or letters have been found to date. Thus scholars have to rely on witness statements made since 1944 and on memoirs. Unlike Holocaust survivors elsewhere, Soviet witnesses were interviewed only at war’s end—usually by the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Committed by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices—and then, for those still residing in Ukraine, only after 1990.

    A complete picture of the Holocaust in Ukraine is possible only by integrating all of the remaining bystander material. The examination of Soviet state records—those of the Communist Party, the NKVD, the partisan movements, and the Red Army—for this purpose has only just begun. Little is to be expected at the individual level or in church files.

Memory

The memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine evolved in very different contexts: In the Ukrainian diaspora, especially in North America and Germany, the Holocaust was not an issue. The reverse is true in the case in the Ukrainian-Jewish diaspora that predated the Holocaust. After the war, the landsmanshaftn abroad were almost the only institutions left to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust in their former home towns. In most cases, however, only communities from interwar Poland had such landsmanshaftn. The waves of emigration from the Soviet Union since 1971 did not lead to another wave of yizkor (memorial) books, although within Israel, they greatly contributed to the knowledge of the Holocaust in Ukraine.⁴²

    In Soviet Ukraine, memory of the German mass crimes against the Jews all but vanished during late Stalinism. There the focus was on Soviet citizens in general. After Stalin’s death some notable exceptions emerged surrounding the memory of Babi Yar massacre: the controversy over Evgenii Evtushenko’s poem, Dmitry Shostakovich’s 13th Symphony, and Anatoly Kuznetsov’s book on the massacre. Eventually, hundreds of small memorials, in some cases larger ones, were put up at executions sites, but nearly all of these omitted any reference to the Jewish identity of the victims. Nevertheless, there were incidents when the fate of the Jews during the war was made public, for example, during the late war crimes trials in Soviet Ukraine, which continued into the 1990s.

    In independent Ukraine, this began to change, starting with the 1991 visit of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and the revival of Jewish institutions in the Ukraine. The new government had to adjust to the Western approach to the Holocaust, especially with regard to relations with the United States and Israel. Thus a state-sponsored approach to Holocaust memory has prevailed, which has broadened as civil society has emerged. The Holocaust is now integrated into school curricula, although as a rather isolated incident, and the state strives to support both memorialization and historical research.⁴³

    In the West, there is no specific memory of the “Holocaust in Ukraine,” rather it tends to be connected to individual places such as the Lviv ghetto or events like the Babi Yar massacre.⁴⁴ From time to time, the perception of Ukrainian nationalism as profoundly anti-Semitic has surfaced, especially during the controversies surrounding Ukrainian collaborators who emigrated to North America after the war and were later prosecuted. This has been reinforced by the visual perception of the Holocaust in Ukraine, especially the almost iconic series of photographs depicting the Lviv pogrom in early July 1941.

    The Holocaust in Ukraine was also a major subject of two exhibitions on the Wehrmacht—the original one from the late 1990s and the revised one from 2001—as it documented, at least where the photos were correctly described, the participation of Wehrmacht units in the mass murder of Jews, especially in the area of operations of the 6th Army. Thus some elements of the Holocaust in Ukraine became central to the public debate in both exhibitions. But also other countries have been affected: The Catholic Church in France now supports a larger research and memorialization project called the “Holocaust by Bullets,” based on the efforts of French priest Patrick Desbois.⁴⁵

    Finally, it is necessary to address the current tendencies of Holocaust memorialization in the Ukraine. As historian Omer Bartov has documented dramatically, Holocaust memorialization is almost completely externalized in western Ukraine, where both the number of victims and the participation of Ukrainian locals reached the highest proportions. Instead, memorialization of the right-wing Ukrainian underground has tended to dominate the agenda. In some towns, monuments honoring OUN and UPA leaders have been built on the terrain of former ghettos or execution sites.⁴⁶

    It is necessary to point out these current tendencies in Ukraine’s memory policy, but it is even more necessary to deepen historical research on the subject and to put the issue of collaboration in its historical context. The most important perspectives, however, remain the question of why the crimes occurred, which deals with perpetrator history, and of how the victims were affected, which addresses Jewish history.

NOTES

        1. These 1.5 million victims are from the lands that now make up Ukraine. This figure therefore includes regions of prewar Poland and thus a share of the roughly three million Jewish citizens of the interwar Polish state murdered during the Holocaust. The number of murdered Jews from those interwar Polish lands located in postwar Poland is just under two million.

        2. This text draws on Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), as well as Dieter Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews under Military Administration and in Reich Commissariat Ukraine,” in The Shoah in Ukraine, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 23–76.

        3. Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 70–71.

        4. “Betr.: Richtlinien für das Verhalten der Truppe in Russland” (Nuremburg Document NOKW-1692), 4 June 1941, in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen der sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener,” in Anatomie des SS-Staates, Bd. 2, ed. Martin Broszat et al. (Munich: dtv, 1984), 187–88.

        5. This notion was widespread between the wars, but the share of Jews among the commissars was in fact 8 percent in 1929 and ca. 20 percent in 1938. The figure then declined during Stalin’s purge of the Red Army, see Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 75–76. See also the extensive study of the “commissar order” by Felix Römer, Der Kommissarbefehl. Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42 (Paderborn: Schöningh 2008).

        6. This was the case of at least the 22nd Infantry Division, which operated in southern Ukraine, see Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 76.

        7. Ibid., 72–73.

        8. On the hunger plan, see Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 64–66 and 183–94.

        9. Two oblasts from prewar Soviet Right-Bank Ukraine lost over 50 percent of their prewar Jewish population: Vinnytsia (81 percent) and Proskuriv (94 percent), see Table 8.4 “Jews Who Perished as Part of Prewar Jewish Population,” in Alexander Kruglov, “Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941–1944,” in Brandon and Lower, Shoah in Ukraine, p. 284. The Kiev Oblast figure should be 25.6 percent, not 61.4 as shown in the table.

        10. Wadim Dubson, “On the Problem of Evacuation of the Soviet Jews in 1941 (New Archival Sources),” Jews in Eastern Europe 40, no. 3 (1999), 37–55.

        11. On the pogroms in general, see Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 77 and 244–46. For greater detail on east Galicia and the role of the NKVD morders there, see Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 54–67. Kai Struve of the University Halle-Wittenberg is working on a study of the pogroms in eastern Poland (western Soviet Union) in 1941.

        12. Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah: die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die Judenvernichtung, 1939–1945 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 165–67.

        13. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 28.

        14. Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 248–49.

        15. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 139–51.

        16. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 43.

        17. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 46–47.

        18. Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944 (New York: I. Dee, 2000); Jean Ancel, Contributii la istoria Romaniei. Problema evreiasca, 1933–1944 (Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 2001). In Hebrew: Zhan Ancel, Toledot has-sho’a: Rumenya (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem 2002); Rumänien und der Holocaust. Zu den Massenverbrechen in Transnistrien, 1941–1944, ed. Mariana Hausleitner, Brigitte Mihok, Juliane Wetzel (Berlin: Metropol, 2001); Michael Gesin, “Holocaust: The Reality of Genocide in Southern Ukraine.” PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2003.

        19. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews,” 38–39.

        20. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews,” 48.

        21. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 188–98.

        22. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews,” 48.

        23. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 211–65.

        24. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews,” 49–52.

        25. Martin Broszat, “Die jüdischen Arbeitskompanien in Ungarn,” in Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 1 (Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1959), 200–14; Randolph L. Braham, The Hungarian Labor Service System, 1939–1945 (New York: East European Publications, 1977), 25–27; The Wartime System of Labor Service in Hungary, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Boulder, CO: East European Publications, 1995).

        26. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews,” 52–53.

        27. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 320–26; Metropolyt Andrey Sheptyts’kyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 1941–1944, ed. Zhanna Kovba (Kiev: Dukh i litera, 2003); Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair. Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2004), 83–84; Yitzhak Arad, “The Christian Churches and the Persecution of Jews in the Occupied Territories of the USSR,” in Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of National Socialism, 1919–1945, ed. Otto Dov Kulka, Paul Mendes-Flohr (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem 1987), 401–11.

        28. See http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp. The extent to which these figures reflect Poles in western Ukraine is unclear. This subject remains understudied. A rather apologetic examination of rescuers in eastern Galicia is Zhanna Kovba, Liudianist’ u bezodni pekla. Povedinka mistsevoho naselennia Skhidnoï Halychyny v roky “ostatochnoho rozv’iazannia ievreis’koho pytannia,” 2nd exp. ed. (Kiev: Instytut Judaïky, 2000).

        29. Dieter Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden,” in Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 205–34.

        30. Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews,” 55.

        31. Two of the most prominent authors were Philip Friedman and Tatiana Berenstein. Two of Friedman’s articles on the Holocaust in Ukraine are available in English in Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust (New York and Philadelphia: Conference on Jewish Social Studies and Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980). Berenstein published the first major study on Galicia in 1953 in Yiddish. A Polish version appeared in 1967: “Eksterminacja ludnosci żydowskiej w dystrykcie Galicja,” Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego 61 (1967), 3–58.

        32. Cartea neagra. Suferintele evreilor din Romania, 1940–1944, vol. 3: Transnistria (Bucharest: Societatea Nationala de Editura si Arte Gratice “Dacia Traiana,” 1948).

        33. Excerpts of a version of the manuscript sent to the United States and Romania were published in 1946: The Black Book: The Nazi Crime against the Jewish People (New York: Jewish Black Book Committee, 1946). A subsequent edition appeared in 1980, but the full version was published only in 2001: The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001).

        34. J. S. Fisher, Transnistria: The Forgotten Cemetery (South Brunswick: Yoseloff, 1969).

        35. Ha-mishtara ha-yehudit ba-general government u-vi-Shlezya ilit bi-tqufat ha-Sho’a (Jerusalem: Ha-universiṭa ha-ivrit, 1973).

        36. Shmuel Spector, Sho’at Yehude Ṿohlin, 1941–1944. (Jerusalem: Yad ṿa-shem and ha-Federatsyah shel Yehude Ṿohlin, 1986).

        37. Pinqas ha-qehilot: entsiqlopedya shel ha-yishuvim ha-yehudiyim le-min hivasdam ve-’ad le-aḥar sho’at milhemet ha-’olam ha-shniya, vol. 2, Galitsiya ha-mizraḥit (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), and vol. 5, Vohlin ve-Polesie (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990).

        38. Shmuel Spector, [The Fate of Ukrainian Jewry during the Nazi Invasion—Statistics and Estimates], Shvut 12 (1987), 55–66 [in Hebrew].

        39. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien; Thomas Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsaktionen von Berthold Beitz (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Frank Golczewski, “Die Revision eines Klischees. Die Rettung von verfolgten Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg durch Ukrainer,” in Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit, Bd. 2, ed. Wolfgang Benz, Juliane Wetzel (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), 9–82; Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord. Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion, 1941–1943 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003); Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44 (London: Palgrave, 2000); Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

        40. Karel Berkhoff, “Ukraine under Nazi Rule (1941–1944): Sources and Finding Aids,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 45, nos. 1–2 (1997), 84–103 and 273–309.

        41. Archivy okupatsiï 1941–1944. Anotovanyi reiestr fondiv derzhavnykh arkhiviv Ukraïny, CD-ROM (Kiev: Derzhkom archiviv Ukrainy, 2005), online version: http://www.archives.gov.ua/Publicat/AO-1941-1944.php.

        42. Cf. New York Public Library: http://legacy.www.nypl.org/research/chss/jws/yizkorbooks_intro.cfm.

        43. Johan Dietsch, Making Sense of Suffering. Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture (Lund: Lund University Press, 2006); David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2007); and articles by Wilfried Jilge. Cf. the activities of Ukraïns’kyi tsentr vyvchennia istoriï Holokostu, and of the Tkuma-Center in Dnipropetrovsk and the Fond Babyn Jar. In particular, Babii Yar. Chelovek, vlast’, istoriia, t. 1: Istoricheskaia topografiia. Khronologiia sobytii, ed. Tat’iana Evstaf’eva, Vitalii Nakhmanovich (Kiev: Vysshtorgizdat, 2004).

        44. Cf. the film by Karl Fruchtmann, “Die Grube” (Radio Bremen 1995); Die Schoáh von Babij Jar. Das Massaker deutscher Sonderkommandos an der jüdischen Bevölkerung von Kiew 1941—fünfzig Jahre danach zum Gedenken, ed. Erhard Roy Wiehn (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 1991); and the film “Babi Jar” by Artur Brauner.

        45. Cf. the results of the conference “The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Resources and Perspectives,” Paris, 1–3 October 2007.

        46. Omer Bartov, Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

9

Belarusian Partisans and German Reprisals

Timm C. Richter

In 1945, Belarus was one of the most devastated territories in Europe. This was due not only to the Wehrmacht’s advance in 1941 or its retreat in 1944. This destruction was also the result of the antipartisan operations that took place behind the German lines in military- and civil-administered Belarus. During the war, the Soviet Union made extensive use of partisan, or guerrilla, warfare, and the German police and army security forces responded ferociously, raiding villages, plundering foodstuffs, deporting those capable of work to Germany, and shooting most of those who remained.¹

    Guerrilla warfare is as old as war itself. But since the French Revolution and the emergence of the concept of levée en masse, the mass conscription of able-bodied men for military service, this type of warfare has come to be associated in general with ideological commitment, whether to a people, state, or idea. This was especially typical of underground Communist movements in the twentieth century. In the age of total war, when invading armies sought not only to defeat the enemy and occupy its territory, but to subjugate its population and exploit its resources, partisan and antipartisan warfare began to assume a growing importance for the outcome of a war. The phrase “total war” can be traced back to General Erich Ludendorff in 1935, but total war has also been in use for centuries. The modern understanding of the idea is now identified with U.S. General Phillip Sheridan’s troops stripping the Shenandoah Valley during the American Civil War. Sheridan’s aim was to eliminate foodstuffs and supplies vital to the military operations of Confederate forces and to strike a blow at civilian morale within the Confederacy.

    Partisan warfare and antipartisan operations blur the distinction between combatant and noncombatant and raise complex moral questions for all those involved. Combat is in and of itself enormously stressful for soldiers, but in a conventional war, battles are usually more or less limited in duration and confined to a certain area, with soldiers on each side of the battle lines distinguished by their uniforms. Guerrilla wars are of course quite different. There is no front, and the threat of attack is constant. Furthermore, the partisan side usually lacks uniforms and is largely indistinguishable from the civilian population (once weapons are concealed). In such situations, regular troops can easily come to consider the population of an entire region hostile, and the chances are much greater that an ambiguous movement or sound can provoke a confrontational or violent reaction that deteriorates into atrocity.

    In turn, by challenging an occupation regime, partisans hope to undermine military security and public order, and the acts involved in posing that challenge often tempt the criminal impulses of individual underground fighters, which in turn can draw a similar criminal response on the part of the occupying authorities. Thus, in every guerrilla war, there exists a danger of an unending spiral of violence and atrocity. The success of an insurgency depends on its ability to gain the support of the civilian population despite this danger. And if there is no groundswell of genuine support, partisans often resort to the threat of violence or acts of violence to coerce the civilian population into cooperation. In some cases, partisans even covertly provoke reprisals against civilian populations so as to arouse enmity toward the occupiers.

    In conflicts where an occupying force considers itself ideologically, culturally, racially, or otherwise superior to the people it seeks to subjugate, the threshold of violence can be much lower. The German occupation of the western Soviet Union was very much such a conflict. The German invasion of the Soviet Union, codenamed “Barbarossa,” was planned and launched as a war of annihilation that aimed to destroy the ideological opponent Bolshevism, to seize lebensraum for Germany, and to decimate what was seen as a racially and culturally inferior civil population. The civilian occupation regime that followed in the wake of the Wehrmacht pursued these aims by administrative fiat and SS and police coercion. When the German advance foundered outside Moscow in December 1941, the Soviets reorganized their partisan movement and began to build on the massive discontent created by Nazi policies. There ensued a protracted, irregular conflict between German security forces, on the one hand, and mostly Soviet partisan formations, on the other. Anti-German, pro-Soviet insurgents could be found from the Baltics to the Crimea, from the district of Białystok within East Prussia to the army rear areas beyond Smolensk. However, the epicenter of that conflict was Belarus.

    The Germans captured about 80 percent of the Belarusian Socialistic Soviet Republic in the first weeks of the German invasion. By June 30, German troops were entering Minsk; a week later, they were in the Soviet republic’s easternmost oblasts (regions). The latter—the oblasts of Vitsebsk, Bobruisk, Mohileu (Mogilev), and Homel (Gomel)—remained under German military administration throughout the war. The rest were divided among several civil authorities: the Belastok (Białystok) Oblast and a part of the Brest (Brześć) Oblast were attached to East Prussia as District Bialystok (Bezirk Bialystok) and thus fell under the authority of the Reich. Almost all of what remained of the Brest Oblast and most of the Pinsk and Polesie oblasts were attached to the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, while the remaining regions—the Baranovichi (Baranowicze), Vileika (Wilejka), Minsk oblasts—were grouped into the General Commissariat White Ruthenia, a regional structure subordinate to the Reich Commissariat Ostland.² This chapter addresses primarily military administrated Belarus and the General Commissariat White Ruthenia.

Belarus in Nazi Planning and under Soviet Rule

Most of the Germans stationed in Belarus, be they soldiers, policemen, SS men, or civilians, had never been there before. Those who had served on the Eastern Front during the First World War generally held the view that the east was a dangerous place, and that life did not count for much there. Such attitudes toward the inhabitants of the former Russian Empire were later reinforced by anti-Bolshevik propaganda, fear of revolution, and anti-Slavic prejudice. As the First World War continued, Germans soldiers came to be impressed by Russian warfare, which they called the Russian steamroller (Dampfwalze). Confronted by the massive attacks made possible by the large population from which soldiers could be recruited and thrown into battle, many German soldiers responded with what they saw as the best way to deal with this threat: mass annihilation.³

    Germany’s officers were deeply affected not only by the First World War from 1914 to 1918 but also by civil unrest and economic upheaval from 1918 to 1923, a time when the fear of Bolshevik revolution in the west was rampant. The material loss, fear, and violence of these years made a lasting impact on a generation of German officers and would influence their treatment of Soviet citizens during the Second World War. Inasmuch as these Germans had preconceived notions of Belarusians, those views were rudimentary. Belarus was neither Poland nor Russia, neither the Baltics nor Ukraine; unlike any of these other countries or regions, it was not known for a German diaspora and had never been under German rule or direct influence. Belarusians were seen as a backward people, lacking a developed sense of national identity.⁴ They were considered subject to beating up and shooting.⁵ This arrogance and ignorance extended from the rank and file soldier to the planners working on behalf of Alfred Rosenberg, the future Reich minister for the occupied eastern territories. In the run-up to the German invasion, Rosenberg’s staff foresaw Belarus as a dumping ground for Poles from the General Government (the German-occupied Polish territories not annexed to the Reich) and “undesirable elements” from the Baltic lands,⁶ beyond that, a “wildlife conservation park.”⁷

    Belarus was also of less economic interest to the Germans than Ukraine. With the exception of livestock, oats, and timber, the country produced little else of value to the Germans.⁸ In order to increase the food imports from the occupied Soviet territories, German economic planners foresaw withholding food supplies from larger cities and “deficit areas” (Zuschussgebiete), regions that had been supplied with traditionally food from “surplus areas” (Überschussgebiete). Belarus was such a “deficit area.” Therefore it was to be subjected to mass starvation, in particular the Belarusian capital of Minsk, with its population of almost 250,000 people.⁹

    German propaganda trumpeted the liberation from Bolshevism, but the actions of the first combat troops, to say nothing of the SS and police forces and economics commandos that followed, foreshadowed an occupation no less brutal and callous than the Soviet regime it had displaced. The ruthless exploitation of the countryside and racially motivated repression paralleled in many ways the Soviet tyranny. With the appearance of the first partisans and the German response, the situation deteriorated.¹⁰ The local population found itself “between the Soviet hammer and the Nazi anvil.”¹¹

The Hammer: Soviet Partisans

Although insurrection had been an element of Bolshevik military doctrine during the revolution and subsequent civil war, the Soviets were not prepared to conduct a partisan war in 1941.¹² Shortly after the Russian Civil War, the use of partisan warfare in the event of an invasion had been considered by Red Army Chief of Staff Mikhail W. Frunze. By 1936, however, those plans had been shelved. Stalin and his advisors favored an offensive strategy, which aimed to shift the fighting to foreign soil as quickly as possible.¹³ Thus, on the eve of German invasion, the Soviet Union had no plans for a guerrilla movement behind enemy lines.

    Be that as it may, the Soviet High Command reacted very quickly to the German invasion of 22 June 1941. Seven days later, it issued orders for the formation of partisan units in the oblasts near the frontlines.¹⁴ However, due to the rapid advance of the German troops, this was initially only possible in the oblasts of Homel and Mohileu.¹⁵ These first units were led by party members or the NKVD (the Soviet secret police) and were inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and largely estranged from the civilian population. Often, it was all too apparent that the peasants in particular had little love for the order they were expected to defend. Before the war, they had suffered tremendously from the liquidation of private farming and collectivization. Reduced to a dehumanized pool of seemingly inexhaustible labor, they had not forgotten the impoverishment, deportations, and shootings that had accompanied the economic development of the world’s first peasants’ and workers’ state.¹⁶ Thus, in the Belarusian countryside, most people were indifferent or hostile toward Soviet partisans.¹⁷ There was little sign of any willingness to launch a broad-based popular uprising.

    The first Soviet partisan units, somewhat ironically, emerged as a consequence of German military tactics. The rapid armored pincer movements and huge pocket battles broke up large numbers of Soviet formations, thus leaving thousands of Red Army soldiers behind the lines. These stragglers had few options to choose from. Surrendering to the Germans was extremely dangerous. They could be treated as partisans and promptly shot, or they could be sent to POW camps, which were gradually becoming known as sites of indescribable squalor as prisoners were left to die of starvation and exposure. If they managed to slip through the lines to Soviet-held territory, they risked being charged with desertion and treason. The best option was to hide in the countryside and try to survive on their own. These Red Army stragglers, wary of both the German and the Soviet authorities, formed the first anti-German partisan units.

    By the end of 1941, most of these units had been destroyed. Aside from issuing calls for the formation of partisan units, the Soviet High Command had paid little attention to the partisans. Inadequacies in organization, leadership, equipment, and training had limited the effectiveness of those first partisans and led to their annihilation. But after the failure of the Germans to reach Moscow and the Soviet counterattacks in December 1941, a shift took place in Soviet partisan policy. The Red Army had come to realize the potential of partisan units, if they were well organized and equipped, which had evidently been proven by individual units in the area of Viazma. The NKVD, for its part, saw in the partisans an opportunity to control and monitor the rural population and to spread terror beyond the frontline. Although still suspicious to the Soviet authorities, the remaining Red Army stragglers ceased to be treated automatically as deserters and traitors.

    The remaining partisans were reorganized and supplied by the Red Army and the NKVD: either by land (directly through the frontlines) or by air. New detachments were established with officers and specialists trained in special partisan academies. According to official Soviet statistics, 237 partisan units with 23,000 combatants were operating in Belarus by July 1942. Their equipment included 11,500 rifles and 1000 machine guns.¹⁸ In addition, on 30 May 1942, the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement (Tsentral’nyi shtab partizanskogo dvizheniia, TsShPD) was established under the command of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus.¹⁹ The purpose of this staff was to oversee the partisan units and to coordinate their operations with the needs of the Red Army. Halfway through 1942, partisan activity was a constant factor in almost every raion (sub-regional administrative district) of Belarus, above all in and around Minsk, Polotsk, and Lepel, as well as the Polesie region (including those parts of the latter incorporated into the Reich Commissariat Ukraine).

    The partisans did not carve out “partisan republics” in the German rear; they created “twilight zones,” where neither the Germans nor the Soviet partisans were fully in control.²⁰ Although the partisans were growing in strength, direct attacks on German troops remained rare. Instead, the partisans targeted Soviet citizens regarded as collaborators. The partisan war in Belarus also seems to have had an element of class warfare, which was evident in the attacks on estate owners in the territories of the interwar Polish state that the Soviets had annexed in 1939.²¹ These were soft targets, and they were available in large numbers. Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich minister for the occupied eastern territories, told Hermann Göring, the plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan, in early August 1942 that the partisans had killed some 1500 town mayors.²² The degree of intimidation for those holding other positions was so intense that one local forester returned his weapon to Economics Commando Bobruisk and asked for written confirmation of the handover so that he could show it to the partisans should they attack again. The Germans complied.²³

    Such incidents point to a reality that diverges from the official history of Soviet partisans during the Second World War. Soviet historians claimed that the partisans were the defenders and avengers of the local population, which willingly provided the partisans with food and clothing and sheltered them when needed. German documents, by sharp contrast, portrayed the partisans as fanatical NKVD agents, bandits, and looters who created only resentment among the civilian population. In fact, the partisans’ relations with civilians varied according to geographic origins of the units, operational circumstances, objectives, and orders from on high. The staff of the TsShPD understood that partisan violence against civilians was more or less widespread and tried to contain it. As discipline improved over the course of 1942 and 1943, such violence declined, but it did not disappear.²⁴ For the Soviets of course manpower, control, and coordination were of greater importance than moral probity.²⁵

    Starting in 1943, partisan operations were increasingly directed at German supply lines and transport. Some actions were spectacular but of little operational significance.²⁶ Nonetheless, the general staff of the High Command of the German Army (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH) demanded that the General Commissariat White Ruthenia be returned to military administration. Hitler refused for fear that this would create the appearance that the Germans were losing the war and could not control the territories under civilian authority.²⁷ Meanwhile, the Communist underground continued to grow, not only in the country but in the cities as well.

    In the final stage of the German occupation, in 1944, the partisans finally became a military factor. This was seen during the collapse of Army Group Center, the greatest defeat suffered by German troops during the Second World War. On the eve of the Soviet offensive (Operation Bagration), partisans detonated almost 10,500 charges,²⁸ cutting the German lines for days. The Soviet attack, which began on 22 June 1944, was a tremendous success, opening the way to Poland and, by extension, to Berlin. The political and psychological impacts of partisan warfare, however, were perhaps even more important. The presence of Soviet partisans behind the German lines served as a constant reminder to the civilians in the occupied areas that the Soviet state, the party, and the NKVD were nearby and observing events. It also made it easier for the Soviets to reestablish control in Belarus after the German retreat.

    This reminder was especially important in those Belarusian lands annexed to the Soviet Union from Poland in late 1939. Here the Soviet state was not as well established as within the prewar Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. Here the TsShPD had to put a great deal of effort into inspiring pro-Soviet resistance in advance of the Red Army’s return. This was very complicated undertaking and depended on a number of factors: German occupation policy (whether a particular region fell within the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, the Reich Commissariat Ostland, or the Reich itself), Soviet policy during the 1939–41 period (administrators, clergymen, settlers, political activists, the well-to-do, etc., were subject to repression, especially if they were ethnic Poles), local political culture and the strength of nationalist sentiment (Belarusian national consciousness was as a rule not as developed as that of the Poles), the situation on the front (which depended on the approach of an offensive and points of special interest for the Red Army), and the strategic goals and strength of local nationalist guerrillas (the Polish underground was considered a far greater threat to the reestablishment of Soviet rule than the Belarusians). In these territories—in particular in the District Bialystok and parts of the western half of the General Commissariat White Ruthenia—the Soviets had to contend with the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK).

    In the autumn of 1943, the conflict between the AK and the Soviet partisans reached a new level. The Polish government in exile asked the British government, unsuccessfully, to intervene with Moscow on behalf of the Polish civilians in Belarus.²⁹ In what is perhaps one of the greatest paradoxes of the Second World War, individual AK units at the local level in western Belarus felt compelled to conclude temporary ceasefires with the German authorities in February 1944 and subsequently received arms from the Wehrmacht for their struggle against the Soviet partisans.³⁰ By October 1944, however, the Soviets had destroyed most of the AK in Belarus, although smaller units kept on fighting into 1945.³¹

    Belarusian national partisans were of less importance than in the Baltic countries and western Ukraine. Those that existed were ultimately forced to join the Communist forces or face annihilation at the hands of the Soviet partisans, the Red Army, or the NKVD.³² Unlike Ukraine, where the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army established itself in the Ukrainian territories of interwar Poland, there was no major Belarusian national resistance to Soviet rule, not in the prewar Polish territories that made up western Belarus, and not in the territories that had belonged to the Soviet Union before the war.

The Anvil: German Antipartisan Forces

The German orders and guidelines for Barbarossa contained numerous references to franc-tireurs, saboteurs, snipers, assassins, agitators, and propagandists (as well as Jews).³³ The German government and military, steeped in the experiences of the First World War and fear of Bolshevism, were convinced that the Soviets would ignore the Geneva conventions and use illegal, underhanded tactics from the start of the German invasion. Despite these concerns, the Germans had no special training for antipartisan warfare. There were no special antipartisan units in the Wehrmacht. The campaign against the Soviet Union was supposed to be short. Had the war gone according to plan, the Soviet state would have collapsed within a few months, and a mass partisan movement fighting on its behalf would have made no sense. Because the German gamble on a swift victory did not pay off, new plans had to be made. In the years that followed, German tactics and forces developed in response to events.

    One of the essential factors shaping the German response to the growing partisan threat was that of manpower. The Eastern Front was chronically starved of able-bodied men. Even before the invasion, this had been a key reason why the Wehrmacht had embraced the planned injection of SS and police troops in the army group and army rear areas. By the end of July 1941, however, just five weeks into the Soviet campaign, more German soldiers had already died than in all of the previous campaigns together. Wehrmacht planning had anticipated losses of about 475,000 soldiers by September and war’s end.³⁴ As it turned out, 830,000 men had been lost by the end of December, and there was no end in sight.³⁵

    These losses, coupled with the failure to defeat the Red Army, had repercussions for the army and army group rear areas. The rear area commandants had to secure huge swathes of land, even as they had to release soldiers to help replenish the ranks on the front. The extent to which German manpower was stretched is seen in the following example: on 1 October 1941, the 9th Army’s rear area commandant had 1400 men under his command, but only 300 were available for patrolling the countryside, an area of 10,000 square kilometers (comparable to a 28-mile-wide strip of territory along the 140-mile-long California-Mexican border).³⁶

    The shortage of manpower could only be alleviated—temporarily—by drawing even more extensively on the 35,000 SS and policemen in the hinterland, who of course had other things to do than help to maintain a semblance of tranquility behind Wehrmacht lines.³⁷ The High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) nonetheless continued to cling to the hope that, after a victorious second offensive (Operation Typhoon) and the capture of Moscow, enough troops could be made available for a final cleansing of the army group and army rear areas. This hope dissipated when the Red Army repulsed the attack on Moscow in December 1941. In the first half of 1942, the Soviet partisan movement was reorganized and expanded. By autumn, the Germans were pulling in every suitable military and police unit available, as well as able-bodied civilians assigned to the east, such as German railway workers, foresters, and agronomists.³⁸

    In the struggle against the partisans, the Germans relied on temporary composite formations known as battle groups (Kampfgruppen).³⁹ The first of these battle groups were established in the course of Operation Hanover (May 1942) in order to fight a massive Soviet breakthrough supported by airborne troops and partisans in the Viazma area. Unlike later operations of this kind, Operation Hanover was successful. The most important battle group in Belarus was Battle Group von Gottberg, which was first assembled in November 1942.⁴⁰ Its commander, Curt von Gottberg, had been sent to Minsk in October 1942 as SS and police leader White Ruthenia (SS- und Polizeiführer Weissruthenien, SSPF White Ruthenia), the top regional-level SS and police post in this part of Belarus. However, in a relatively short time, Gottberg also became a key figure in occupation policy in general.⁴¹

    The units assigned to the battle groups came from various branches of the SS and police, as well as from the Wehrmacht. The 1st SS Infantry Brigade, a formation from the SS combat forces (Waffen-SS), was often committed to antipartisan operations in Belarus, especially as part of Battle Group von Gottberg.⁴² Starting in late 1942, the newly formed SS Cavalry Division also took part in such operations. In addition to these large SS formations, the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei, Sipo) and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD), or the stationary Sipo-SD offices in the civil-administered territories, also played an important role in the battle groups.⁴³ Deployed in almost every battle-group operation, the Sipo-SD commandos were involved in reconnaissance operations, interrogation of suspects, and searches of “gang villages.” It often fell to these commandos to decide on collective punishment, usually meaning mass shootings.⁴⁴

    To reinforce the antipartisan effort in Belarus, Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer-SS and chief of the German police, had Special Commando Dirlewanger transferred to Minsk in January 1942. This unit had originally been made up of about 80 convicts, mostly poachers, and stationed in Lublin, where it had become the subject of an internal SS investigation due to repeated excesses. Upon its transfer to Belarus, Special Commando Dirlewanger was also an integral part of numerous battle groups.

    The most essential component of the battle groups, however, were the battalions from the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), the regular German police.⁴⁵ The police battalions served a variety of functions, ranging from mass shootings to tactical combat operations on the front, but they ultimately proved indispensable in pacifying the military-administered rear areas and civil administered hinterland. Most of the police battalions in the Soviet Union, like the SS combat troops and the Einsatzgruppen, had been particularly involved in the mass shootings of Jews during 1941 and 1942 and were not squeamish about harsh reprisals.

    Rounding out the German components in the battle groups were units made up of local collaborators. During the invasion in the summer of 1941, the Germans had established local police forces throughout the Soviet Union. First known as militsia (the Russian word for street police) under military administration, these were renamed Schutzmannschaft (another German word for police) under civil administration. With time, local men were also recruited to serve in cohesive units, usually battalions (Schutzmannschafts-Bataillonen). One of the early local police forces in the military-administered territories of Belarus was even allowed to expand to a brigade. This unit, the Kaminski Brigade, gained a level of notoriety similar to that of the Dirlewanger commando and other German units. Several battalions of indigenous police, often alongside the Kaminski Brigade, could usually be found in battle groups as well.

    Despite being able to draw on so many branches of the police and the SS, in early 1944, Gottberg, by that point acting higher SS and police leader for “central Russia”, could mobilize only some 3000 men—and even this modest force still faced the threat of deployment to the front.⁴⁶ Given this shortage of troops, Soviet estimates of the number of German troops dedicated to fighting the partisans are baseless. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that, in light of the small number of German troops stationed in the hinterland, that the partisan movement was somehow foundering. There were simply too few Germans available to fight the partisans.

    Finally, like the Soviet partisans before May 1942, the German partisan effort also suffered from a lack of coordination. The absence of a central command staff on the German side hampered operations throughout the first half of 1942. To remedy this, Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the OKW, proposed to Himmler the establishment of a unitary command for partisan operations, so as to ensure a “uniformity of measures” and “rapid exchange of experience.”⁴⁷ In the event, on 18 August 1942, Himmler became responsible for antipartisan warfare in the areas under civil administration, while the struggle against partisans in the military-administered territories became solely the domain of the OKH.⁴⁸ To coordinate the operations under his purview, Himmler appointed Higher SS and Police Leader Russia Center Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski “plenipotentiary of the Reichsführer-SS for fighting gangs” (Bevollmächtigter des Reichsführers-SS für Bandenbekämpfung). One year later, Bach-Zelewski, the guiding force of Germany’s cruel and racially driven antipartisan warfare, became “chief of gang-fighting formations” (Chef der Bandenkampfverbände).⁴⁹ The “gang-fighting formations,” however, remained the same aforementioned potpourri of units. Standing formations trained and dedicated solely to antipartisan warfare were never set up.

Steps of German Antipartisan Warfare

The development of German antipartisan warfare can be divided into steps. “Step” in this context seems more accurate and appropriate than “phase” or “period,” because the measures introduced were cumulative. The measures used in one step were still in effect as the next step was applied.

Preventive Terror

In December 1941, after the battle of Moscow, the idea that antipartisan warfare would rest on the harshest of measures permeated the army commands. “Based on experience,” wrote the operations officer of the 6th Army to Army Group South on 7 December, “We have determined: Only those measures that frighten the population more than the terror of the partisans lead to results.” The 11th Army noted in a memorandum a few days later, on 15 December: “The basic principle must apply ‘Fight terror with terror.’”⁵⁰

    This doctrine of terror had its origins in the Franco-Prussian War some seventy years earlier, when Prussian forces were surprised by the phenomenon of franc-tireurs and their unconventional tactics. Thereafter, German military theorists sought a way to address this problem for future wars. Former General of the Cavalry Julius von Hartmann, for example, wrote, “Terrorism will become an essential military principle.”⁵¹ The German General Staff followed this logic in its guidelines. At the War Academy in Berlin, young officers were taught that everything had to submit to the raison de guerre,⁵² including the treatment of the civilian population. Mass shootings were seen as “humane,” because wars could end sooner and one’s own casualties would be lower, according to one German manual from 1902.⁵³ That this might result in further violence was understood. “Bitterness, rage, and revenge,” continued the manual, could lead to “cruel reprisals.”⁵⁴

    The results of this tenet of German doctrine were seen in Belgium in the opening weeks of the First World War, when nearly 5000 civilians were killed in reprisal measures between 18 and 28 August 1914.⁵⁵ Such measures were largely limited to the opening weeks of that war, but twenty-five years later, during the first weeks of the invasion of Poland, the Germans resorted to them once again.⁵⁶ Moreover, it was also quickly noted that inexperienced troops tended to be most nervous and developed a special form of combat psychosis.⁵⁷ That German soldiers were encouraged to react swiftly and ruthlessly served only to guarantee that troops resorted to shooting in ambivalent situations.

    In the run-up to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler had stressed that the looming campaign was to be a war of annihilation. Wehrmacht leaders shared the dictator’s attitude toward “Jewish Bolshevism” and were also convinced that extreme brutality would be necessary in a campaign against the Soviet Union. Thus they readily accepted the presence of SS and police troops in the army group and army rear areas. And they contributed to drafting the policies that gave the army carte blanche with regard to certain types of prisoners (the Commissar Order) and the courts martial (the Jurisdiction Decree).⁵⁸ The latter of these, the Jurisdiction Decree (Erlass über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit), is of particular importance for German antipartisan warfare.⁵⁹ This permitted soldiers to take collective action against enemy civilians on the spot, without risk of trial by court martial. In late 1942, Keitel even forbade courts martial in connection with antipartisan action and endorsed all measures that helped pacify the east, even those that targeted women or children.⁶⁰ Thus the people of German-occupied Europe were abandoned to the arbitrary and spur-of-the-moment decisions of German security forces.⁶¹

    One OKH directive written during preinvasion planning asserted that a “self-confident and ruthless demeanor” was an “effective means of prevention.”⁶² The intelligence officers of the invading armies and armored groups were informed with regard to franc-tireurs: “The severity of the war demands severe punishments.…In cases of doubt as to perpetration, suspicion will frequently have to suffice. Often, clear proof cannot be produced.”⁶³ Initial OKH guidelines for antipartisan warfare were also unambiguous: act “ruthlessly and mercilessly.”⁶⁴ The unexpected fierce resistance on the part of the Red Army, the mounting German losses, and inadequate manpower to secure the hinterland set nerves on edge in the zone of operations and created widespread frustration in Berlin. In late July 1941, during a discussion of the manpower shortage, Keitel insisted on a reign of terror to discourage the civil population from resisting German rule.⁶⁵

    Among the first victims of this terror were those engaged in “hanging around” and “vagabond troublemaking.” Such people were declared a security risk, but those affected by this measure were mostly Red Army stragglers, fugitive POWs, refugees, and city dwellers searching for food. Getting caught by the Germans in the countryside or woods could end in brutal interrogation, summary shooting, or confinement to a special Wehrmacht concentration camp.⁶⁶

    But first and foremost, the German military’s concept of “peace keeping” overlapped with “security interests” based on a racist ideology that strived to eliminate those who were considered “subhuman.” In this respect, Hitler saw Stalin’s appeal for the creation of a partisan movement in pragmatic terms: “This partisan war also has an advantage: it gives us the opportunity to exterminate everybody who opposes us.”⁶⁷ And, according to National Socialist ideology, Jews and Slavs were Germany’s natural enemies, especially those living in the Soviet Union.

    The close connection between partisan warfare and race-driven mass murder was clearly expressed during a training course in Mohileu on 24–26 September 1941. Initiated by the commander of Rear Area Army Group Center, General Max von Schenckendorff, the course included presentations by “experts” such as Bach-Zelewski and Einsatzgruppe B Commander Arthur Nebe on topics like “The Capture of Commissars and Partisans” and “The Jewish Question with Regard to the Partisan Movement.” At the end of the course, it was determined: “Where there’s a partisan, there’s a Jew, and where there’s a Jew, there’s a partisan.”⁶⁸ In its pursuit to pacify the hinterlands, the Wehrmacht revealed its own commitment to racially-motivated mass murder. The 707th Infantry Division became one of the most notorious examples of Wehrmacht collusion in the Holocaust.⁶⁹ In a situation report dated 10 November 1941, Brigadier General Gustav von Bechtolsheim, the commander of the aforementioned division, stated that the Jews would continue “to find common cause” with the Communists; therefore their “complete elimination” in his area of operations was underway. In the same report, he referred to 10,940 prisoners, 10,431 of whom had been shot.⁷⁰

    Such extreme measures of preventive terror and the pursuit of the Nazi regime’s racial and political policies under the guise of antipartisan operations had a brutalizing effect on the troops. However, this policy seems to have been effective only within the context of German military successes, or perceived successes, on the front.

Large-scale Operations (Grossunternehmen)

In early 1942, the Germans faced enormous problems both on the front and in the rear areas. Moscow had not fallen; instead the Soviets had dealt the Germans a major defeat. Meanwhile, the policy of terror had failed to pacify the rear. Mass shootings and mass destruction had not frightened people into submission, but had encouraged civilians to embrace the Soviet partisan movement. Calls for a change of German tactics and behavior could be heard among top commanding officers, even those who had previously advocated harsh and ruthless measures.⁷¹

    But the reality of 1942 was harsh: there was a tremendous increase of massacres.⁷² For Ludwig Ehrenleitner, the German county commissar in Slonim, the situation of the local peasants recalled the Thirty Years War (1618–48), an analogy that Germans understood as the extreme of mayhem and death in the countryside.⁷³ The introduction of large-scale operations was responsible for this development. The German “partisan experts” knew that there were not enough troops to control the occupied territories, but Hitler, Himmler, Bach-Zelewski, and Gottberg refused to cede the hinterland to the partisans. So they decided to attack the partisans in a series of large antipartisan operations.⁷⁴

    Himmler ordered the first of these large operations on 7 August 1942 as he struggled to assert the primacy of the SS in antipartisan operations.⁷⁵ Although some effort went into lending these operations a professional military character, they were more or less campaigns of murder and plunder. The enemies remained the same: “every gangster, Jew, Zigeuner, and gang-suspect.”⁷⁶ In the course of Operations Swamp Fever, Nürnberg, and Hamburg, 13,164 Jews were murdered.⁷⁷ But non-Jews could easily arouse suspicion as well: Entire villages were wiped out if a location was deemed to be “gang-friendly” (bandenfreundlich).⁷⁸ This happened frequently where villages were discovered near a partisan attack on the Germans⁷⁹ and in remote corners of the woods. Isolation alone was enough to make the Germans suspicious.⁸⁰

    In these large operations, an area was encircled and the resulting pocket then penetrated and combed.⁸¹ The model for such operations was Operation Bamberg (April 1942), although it was itself a complete failure.⁸² Usually, German forces were too weak to control and seal the combat zone, or troops were poorly deployed in a number of smaller operations within a large operation, as was the case with Operation Swamp Fever (August–September 1942).⁸³

    This tactic also had an economic dimension. In guidelines issued by Bach-Zelewski in February 1943, it was stated that “every ton of grain, every cow, every horse is worth more than a shot bandit.”⁸⁴ To assist with assessing the agricultural products available in the villages, agronomists (Landwirtschaftsführer) were assigned to the battle groups.⁸⁵ The agronomists oversaw requisitions, but they often also had a say in deciding which village should be maintained and which should be destroyed.⁸⁶

    To “live off the land” became a pretext for plunder. For days on end, the troops busied themselves with seizing foodstuffs instead of chasing partisans.⁸⁷ Consequently, most partisans escaped, abandoning thousands of civilians to their fate at the hands of the Germans. The use of large-scale operations was not an effective way to fight the partisans. Moreover, the brutality of such tactics only contributed to the partisan movement’s growth, which in turn made the Germans feel increasingly helpless. The desperate measures that followed speak volumes: surprised by the number of bicycles found in partisan camps, the commander of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade, Karl von Treuenfeld, issued orders stating, “Anybody bicycling has to be shot.”⁸⁸

Forced Labor

With the defeat of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in early February 1943, it became clear that the Germans could lose the war in the east. In July 1943, German forces tried to regain the initiative by attempting another giant pincer movement near Kursk in an ill-considered operation codenamed “Citadel.” The operation failed, leaving the Red Army free to launch a systematic drive to the west, starting in Ukraine. In the meantime, German troops in North Africa had been forced to surrender. U.S.and British forces had overrun Sicily, and an invasion of the Italian mainland was looming. German troops on the eastern front had to be diverted west. The OKW had to concede that it was impossible to pacify the entire area occupied in the east. But instead of abandoning what had clearly become a counterproductive campaign of murder, plunder, and destruction, German forces were ordered to secure resources necessary for the continuation of the war effort.⁸⁹ Among the most important of these resources was labor.

    Lack of labor had been a central problem for the German economy since the failure of Barbarossa. Millions of German men were serving in the Wehrmacht; German women could not be mobilized for ideological reasons; and volunteers from allied nations like Italy were scarce. The alternative was a massive drive to find forced laborers, an effort coordinated by Fritz Sauckel, the general plenipotentiary for the deployment of labor (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz). Appointed in March 1942, Sauckel realized that it made little sense to work so hard to mobilize laborers, especially in the cities, when thousands of people capable of work were at the same time being shot in antipartisan operations, in particular in rural areas. Combining antipartisan warfare with round-ups for forced laborers seemed the next logical step to the Nazis. In January 1943, Himmler ordered that “men, women, and children who were suspected of gang activity” should be collected, not shot, and sent to Auschwitz and Lublin as laborers.⁹⁰ One month later, in a letter to Bach-Zelewski, Himmler made clear that those “suspected of gang activity” would not be transferred to Sauckel’s authority, but he proposed that “entire areas” of Belarus should be “evacuated,” and that “men who were not suspected of gang activity” be turned over to Sauckel.⁹¹

    The orders to collect potential laborers instead of shooting them gradually made themselves felt in antipartisan operations. In the first months of 1943, the number of prisoners remained relatively low: 1308 during Operation Harvest Festival I (January 1943),⁹² 272 during Operation Harvest Festival II (January–February 1943),⁹³ and 65 during Operation Hornung (February 1943).⁹⁴ The reason for these low numbers was that captives were still being shot. By mid-spring, however, the antipartisan campaign was serving the hunt for laborers. With Operation Cottbus (May–June 1943), 4997 men and 1056 women were captured and deported from Belarus for forced labor.⁹⁵ During Operation Hermann (July–August 1943), 9065 men, 7701 women, and—for the first time—4178 children were sent west for forced labor.⁹⁶ Even the Dirlewanger formation—which had never been known for taking prisoners⁹⁷—deported some 1200 civilians for the Berlin factories in July 1943.⁹⁸

    The unscrupulous mass deportation of Belarusians to the Reich for deployment as workers created new problems for the Wehrmacht. For example, during Operation Heinrich (November 1943), 450 men were needed just to requisition agricultural products and guard the labor camps.⁹⁹ This was more than 10 percent of the battle group assembled for that operation—which is all the more significant given the general lack of manpower. More than anything, though, the depopulation of parts of Belarus for forced labor in Germany ruined the Germans’ reputation among Belarusians once and for all and served to generate more support for the partisan movement.

Dead Zones (Tote Zonen)

The mass deportations of would-be forced laborers were closely related to another policy, one of total depopulation and destruction. It was nothing new for the Germans to drive away, or shoot, the entire population of a village and burn the buildings to ground. However, the use of this measure had begun to shift from a “tactical, locally applied measure to a thoroughly planned, systematic regional strategy.”¹⁰⁰ The shift could be seen in the aforementioned Operation Hornung in February 1943, when the acting commander of the Dirlewanger unit informed his men: “The area will become a no-man’s land. The entire population will be shot.”¹⁰¹ In the course of this operation, 12,718 persons were killed. This was before the SS and police had adjusted to using antipartisan operations as a means of rounding up forced laborers.¹⁰² With Himmler’s orders to evacuate potential forced laborers, the process of destroying villages or regions was systematized, with mass murder being substituted by mass deportation.¹⁰³

    A typical example was Operation Hermann (July–August 1943). First, Gottberg declared an area to be “gang-infested” (bandenverseucht). Then all of the civilians, all of the livestock, and anything else of value found were taken away and what was left behind was burned—even the woods. Civilians who entered the zone afterward were to be treated as “fair game,” meaning that they were to be shot.¹⁰⁴ The application of this policy on such a sweeping scale quickly became the subject of criticism from within the administration of the General Commissariat White Ruthenia. In the long term, wrote one official, Belarus could not be run from just the capital and a few key cities.¹⁰⁵

Armed Villages (Wehrdörfer)

Securing the population’s cooperation, or at least acquiescence, was crucial if Germany was to have any success in fighting the partisans. One of the first to realize this during the German occupation of Belarus was General Commissar Wilhelm Kube. In April 1943, he urged an end to the most repressive policies and suggested an alternative program.¹⁰⁶ Although most of Kube’s suggestions were of a more or less tactical nature, they still contrasted sharply with the policies advocated by Hitler, Himmler, Reich Commissar for Ukraine Erich Koch, and party chancellery boss Martin Bormann.¹⁰⁷ For anti-partisan combat, Kube recommended a system of military bases and armed villages. He also suggested a land reform to help win over the inhabitants of strategic villages.¹⁰⁸ Kube’s proposals were rejected by the SS, in particular by Gottberg, who, in Kube’s eyes, was simultaneously both depopulating and destroying Belarus. Kube was especially outraged by Operation Cottbus, which had killed almost 10,000 and captured over 6000 potential forced laborers, including thousands of women and children.¹⁰⁹ Kube’s indignation was shared by his boss, Reich Commissar Ostland Hinrich Lohse, who forwarded Kube’s observations to Reich Minister Rosenberg with a cover letter noting: “Shutting men, women, and children in a barn and setting it on fire does not strike me as a suitable method of fighting gangs even if one wants to exterminate the population.”¹¹⁰ In September 1943, however, Kube was murdered by Soviet partisans, and Gottberg was appointed to take over the civil administration.

    After Kube’s death, however, Gottberg continued Kube’s policies, even ordering the creation of armed villages on 19 October 1943.¹¹¹ There are indications that Gottberg himself had finally grasped the consequences of German antipartisan action as early as April 1943, but this had not prevented him running Operation Cottbus according to standard procedures.¹¹² At any rate, the proposed land reform and the armed villages policy were motivated by the same aim: to improve the military situation in the fight against partisans. Whereas the search for forced laborers had been paramount in the spring of 1943, the emphasis in the autumn of 1943 was on finding collaborators. This still did not constitute a fundamental change in policy. The mass murder and deportations continued. Furthermore, before a village became an armed village, the “unreliable elements” had to be excluded.¹¹³ About a hundred armed villages were ultimately established, but this was too little too late.¹¹⁴ On 6 June 1944, the Allied invasion of Normandy took place; two weeks later, the main Soviet offensive in Belarus was launched. The ensuing collapse of Army Group Center marked the end of the German occupation of Belarus.

Conclusion

The consequences of the German occupation of Belarus were dreadful. Of a pre-Barbarossa population of nearly nine million, about 1.7 million were killed, about 345,000 in antipartisan operations.¹¹⁵ The Germans and their collaborators suffered 35,000–45,000 casualties.¹¹⁶

    The Soviet way of partisan war and the German countermeasures were shaped by one another’s tactics and strategic aims. Other factors included ideology, the destructiveness of modern warfare, conditions in the field, economic needs, cultural and psychological predispositions, and the political structure of the Third Reich. The resulting actions on both sides ranged from terror to more conciliatory attempts to win over the local population. On the German side, the fear of partisans, criminal orders, and limited resources encouraged violence as a means of preventing resistance. But the strategy of terror was just as much entwined with radical forms of racial prejudice and economic exploitation. It was therefore all but inevitable that the antipartisan operations would take on genocidal dimensions.

    The Soviet partisan movement benefited from the mistakes of German occupational policy and ultimately became a military factor in and of itself. The partisans did not win battles or conquer cities, but they were able to provide effective support operations for the Red Army. Moreover, the partisans were a political factor, helping to restore the prewar status quo in central and eastern Belarus and to destroy prewar society in western Belarus so a new, Soviet one could be created. But they also created a security vacuum that was filled by brutality, criminality, greed, and betrayal.

    The partisan war had an enormous impact on Belarusian society and everyday life. In some places, especially in the western parts of Belarus, the partisan war even degenerated into interethnic conflict to the point that it bordered on civil war. The war left a traumatized and decimated population amid an endless expanse of ruins. However, after the war, there was little room for a genuine process of working through the trauma and loss. There was only the dogma of the Great Patriotic War.

NOTES

        1. For general information, see Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999). For the area of Baranovichi see the brilliant study by Alexander Brakel, Unter Rotem Stern und Hakenkreuz: Baranowicze 1939–1944: Das westliche Weissrussland unter sowjetischer und deutscher Besatzung (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009).

        2. The Belastok, Baronovichi, Brest, Pinsk, and Vileika oblasts were made up of territory annexed from Poland after the German-Soviet partition of the interwar Polish republic in September 1939. They had been carved out of the prewar voivodeships of Białystok, Nowogródek, Wilno, Polesie, and, to a small extent, Warsaw.

        3. “Gegen Russland, das nur mit der Masse wirkt, kann nur mit Massenvernichtung etwas ausgerichtet werden,” Der Landsturm, 23 May 1915, cf. Anne Lipp, Meinungslenkung im Krieg. Kriegserfahrungen deutscher Soldaten und ihre Deutung 1914–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2003), 216.

        4. Bernhard Chiari, “Deutsche Zivilverwaltung in Weissrussland. Die lokale Perspektive der Besatzungsgeschichte,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, Bd. 52 (1993), 67–89.

        5. “Die Bevölkerung hier ist doch weiter nichts wert, als geprügelt oder erschossen zu werden,” in Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), Fb 85, Protokoll über die Tagung der Gebietskommissare, Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter des Generalkommissars in Minsk vom 8. April bis 10. April 1943, Referat Kube, fol. 12.

        6. “Instruktionen vom 8. Mai für einen Reichskommissar Ostland” (1029-PS), in Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg, 14 November 1945–1 Oktober 1946 (IMG) (Nuremberg: Sekretariat des Gerichtshofs, 1947–1949), Bd. 26, 573–76, here 574–75; IfZ, Fb 85, Protokoll über die Tagung, fol. 3.

        7. “Rede des Reichsleiters Rosenberg vor den engsten Beteiligten am Ostproblem am 20. Juni 1941” (1058-PS) in IMG, Bd. 26, 610–27, here 623.

        8. Rolf-Dieter Müller, “Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, ed. H. Boog et al. (Stuttgart: DVA, 1983), 145. See also Alex J. Kay, Chapter 7, in this volume.

        9. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 265–319.

        10. The best survey about ordinary life during the time of occupation is still Bernhard Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kolloboration und Widerstand in Weissrussland 1941–1944 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998). For everyday life in an urban setting, see Stephan Lehnstaedt, Okkupation im Osten. Besatzeralltag in Warschau und Minsk, 1939–1944. Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, Band 82 (München: Oldenbourg, 2010). Elem Klimov’s 1985 film “Come and See” (Idi i smotri) conveys a shocking impression of life in Belarus under German occupation.

        11. Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), 71. The fate of Ivan P., a peasant from Turets, is an extreme, but not untypical example. In 1943, he wanted to join the partisans, but was shot by them as a spy. His wife and five children (aged between one and eight) were murdered by the German police as a partisan family: Chairi, Alltag hinter der Front, 156.

        12. Soviet Partisans in World War II, ed. John A. Armstrong (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Witalij Wilenchik, “Die Partisanenbewegung in Weissrussland 1941–1944,” Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, Bd. 34 (1984), 129–297; Bernd Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Partisanen, 1941–1944: Legenden und Wirklichkeit des ‘allgemeinen Volkskrieges,’” in Partisanen und Volkskrieg: Zur Revolutionierung des Krieges im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Gerhard Schulz (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht,1985), 92–124; Leonid D. Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944: A Critical Historiographical Analysis (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999); Sowjetische Partisanen in Weissrussland: Innenansichten aus dem Gebiet Baranoviči 1941–1944. Eine Dokumentation, ed. Bogdan Musial (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004); Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Alexander Brakel, “Gewalt der sowjetischen Partisanen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung,” in Krieg und Verbrechen: Situation und Intention: Fallbeispiele, ed. Timm C. Richter (Munich: Meidenbauer, 2006), 147–55.

        13. Gerhard Schulz, “Die Irregulären: Guerilla, Partisanen und die Wandlung des Krieges seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. Eine Einführung,” in idem, Partisanen und Volkskrieg, 9–35, here 20; Joachim Hoffmann, “Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs,” in Boog, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 9–140, here 81.

        14. Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen in Weissrussland, 17. One day later, the Communist Party of Belarus issued a similar order; ibid.

        15. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 860.

        16. See Lynne Viola, Chapter 1, in this volume.

        17. “Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr. 6 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR, Berichtszeit vom 1.-31.10.1941” (102-R), in IMG, Bd. 38, 279–303, here 287.

        18. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Einsatzgruppe A der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1941/1942 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1996), 367.

        19. A regional staff, the Belorusskii shtab partizanskogo dvizheniia, was established in September 1941; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 863; Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen in Weissrussland, 20.

        20. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 864.

        21. Bogdan Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen, 1941–1944: Mythos und Wirklichkeit (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 2009).

        22. “Stenographischer Bericht über die Besprechung des Reichsmarschalls Göring mit den Reichskommissaren für die besetzten Gebiete und den Militärbefehlshabern über die Ernährungslage am Donnerstag, dem 6. August 1942” (170-USSR), in IMG, Bd. 39, 358–407, here 398.

        23. “WiStab Ost, Monatsbericht Juli 1942,” in Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941–1944), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, Bd. 7, ed. Norbert Müller (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1991), 305–11, here 307.

        24. Brakel, “Gewalt der sowjetischen Partisanen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung,” 150–51.

        25. For example, 16 percent of the Stalin Brigade was press-ganged into service; ibid., 153.

        26. Hermann Teske, “Partisanen gegen die Eisenbahn,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (1953), 468–75; idem, “Der Wert der Eisenbahnbrücken im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 4 (1954), 514–23.

        27. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtsführungsstab), 1940–1945: Geführt von Helmuth Greiner und Percy Ernst Schramm, Bd. III: 1. Jan. 1943–31. Dez. 1943, ed. Percy Ernst Schramm (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1965), 110–11, entry for 9 February 1943.

        28. Teske, “Partisanen gegen die Eisenbahn,” 475.

        29. Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front, 284.

        30. On the results of Teofil Lepszinowcz’s negotiations with the county commissar in Lida, cf. Wilenchik, “Die Partisanenbewegung in Weissrussland, 1941–1944,” 261, and Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front, 296–99.

        31. In Baranovichi Oblast, for example, 500 “followers” of the AK were liquidated, Brakel, “Gewalt der sowjetischen Partisanen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung,” 154.

        32. Wilenchik, “Die Partisanenbewegung in Weissrussland,” 240–41.

        33. Erich Hesse, Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg 1941 bis 1944 im Spiegel deutscher Kampfanweisungen und Befehlen, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1993); Matthew Cooper, The Phantom War: The German Struggle against Soviet Partisans, 1941–1944 (London: Macdonald and Janes, 1979); Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 1985); Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford, New York, and Munich: Berg, 1989); Hans Umbreit, “Das unbewältigte Problem: Der Partisanenkrieg im Rücken der Ostfront,” in Stalingrad: Ereignis—Wirkung—Symbol, ed. Jürgen Förster (Munich: Piper, 1993), 130–50; Timm C. Richter, “Herrenmensch” und “Bandit”: Deutsche Kriegsführung und Besatzungspolitik als Kontext des sowjetischen Partisanenkrieges (1941–44) (Münster: Lit, 1998); Klaus-Jochen Arnold, Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion: Kriegführung und Radikalisierung im “Unternehmen Barbarossa” (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004); Ben Shepherd, War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

        34. Rüdiger Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 238.

        35. Jürgen Förster, “The Dynamic of Volksgemeinschaft: The Effecttivness of the German Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Military Effectiveness, vol. 3: The Second World War, ed. Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray (London: Taylor and Francis, 1988), 180–220, here 203.

        36. Hesse, Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg, 81–82.

        37. Konrad Kwiet, “Auftakt zum Holocaust. Ein Polizeibataillon im Osteinsatz,” in Der Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, ed. Wolfgang Benz et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993),, 191–208, here 193.

        38. “Weisung Nr. 46 Richtlinien für die verstärkte Bekämpfung des Bandenunwesens im Osten,” 18 August 1942, in Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1939–1945: Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, ed. Walther Hubatsch, 2nd ed. (Erlangen: Karl Müller Verlag, 1983), 201–05, here 205.

        39. Bundesarchiv Ludiwigsburg (BArch Ludwigsburg), UdSSR 108, Kampfgruppe v. Gottberg, Tgb. Nr. 2/42, Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Hamburg,”; BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 245 Ab, Kampfgruppe v. Gottberg, Tgb. Nr. 43/43 geh., Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Cottbus”; BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, Kampfgruppe v. Gottberg, Ia Tgb. Nr. 398/43 II (g.), Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Hermann” and Kampfgruppe v. Gottberg, Abt. Ia, Tgb. Nr. 19/43 g., Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Heinrich.” Battle Group von Gottberg operated mostly in the areas under civil administration; the Wehrmacht conducted antipartisan actions in the Belarusian regions under military administration. For the most part, security divisions were used to fight the partisans. The use of front-line formations in antipartisan operations was rare.

        40. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 107, Vortrag Gottberg, 10 April 1943. For more details, see Moritz F. Lück, “Partisanenbekämpfung durch SS und Polizei in Weissruthenien 1943: Die Kampfgruppe von Gottberg,” in Im Auftrag. Polizei. Verwaltung und Verantwortung, ed. Alfons Kenkmann and Christoph Spieker (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 225–48.

        41. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 107, Vortrag Gottberg, 10 April 1943. For biographical details see Peter Klein, “Curt von Gottberg—Siedlungsfunktionär und Massenmörder,” in Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien, ed. Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004), 95–104.

        42. For general information, see Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah: Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab und die Judenvernichtung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005).

        43. Helmuth Krausnick, Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppen des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1981); Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führerkorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002).

        44. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, Chef des Einsatzstabes der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Ostland, Tgb. Nr. 41/42 Geheime Reichssache, 18 November 1942.

        45. See for general information Friedrich Wilhelm, Die Polizei im NS-Staat: Die Geschichte ihrer Organisation im Überblick (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997); Edward Westermann, Hitlers’s Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

        46. “Vermerk von Walter Labs über eine Besprechung im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete am 1.3.1944,” in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, 536–38, here 537.

        47. Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah, 246–47.

        48. “Weisung Nr. 46” in Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen, 201–05.

        49. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 951.

        50. Richter, “Herrenmensch” und “Bandit,” 65.

        51. Julius von Hartmann, Militärische Nothwendigkeiten und Humanität (Berlin: Partel, 1878), 68.

        52. Hermann Dieter Betz, “Das OKW und seine Haltung zum Landkriegs-Völkerrecht im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” PhD diss. University of Würzburg, 1970, 105. See also Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

        53. Grosser Generalstab, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I, Kriegsbrauch im Landkrieg (Berlin: Mittler, 1902), 9.

        54. Ibid., 5.

        55. John Horne, Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

        56. Jochen Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2006), 54–168.

        57. 4. I.D., Abt. Ia, 6 September 1939, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg, RH 26-4/3.

        58. For more information see Jürgen Förster, “Verbrecherische Befehle,” in Kriegsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Wolfram Wette and Gerd R. Ueberschär (Darmstadt: WBG, 2001), 137–51.

        59. “Erlass über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit im Gebiet “Barbarossa” und über besondere Massnahmen der Truppe, 13 May 1941” (50-C), in IMG, Bd. 34, 252–55.

        60. “Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Betr.: Bandenbekämpfung, 16 December 1942” (66-UK), in IMG, Bd. 39, 128–29.

        61. Ibid.

        62. “OKH/GenSt.d.H./GenQu, Besondere Anordnung für die Versorgung, Teil C,” in Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in der UdSSR: Dokumente, ed. Norbert Müller (Cologne: Pahl Rugenstein, 1980), 35–42.

        63. “Pz. Gru 3, Abt. Ic, Tätigkeitsbericht Jan.–Juli 1941,” 29, in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekution sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener,” in Anatomie des SS-Staates, Bd. II, ed. Hans Buchheim (Freiburg: Walter, 1965), 163–279, 229.

        64. “[OKH], Richtlinien für Partisanenbekämpfung,” 25 October 1941, in Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges, 1941–1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 436.

        65. “Ergänzung zur Weisung Nr. 33” (52-C), 23 July 1941, in IMG, Bd. 34, 258–59.

        66. Richter, “Herrenmensch” und “Bandit,” 62–63.

        67. “Aktenvermerk” (221-L), 16 July 1941, in IMG, Bd. 38, 86–94, here 88.

        68. Helmut Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppen des Weltanschaungskrieges, 1938–1942 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1989), 217–18.

        69. Peter Lieb, “Täter aus Überzeugung? Oberst Carl von Andrian und die Judenmorde der 707. Infanteriedivision 1941/42,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 50 (2002), 523–57.

        70. “Wehrmachts-Kommandant Weissruthenien, Monatsbericht für die Zeit vom 11.10.–10.11.1941,” in Lebensraum im Osten”: Deutsche in Belorussland 1941–1944. Quellen- und Materialmappe für Unterricht und Erwachsenenbildungsarbeit, ed. Hartmut Lenhard (Düsseldorf: dtv, 1991), 219–20.

        71. Richter, “Herrenmensch” und “Bandit,” 91–97.

        72. According to Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 943, only 3 percent of the massacres committed by the Germans in Belarus occurred in 1941, while 79 percent took place in 1942–43.

        73. Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front, 78.

        74. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 107, Vortrag v. Gottberg, 10.4.1943. For an overview of these operations, see the table in Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 899–904.

        75. Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah, 252. The first large operation was Operation Swamp Fever (Unternehmen Sumpffieber) and took place in General Commissariat White Ruthenia between 22 August and 21 September 1942.

        76. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, 1. SS-Inf.-Brig.(mot.), Ia, Nr. 655/42 geh., Angriffsbefehl Nr. 1, 20 November 1942 and Kampfgruppe von Gottberg, Tgb. Nr. 2/42, Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Hamburg,” 7 December 1942.

        77. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 899–900.

        78. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, 1. SS-Inf.-Brig.(mot.), Ia, Nr. 655/42 geh., Angriffsbefehl Nr. 1, 20 November 42.

        79. Ibid., 1. SS-Inf.-Brig.(mot.), Ic, Feindlage “Nürnberg,” 19 November 1942.

        80. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 912–13.

        81. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 107, Vortrag v. Gottberg, 10 April 1943; BArch Ludwigsburg, 202 AR 509/70, S. H. Dokumente “Nürnberg,” Dokument 20, KTB Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 23 February 1943; BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, 1. SS-Inf.-Brig.(mot.), Ia/Nr. 655/42 geh., Angriffsbefehl Nr. 1, 20 November 1942 and Kampfgruppe v. Gottberg, Tgb. Nr. 2/42, Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Hamburg.”

        82. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 885–93; Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah, 245.

        83. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 930–933; Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah, 253.

        84. Hesse, Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg, 218.

        85. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, Kampfgruppe v. Gottberg, Tgb. Nr. 2/42, Einsatzbefehl für das Unternehmen “Hamburg,” 7 December 1942.

        86. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, 1. SS-Inf.-Brig.(mot.), Ia, Nr. 655/42 geh., Angriffsbefehl Nr. 1, 20 November 1942; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 814.

        87. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, Tagebuch Wilke, 20 January 1943.

        88. Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah, 254–55.

        89. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Bd. III, 775, entry for 13 July 1943.

        90. “RFSS, SS-Befehl, 6.1.1943,” in Reichsführer!...Briefe an und von Himmler, ed. Helmut Heiber (Stuttgart: DVA, 1968), 179–80.

        91. RFSS an von dem Bach, 9.2.1943, in Heiber, Reichsführer, 189.

        92. BArch Ludwigsburg, 202 AR 509/70, S.H. Dokumente “Erntefest I,” Dokument 7, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten Nr. 43.

        93. Ibid.

        94. Ibid., S. H. Dokumente “Hornung,” Dokument 6.

        95. BArch Ludwigsburg, 202 AR 509/70, S.H. Dokumente “Cottbus,” Dokument 11, Kampfgruppe von Gottberg, Gefechtsbericht über das Unternehmen “Cottbus,” 28 June 1943.

        96. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 245 Ab, Gefechtsbericht “Hermann,” 20 August 1943.

        97. Dirlewanger had to be reminded in July 1943 not to subject those suspected of gang activity or prisoners to “special treatment,” Hans-Peter Klausch, Antifaschisten in SS-Uniform: Schicksal und Widerstand der deutschen KZ-Häftlinge, Zuchthaus- und Wehrmachtgefangenen in der SS-Sonderformation Dirlewanger (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1993), 85.

        98. BArch Ludwigsburg, 202 AR 509/70, S.H. Dokumente “Hermann,” Dokument 7, Aktenvermerk über die Rücksprache Gottbergs beim Gauleiter Kube am Donnerstag, den 15.7.43, 11-11.45 Uhr, angefertigt von Hstf. Herzig.

        99. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, Kampfgruppe von Gottberg, Ib, Besondere Anordnung für die Erfassung von Arbeitskräften und landwirtschaftlichen Produkten, 29 October 1943.

        100. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 1010.

        101. Ibid., 945.

        102. Ibid., 947.

        103. Ibid., 1023–24.

        104. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, Kampfgruppe von Gottberg, Befehl zur Evakuierung, 1 August 1943; BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 245 Ab, Kampfgruppe von Gottberg, Ia, Gefechtsbericht “Hermann,” 20 August 1943.

        105. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 245 Ab, Der Generalkommissar für Weissruthenien, Abt. Forst, Holz und Jagd, Br./Ke, An den Herrn Leiter der Hauptabteilung III, im Hause, 19 June 1943.

        106. IfZ, Fb 85, Protokoll über die Tagung, Referat Kube, fol. 3.

        107. Richter, “Herrenmensch” und “Bandit,” 107–11.

        108. IfZ, Fb 85, Protokoll über die Tagung, Referat Hauptabteilungsleiter Wirtschaft Freitag, fol. 5, 7.

        109. See the attachment “Der Generalkommissar für Weissruthenien an den Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, durch den Herren Reichskommissar für das Ostland, Betr.: Das bisherige Ergebnis des Polizeiunternehmens ‘Cottbus’ für die Zeit vom 22.6. bis zum 3.7.1943 [sic],” 5 June 1943, which makes up a part of document 135-R, in IMG, Bd. 38, 373–75; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 950.

        110. Ibid., 372.

        111. Ibid., 1040.

        112. BArch Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 107, Referat Gottberg in Minsk am 10.4.1943.

        113. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 1045.

        114. Ibid.

        115. Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen in Weissrussland, 15. According to Gerlach perhaps 10 percent of those who were killed during antipartisan actions were actually partisans, Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 958.

        116. Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen in Weissrussland, 22. Mulligan estimates the German casualties at 54,000–57,000; Timothy P. Mulligan, “Reckoning the Cost of the People’s War: The German Experience in the Central USSR,” Russian History 9 (1982), 27–48. According to Gerlach, 6000–7000 Germans were killed by partisans, Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 866. This is far more likely than the 1.5 million claimed by Soviet historians.

10

Stalin’s Wartime Vision of the Peace, 1939–1945

Geoffrey Roberts

Stalin’s vision of the peace at the end of the Second World War may be summarized as follows: a great power peace based on an enduring Soviet-Anglo-American alliance; a punitive peace aimed at the long-term containment of Germany and Japan; an ethnic peace involving the ethnic reordering of central and eastern Europe and an alliance of Slavic states; and an ideological peace that would witness significant political advance for the European Communist movement.

    Stalin’s vision of peace evolved and changed during the war, but from the outset, he was convinced the postwar world would differ radically from the prewar world, not least with respect to the central role the Soviet Union would play in world politics. At the same time, Stalin projected large elements of continuity and stability into the postwar future. The postwar order he envisioned would entail the restoration of a Europe of independent sovereign states and the reassertion of ethnic nationalism and democracy as the basis of its politics, albeit with a more progressive hue. In this respect, the postwar order sought by Stalin was not that much different from the 1920 Treaty of Versailles. Stalin was committed to Communist ideology, but his priority was to safeguard and strengthen the Soviet system as the basis for a long-term global transition to socialism. While Stalin expected the Second World War to be as politically transformative as the First World War, he neither foresaw nor sought a European-wide revolutionary upheaval. Social transformation and political upheaval were seen as inevitable and desirable, but he hoped to contain change within a stable framework of peace and international cooperation that would facilitate postwar reconstruction.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact

When war came in 1939, Stalin, like many other observers, expected some kind of a rerun of the First World War: a protracted military struggle accompanied in due course by political upheaval across the continent. This was the calculation behind the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression: collaboration with Hitler in order to remain neutral in the European war, while at the same time securing strategic gains for the Soviet Union. As Stalin told Georgi Dimitrov, the leader of the Communist International, on 7 September 1939:

    A war is on between two groups of capitalist countries...for the redivision of the world, for the domination of the world! We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight and weakening each other. It would be fine if at the hands of Germany the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken. Hitler, without understanding it or desiring it, is shaking and undermining the capitalist system.…We can maneuver, pit one side against the other to set them fighting with each other as fiercely as possible. The non-aggression pact is to a certain degree helping Germany. Next time we we’ll urge on the other side.¹

    The Communist International, or Comintern, was the global organization of Communist parties established by the Bolsheviks in 1919 to further the cause of world revolution. Some historians have interpreted Stalin’s statement to Dimitrov on 7 September to mean that he expected the outbreak of a new world war to occasion a resurgence of the Bolshevik revolutionary wave, which had ebbed after the First World War. However, in subsequent conversations with Dimitrov, Stalin was careful to distance himself from the idea that the Comintern’s policy should be to turn the imperialist war into an international class war. The fundamental difference between 1914 and 1939, Stalin reminded Dimitrov, was the existence of the Soviet Union. This created an imperative for Communists to contain the dangers to Soviet security posed by wartime upheavals. Thus the most important task for the Communist movement was not the pursuit of revolution but the struggle for peace, including the Comintern’s support for the German “peace offensive” at the end of September 1939. When, after Poland’s defeat, Hitler called upon Britain and France to end the war, he was supported by the Soviets and their Communist allies.

    At the end of September, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop traveled to Moscow to continue the negotiations with Stalin that had begun with the Nazi-Soviet pact of 23 August 1939. Ribbentrop’s second trip to the Soviet capital was prompted by Stalin’s desire to renegotiate the Soviet-German demarcation line in Poland, as agreed to in the secret protocol to the August pact. Stalin told Ribbentrop that, when the pact was signed, the continuation of a separate Polish state had been envisaged. However, Moscow and Berlin had since agreed that an independent Poland was no longer desirable, and that the Polish territories should be partitioned. But, Stalin continued, if Poland were divided along the line agreed on 23 August—along the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers—that would necessitate a Polish Soviet Socialist Republic and, inevitably, agitation among Poles there for reunification with their compatriots in German-occupied Poland. It would be far better, argued Stalin, to divide Poland along ethnic lines so that the vast majority of Poles would be contained in the German sphere of influence and almost all of the Belarusians and Ukrainians of prewar Poland in the Soviet zone.² Ribbentrop responded by agreeing to the transfer of former Polish territory in the Soviet zone of occupation to German control. In return, Stalin secured the transfer of Lithuania to his sphere of influence in the Baltic (which already included Estonia, Latvia, and Finland). This deal was enshrined in a secret protocol to the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty of 28 September 1939, as was, in another agreement, the suppression of nationalist agitation in former Poland.³ In the weeks that followed, western Belarus and western Ukraine were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union and merged with the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet republics. Integral to incorporation was a violent process of “Sovietization”—the state takeover of the economy and the establishment of Communist rule—together with an extensive program of political and ethnic cleansing in the annexed territories, not least the deportation, imprisonment, or execution of over 400,000 Polish citizens, most of them Poles.⁴ There were also agreements with Germany on ethnic transfers across the new frontier (mainly ethnic Germans to the German zone).⁵

    The manner in which Stalin sought to partition Poland prefigured an important and persistent element of his wartime thinking about the postwar world: the need for a stable ethnic basis for the postwar peace settlement. His immediate concern was ethno-political stability along Soviet borders, but during the war, Stalin came to adopt a broader vision of the ethnic reordering of Europe, which he thought was necessary to secure a prolonged and stable peace.

    At the conclusion of Ribbentrop’s visit, the two states issued a communiqué calling on Britain and France to end the war. The statement warned that if the British and French decided to fight on there would be further Soviet-German consultations. While this statement did not threaten Soviet involvement in the war on the German side, it was indicative of Stalin’s commitment to pursue a long-term political alliance with Germany—a collaboration that he thought would survive into the postwar world. As Stalin told Ribbentrop on 27 September:

    Soviet foreign policy has always been based on belief in the possibility of cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they were accused of being paid German agents. It was the Bolsheviks who concluded the Rapallo agreement. It provided the basis for the expansion and deepening of mutual relations. When the National Socialists came to power in Germany, relations worsened as the German government deemed it necessary to give priority to internal political considerations. After a while, this issue exhausted itself, and the German government displayed the will to improve relations with the Soviet Union.…Historically, the Soviet Government never excluded the possibility of good relations with Germany. Hence it is with a clear conscience that the Soviet Government begins the revival of collaboration with Germany. This collaboration represents a power that all other combinations must give way to.⁶

    Stalin’s belief in the possibility of a long-term Soviet-German alliance persisted even after the fall of France in June 1940. When Stafford Cripps, the new British ambassador to Moscow, met Stalin on 1 July, he presented him with a letter from Prime Minister Winston Churchill warning of the dangers of German hegemony in Europe. Cripps was given short shrift. Responding to the point that Britain was fighting to maintain a balance of power in Europe, Stalin told Cripps that he

    wanted to change the old equilibrium in Europe, which worked against the USSR. As the [negotiations with London and Paris for a triple alliance] showed, the British and French did not want to meet us halfway on this question. This served to bring about a rapprochement between Germany and the USSR.…If the issue is the restoration of equilibrium, including the establishment of a balance in relation to the USSR, then we have to say that we cannot agree with this.

He further told Cripps that it was

    premature to speak of German domination of Europe. The defeat of France did not signify such domination. Such domination over Europe by Germany would require German domination of the seas, and that was hardly possible.…In all his meetings with German representatives, he had noted no desire for German domination of the world...he did not deny that among the National Socialists there were those who spoke of German domination of the world. But...in Germany, there are intelligent people who understand that Germany does not have the power to dominate the world.⁷

    Two weeks after this meeting, Molotov provided Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, with a sanitized but not inaccurate report of the Stalin-Cripps conversation. Stalin’s message to Hitler was clear: he wanted to continue the Nazi-Soviet pact. That message was reinforced by Molotov in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 1 August 1940, when he derided press speculation that the Soviet Union found Germany’s new power position in Europe disagreeable and intimidating. Molotov made the point that the war, far from being over, was entering a new phase, in which Germany and Italy would be pitched against Britain and the United States. For the Soviet Union, the continuation of the Nazi-Soviet pact was now more important than ever. It was, Molotov said, a pact based not on “fortuitous considerations of a transient nature, but on the fundamental political interests of both countries.”

    Stalin’s continuing commitment to long-term collaboration with Germany was also evident in his instructions to Molotov in advance of the Soviet foreign minister’s famous conference in Berlin with Ribbentrop and Hitler in November 1940:

    Aim of the trip: to find out the real intentions of Germany [and Italy and Japan] in relation to plans for a “New Europe” and for a “Greater East Asia Sphere.”...To prepare a basic outline of the spheres of interest of the USSR in Europe and in the Near and Middle East, seeking possible agreement on this with Germany (also Italy).⁸

    What Stalin wanted from Hitler was a new agreement on spheres of influence that would stabilize Soviet-German relations for a prolonged period. Even Molotov’s failure to reach any agreements or understandings in Berlin did not lead Stalin to abandon all hope. On 25 November, Molotov presented Schulenburg with a memorandum setting out Soviet terms for its adherence to a four-power pact with Germany, Italy, and Japan: (1) withdrawal of German troops from Finland; (2) a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact, including the establishment of Soviet military bases in Bulgaria; (3) recognition of Soviet aspirations in the direction of the Persian Gulf; (4) an agreement with Turkey providing for Soviet military bases on the Black Sea straits; and (5) Japanese renunciation of rights to coal and oil concessions in north Sakhalin.⁹ As historian John Erickson noted, “Stalin’s response...was in every sense a test of Hitler’s intentions: the Soviet terms...amounted to giving Hitler full freedom in the west only at the price of foreclosing his option to wage a successful war against the Soviet Union.”¹⁰

    Hitler’s silence in response to the Soviet proposal spoke volumes, and by early 1941, there could be little doubt that there would be a Soviet-German war. Even so, Stalin continued to believe in the possibility that Soviet-German negotiations would avert such a conflict, at least for a time. One reason for this belief was the Soviet perception that there was a “peace party” in Berlin that shared Stalin’s preference for long-term Soviet-German collaboration. Such perceptions of divided counsel would also feature in Stalin’s thinking about long-term relations with his new British and American allies after 22 June 1941.

The Grand Alliance

During the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Stalin became accustomed to wide-ranging discussions about borders, spheres of influence, and grand schemes for reordering global politics. This mode of thinking continued to dominate his perspectives on the postwar world. In December 1941, Stalin invited British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Moscow for discussions about postwar collaboration between Britain and the Soviet Union. Eden’s visit coincided with the Soviet counterattack during the Battle of Moscow and the unfurling of an all-out counteroffensive by the Red Army. Stalin expected the war to end in a matter of months rather than years, and he was keen to reach some advance agreements with the British on the shape of the postwar peace settlement. Another reason for his haste was concern that the United States’ formal entry into the war would complicate future negotiations about the postwar world.

    Stalin proposed to Eden a secret agreement on the reorganization of European borders after the war. First, Soviet borders would be those extant in June 1941, that is, including not just western Belarus and western Ukraine but also Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (annexed from Romania in June 1940), Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in July 1940), as well as the territory ceded by Finland in the wake of its defeat in the Winter War (1939–40). Poland would be restored, and its border with the Soviet Union would run along the two countries’ ethnic divide, with the Poles being compensated for territorial losses by the acquisition of German territory. Second, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia would be reestablished within their prewar boundaries, with the latter gaining Trieste at Italy’s expense. Third, in return for remaining neutral, Turkey would get the Dodecanese Islands, some Bulgarian territory, and perhaps some Syrian territory. Fourth, Germany would be weakened by various measures of disarmament and dismemberment. Fifth, Britain would have an alliance with Belgium and Holland, while the Soviet Union would have alliances with Finland and Romania. In both cases, there would be provisions for the establishment of military bases. Sixth, overseeing the postwar order in Europe would be a military alliance of democratic states headed by some kind of central council or other body.¹¹

    Compared to the grand schemes and spheres of influence Stalin envisaged during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, his proposal to Eden was relatively modest. Moscow’s sphere of influence was limited to Finland and Romania—two states that had joined in the German attack on the Soviet Union—and the main content of the proposed secret protocol (the restoration of prewar European borders) was broadly in line with Stalin’s public commitment in his speech of November 1941 to wage a war of liberation to reestablish a Europe of independent sovereign states. Importantly, the proposals on spheres of influence and postwar borders were secondary to Stalin’s main goal in the negotiations: to gain advance British recognition of the territorial gains he had made during the period of his pact with Hitler.

    Eden was prepared to sign a general agreement on military cooperation and postwar collaboration, but any commitments on specific territorial issues, including Soviet borders, would require consultation not just with Churchill and the Cabinet but with the United States and the British Dominions. Eden’s stance was very frustrating for the Soviets, and at one point in the discussion, Stalin protested:

    Britain had an alliance with Tsarist Russia when it comprised Finland, Bessarabia and more than half of Poland. Not a single British statesman in Britain had thought of protesting against that alliance then on the grounds that the said territories were part of the Russian Empire. Today, however, the question of the Finnish frontier and the Baltic Republics seems to be a stumbling-block.¹²

    Eden left Moscow on 22 December without any agreement. Despite this setback, Stalin remained interested in the question of the postwar order. On 26 December, Deputy Foreign Commissar Solomon Lozovsky sent a memorandum to Stalin and Molotov on the subject. Lozovsky speculated that when the Axis powers were defeated there would be a peace conference, and he highlighted three important issues for the Soviet Union: reparations from enemy states; Soviet postwar borders; and the permanent weakening of Germany. He concluded by proposing the establishment of two commissions to consider postwar questions: an economic-financial commission to prepare proposals on reparations, and a political commission to examine the issue of the Soviet and German borders, as well as those of other countries. At the end of January 1942, the Politburo decided to establish a “Commission for the Preparation of Diplomatic Materials,” which was to be chaired by Molotov. The commission’s brief was to collect, examine, and summarize documentation on the postwar order in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world, research that would form the basis for planning the postwar world. Over the next two years, the commission did some useful research, but its practical importance turned out to be far less than anticipated.¹³ The reason was the deterioration in the military situation and the fading of Stalin’s immediate interest in postwar questions. By February 1942, the Soviet winter offensive was running out of steam. The Germans had been pushed back in a few places, but they still occupied vast swaths of Soviet territory. German armies remained entrenched just 100 miles from Moscow. Leningrad was still surrounded, and almost all of Ukraine was in German hands. In April, Stalin ended his counteroffensive. While he remained confident the Red Army’s advance would resume in the summer, the changed military outlook resulted in a new priority in Soviet relations with Britain and the United States: the opening of a second front in France that would draw a considerable body of German troops away from the Eastern Front.

    In May 1942, Stalin sent Molotov to London and Washington to secure an agreement on the opening of a second front in France by the end of 1942. During the London talks, Eden and Churchill proposed a twenty-year treaty of mutual assistance between Britain and the Soviet Union that would include a general commitment to postwar collaboration. On 24 May, Molotov sent Stalin a telegram containing the British draft of the proposed treaty. Signed by Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, as well as by Molotov, the telegram concluded with a one-line sign-off comment: “We consider this treaty unacceptable, as it is an empty declaration, which the Soviet Union does not need.”¹⁴ Molotov and Maisky dismissed the treaty because it contained no commitments on Soviet borders or the organization of the postwar peace. Stalin took a different view:

    We have received the draft treaty Eden handed you. We do not consider it an empty declaration, but regard it as an important document. It lacks the question of the security of frontiers, but this is not too bad perhaps, for it gives us a free hand. The question of frontiers, or to be more exact, of guarantees for the security of our frontiers at one or another section of our country, will be decided by force.¹⁵

    Behind Stalin’s positive response to the British proposal were events on the battlefield. On 12 May, the Red Army had launched a major operation to retake Kharkov, Ukraine’s second city. This was the first in a series of projected offensives designed to roll the Germans back to Soviet western borders by the end of the year. But the Kharkov operation proved to be a disaster and called into question Stalin’s rosy strategic scenario. It made the solidification of the wartime alliance with Great Britain even more critical and enhanced the importance of a second front in France. Thus the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed by Molotov on 26 May 1942, provided for a twenty-year mutual assistance pact against Germany and contained a pledge of “close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.”¹⁶

    In Washington, Molotov had a conversation with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt that was to prove critical in shaping Stalin’s thinking about the postwar world. At a meeting in the White House on 1 June, Roosevelt told Molotov that

    in order to prevent a war in the next 25–30 years, it was necessary to establish an international police force of three or four states...the four Powers [the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China] will have to maintain peace by force.¹⁷

On being informed of Roosevelt’s proposal, Stalin responded enthusiastically and cabled Molotov that the president’s

    considerations about peace protection after the war are absolutely sound. There is no doubt that it would be impossible to maintain peace without creating a united military force by Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union capable of preventing aggression. Tell Roosevelt that...[he] is absolutely right, and that his position will be fully supported by the Soviet Government.¹⁸

Most of Molotov’s conversations with Roosevelt were otherwise devoted to the second front issue, and the result was a communiqué that “full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942.” A similar communiqué was issued by the Soviets and the British. In the event, a second front was not opened in the West until June 1944.

    For the remainder of 1942, Stalin was preoccupied by military matters and did not return to postwar questions until after the victory at Stalingrad in early 1943. After Stalingrad, Churchill and Roosevelt had to reckon with a Soviet ally that would emerge from the war as the greatest military power in Europe—one whose political influence would be buoyed by popular admiration for the Red Army’s heroic deeds and growing support for the European Communist parties, which were in the vanguard of the resistance to the Nazi occupation. In this new context, the idea of an advance settlement of a number of postwar issues became increasingly attractive to Western leaders, who began pressing Stalin for a face-to-face meeting.

    An early indicator of Stalin’s political intentions was the decision to abolish the Comintern in May 1943. By freeing the Communist parties of direct control from Moscow, Stalin signaled that the political struggle for postwar Europe would be waged under the banner of a socially progressive patriotism. Another indication that Stalin was thinking again about postwar issues was the launch in June 1943 of a new, fortnightly journal devoted to foreign affairs: Voina i Rabochii Klass (War and the Working Class). Ostensibly published by the Soviet trade unions, it was, in effect, the house journal of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, much of the material published by the journal started out as internal briefing documents from within the foreign affairs commissariat, and its contents were tightly controlled by Molotov and Stalin.

    After the Red Army’s success in the great tank battle at Kursk in July 1943, Stalin began to focus more fully on the question of the postwar order. Within the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the new priorities were flagged by the creation that summer of three new policy commissions: a Commission on the Armistice Terms, headed by former Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov; a Commission on Peace Treaties and the Postwar Order, headed by Maksim Litvinov, Molotov’s predecessor as foreign commissar; and a Commission on Reparations headed by Maisky, who had been recalled from London.

    The catalyst for the establishment of these commissions was an upcoming foreign ministers conference in Moscow. In August 1943, Stalin had agreed to meet Roosevelt and Churchill and had also consented to a preliminary conference of the American, British, and Soviet foreign ministers to prepare for the summit. In agreeing to host the foreign ministers’ conference, the Soviets aimed to press their case for a second front. Hence they submitted only one item for the agenda: “measures to shorten the war against Germany and its allies in Europe.” It was clear, however, the conference would occasion discussion of a wide range of political issues, and during preparations, the Soviets clarified their position on a number of postwar questions.¹⁹

    The conference opened on 19 October 1943, and its discussions and decisions shaped allied relations for the rest of the war. Among the more important resolutions were a declaration on the need to create a new international security organization; a pledge to punish German war criminals; and a decision to establish a tripartite European Advisory Commission, based in London, to consider the armistice terms for Germany and other enemy states. While there was no specific agreement on the postwar treatment of Germany, there was a broad meeting of minds on the need for the country to be disarmed, demilitarized, denazified, and dismembered, that is, broken into a number of smaller states. The Soviets were quite satisfied with the results of the conference and hailed it in the Soviet press as the harbinger of victory and a long and stable peace guaranteed by the continuing cooperation of the “Big Three.”²⁰

    At the end of November 1943, Stalin met with Roosevelt and Churchill in Tehran. The summit had no fixed agenda, and the conversations between the three leaders ranged far and wide. Early discussions were dominated by the second front issue because Stalin sought—and was given—a hard and fast commitment to an allied invasion of France in spring 1944. In return, Stalin promised to join the war against Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany.

    With regard to Stalin’s developing vision of the peace, three discussions at Tehran were of particular importance. First, there was an exchange between Roosevelt and Stalin about the idea of a great power directorate to police the postwar order. At a private meeting with the Soviet dictator, Roosevelt outlined his plan for an international organization with three components: a general organization of all the “united nations”; an executive committee of ten to eleven countries; and a “police committee” of the Big Three plus China. The small states of Europe would not like such an organization, Stalin observed, referring to the role of China, and suggested instead the foundation of two organizations—one for Europe and one for the Far East. Roosevelt noted this was similar to a proposal put forward by Churchill, but added that the U.S. Congress would never agree to membership of a solely European organization. Stalin asked that if a world organization was formed, would the United States send its troops to Europe? Not necessarily, said Roosevelt: in the event of aggression in Europe, the United States would supply ships and planes, but the troops could come from Britain and Russia. Roosevelt in turn questioned Stalin about his views on this matter. The Soviet leader began by noting that at dinner the previous night Churchill had said Germany would not be able to reestablish its power very quickly after the war. Stalin did not agree. He thought Germany would be able to reestablish itself in fifteen to twenty years and then be in a position to launch a new war of aggression. To prevent this, the great powers had to be able to occupy key strategic positions in and around Germany. The same was true of Japan. The new international organization had to have the right to occupy these strategic positions. Roosevelt said “he agreed with Marshal Stalin one hundred percent.”²¹

    Second was Stalin’s insistence during several conversations that a harsh, punitive peace should be imposed on Germany. According to Charles Bohlen, the American interpreter:

    In regard to Germany, Marshal Stalin appeared to regard all measures proposed by either the President or Churchill for the subjugation and for the control of Germany as inadequate.…He appeared to have no faith in the possibility of the reform of the German people and spoke bitterly of the attitude of the German workers in the war against the Soviet Union.²²

When the issue of dismemberment came up Stalin was insistent that:

    it was far better to break up and scatter the German tribes. Of course they would want to unite, no matter how much they were split up. They would always want to reunite. In this, he saw great danger, which would have to be neutralized by various economic measures and in the long run by force if necessary. That was the only way to keep the peace. But if we were to make a large combination with Germans in it, trouble was bound to come. We had to see to it that they were kept separate.…There were no measures to be taken which excluded a movement toward reunion. Germans would always want to reunite and take their revenge. It would be necessary to keep ourselves strong enough to beat them if they ever let loose another war.²³

    Third was the reassertion of the Soviet claim to its June 1941 border with Poland. To compensate Warsaw for the loss of western Belarus and western Ukraine, Stalin was prepared to transfer German territory to the Poles. He was also willing to consider returning to Poland those eastern borderlands containing a majority of ethnic Poles. But on the fundamental issue of retaining the territorial gains made during the Nazi-Soviet pact, there would be no concessions.²⁴

    While neither Churchill nor Roosevelt had any great objections to Stalin’s plans for Poland, the question of Western recognition of the 1941 Soviet border with Poland remained unresolved. The same was true of all the other political issues raised at Tehran. Nonetheless, Tehran, together with the foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow, marked the start of a new, tripartite phase in Soviet foreign policy, one dominated by the idea that the postwar world would be shaped by the wartime negotiations of the Big Three, who would then collectively police the international order they jointly created. Driving Stalin’s pursuit of a peacetime Grand Alliance with Britain and the United States was fear of renewed German aggression. In Stalin’s view, the German danger would need to be contained on a long-term basis by permanently weakening the country. Central to that project was the policy of dismemberment, and the breakup of Germany was conceivable—and sustainable—only on the basis of long-term collaboration between the Big Three. Dismemberment also implied spheres of influence, since it was likely that the separate German states would come under the wing of one or another great power. The cement binding these arrangements together would be the common interest of the great powers in maintaining peace and security.

    Two weeks after the Tehran conference, Bohlen penned a much-quoted summary assessment of Stalin’s war aims:

    Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern and southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe will be reduced to military and political impotence.²⁵

    Bohlen’s assessment was accurate in some respects, but it omitted a vital component of Stalin’s perspective: Soviet aims would be achieved in cooperation with Churchill and Roosevelt, and there would be a quid pro quo regarding British and U.S. goals in their spheres of interest. More important, Stalin’s emergent goals were political and ideological, as well as strategic. The Europe that the Soviet leader sought to dominate would be a continent transformed by social and economic upheavals and by Communist political gains. But Stalin saw no contradiction between a peacetime Grand Alliance with Britain and the United States and the beginning of a Europe-wide transition to socialism and Communism. The immediate needs and interests of the great capitalist powers to collaborate with the Soviet Union would override the long-term dangers to the capitalist system of such collaboration. Stalin was also confident that the personal rapport he had established with Churchill and Roosevelt would help overcome future difficulties within the Grand Alliance on a mutually acceptable basis.

    Not long after Tehran, there occurred one of the more extraordinary manifestations of Stalin’s thinking about the postwar world. In January 1944, the All-Union Communist Party’s Central Committee convened its one and only plenum during the Second World War. The main purpose of this meeting was to agree a resolution changing the people’s commissariats of defense and foreign affairs from “all-union” to “union-republic” ministries, that is, from unified ministries that represented all the Soviet Socialist Republics that constituted the USSR, to ministries of defense and foreign affairs representing each republic. As a kind of counterbalance to this resolution, the plenum decided also to replace “The Internationale” with a new Soviet national anthem, the first verse of which was: “The unbreakable union of free republics / Has been joined together forever by Great Russia / Long live the united and mighty Soviet Union / Created by the will of the peoples.”

    In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on the proposed changes, Molotov explained their rationale as twofold. First, they would allow the formation of republican military units within the framework of the Red Army. Second, they would enable the republics to develop direct relations with foreign states. In relation to the latter, Molotov reminded his audience that in the early days of Soviet power Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan had maintained their own foreign ministries, had established diplomatic relations with other states, and had signed a number of international agreements. In the 1920s, the republics’ foreign commissariats had been abolished and replaced by an all-union body because of the need to strengthen the Soviet position in world affairs, said Molotov, but a new stage had now arrived in relations between the national constituencies of the Soviet Union. The direct involvement of the republics in foreign relations would strengthen the growing Soviet presence in world affairs and lead to the development of a myriad of positive connections with other countries, not least with those states participating in anti-Hitler coalition.²⁶

    In the longer, unpublished version of this speech—the one given at the Central Committee plenum—Molotov was more forthcoming about the thinking behind the proposal. He presented more details about the past foreign involvements of the Soviet republics and argued that there were now enhanced opportunities for their participation in international organizations. He gave the example of international discussions on the punishment of war criminals that included representatives of British dominions, such as India and Burma, but not Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelia, and Ukraine—all of which had suffered greatly from Nazi occupation. Molotov also pointed out that some British dominions had participated in the Versailles Peace Conference and had been independently represented in various international organizations.²⁷

    Molotov’s speech, like all his major public pronouncements, was edited by Stalin. The only substantial change made to Molotov’s draft by Stalin was the deletion of the following sentence: “Of course, the foreign policy of the Republics must not contradict the foreign policy of the Union and must be conducted within the framework of Union foreign policy.”²⁸

    Belarus and Ukraine did establish separate foreign ministries and became independent members of the United Nations, but never at any stage did the two republics display any independence from Soviet foreign policy. Still, Stalin’s willingness to expand channels of communication between the union republics and the outside world was indicative of quite flexible thinking about the Soviet role in a new postwar order.

Pan-Slavism

Postwar cooperation with Britain and the United States was not the only peacetime alliance that Stalin had in mind. At the end of 1943, Stalin began moves to create an alliance of Slavic states. In December 1943, a Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation was concluded with the exile Czech government under President Eduard Beneš. The treaty, signed in Moscow on 12 December, contained a protocol providing for a third country to join in the arrangement—a clause specifically aimed at facilitating a Czechoslovak-Polish-Soviet pact.²⁹ Stalin was just back from Tehran, and his obsession with the postwar reemergence of the German threat was evident in his talks with Beneš. In their conversation on 18 December, Stalin told Beneš: “The Germans are a very powerful and talented people, and they will recover very quickly after the war. From the Tehran conference, [he] had formed the impression that this view was fully shared by all the allies.” At a reception for Beneš on 22 December, Stalin spoke of the “necessity for Slavic cooperation after the war,” noting that “up to now the Germans had been able to divide the Slavs, cooperating with some Slavs against others and then turning against them. From now on, the Slavs must be united.”³⁰ Stalin’s diplomacy toward Czechoslovakia was motivated mainly by strategic and political calculations—the country represented an important bridge between eastern and western Europe—but the ethnic dimension was also important.

    Stalin returned to the Slavic unity theme in his talk with Father Stanislaus Orlemanski, a Polish-American Catholic priest, on 28 April 1944:

    Germany will be able to renew itself in some 15 years. That is why we must think not only about how to end this war...but also about what would happen in 20 years, when German revives itself. This is why an alliance between Russia and Poland is absolutely necessary in order not to let the Germans become an aggressor once again.…[He] could give the example of the Grunwald battle during which the Slavic peoples united against the members of the German order of Knights of the Sword. The united Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians then defeated the Germans...we should revive the policy of Grunwald on a broad basis. This is his dream.³¹

The other partners in Stalin’s projected Slavic alliance were Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In January 1945, Stalin met with a group of Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communists at his dacha, where he told them:

    The capitalist world is divided into two hostile blocs—democratic and fascist. The Soviet Union takes advantage of this in order to fight against the most dangerous [country] for the Slavs—Germany. But even after the defeat of Germany the danger of war/invasion will continue to exist. Germany is a great state with large industry, strong organization, employees, and traditions; it shall never accept its defeat and will continue to be dangerous for the Slavonic world, because it sees it as an enemy. The imperialist danger could come from another side.

    The crisis of capitalism today is caused mainly by the decay and mutual ruin of the two enemy camps. This is favorable for the victory of socialism in Europe. But we have to forget the idea that the victory of socialism could be realized only through Soviet rule. It could be presented by some other political systems—for example by a democracy, a parliamentary republic and even by constitutional monarchy.³²

Another version of Stalin’s remarks at this meeting is recorded in Dimitrov’s diary:

    Germany will be routed, but the Germans are a sturdy people with great numbers of cadres; they will rise again. The Slavic peoples should not be caught unawares the next time they attempt an attack against them, and in the future, this will probably, even certainly, occur. The old Slavophilism expressed the aim of tsarist Russia to subjugate the other Slavic peoples. Our Slavophilism is something completely different—the unification of the Slavic peoples as equals for the common defense of their existence and future.…The crisis of capitalism has manifested itself in the division of the capitalists into two factions—one fascist, the other democratic. The alliance between ourselves and the democratic faction came about because the latter had a stake in preventing Hitler’s domination, for that brutal state would have driven the working class to extremes and to the overthrow of capitalism itself. We are currently allied against one faction against the other, but in the future we will be allied against the first faction of capitalists, too.

    Perhaps we are mistaken when we suppose that the Soviet form is the only one that leads to socialism. In practice, its turns out that the Soviet form is the best, but by no means the only, form. There may be other forms—the democratic republic and even under certain conditions the constitutional monarchy.³³

    Stalin’s remarks about the two wings of capitalism have been interpreted to mean that he believed conflict between the Soviet Union and the democratic faction of capitalism was inevitable. But, as both quotations show, Stalin was thinking about the long-term German threat and the need for Slavic unity to confront it. Stalin’s message to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav comrades was that the Slavs could rely on only themselves to deal with the Germans, not on an enduring alliance with democratic capitalism. Hopefully, according to Stalin, the Grand Alliance with Britain and the United States would last, but it might not. Equally, it is clear that in terms of Communist political strategy Stalin was advocating a moderate political course, one that focused on gradual reform rather than on a revolutionary upheaval on the model of Russia in 1917.

    Stalin was even more emphatic in his assertion of the need for pan-Slavic unity at a reception for a visiting Czechoslovak delegation in March 1945:

    We are the new Slavophile-Leninists, Slavophile-Bolsheviks, Communists who stand for the unity and alliance of the Slavic peoples. We consider that irrespective of political and social differences, irrespective of social and ethnic differences, all Slavs must ally with one another against the common enemy—the Germans. The history of the Slavs teaches that an alliance between them is necessary to defend Slavdom. Take the last two world wars. Why did they begin? Because of the Slavs. The Germans wanted to enslave the Slavs. And who suffered most because of these wars? In the First World War, as well as the Second World War, the Slavic peoples suffered most: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Poles...

    Now we are beating the Germans, and many think the Germans will never be able to threaten us again. This is not so. I hate the Germans. But that must not cloud one’s judgment of the Germans. The Germans are a great people. Very good technicians and organizers. Good, naturally brave soldiers. It is impossible to get rid of the Germans, they will remain. We are fighting the Germans and will do so until the end. But we must bear in mind that our allies will try to save the Germans and come to an arrangement with them. We will be merciless toward the Germans, but our allies will treat them with kid gloves. Thus we Slavs must be prepared for the Germans to rise again against us. That is why we, the new Slavophile-Leninists, are so insistent on calling for the union of the Slavic peoples. There is talk that we want to impose the Soviet system on the Slav peoples. This is empty talk. We do not want this because we know that Soviet system cannot be exported abroad as you wish; certain conditions are necessary. We can’t establish the Soviet system in Bulgaria if they don’t want it there. But we don’t want to go that way. In friendship with the Slavic countries, we want genuine democratic governments.³⁴

The broader political background to Stalin’s pan-Slavic diplomatic initiatives is also worth noting. In 1941, the Soviets had formed a Pan-Slavic Committee. Its task was to expose the anti-Slavic character of Nazi expansionism and to rally Slavic opinion in support of the Soviet Union. The committee was very active during the war not just in the Soviet Union but in other allied states as well. Pan-Slavic committees were established in a number of countries, which sponsored many meetings, publications, and other activities supporting the Soviet war effort. During the war, the Soviet-based Pan-Slavic Committee supplied no fewer than 16,000 articles to the foreign Slavic press. After the war, the Pan-Slavic Committee was replaced by the Slavic Committee of the USSR, which continued publication of the journal Slaviane.³⁵ There was also more than a little pan-Slavic sentiment in Stalin’s statement to a visiting Czechoslovak delegation in July 1947, when he announced that Czechoslovakia would have to withdraw from Western discussions about the Marshall Plan because all the other Slav states had done so.³⁶

The Churchill-Stalin Percentages Deal

By far the best-known example of Stalin’s wartime thinking about the postwar world is the “percentages deals” of October 1944. According to Churchill’s famous account, when he arrived in Moscow on 9 October, he went straight to the Kremlin for dinner. At the meeting that followed, Churchill passed Stalin a piece of paper with a suggested division of the Balkans into British and Soviet spheres of influence, a division expressed in percentages: 90/10 for Russia in Romania; 90/10 for the British in Greece; Yugoslavia and Hungary 50/50; Bulgaria 75/25 in favor of Russia. Stalin ticked the list and passed the paper back to Churchill. Later in the meeting, Stalin said the figures for Bulgaria should be amended 90/10 so that they harmonized with those for Romania. Stalin, or perhaps Molotov, had some further thoughts on the matter after the meeting. When Molotov met Eden the next day, he angled for 75/25 Soviet influence in Hungary. In return, he was prepared to drop Stalin’s demand for 90/10 in Bulgaria and reduce that to 75/25. Molotov also demanded a 60/40 share of Yugoslavia. The matter was finally settled at a further meeting on 11 October, when it was agreed that Yugoslavia should remain 50/50 while Bulgaria and Hungary would be 80/20 in the Soviet favor.³⁷

    But what did these percentages mean? The closest that Molotov and Eden came to a practical definition was in relation to an Allied Control Commission established to run the occupation of Bulgaria. The Soviets intended to apply to Bulgaria the model used in relation to Romania, where occupation was overseen by an Allied Control Commission, but excluded the British and U.S. representatives from any real say in decision making. The rationale for this model was that whichever allied country or countries militarily occupied an enemy state should be in control, the principle established by the Anglo-American occupation of Italy in 1943.

    In truth, the only clear thing to emerge from the percentages discussions was that Stalin agreed to keep out of Greece. Churchill was afraid that Greece would be overrun by a Communist-led partisan movement that already controlled large tracts of the country. The main issue from Churchill’s point of view was Stalin’s forbearance in relation to Greek affairs. He need not have worried. The Soviets had long before decided Greece should be conceded to the British. Indeed, even before Churchill presented him with his “naughty document” at the meeting on 9 October, Stalin had “agreed that England must have the right of decisive voice in Greece.”

    Poland was actually the main topic of Stalin and Churchill’s discussions in October 1944, not spheres of influence. Churchill was in Moscow specifically to broker a deal to restore Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. These relations had broken down in April 1943 after the Germans announced the discovery of mass graves containing Polish POWs in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. The POWs had been shot by the Soviet secret police in March–April 1940 on the instructions of the Politburo,³⁸ but Moscow responded to the announcement by blaming the Germans for the killings. The Polish government in exile in London called for an independent inquiry into the massacre. The Soviets retaliated by severing diplomatic relations with the London Poles. Relations continued to deteriorate when the Red Army entered western Belarus and western Ukraine in 1944—territories the exile government claimed were part of Poland. But Stalin and Molotov kept the door open to a deal with elements of the exile government. Indeed, when the Warsaw Uprising erupted in August 1944, the Polish prime minister in exile, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, was in Moscow talking to Stalin. The Soviets offered a coalition government, including their Communist allies, which would rule liberated Poland pending the peace conference and postwar elections. In return, Mikołajczyk would have to recognize the June 1941 frontier as the Polish-Soviet border. While the Stalin-Mikołajczyk talks went quite well, any chance of a deal was dashed by the controversy over the Soviet refusal to support the Warsaw Uprising. But Stalin was willing to try again, and he agreed to Churchill’s proposal that Mikołajczyk be invited to Moscow for further talks. In Moscow that October, Mikołajczyk talked with Churchill, Stalin, and Molotov, as well as with the leaders of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the front organization for the Communists and their allies that had established a provisional government based in Lublin to administer territories liberated by the Red Army (hence the appellation “Lublin Poles”). Mikołajczyk was inclined to do a deal, but was constrained by the exile government in London. The talks in Moscow ended in failure, and a few weeks later, Mikołajczyk resigned from his post.

    Stalin and Churchill also talked about Turkey and about Soviet demands for a share in the control of the Black Sea straits. This topic had cropped up before in their talks, and what Stalin had said on this occasion typified the Soviet leader’s growing sense of great power entitlement:

    It was quite impossible for Russia to remain subject to Turkey, who could close the Straits and hamper Russian imports and exports and even her defense. What would Britain do if Spain or Egypt were given this right to close the Suez Canal, or what would the United States Government say if some South American Republic had the right to close the Panama Canal?³⁹

    At their meeting on 17 October 1944, Churchill and Stalin exchanged views on the future of Germany. Once again, Stalin expressed fear of a revival of German power and made plain his preference for the dismemberment of the country. Asked by Churchill whether he supported the formation of a federation of east European states to protect against German aggression, Stalin gave an interesting reply:

    [the] first three or four years after the war, there will be a nationalistic atmosphere in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The first desire of the peoples of these countries will be to organize their national life.…To a degree, the Hitler regime developed national feelings, as shown for example in Yugoslavia...where everyone wants their autonomy. In the first years after the war, the predominant feeling will be the desire to live a full national life without interference. After the last war, a number of untenable states were formed that had little basis, and they suffered bankruptcy. Now, there is the danger of going to the other extreme and forcing small peoples to unite together. It is difficult to see the Czechs and Hungarians, even the Czechs and Poles, finding a common language. Hence it is not possible to think about such associations, although they are not excluded in the future.⁴⁰

    These remarks by Stalin were yet another reflection of his growing consciousness of ethnic issues during war and his preference for ethnic unification where possible. In relation to the Soviet Union’s own ethnic integrity, this outlook led Stalin in 1945 to negotiate the transfer of Transcarpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. As he explained later:

    In their times, in the thirteenth century, the Russians lost the trans-Carpathian Ukraine, and from that time, they always dreamt of recovering it. Thanks to our correct policy, we succeeded in recovering all Slavic—Ukrainian and White Russian—lands and to realize the age-old dreams of the Russian, Ukrainian and White Russian people.⁴¹

    Other examples of Stalin’s pursuit of ethnic politics during and immediately after the Second World War include: the encouragement of ethnic transfers between Poland and Ukraine; support for the return of Transylvania to Romania; acquiescence in Polish and Czechoslovak expulsion of German minorities; the demand that Turkey “return” territories to Armenia and Georgia; sponsorship of a southern Azeri independence movement in Iran; and endorsement of Yugoslavia’s claim to Trieste on ethnic grounds. But the extent to which Stalin’s vision of the peace was driven by ethnic sensibilities should not be exaggerated. More important, perhaps, were its geopolitical and ideological components. As the Second World War drew to a close, Stalin’s primary goal was a great power peace that would contain Germany, provide a stable framework for Soviet postwar reconstruction, and permit the pursuit of Communist ideological goals on a gradual basis.

Yalta and Potsdam

Stalin’s vision of a great power peace reached its apogee at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. At Yalta in February 1945, Stalin pushed hard for a definite agreement on the dismemberment of Germany, but achieved only partial satisfaction when the issue was referred to a postconference committee for further discussion. Stalin was more successful in relation to Soviet reparations demands, and it was agreed the Soviet Union would receive half of a projected sum of $20 billion from Germany.

    The second major discussion at Yalta concerned Roosevelt’s pet project: the establishment of the United Nations. At the Moscow conference, it had been agreed to establish a new postwar security organization to replace the League of Nations. These discussions were carried forward at the Dumbarton Oaks conference of August–September 1944. Dumbarton Oaks went quite well, and Stalin’s speech of November 1944 lauded its significance: “The foundation for the alliance of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States lies not in chance and passing considerations, but in vitally important and long-term interests.” When the war was won, the alliance would face the problem of making “impossible the outbreak of a new aggression and a new war—if not for ever, then at all events for a very long period.” The danger of a new war arose because, as history showed, it was inevitable Germany would recover from defeat in two or three decades and pose a new threat. The way to avert that threat, said Stalin, was to create an international security organization endowed with the armed forces necessary to protect peace and to deal with any threats posed by aggressive states. At the heart of this new organization would be those great powers that had borne the burden of the war against Germany, and who would therefore need to maintain their unity and cooperation in the postwar period.⁴²

    But there was continuing disagreement about the voting procedure on the UN Security Council. The Soviets stood for the principle of unanimity and rejected a U.S.-British compromise that the right of veto should not apply when a great power was directly involved in a security dispute. When Roosevelt appealed to Stalin on 9 September to accept the Western position, the Soviet dictator was unmoved, replying a few days later:

    the voting procedure in the Council will, I feel, be of appreciable importance to the success of the International Security Organization because it is essential that the Council should base its work on the principle of agreement and unanimity between the four leading Powers on all matters, including those that directly concern one of those powers.⁴³

At Yalta, Stalin stuck to his guns on the veto issue, stressing that the procedure agreed had to be designed to avoid divergences among the great powers, and that the aim was to construct an organization to ensure peace for at least another fifty years. In the end, the matter was resolved amicably, and it was decided to invite all those states that had participated in the war against Germany to a founding conference in San Francisco in April 1945.

    Even more congenial were the discussions between Stalin and Roosevelt about Soviet entry into the war in the Far East. Stalin agreed to attack Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany. In return, he would gain southern Sakhalin, the Kurils, transit rights through Manchuria, and control of the Chinese ports of Darien and Port Arthur. The only proviso was that the concessions affecting China would be subject to a separate Sino-Soviet agreement, a stipulation that neither Stalin nor Roosevelt expected to cause any difficulty.

    More difficult to resolve was the Polish question, specifically whether Britain and the United States would recognize the Polish provisional government established by the Soviets. Eventually, it was agreed that the Lublin government would be “reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.” In addition, the 1941 frontier was accepted as the Polish-Soviet border, and the principle of transferring German territory to Poland agreed.

    Finally, there was the “Declaration on Liberated Europe.” This U.S.-proposed declaration spoke of “the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government” to European peoples, to be achieved through “free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people.” It was the only major concession made by Stalin to the democratic sensibilities of his Western allies. Even so, the Soviet interpretation of the document stressed its references to destroying the last vestiges of Fascism and Nazism rather than its commitment to Western-style democracy. In any case, the Soviets were convinced their Communist allies would do well in the forthcoming elections and would emerge as important players in broad-based coalition governments.

    The immediate postconference assessment of the conference by the Soviets was very positive. Maisky, who had presented Soviet policy on reparations to the conference, drafted a circular to Soviet embassies for Molotov that concluded: “in general, the atmosphere of the conference had a friendly character, and the feeling was one of striving for agreement on disputed questions. We assess the conference as highly positive.”⁴⁴ In the Soviet press, the conference was lauded as yet another great historical turning point in the construction of the projected peacetime Grand Alliance.⁴⁵

    Post-Yalta, however, was a period of tension in Soviet relations with the West. Stalin was disappointed by his failure to gain a firm commitment from Churchill and Roosevelt to dismember Germany. If dismemberment was not going to happen, he reasoned, then the Soviet Union should strive to avoid being blamed for pushing such a policy and should seek instead to gain some political benefit from supporting German reunification. On 24 March, Molotov cabled Fedor Gusev, his ambassador in London and the Soviet representative on the Commission on Dismemberment, with instructions to drop the policy.⁴⁶

    A second disappointment was the prolonged wrangling over the composition of the new Polish provisional government. The Soviet interpretation of the Yalta agreement was that the Lublin government would be broadened by the inclusion of Polish politicians who were prepared to accept the 1941 border and were willing to work constructively with the Soviets and their Communist allies. Britain and the United States, on the other hand, wanted the creation of a completely new Polish government, to include a significant group of pro-Western political leaders. It was Molotov’s job to resolve this dispute in negotiations with the British and U.S. ambassadors in Moscow. By April, the negotiations had reached an impasse as both sides maneuvered for political advantage.

    At the height of the dispute over Poland, the death of President Roosevelt cast further doubt on the future of the Grand Alliance. When Averell Harriman, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, visited Stalin to discuss Roosevelt’s death, the Soviet dictator seemed genuinely moved by the news: “When I entered Marshal Stalin’s office I noticed that he was obviously deeply distressed at the news of the death of President Roosevelt. He greeted me in silence and stood holding my hand for about 30 seconds before asking me to sit down.” Harriman told Stalin that he had come to see him because he thought the Soviet leader might have some questions about the situation in the United States following Roosevelt’s death. Stalin, however, expressed confidence that there would be no change in U.S. policy. “President Roosevelt has died, but his cause must live on,” Stalin told Harriman. “We shall support President Truman with all our forces and all our will.”⁴⁷ As well as commiserating with Harriman, Stalin wrote that day to Harry Truman to express his “deep regret” over Roosevelt’s death and to state his confidence that wartime cooperation would continue into the future.⁴⁸ At Harriman’s suggestion, Stalin agreed to send Molotov to the United States to meet the new president and to attend the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco.

    Molotov’s second visit to the United States is renowned for his famously bruising first encounter with Truman when the two men clashed over the Polish question. But its negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations has been much exaggerated.⁴⁹ The logjam in the negotiations about the composition of the Polish provisional government was soon broken when, at a meeting of foreign ministers in San Francisco on 2 May, Molotov announced that Mikołajczyk would be an acceptable member of a reconstructed Polish government. The next concession came from Truman, who decided to send Harry Hopkins—Roosevelt’s trusted confidant—to Moscow to broker a deal. Hopkins arrived in the Soviet capital on 25 May and had several meetings with Stalin. A deal was reached that foresaw the reorganization of the Lublin government to include four pro-Western cabinet ministers, including Mikołajczyk, who was named a deputy premier.

    Stalin and Hopkins also discussed Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war. Stalin told Hopkins that he thought Japan should, like Germany, be jointly occupied after the war and divided into American, British, and Soviet zones of military occupation. Stalin’s attitude to the postwar treatment of Japan was similar to the one he held in relation to Germany—he favored a punitive peace:

    Marshal Stalin said that war such as the present could only happen once in a hundred years, and it was better to take advantage of it and utterly defeat Japan and cope with the military potential and in that manner assure fifty or sixty years of peace.

The need to contain Japanese aggression in the long term was also the major theme of Stalin’s discussions with T. V. Soong, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow. These discussions, prompted by Stalin’s desire to secure a Sino-Soviet alliance in advance of Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war, provide a fascinating window on the Soviet dictator’s global thinking. Stalin’s main theme was the parallel between the long-term threat from Japan and that emanating from Germany. On 2 July, he told Soong:

    Japan will not perish, even if it is forced to surrender unconditionally. History shows that the Japanese are a powerful nation. After the Versailles Treaty, everyone thought that Germany would not rise again. But after some 15–17 years, it had restored its strength. If Japan is forced to its knees, then it too will in time be able to repeat what Germany did.

Stalin went on to explain to Soong that his main aim in signing the Yalta agreement on the Far East was to strengthen the Soviet strategic position in order to fight a future war with Japan.⁵⁰ On 7 July, Stalin told Soong:

    the Soviet Union is thinking about the future, about the long-term, not six months or a year. Japan will recover some 20 years after she is defeated. The Soviet Government wants to construct a Chinese-Soviet relationship not just for the present but for the future, the long-term.⁵¹

As historian David Holloway has argued:

    Stalin’s vision of the postwar world was very much colored by the revival of German power after World War I, and by the dual threat posed to the Soviet Union in the 1930s by Germany in the west and Japan in the east. He foresaw the eventual emergence of Japanese and German power after World War II but wished to postpone it for as long as possible. He feared that Britain and the United States would seek to restore the power of those countries in order to balance the Soviet Union. That was why it was important to secure positions that would make it possible to prevent, delay or counter the restoration of German and Japanese power and to ensure a dominant Soviet position in Europe and in Asia.⁵²

    In Europe, Stalin’s solution to the dilemma posed by German power and his fears about the inconstancy of his Western allies was to build a long-term alliance of Slavic states. In the Far East, the solution was a strong Sino-Soviet alliance. Another parallel with Europe concerned the role of the Chinese Communists in Stalin’s postwar schema for the Far East. In China, as in Europe, the Communists were urged by Stalin to construct a national front against the common enemy—in this case the Japanese—and to adopt the perspective of a postwar democratic progressive regime. In a conversation with Harriman, Stalin jokingly referred to Mao Tse-tung and his comrades as “margarine Communists,” which the ambassador took to mean that they were not real Communists but patriots whose main concern was their country’s national interests. In Asia, as in Europe, Stalin’s consistent message to his Western allies was that “Sovietization” no longer figured on the Communists’ immediate political agenda.

    The dispute over Poland had soured Soviet relations with the West for several months, but in the end, Stalin and Molotov extracted from Britain and the United States the concessions they considered vital to Soviet interests. This success suggested that the implicit spheres of influence agreement negotiated at Yalta remained valid, and that the forthcoming Potsdam summit with Truman would continue tripartite cooperation.

    At Potsdam, the main discussion was the future of Germany, and a detailed agreement was reached on the country’s “complete disarmament and demilitarization,” as well as the decentralization of its economic and political structures. On reparations—an issue very important to the Soviets—it was agreed that part of the $10 billion due the Soviet Union would be paid by industrial plant and deliveries from the Western zones of military occupation. More contentious was the treatment of Germany’s allies during the war: Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania. While the British and Americans sought special treatment for Italy, Stalin strove to protect the interests of states in his sphere of interest by gaining Western recognition for the friendly governments that had been established in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania. In the end, the issue was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was established at the conference to negotiate the details of peace treaties for the Axis states. The Soviets were disappointed by their exclusion from the Potsdam declaration calling upon the Japanese to surrender or face “prompt and utter destruction,” but apart from that, there was very little discussion of the Far East except Soviet confirmation that they would declare war on Japan by the middle of August.

    At the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference on 2 August 1945, the participants solemnly declared that the gathering had “strengthened the ties...and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding,” and had renewed their confidence in their ability to deliver “a just and enduring peace.” In the Soviet press, Potsdam received the same adulatory treatment as Tehran and Yalta had.⁵³ In private, the Soviets were only a little more restrained. In a report circulated to Soviet ambassadors, Molotov wrote that “the conference ended with quite satisfactory results for the Soviet Union.”⁵⁴ Most revealing are the confidential statements recorded by the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow:

    According to Molotov...at the conference, it was possible to see, and to see in its results, that the English and Americans accept that they have lost Eastern Europe and the Balkans.… Molotov said that throughout the conference there was a good atmosphere, albeit not without harsh polemics and sharp words. Everyone tried to ensure that all questions were resolved by compromise decisions...About Truman, they said he was quite cultured and shows much understanding of European problems.⁵⁵

Dimitrov recorded similar comments in his diary: “spoke with Molotov about the Berlin conference, and in particular about decisions affecting Bulgaria and the Balkans. Basically, these decisions are to our advantage. In effect, this sphere of influence has been recognized as ours.”⁵⁶

    As the Second World War drew to a close, Stalin foresaw a great future for the Grand Alliance. The success of Potsdam augured well for the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was to be held in London in September. Tripartite cooperation had survived Roosevelt’s death, and a number of difficult issues in relations among the allies had been resolved. The Soviet perspective was that great power collaboration would continue in the long term to contain Germany and to maintain a stable setting for postwar reconstruction. Stalin was still a Bolshevik and was far from abandoning his socialist goals, but these would be pursued on gradual basis through the spreading influence of the Communists and their allies. No doubt there would be tensions arising from Soviet pursuit of ideological as well as diplomatic goals—this contradiction was, after all, a hardy perennial of Soviet foreign policy—but peace and an equitable division of the spoils of war was the overriding interest of all the participants in the Grand Alliance, or so Stalin believed.

Conclusion

When the Second World War began in September 1939, Stalin’s vision of the peace was a postwar world dominated by a Soviet-German alliance. After the German attack on Russia in June 1941, Stalin’s vision of a great power peace shifted to the idea of an enduring Grand Alliance among Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. At the same time, Stalin expected radical political change in Europe that would favor the Soviet and Communist cause. He also envisaged an ethnic reordering of Europe that would stabilize the continent’s borders, not least those of the Soviet Union. In this context, Stalin sought Slavic unity and an alliance of Slavic states as both a bulwark against a German revival and an insurance policy against the collapse of the Grand Alliance.

    The fate of Stalin’s vision of the peace was mixed. The Grand Alliance broke up after the war, but the ensuing Cold War proved to be a relatively stable and peaceful international order. By the 1950s, the Soviets found themselves facing a rearmed West Germany, but the German threat was contained by the country’s integration into North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the countervailing power of the Warsaw Pact. Aided by Soviet power, the Communist advance in eastern Europe was considerable, but the Communist challenge in western Europe had faded by the late 1940s. Postwar Europe was (and still is) a continent of independent sovereign states, but the ethnic reordering envisaged by Stalin remained incomplete. There was an alliance of Slavic states after the Second World War, but it was held together by Communist politics and Moscow’s rule rather than any sense of Slavic solidarity. Contrary to Stalin’s ultimate vision of a global Soviet socialist order, it was the Soviet Union that collapsed after four decades of Cold War, and it was capitalism not Communism that prevailed in the long run.

NOTES

        1. The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, ed. I. Banac (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 115–16.

        2. Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki 1939 god, t. 22, kn. 2 (Moscow: MO, 1992), 606–17. It should be noted that these arrangements still left a lot of Poles in western Ukraine and many Ukrainians in German-occupied Poland.

        3. Nazi-Soviet Relations (New York: Didier, 1948), 105–07.

        4. J. T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

        5. T. S. Ilarionova, “Obem Naseleniem mezhdu SSSR i Germaniei Nakanune i Nachale Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny,” Otechestvennaia Istoriia, 2004, no. 4.

        6. Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki 1939 god, t. 22, kn. 2, p. 609.

        7. Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki 1940–1941, t. 23, kn. 1 (Moscow: MO, 1995), doc. 240.

        8. Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki, t. 23, kn. 2 (Moscow: MO, 1998), doc. 491.

        9. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 258–59.

        10. J. Erickson, “Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930–1941,” in Knowing One’s Enemies, ed. Ernest R. May (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 414.

        11. The relevant documents may be found in War and Diplomacy: The Making of the Grand Alliance, ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1996).

        12. Ibid., 54.

        13. SSSR i Germanskii Vopros, 1941–1949, t. 1, ed. G. Kynin and J. Laufer (Moscow: MO, 1996), docs. 15, 18, 38.

        14. Rzheshevsky, doc. 36.

        15. Ibid., doc. 38.

        16. Ibid., doc. 63.

        17. Ibid., doc. 68.

        18. Ibid., doc. 82.

        19. The Soviet preparatory documents may be found in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, fond (f.) 6, opis’ (op.) 5b, papka (pap.) 39, delo (d.) 1–6, and pap. 40, d. 11.

        20. For the Soviet record of the conference proceedings: Moskovskaia Konferentsiia Ministrov Inostrannykh Del SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984).

        21. Tegeranskaia Konferentsiia Rukovoditelei Trekh Souznykh Derzhav—SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), doc. 56.

        22. The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949), 777. See also Tegeranskaia Konferentsiia, doc. 54.

        23. Public Record Office, PREM 3/136/11/75892

        24. On Stalin at the wartime summits see G. Roberts, “Stalin at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 4 (2007).

        25. Cited by V. Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 132.

        26. Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskogo Soiuza v Period Otechestvennoi Voiny, t. 2 (Moscow: Ogiz, 1946), 66–79.

        27. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, f. 2, op. 1, d. 4. The preparatory materials and drafts of Molotov’s speech may be found in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 82, op. 2, d. 271.

        28. Ibid., d. 271, list (l.) 130.

        29. Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskogo Soiuza v Period Otechestvennoi Voiny, t. 1 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1944), 372–76.

        30. “Peregovory E.Benesha v Moskve (Dekabr’ 1943g.),” Voprosy Istorii 1 and 3 (2001).

        31. Stalin and the Cold War, 1945–1953: A Cold War International History Project Documentary Reader (September 1999), 3.

        32. Ibid., 130.

        33. The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 357–58.

        34. “Diary of V. A. Malyshev,” Istochnik 5 (1997), 128.

        35. See H. Kohn, “Pan-Slavism and World War II,” American Political Science Review 46, no. 3 (1952), and “‘Pered Komitetom Stavilis’ Sledushchie Zadachi...’: Vseslavianskii Komitet v 1941–1945 gg.,” Istoricheskii Arkhiv 3 (2010).

        36. “Stalin, Czechoslovakia and the Marshall Plan: New Documentation from Czechoslovak Archives,” Bohemia, Bd. 32 (2002).

        37. O.A. Rzheshevsky, Stalin i Cherchill’ (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), doc. 162. This volume also contains the Soviet records of the Stalin-Churchill conversations, including the percentages discussion.

        38. See G. Roberts, “Stalin and the Katyn Massacre” in Stalin: His Times and Ours, ed. G. Roberts (Dublin: Irish Association for Russian and East European Studies, 2005).

        39. Siracusa, “The Meaning of Tolstoy: Churchill, Stalin and the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,” Diplomatic History (fall 1979), 449.

        40. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 283, l. 84.

        41. Cited by E. van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin (London: Routledge, 2002), 232. A detailed study of the transfer, with documents, is V. Mar’ina, Zakarpatskaia Ukraina (Podkarpatskaia Rus’) v Politike Vnesha i Stalina (Moscow: Novyi Khrongraf, 2003).

        42. Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials, vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson, 1945), 25–33.

        43. Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Atlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–1945 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), vol. 2, doc. 227.

        44. SSSR i Germanskii Vopros, doc. 144. See further G. Roberts, “Stalin at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam.”

        45. “Istoricheskie Resheniia Krymskoi Konferentsi,” Pravda, 13 February 1945, and “Krymskaia Konferentsiia Rukovoditelei Trekh Souznykj Derzhav,” Izvestiia, 13 February 1945.

        46. SSSR i Germanskii Vopros, doc. 154.

        47. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, Container 178, Chronological File 10–13/4/45.

        48. Stalin’s Correspondence, doc. 291, p. 214.

        49. See further G. Roberts, “Sexing up the Cold War: New Evidence on the Molotov-Truman Talks of April 1945,” Cold War History 4, no. 3 (2004), 105–25.

        50. Russko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia v XX Veke, t. 4, kn. 2 (Moscow: PIM, 2000), doc. 657.

        51. Ibid., doc. 660.

        52. D. Holloway, “Jockeying for Position in the Postwar World: Soviet Entry into the War with Japan in August 1945,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The End of the Pacific War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 145–88.

        53. For example, the editorials published in Pravda and Izvestiia on 3 August 1945, both under the headline “Berlinskaia Konferentsiia Trekh Derzhav.”

        54. Cited by R. B. Levering, V. O. Pechatnov et al., Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 105.

        55. Cited by L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Doneseniia Ugoslavskogo Posla v Moskve o Otsenkak Rukovodstvom SSSR Potsdamskoi Konferentsii i Polozheniia v Vostochnoi Evrope,” Slavianovedenie, 1994, no. 1.

        56. The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 377.

11

Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Establishment of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1941–1948

Mark Kramer

Soviet policy in eastern Europe during the final year of the Second World War and the first years thereafter had a profound impact on global politics.¹ The clash of Soviet and Western objectives in eastern Europe was submerged for a while after the war, but by March 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill felt compelled to warn in his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, that “an ‘Iron Curtain’ has descended across the Continent” of Europe. At the time of Churchill’s remarks, the Soviet Union had not yet decisively pushed for the imposition of Communist rule in most east European countries. Although Communist officials were already on the ascendance throughout eastern Europe, non-Communist politicians were still on the scene. By the spring of 1948, however, Communist regimes had gained sway throughout the region. Those regimes aligned themselves with the Soviet Union on all foreign policy matters and embarked on Stalinist transformations of their social, political, and economic systems. Even after a bitter rift emerged between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the other east European countries remained firmly within Moscow’s sphere.

    By reassessing Soviet aims and concrete actions in eastern Europe from the mid-1940s through the early 1950s, this chapter touches on larger questions about the origins and intensity of the Cold War. It aims to show that domestic politics and postwar exigencies in the Soviet Union, along with Joseph Stalin’s external ambitions, decisively shaped Soviet relations with eastern Europe. Stalin’s adoption of increasingly repressive and xenophobic policies at home and his determination to quell armed insurgencies in areas annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of the war were matched by his embrace of a harder line vis-à-vis eastern Europe. This internal-external dynamic was not wholly divorced from the larger East-West context, but it was to a certain degree independent of it. At the same time, the shift in Soviet policy toward eastern Europe was bound to have a detrimental impact on Soviet relations with the leading Western countries, which had tried to avert the imposition of Stalinist regimes in eastern Europe. The final breakdown of the Soviet Union’s wartime alliance with the United States and Great Britain was for Stalin an unwelcome but acceptable price to pay. Although he initially had hoped to maintain a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States and Britain after the Second World War, he was willing to sacrifice that objective as he consolidated his hold over eastern Europe.

    The chapter begins by describing the historical context of Soviet relations with the east European countries, particularly the events of the Second World War, as these helped to shape Stalin’s policies and goals after the war. It then discusses the way Communism was established in eastern Europe in the second half of the 1940s. Although the process varied from country to country, the discussion highlights similarities and differences. The final section offers conclusions about Stalin’s policy and the emergence of the east European Communist regimes.

    The analysis here draws extensively on newly available archival materials and memoirs from the former Communist world. For many years after 1945, Western scholars had to rely exclusively on Western archives and on published Soviet, east European, and Western sources. Until the early 1990s, the postwar archives of the Soviet Union and of the Communist states of eastern Europe were sealed to all outsiders. But after the demise of Communism in eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Soviet archives were partly opened and the east European archives were more extensively opened. Despite the lack of access to several of the most crucial archives in Moscow—the Presidential Archive, the Foreign Intelligence Archive, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service, and the Main Archive of the Ministry of Defense—valuable anthologies of documents pertaining to Soviet–east European relations during the Stalin era, including many important items from the inaccessible archives, have been published in Russia over the past decade.² Many other first-rate collections of declassified documents have been published or made available online in all of the east European countries. In the West as well, some extremely important collections of documents concerning Soviet policy in eastern Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s have only recently become available. Of particular note are declassified transcriptions of Soviet cables that were intercepted and decrypted by U.S. and British intelligence agencies.

The Historical Setting

The Bolshevik takeover in Russia in November 1917 and the conclusion of the First World War a year later radically altered the political complexion of east central Europe.³ Under the Versailles Treaty and other postwar accords, many new states were created out of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. Some of these new entities—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Estonia, and Latvia—had never existed before as independent states. Others, such as Poland and Lithuania, had not been independent since the pre-Napoleonic era. Germany, which since Bismarck’s time had been the most dynamic European country, was relegated to a subordinate status. The new Bolshevik government in Russia was able to maintain itself in power, but was badly weakened by the vast amount of territory lost to Germany in the closing months of the war (some of which was recovered after Germany’s defeat) and then by the chaos that engulfed Russia during its civil war from 1918 to 1921. The extent of Soviet Russia’s weakness was evident when a military conflict erupted with Poland in 1919–20. The Soviet regime was forced to cede parts of Ukraine and Belarus to Poland, a setback that would have been unthinkable five years earlier.⁴ Although the Red Army reclaimed some of the forfeited territory after the First World War, the new Soviet state was still a good deal smaller along its western flank than the tsarist empire had been.⁵

    During the interwar period, attitudes toward the Soviet Union differed widely among the countries of eastern Europe.⁶ The repressive policies and revolutionary rhetoric of the Bolshevik government, as well as the fierce competition for influence waged by the Germanic states and tsarist Russia in eastern Europe since the late eighteenth century, shaped many people’s perceptions of the newly constituted Soviet Union. Some east European leaders in the 1920s and 1930s sensed a more ominous threat from the Soviet Union than from Germany. Several nations, especially the Poles, had bitter memories of Russia’s armed intervention against them during their struggles for independence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and those memories had been rekindled by the Polish-Soviet War. The different religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds of these peoples also had long separated them from their Russian neighbors. Moreover, the violent tyranny of the short-lived Soviet republic in Hungary in 1919 had aroused widespread antipathy, particularly among Hungarians and Romanians, toward the Communist system in Russia.

    Among other peoples in the region, however, sentiments toward the Soviet Union were distinctly warmer or at least not as hostile. The Czechs and the Serbs had traditionally relied on Russia as a counterweight against German expansion, and the Bulgarians were still grateful for Russia’s assistance in liberating them from the Turks in 1873. The influence of pan-Slavism continued to prevail among many Serbs, Croats, Czechs, and Bulgarians, prompting them to look favorably upon their fellow Slavs in the Soviet Union.

    Nevertheless, even for these normally friendly east European nationalities, developments in the interwar period engendered discord with the Soviet Union. In Bulgaria, Communist Party agitators linked to the Soviet-dominated Communist International (Comintern) led a failed revolt in September 1923 and then, in 1925, bombed Sveta Nedelya Cathedral in an attempt to assassinate Tsar Boris III. This latter action, which killed more than 100 people, provoked the imposition of martial law and a harsh crackdown on the Communist Party. Both events stirred deep anxiety in Sofia about Moscow’s intentions toward Bulgaria and the Balkans as a whole.⁷ In Czechoslovakia, unease about the Bolshevik takeover in Russia was so acute that the Czechoslovak government sent a legion to assist anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian Civil War.⁸ Over the course of the 1930s, as the human toll of Stalin’s policies—dekulakization of the peasantry, collectivization, mass deportations, and terror—became known, Czechoslovakia’s pro-Moscow inclinations were further eroded, thus largely ruling out the prospect of an alliance with the Soviet Union.

    The fear of the Soviet Union found among many in eastern Europe intensified throughout the 1930s, despite the growing realization of the threat posed by Germany. Even after Adolf Hitler’s expansionist drive for German lebensraum had raised alarm about Germany’s intentions toward the region, the Nazi regime’s strong opposition to Soviet Communism (and Hitler’s enmity toward Jews) ensured at least tacit support for Germany among large segments of the Hungarian, Slovak, and Romanian populations in eastern European in particular. Poland and Romania continued to reject any military alliance with the Soviet Union, although both had readily entered into such an arrangement with Great Britain and France.⁹

    The situation in eastern Europe took a sharp turn for the worse in March 1938 when Germany occupied Austria and incorporated it into the “Third Reich.” Six months later, Hitler began the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, securing international approval at Munich for Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland. In March 1939, Germany moved against the rest of Czechoslovakia, setting up a Nazi protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia and allowing a pro-Nazi government to rule nominally independent Slovakia. Simultaneously, Hitler forced the Lithuanian government to cede the Memelland to Germany, undoing a transfer mandated at the end of the First World War. Neither France nor Britain objected to Germany’s annexation of this region, leaving the Lithuanian authorities no choice but to sign a treaty codifying the loss.¹⁰

    The plight of the east European countries deteriorated still further in August 1939, when the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a treaty of nonaggression and simultaneously concluded a secret protocol to the treaty. Under the terms of the secret protocol, the two signatories divided eastern Europe into spheres of influence and pledged not to interfere in each other’s sphere. On 1 September, the German army invaded Poland, prompting Britain and France to declare war on Germany. Sixteen days later, Soviet troops moved into eastern Poland. The Wehrmacht initially encountered stiff armed resistance, but soon consolidated its hold over western and central Poland. By the time the Red Army entered eastern Poland, most of the resistance had been quelled. On 22 September, Soviet and German forces celebrated the conquest of Poland with a joint military parade at Brest-Litovsk, a small city on the demarcation line established under point 2 of the secret protocol. Moscow and Berlin established brutal regimes in their respective zone of occupation. Hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens were shot or deported, to distant Siberia and the Kazakh steppes in the case of the Soviets or to the nearby General Government (the nonannexed central Polish territories) in the case of the Nazis.¹¹

    Even as the Red Army was imposing Soviet rule on eastern Poland, Soviet troops also began establishing bases in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had enjoyed two decades of independence after the First World War. Over a period of several days in the first half of June 1940, Soviet military and state security forces compelled the national governments of these countries to comply with Moscow’s demands, eventually replacing them with puppet regimes that promptly voted for “voluntary” incorporation into the Soviet Union.¹² The same pattern was evident in the formerly Romanian territories of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which the Soviet Union occupied and annexed in late June 1940.

    The only major impediment to the expansion of Soviet rule in eastern Europe came in Finland, where the entry of Soviet troops at the end of November 1939 sparked a brief but intense war that exposed severe weaknesses in the Red Army, the result of Stalin’s purge of the Soviet High Command in 1936–38. Although the vastly outnumbered Finnish forces eventually had to surrender, the three and a half months of combat in 1939–40 inflicted tremendous losses on the Red Army, including at least 126,875 dead and 264,908 wounded.¹³ Stalin prohibited any public disclosure of the full magnitude of Soviet casualties and depicted the conflict with Finland as an unblemished success.

    Meanwhile, Germany expanded and consolidated its western and northern flanks in a series of successful offensives. In April 1940, the German army seized control of Denmark and Norway. That May, there followed the long-awaited western offensive, during which France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were occupied.¹⁴ Hitler followed these conquests with a renewed push into eastern Europe, sending troops into the Balkans, where they occupied Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941.¹⁵ From that vantage point, Nazi officials were able to compel Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria to accede to the Axis alliance. The Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian governments attempted to remain neutral in the run-up to the German attack on the Soviet Union, but they soon found themselves having to align more closely with Germany for both economic and political-military reasons.

    This trend accelerated after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Although Bulgarian troops were not sent into combat against Soviet forces, the Bulgarian government supported Germany in numerous other ways, prompting the Soviet Union to declare war on Bulgaria in September 1944 and to execute the Bulgarian regent, Prince Kiril, in February 1945.¹⁶ Unlike Bulgaria, the Hungarian and Romanian governments dispatched troops to fight alongside the Wehrmacht and to press irredentist claims. The Romanians promptly regained Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and stayed there until Soviet forces returned in the summer of 1944, at which point King Michael ousted Romania’s pro-Nazi government headed by Ion Antonescu and declared Romania on the side of the Allies.¹⁷ The Hungarian army suffered heavy losses, but persisted until war’s end, aiming to safeguard territory that Hungarian soldiers had seized from neighboring states in 1938 and 1939. The German-sponsored state of Slovakia contributed two Slovak divisions, some 20,000 troops, in the struggle against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944. In some cases, Polish guerrilla forces resisting the German occupation subsequently fought the Red Army as it crossed the interwar frontier along the Pripiat Marshes into what had been Polish territory until September 1939.¹⁸

    By contrast, Czech soldiers sided with the advancing Soviet troops, as did the Communist-led partisans in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Pro-Communist factions of the anti-Nazi resistance movements in most of the other countries under German occupation also received assistance and close supervision from the Soviet government and were often led by Moscow-trained emigrés. These Communist factions, having benefited from their identification with the nationalist cause and from their combat experience, formed the core of the region’s Communist parties after the war. The actual contribution of these resistance forces—and of others—to the victory over Germany was exiguous at best (German troops were able to neutralize local resistance movements through the use of unbridled violence), but the partisans successfully fostered the myth that they played a crucial role in helping the Red Army to defeat the Wehrmacht.¹⁹

Stalin and the New Postwar Context

The interwar period and the Second World War profoundly influenced Stalin’s approach to eastern Europe after the war. Although many aspects of Soviet policy toward eastern Europe were not yet firmly congealed in 1945, the broad parameters of Stalin’s postwar actions were already in place. Ten points about the formative experiences of the prewar and wartime years are worth stressing for the way they shaped Soviet policy after 1945.

    First, Stalin and other leading Soviet officials were determined to ensure that, at a minimum, eastern Europe would be converted after the war into a protective zone against future invasions from Europe and a safeguard against the threat of a revived German militarism.²⁰ The history of Russia’s (and later the Soviet Union’s) vulnerability to foreign invasion—the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, the Polish-Soviet War, and the Second World War—and in particular those by Germany, deeply colored the perceptions of Stalin and his subordinates. The defense of socialism at home, as they saw it, would require acquiescent border states, especially because the territory of the Soviet Union at war’s end had been expanded westward to the former boundaries of the former tsarist empire and even into regions that had never been under tsarist rule.²¹ The experiences of the interwar years, most notably with Poland, Romania, and Hungary, and Stalin’s feelings of betrayal and humiliation when Hitler broke the Nazi-Soviet pact, had further convinced the Soviet leader that he must prevent the reemergence of hostile regimes anywhere along the Soviet Union’s western flank. This objective did not necessarily require the imposition of Communist regimes in the region (at least in the near term), but it did presuppose the formation of staunchly pro-Soviet governments.

    Other considerations pointed Stalin in the same direction. The Soviet leader viewed the establishment of a secure buffer zone in eastern Europe as the best way to obtain economic benefits from the region, initially in the form of reparations and resource extraction.²² From eastern Germany alone, the Soviet Union extracted some 3500 factories and 1.15 million pieces of industrial equipment in 1945 and 1946.²³ Soviet forces also removed from Germany more than 17,000 tons of pipes and pumping equipment, more than 3100 tons of cranes and construction equipment, and 9723 railway cars.²⁴ Similar amounts of industrial facilities, manufacturing equipment, infrastructure, and transport systems (especially railway cars) were taken from Hungary.²⁵ In addition, Stalin regarded the east European countries as a foundation for the eventual spread of Communism into France, Italy, and other west European countries that in his view would be increasingly “ripe for socialism” as the benefits of the system elsewhere became more apparent.²⁶

    These diverse objectives—military, economic, and political—led almost inevitably to the sweeping extension of Soviet military power into eastern Europe, for Stalin had increasingly come to believe, in the oft-cited comment recorded by the Yugoslav politician (later dissident) Milovan Djilas, that “whoever occupies a territory [after the war] also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army has power to do so.”²⁷ Even though Stalin did not set out to establish full-fledged Communist regimes in eastern Europe overnight, he wanted to ensure that he alone would determine the parameters for political change in the region—an objective that required a large-scale Soviet military presence throughout eastern Europe.

    Second, in contrast to the experience of the interwar years, the Soviet Union after the war possessed sufficient military and political power to establish dominance over eastern Europe. In 1919, the Soviet government had watched helplessly as Béla Kun’s Communist regime was overthrown in Hungary, and in March 1921, the Soviet Union was forced to cede parts of Belarus and Ukraine to Poland. But by the time the Second World War had ended and the Red Army had occupied most of eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was able to use its armed forces to support Communist parties and pro-Moscow forces throughout the region. Complementing the Soviet Union’s vastly greater military strength was the direct political influence that Moscow had gained by overseeing the rise of Communist parties in eastern Europe, including those where Communist influence had traditionally been negligible or nonexistent.²⁸ The loyalty of these parties to Moscow was unquestioned, for most top east European Communist officials had been trained in Moscow and owed their careers to the Soviet Union. The large majority of Hungarian, Polish, Czech, East German, and Bulgarian Communist party leaders who came to power under Soviet auspices had been emigrés in the Soviet Union since the late 1920s and 1930s.²⁹ Many had served as informants or in some other capacity for the Soviet state security organs, a function that came in handy when the Stalinist terror began targeting foreign Communists. After gaining power, these officials more often than not remained steadfastly loyal to their Soviet mentors—a sharp contrast to the hostility Moscow faced in eastern Europe prior to the war.

    Third, although Soviet power in eastern Europe in relative terms was much greater after the Second World War than during the interwar years, the reverse was true for the east European countries. The independence and relative buoyancy of the east European countries in the 1920s had been possible only because the traditional rivals for overarching power in the region—Germany and Russia—had been temporarily eclipsed. By the mid-1930s, the revival of both Germany and Russia was well under way, and the east European countries were increasingly impotent and fractured. The Second World War exacted its heaviest toll in the eastern half of Europe. The territory stretching from Germany to the western regions of the Soviet Union suffered untold devastation and bloodshed. With Germany’s defeat, a power vacuum opened up in eastern Europe, which the Soviet Union was both determined and able to fill. Power relationships are always reciprocal, but in 1945, the Soviet–east European relationship was overwhelmingly one-sided. The establishment of Soviet dominance in the region after the Second World War owed as much to east European weakness as to Soviet strength.

    Fourth, the stance adopted by the United States and Great Britain toward eastern Europe during the Second World War undoubtedly bolstered a perception among Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union would have a secure sphere of influence in the region after the war.³⁰ High-level U.S. officials repeatedly sought to defer allied consideration of future political arrangements for eastern Europe until postwar negotiations, despite the reality that was taking shape on the ground. This posture led to a series of U.S. and British concessions on eastern Europe starting at the December 1943 Tehran Conference, where British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt acquiesced to Stalin’s demands for an east-west division of military operations in Europe and an “adjustment” of the Soviet-Polish border 250 kilometers to the west to the Curzon Line (a demarcation line proposed in 1919 by British Foreign Secretary George Curzon).³¹

    Significant as these concessions may have been, the real turning point came during the Warsaw Uprising of August–September 1944, when the non-Communist Polish resistance—the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK)—launched an insurrection against the Nazis in the expectation that the Soviet troops already on the outskirts of Warsaw would come to their aid.³² A broadcast on Radio Moscow International on the eve of the uprising had exhorted the AK forces to take up arms, declaring that “the time for action has arrived.” But when the fighting began, the Red Army refrained from intervening and instead waited for two months on the east side of the Vistula River before attacking the Germans. By that time, most of the AK fighters had either surrendered or been killed. The motivation behind Moscow’s delay became evident when Stalin also prevented Allied planes from airlifting supplies and weapons to the AK from bases in Soviet-occupied territory.³³ U.S. and British officials strongly protested the Soviet leader’s actions, but took no retaliatory measures. Nor did they take any action when Soviet troops, after driving out the Germans, began tracking down and destroying surviving AK units.³⁴ Stalin evidently interpreted the Western response to imply that, save for verbal protestations, the West would not, and indeed could not, deny him a “free hand” in eastern Europe after the war.³⁵

    This perception almost certainly increased after Churchill’s efforts to arrange formal postwar “spheres of responsibility” with the Soviet Union at his October 1944 meeting in Moscow, and after Roosevelt’s announcement at the Yalta conference in early 1945 that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Europe no more than two years after the war. The Soviet Union in the meantime was rapidly creating faits accomplis with its tanks and artillery in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Any lingering doubts Stalin may have had about U.S. policy toward eastern Europe were presumably dispelled when the United States held back its own troops for several weeks to permit the Red Army to be the first to enter Berlin and Prague, two events whose political significance was not fully appreciated by U.S. political and military officials.³⁶ Thus, long before the fighting was over, Soviet leaders had many reasons to conclude—accurately, as later events proved—that the Western countries ultimately would not pose a serious challenge to Soviet military and political hegemony in eastern Europe.

    Fifth, the role that Soviet troops played in liberating most of the east European states from Nazi occupation contributed in four ways to Soviet dominance in the region. For one, it stirred at least temporary gratitude from some nations in eastern Europe, particularly the Czechs and Bulgarians. For another, it induced the new east European regimes to continue to look to the Soviet Union for protection against German “revanchism,” a threat that was especially acute in Czechoslovakia and Poland in light of the territorial settlement at war’s end. The Sudetenland was returned to Czechoslovakia, and the region’s 3.1 million ethnic German inhabitants were forcibly expelled. Similarly, Poland’s borders were shifted westward to the Oder and Neisse rivers to compensate for the territory Poland lost to the Soviet Union, and there too several million Germans were expelled.³⁷ Furthermore, wartime operations provided the Soviet armed forces with a well-established military presence throughout the region. And finally, the Red Army enabled the Soviet Union to ensure that Communist officials and labor activists would lead the renascent east European bureaucracies and trade unions, which served as a foothold for the subsequent Communist takeovers. Stalin emphasized this last point as early as October 1944, shortly after Soviet troops had moved into Warsaw, when he told the leaders of the Polish Communist party that the presence of the Red Army would give them “such power that even if you say 2 times 2 equals sixteen, your opponents will affirm it.”³⁸

    These four factors ensured preponderant Soviet influence over the coalition governments established in the region in 1945–47. If Stalin’s only goal had been to establish a secure buffer zone along the western flank of the Soviet Union, the war was far more important than any peace treaties in allowing him to achieve it. To gauge the importance of the Soviet Union’s role in the liberation of eastern Europe from Nazi rule, one might simply note that the two countries in the region that could claim (rightly or wrongly) to have played a major part in their own liberation during the war—Albania and Yugoslavia—were also the only two east European countries that managed to break away from the Soviet bloc before 1989.

    Sixth, in several east European countries the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War was not favorably received. In Poland, for example, the 1939 German-Soviet Treaty of Non-aggression had engendered deep and lasting resentment toward Moscow. The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland from September 1939 to June 1941 was extraordinarily harsh, proving to be no better than the Nazis’ brutal occupation of western Poland during that same period.³⁹ Soviet troops and security forces deported at least 350,000 Polish citizens to Siberia and the Soviet Far North and arrested tens of thousands of others. Although mass killings were less common in the Soviet zone than in the Nazi zone, Soviet security forces acting on Stalin’s orders shot 22,000 Polish army officers and civilians at several sites in Belarus, Ukraine, and western Russia (including Katyn) in April–May 1940. Soviet soldiers also engaged in widespread looting, rape, and other atrocities. The Soviet Union’s actions during the Warsaw Uprising came as a further major blow to Polish national aspirations. Compounding the tensions between the Soviet Union and Poland was Stalin’s postwar annexation of the Polish provinces east of the Curzon Line.⁴⁰

    Equally bitter feelings toward Moscow existed in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany (after 1949, East Germany), where the defeat and Red Army occupation policy made it difficult for the indigenous Communist to gain even a semblance of popular support.⁴¹ Soviet leaders were well aware that for many years the Soviet Union would not be able to “count on the sympathies of the East German people in the way we would have liked.”⁴² Partly for this reason, Stalin in December 1948 instructed the leaders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), as the Communist party in eastern Germany from April 1946 on, to be content with an “opportunistic policy” that would entail “moving toward socialism not directly but in zigzags and in a roundabout way.” He said they must avoid any temptation to adopt a “premature path toward a people’s democracy.”⁴³ In an earlier conversation, Stalin had even suggested that the SED could bolster its popular support by allowing former Nazis to join its ranks.⁴⁴ SED leaders were dismayed by this latter idea, and they politely though firmly declined to go along with it. Nonetheless, the very fact that Stalin would have broached such a peculiar step was indicative of the fact that the SED was nearly bereft of public backing.

    Similar hostility toward the Soviet Union was evident in other east European countries. In a conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov in April 1947, Hungarian Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi acknowledged that Hungary’s new foreign-policy orientation and social order were fragile because “the Hungarian nation’s traditional fear of Russians still persists.”⁴⁵ One of Stalin’s closest associates, Nikita Khrushchev, made the same point later in his memoirs, describing Hungary and Romania as “our involuntary allies.” Khrushchev added:

    It was only natural that there should have been some resentment on their part left over from the war and the first years after the war. The Romanians and Hungarians had been dragged into the war against us by Hitler. Therefore our army, as it pursued the retreating Hitlerite invaders back into Germany, had attacked and defeated these other countries as well.…Because of the lingering hard feelings and even antagonism on the part of our allies, we found it difficult to achieve the desired degree of monolithic unity within the socialist camp.⁴⁶

Given the initial reluctance of most east European states to subordinate their foreign policies to Soviet preferences indefinitely, Stalin increasingly sensed that his goal of a pliant buffer zone would require the imposition of direct Communist rule throughout the region. This realization came at the same time that Stalin had already clamped down at home, undoing the partial liberalization of the wartime years.

    Seventh, the “political cultures” of the east European peoples—that is, their historically molded political values, beliefs, loyalties, practices, and expectations—were not amenable to the political system of Soviet Communism.⁴⁷ In the interwar period, all the east European societies except Czechoslovakia had experienced one form or another of dictatorship, but none of them had exhibited much popular support for a Communist alternative. Indigenous Communist parties, when permitted to organize, were generally of negligible importance in pre-1939 east European politics. Even in Czechoslovakia—the sole industrialized country in the region and as such home to the largest Communist party in eastern Europe—only about 10 percent of the vote went to Communist candidates in prewar parliamentary elections.⁴⁸ Although electoral support for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) increased sharply after 1945, reaching 38 percent in the May 1946 election, it clearly remained a minority party. The Communist share of the vote in the 1946 election was larger in the Czech lands than in Slovakia (where the Slovak Communist Party trailed far behind the Slovak Democratic Party), but even among Czechs, the results were due less to an intrinsic rise of support for Communism than to the disillusionment many Czechs felt toward the West for Munich in September 1938 and the gratitude felt toward the Soviet Union for its part in defeating Nazi Germany.⁴⁹ Moreover, Czechoslovakia was an anomaly in eastern Europe; in no other country in the region except Bulgaria had prewar Communist parties garnered more than trifling support; and in several countries, especially Romania, Hungary, and Poland, Communism was widely regarded as antithetical to traditional beliefs and values.⁵⁰

    Despite the enormous impact of the Second World War on the political cultures of eastern Europe, popular attitudes toward the Communist parties changed surprisingly little in most countries after the war. The destructiveness and horrors of the war, to be sure, had thoroughly discredited the sociopolitical structures of the interwar period and had spawned a general desire for far-reaching social change. Leftist parties had a favorable atmosphere in which to operate and seek electoral support. Nonetheless, the longing of most east Europeans for a sharp break with the prewar social order—a sentiment that was evident in France, Great Britain, and Italy as well—did not translate into support for a Soviet-imposed version of Communism. The popularity of the east European Communist parties had increased as a result of their participation in the anti-Nazi resistance and their advocacy of radical change, but in only a few countries (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) was this increase of major importance. Without explicit or implicit Soviet military backing, the Communist parties would not have been able to gain power in eastern Europe except in Albania and Yugoslavia and perhaps eventually in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, in most east European countries, the Communists would have been of little or no political consequence: in Hungary, for example, the Communist party received only 17 percent of the vote in the 1945 elections (despite Soviet browbeating), and in Poland, as Khrushchev would later admit, “the recognition that the Party received from the working-class and the people was never very deep-rooted or widespread.”⁵¹ Much the same was true of Romania and eastern Germany.

    Furthermore, even if popular support for Communism had been stronger, the puissant sense of nationalism underlying the political cultures of all the east European states guaranteed that external domination by the Soviet Union would not be accepted easily. Even in Czechoslovakia, the willingness of the KSČ to subordinate all its domestic and foreign positions to those of Moscow eventually alienated many of the intellectuals and others who initially had been sympathetic to the KSČ. Even for many erstwhile supporters of the KSČ, the party’s extreme deference to Soviet positions and the contrast between Czechoslovakia’s democratic heritage and the Stalinist dictatorship in the Soviet Union were too glaring to overlook. The consequences of nationalist sentiments throughout the region were enormous: more than anything else, the Soviet Union’s role in establishing Communist regimes and the continued subordination of those regimes to Soviet preferences and policies thwarted efforts by the east European governments to acquire genuine legitimacy among their populations.

    Eighth, despite the lack of widespread popular support for Communist parties in eastern Europe, the social upheavals engendered by the war and its immediate aftermath were conducive to the rise and consolidation of Soviet-backed Communist forces. The mass atrocities and destruction of the war and the vast social dislocation that persisted afterward were bound to affect the psyches of the local populations. As historian Jan Gross has argued, “the unwelcome familiarity with the violence unleashed under World War II regimes of occupation made the methods of Communist seizure of power in the subsequent period more acceptable than they would have been otherwise.” The prolonged, unspeakable violence from 1939 to 1945 led to what Gross describes as the “breakdown of social solidarity” and the “rapid collapse of the norms of civility.”⁵² The ruthlessness of the occupying powers—whether Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union—became the norm. In that atmosphere, the tactics used by the east European Communist parties after the war to eliminate their rivals and gain unchallenged power did not seem at all unusual. Political life was already imbued with violence.

    The immense demographic changes wrought by the war also worked to the advantage of the Communists. The deaths of some forty million people, mostly in eastern Europe, created unprecedented opportunities in the early postwar period for upward social mobility. “The legitimacy of Communist regimes,” Gross points out, “was enhanced because they could take credit for providing opportunities for mobility and for satisfying nationalist aspirations.”⁵³ The mass ethnic cleansing that followed the war gave a further boost to the Communists. More than fifteen million people in eastern Europe—Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians, along with smaller numbers of Hungarians and Slovaks—were forcibly transferred to distant locations shortly after the war.⁵⁴ The expulsions, which were approved and often instigated by Stalin, were marked by lawlessness and a heavy reliance on state coercion, setting precedents that the local Communist parties were soon to exploit. The property left behind by the expellees not only provided capital stock for industrialization and social reforms but also gave the Communists a ready supply of goods to distribute to prospective supporters. Moreover, the fragmentation and disarray of the groups of forced migrants who arrived in neighboring states under Soviet control eroded their willingness to resist new social “experiments” such as agricultural collectivization, a process that caused further disruption and upheaval. Many of the regions that were designated as new living areas for expellees, especially in Poland and eastern Germany, were at the forefront of collectivization and crash industrialization. The Communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia gained further benefits from the expulsions by depicting themselves as the only force in society that could defend against German revanchism and a hostile west. The heavy dependence of the local Communist parties on the Soviet Union normally would have been a serious liability, but by emphasizing the Soviet army’s role in deterring German territorial encroachments, the Polish and Czechoslovak Communists sought to convert this liability into an asset.

    One further element of the wartime social transformation that proved useful for the east European Communists was the extension of state control over almost all aspects of economic life. From medieval times on, as sociologist Charles Tilly showed, waging war has both necessitated and resulted in a huge increase in the power of the state.⁵⁵ At no time was this more true than during the Second World War, when the economies of the occupied east European countries were restructured and brought under state control to serve the military capacity of Germany.⁵⁶ Well before war’s end, the role of the state in east European economic activities had been drastically strengthened, paving the way for the complete etatization under Communist rule.

    Ninth, for both geographical and historical reasons, Soviet leaders attached special importance to East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia after the war. The northern part of eastern Europe had been the traditional avenue for Germany’s “impulse to the east,” and after 1945, Poland and Czechoslovakia provided crucial logistical and communication links between Moscow and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (later renamed the Western Group of Forces). Thus the perceived threat from West Germany appeared more exigent in those two states and East Germany, and to a lesser extent in Hungary, than it did in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, or Yugoslavia. Moreover, the potentially dynamic economies of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and the consequent ability of those states to become military powers in their own right ensured that they were regarded from the outset by Soviet leaders as the key countries in eastern Europe. Threats to Soviet relations with these countries, especially with East Germany, were always viewed with particular concern.

    Tenth, the subordination of the east European states to Soviet power enabled the Soviet Union to set the “political agenda” in the region. Territorial disputes and other conflicts that were so common before 1945—such as those between Poland and Germany, Hungary and Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the general phenomenon of “Balkanization”—ceased to be as important in an era of Soviet dominance. These sorts of conflicts were not totally absent during the Communist era, as the Hungarian-Romanian and Bulgarian-Yugoslav disputes illustrated, but they tended to be submerged and contained by Soviet power. To that extent, Soviet control of eastern Europe imposed a form of ostensible order on the region that could not have existed during the interwar period.

Domestic Political Trends in the Soviet Union and Their Implications for Policymaking vis-à-vis Eastern Europe

The Second World War had both short-term and long-term political effects in the Soviet Union that were important for policymaking toward eastern Europe. In the years leading up to the war and during the fighting itself, Stalin ordered mass deportations of many national and ethnic groups from their homelands to desolate sites in Siberia, the Arctic, or Central Asia.⁵⁷ In the swaths of Soviet territory that fell under German occupation, Stalinist political controls were temporarily replaced by equally harsh German rule. Elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the war brought a tightening of some political strictures (e.g., a drastic increase in the penalties for changing jobs and absenteeism) but also an end to the mass terror of 1937–39 and a relaxation of some of the long-standing restrictions on peasants, religious believers, and artists, especially in Russia. (No such relaxation occurred in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where local leaders maintained harsh controls as they sought to cope with evacuated industries and a large influx of refugees.⁵⁸) As the fighting drew to a close, many ordinary Soviet citizens were hoping that the privations of the war years would cease, and that life would genuinely improve as the country sought to recover from the conflict.⁵⁹ But soon after the war, Stalin came to fear that the Soviet Union was vulnerable to political “contamination” from outside, as soldiers and refugees returned home after having been exposed to “alien ideas” and superior living standards in the West. To ward off this threat and reassert tight control, Stalin brought back a series of draconian restrictions and reinvigorated the internal security organs, using them to send more prisoners to the Gulag. By 1946, many of the repressive measures of the prewar period had been revived—a trend that accelerated over the next six years with the resumption of political purges (albeit selectively), more mass deportations of national groups, a vicious anti-Semitic campaign, and other brutal policies. Although Stalin by the end of his life had not returned to mass terror, Soviet citizens’ hopes of enjoying somewhat greater political freedom proved to be in vain.

    Part and parcel of Stalin’s effort to solidify his own political control and to shield Soviet society from Western influence was his push for ever greater conformity in eastern Europe. His initial goal of creating a secure buffer zone against possible military threats did not require the imposition of Communist systems in eastern Europe, but as he became increasingly worried about the political-ideological “threat” from the West, he sought to close potential channels of “contamination” in eastern Europe. To this end, he pressed the local Communist leaders to “intensify [their] class struggle,” reversing his earlier emphasis on a step-by-step approach.⁶⁰ By late 1946 and early 1947, he had begun urging east European Communist leaders to abandon their cooperation with non-Communist parties and to take “bolder actions” to ensure the “Communists’ victory.”⁶¹ Unlike in November 1945, when the Soviet Union permitted free elections in Hungary that ended in a humiliating setback for the Communist party, Soviet leaders in 1946 and 1947 abetted the falsification of elections in Poland, Romania, and Hungary in favor of the Communists.⁶² By the same token, Stalin in mid-1947 prohibited the east European countries from taking part in the Marshall Plan.⁶³

    Stalin’s shift to a harder line in eastern Europe was spurred not only by his desire to establish a firmer barrier against “hostile” Western influences but also by his determination to crush underground nationalist movements in the newly annexed regions of the western Soviet Union. From the mid-1940s through the mid-1950s, the Soviet army and internal security organs devoted an extraordinary amount of effort and resources to a fierce—but sometimes only partly successful—struggle against underground nationalist “bandits” and resistance fighters in western Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and western Belarus.⁶⁴ Even after Soviet MVD units wiped out the main guerrilla forces in the early 1950s (a process accompanied by great cruelty and bloodshed, especially through mid-1948), some of the underground nationalist movements survived.⁶⁵

    The emergence of these armed resistance groups deeply angered Stalin, who demanded a “merciless campaign to eradicate them.” He frequently and harshly criticized the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Belarusian, Estonian, and Latvian party leaders and internal security forces for their failure to destroy the clandestine nationalist organizations in their respective republics. Stalin repeatedly ordered the governments of the Soviet republics to finish off the task as soon as possible, but his injunctions initially had little effect, as underground nationalists continued to challenge the Soviet regime. The Soviet leader eventually concluded that the task of combating the guerrilla movements would be greatly facilitated if the Soviet Union could enlist the help of several east European countries, notably Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and what became East Germany. Before the east European countries came under Communist rule, Soviet proposals for joint operations against resistance fighters in the western Soviet Union often were abortive or resulted in only limited help. In western Ukraine, for example, local party officials complained in early 1946 that they were “not receiving the timely assistance [they] needed” from Polish troops and security units and that this was “posing grave complications.”⁶⁶ Soviet leaders came to believe that wider and more sustained deployment of the east European security forces against “hostile, anti-Soviet elements” along the border with the Soviet Union would be infeasible unless Communists gained sway in those countries. This perception reinforced Stalin’s growing inclination to press ahead with the establishment of Communist rule in eastern Europe.

    Stalin’s judgment on this particular matter proved to be correct. By the spring of 1947, after Poland had been brought more firmly under Communist rule, the Polish authorities decided to move ahead in “resolving the Ukrainian problem once and for all.”⁶⁷ In a brutal operation known as Operation Vistula (Akcja Wisła), the Polish government removed the entire population of some 200,000 ethnic Ukrainians from southeastern Poland and deported them hundreds of kilometers westward to Poland’s new territories.⁶⁸ The deportations ensured that ethnic Ukrainians in Poland would no longer have any contact with insurgent groups in Soviet Ukraine (formerly eastern Poland), thereby preventing the insurgents from using Polish territory as a safe haven and source of supplies. Akcja Wisła thus enabled the Polish Communists to achieve precisely what Stalin had wanted.

    In other instances as well, the entrenchment of Communist rule in eastern Europe greatly bolstered the efficacy of joint Soviet–east European campaigns against nationalist guerrillas in the Soviet Union. This point was later underscored in a top-secret analysis prepared by the deputy chairman of the KGB:

    Direct contacts were established among the [east-bloc] state security organs [in the late 1940s], and they began to convene periodic meetings of their senior officials. As a result of this cooperation, the state security organs of the USSR, Romania, and Poland arranged joint measures to liquidate the bands of the [Ukrainian] underground and to safeguard their borders.…Cooperation among the state security organs of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR contributed to the [USSR’s] successful struggle against Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian nationalists. With the help of the state security organs of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, all of which provided valuable operational means of studying nationalist organizations and their agents, as well as means of uncovering lines of communications and their control mechanisms, the Soviet state security organs were able to infiltrate agents into the underground nationalist centers, recruit a number of spies within the nationalist organizations (OUN, NTS, etc.), establish control over the channels for setting up agent networks and over their communications, and achieve other aims.⁶⁹

Although armed partisan groups in the western Soviet Union were not fully extirpated until the mid-1950s, the turning point in the Soviet government’s struggle against clandestine nationalist organizations came with the ascendance of Communist governments in eastern Europe. This factor alone would have given Stalin a powerful incentive to encourage the east European Communist leaders to “act more boldly” in their “bid for power.”⁷⁰

The Entrenchment of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe

The emergence and consolidation of Communist regimes in eastern Europe proceeded at varying speeds.⁷¹ In Yugoslavia and Albania, the indigenous Communist parties led by Josip Broz Tito and Enver Hoxha had obtained a good deal of political leverage and military strength through their participation in the anti-Nazi resistance during the Second World War. Tito’s and Hoxha’s partisan armies had also fought against their domestic rivals throughout the war and were able to gain control of their countries as the fighting came to an end. Once in power, they quickly moved to establish Stalinist regimes that were closely modeled on the Soviet system.

    In Bulgaria and Romania, Soviet troops who had occupied the countries in the late summer of 1944 enabled Communist-dominated governments to assume power in late 1944 and early 1945. The Bulgarian and Romanian Communist parties had been of negligible influence prior to and during the Second World War, but the presence of Soviet military forces on Bulgarian and Romanian territory shifted the balance of political power sharply in favor of the Communists during the final months of the war.⁷² The new, Soviet-backed governments in both countries initially took the form of coalitions in which non-Communist parties were allowed to take part. But that arrangement was mostly cosmetic, intended to forestall any immediate frictions with the United States and Britain. No sooner had the governments in both countries been set up than the Communists began methodically eliminating their potential opponents, paving the way for Stalinist transformations.⁷³

    In the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, Soviet commanders and administrators did not move immediately to establish a Communist system, and Stalin repeatedly urged the leaders of the SED to adopt a “cautious approach.” From the start, however, the Soviet authorities took a number of steps that—perhaps unintentionally—ensured that the SED would eventually gain preeminent power.⁷⁴ Soviet forces also methodically continued to dismantle industrial facilities and transfer them to the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ By the time the East German state, known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was formally created in October 1949, a Soviet-style polity was firmly entrenched in East Berlin under Walter Ulbricht.⁷⁶ Stalin by that point had largely abandoned any hope of creating a unified Germany and had overcome his ambivalence about the desirability of setting up a Communist system in the GDR.

    Elsewhere in the region—in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—events followed a more gradual pattern. Local Communists who had spent many years in the Soviet Union returned to their native countries after the Second World War and worked jointly with fellow Communists who had stayed at home during the war and had taken part in the anti-Nazi resistance (or had kept a low profile). In all three countries, the resurgent Communist parties played a leading role in the formation of what initially were broad coalition governments that carried out extensive land redistribution and other long-overdue economic and political reforms. The reform process, however, was kept under tight Communist control, and the top jobs in the ministries of internal affairs went exclusively to Communist party members. From those posts, they could oversee the purging of the local police forces and armies, the execution of alleged “collaborators,” the control and censorship of the mass media, and the intimidation and ouster of non-Communist ministers and legislators.

    With the backing of the Soviet armed forces, the Communist parties in these countries gradually solidified their hold through the sedulous use of what the Hungarian Communist party leader Mátyás Rákosi later called “salami tactics.” “These tactics,” Rákosi told Hungarian Communist officials in February 1952, “involved the cutting out of reaction in slices from the Smallholders Party” and from other non-Communist groupings.⁷⁷ The basic strategy had been outlined by Stalin in May 1946 when he told the Polish Communists that “there is no need to rush.” He urged them to “move gradually toward socialism by exploiting elements of the bourgeois democratic order such as the parliament and other institutions.” The aim of these incremental steps, Stalin said, would be to “isolate all your enemies politically,” to “resist the constant pressure from reactionary circles,” and to lay the groundwork for a “decisive struggle against the reactionaries.”⁷⁸ Subsequently, as the pace of “movement toward socialism” increased, most of the east European countries became known as “people’s democracies,” modeled on the Soviet Union.

    Moscow’s role in imposing Communist systems on the region was strengthened in September 1947 by the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), a body responsible for binding together the east European Communist parties (as well as the French and Italian Communist parties) under the exclusive leadership of the Soviet Communist Party.⁷⁹ Because the Cominform was formally created a few months after U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall made his historic speech at Harvard University proposing a European Recovery Program (i.e., the Marshall Plan), some Western analysts have speculated that the enunciation of the plan is what spurred Soviet leaders to set up the Cominform.⁸⁰ Archival materials that have recently come to light in both Russia and eastern Europe contravene this notion. It is now clear that Soviet planning for an organization like the Cominform began in the early part of 1946 (and possibly earlier), long before the Marshall Plan was even contemplated, much less announced.⁸¹ The establishment of the Cominform was motivated not by the Marshall Plan but by Stalin’s growing conviction that the east European states must conform to his own harsh methods of dictatorial rule. Stalin’s determination to prevent any further “contamination” from the West in the Soviet Union necessitated the Stalinization of eastern Europe.

    The final stage in the establishment of Communist regimes in eastern Europe began with the seizure of power by the KSČ in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, aided by the Soviet embassy and with implicit backing from the Soviet Army. By this point, Soviet-style regimes were already in place elsewhere in the region or were rapidly taking shape. Both formally and informally, the newly emerging “People’s Democracies” in eastern Europe (as most of the states soon became known) were closely allied with the Soviet Union. Although Stalin ultimately withdrew his support for the Communist insurgency in Greece and refrained from trying to establish a Communist government in Finland or even a Soviet-Finnish military alliance, he pushed ever more firmly ahead in consolidating Soviet-backed Communist governments in the broad swath of territory stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans. By mid-1948, despite the sharp split that was about to emerge with Yugoslavia, Communist rule and Soviet power in eastern Europe had been solidly entrenched.

Notes

        1. The term “eastern Europe,” as used in this essay, is partly geographic and partly political, encompassing eight European countries that were under Communist rule from the 1940s through the end of the 1980s. All these countries, except for Yugoslavia and Albania, were formally allied with the Soviet Union until the start of the 1990s.

        2. Of the many document collections that have appeared, two are particularly worth mentioning, both published as large two-volume sets: Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953, t. 1: 1944–1948 gg., and t. 2: 1949–1953 gg., ed. T. V. Volokitina et al. (Novosibirsk: Sibir’skii khronograf, 1997 and 1999), and Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953: Dokumenty, t. 1: 1944–1948, and t. 2: 1949–1953, ed. T. V. Volokitina et al. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999 and 2002). The situation in the former East-bloc archives is far from ideal (especially in Russia), but the benefits of archival research usually outweigh the all too frequent disappointments and frustrations. For an appraisal of both the benefits and the pitfalls of archival research in Moscow, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3 (fall 1993), 1, 15–34.

        3. Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East, and Russia, 1914–1923 (New York: Routledge, 2001); Ruth Henig, Versailles and After, 1919–1933, rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995); and Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, 1919–1944, ed. Erwin Oberländer (Paderborn, Germany: F. Schöningh, 2001).

        4. See the useful collection of documents on the postwar settlement signed in March 1921 in Traktat Pokoju między Polską a Rosją i Ukrainą, Ryga 18 marca 1921: 85 lat później, ed. Bronisław Komorowski (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 2006).

        5. Dieter Segert, Die Grenzen Osteuropas: 1918, 1945, 1989—Drei Versuche im Westen anzukommen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002), 29–68.

        6. For a solid overview of this period, see Joseph Rothschild, East-Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1974). Other useful accounts include Alan Palmer, The Lands Between: A History of East-Central Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970); Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941, rev. ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1962); Hans Hecker and Silke Spieler, Nationales Selbstverstandnis und Zusammenleben in Ost-Mitteleuropa bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der Deutschen Vertriebenen, 1991); Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe Since 1918 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Die Krise des Parlamentarismus in Ostmitteleuropa zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, ed. Hans-Erich Volkmann(Marburg an der Lahn: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1967); and Wayne S. Vucinich, East Central Europe Since 1939 (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1980).

        7. R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria, Oxford History of Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 236–38.

        8. Victor Miroslav Fic, Československé legie v Rusku a boj za vznik Československa, 1914–1918 (Prague: Academia, 2007).

        9. Vostochnaia Evropa posle Versalia, ed. I. I. Kostiushko (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007); Anita Prażmowska, Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000); Anita Prażmowska, Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front, 1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Hans Roos, Polen und Europa: Studien zur polnischen Aussenpolitik, 1931–1939 (Tubingen: Schutz Verlag, 1957), 320–61.

        10. Petronėlė Žostautaitė, Klaipėdos kraštas, 1923–1939 (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1992), 372–81.

        11. Janusz Magnuski and Maksym Kolomijec, Czerwony Blitzkrieg. Wrzesien 1939: Sowieckie Wojska Pancerne w Polsce (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Pelta, 1994).

        12. Suzanne Champonnois and François de Labriolle, Estoniens, Lettons, Lituaniens: Histoire et destins (Crozon, France: Armeline, 2004), 121–35.

        13. See the secret report on the “lessons of the war with Finland” presented by People’s Commissar of Defense Kliment Voroshilov on 28 March 1940 to the VPK(b) Central Committee, Uroki Voiny s Finliandiei, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), fond (f.) 3, opis’ (op.) 50, delo (d.) 261, listy (ll.) 114–158, reproduced in Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 4 (July–August 1993), 104–22. For other important declassified documents pertaining to the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, as well as the latest reassessments of the war, see Zimniaia voina 1939–1940 gg. v dokumentakh NKVD SSSR: Issledovaniia, Dokumenty, Kommentarii (K 70-letiiu nachala sovetsko-finliandskoi Zimnei voiny), ed. A. N. Sakharov et al. (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2009); Tainy i uroki zimnei voiny: Po dokumentam rassekrechennykh arkhivov, ed. N. L. Volkovskii (St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2000); Zimniaia voina, 1939–1940: Politicheskaia istoriia, ed. O. A. Rzheshevskii and O. Vekhviliainen (Moscow: Nauka, 1999); “Prinimaĭ nas, Suomi-krasavitsa”: “Osvoboditel’nyĭ” pokhod v Finliandiiu, 1939–1940 gg., ed. Evgenii Balashov (St. Petersburg: Galeia Print, 1999); Zimniaia voina, 1939–1940: I. V. Stalin i finskaia kampaniia (stenogramma soveshchaniia pri TsK VKP(b)), E. N. Kul’kov and O. A. Rzheshevskii (Moscow: Nauka, 1999); L. P. Kolodnikova, “Istoricheskaia pamiat’ o sovetsko-finliandskoi voine, 1939–1940 godov,” Rossiiskaia istoriia 5 (September–October 2009), 15–29; A. V. Voronin and D. G. Semenov, “Sovetsko-finliandskaia voina 1939–1940 godov v Zapoliar’e,” Rossiiskaia istoriia 5 (September–October 2009), 29–34; Ohto Manninen, The Soviet Plans for the North Western Theatre of Operations in 1939–1944 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2004); Ohto Manninen, Stalinin kiusa—Himmlerin täi (Helsinki: Edita, 2002); A. E. Taras, Sovetsko-finskaia voina, 1939–1940 gg.: Khrestomatiia (Minsk: Kharvest, 1999); Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen, ed. Jari Leskinen and Antti Juutilainen (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1999); Robert Edwards, Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939–1940 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006); Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939–40 (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Ot voiny k miru: SSSR i Finliandiia v 1939–1944 gg.: Sbornik statei, ed. V. N. Baryshnikova et al. (St. Petersburg, Russia: Izdatel’stvo S.-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 2006), 47–172, and the very useful bibliography on pp. 425–51; and M. I. Semiriaga, “‘Asimmetrichnaia voina’: K 50-letiiu okonchaniia sovetsko-flnliandskoi voiny (1939–1940 gg.),” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo 4 (1990), 116–23.

        14. 10 mai–25 juin 1940: La campagne de France, ed. Jacques Enfer (Paris: Barré et Dayez, 1990).

        15. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

        16. Petur Delev, Bulgariya v godinite na Vtorata svetovna voina, 1939–1945 (Varna: Liternet, 2006).

        17. Nicholas Dima, From Moldavia to Moldova: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1991), chap. 2. This book is a revised version of Dima’s Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly Monographs, 1984).

        18. See Nikolai Bulganin’s on-site report on this fighting in Tov. Vyshinskomu, Telephone Cable (Top Secret), 3 November 1944, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 07, op. 5, papka (p.) d. 119, ll. 8–9.

        19. For an excellent account of the Germans’ ruthless suppression of the resistance movements, see Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2008).

        20. This is evident from the preliminary materials released from Stalin’s personal archive (lichnyi fond), parts of which were transferred in 1999 from the Russian Presidential Archive to the former Central Party Archive, now known as the Russian State Archive for Social-Political History. Unfortunately, nearly all of the files in Stalin’s lichnyi fond pertaining to foreign policy, military affairs, and foreign intelligence are still off-limits. Vladimir Pechatnov’s two-part article, based on privileged access to classified files, sheds fascinating light on Stalin’s views about foreign affairs at the outset of the Cold War. See “‘Soiuzniki nazhimaiut na tebia dlia togo, chtoby slomit’ u tebia voliu...’: Perepiska Stalina s Molotovym i drugimi chlenami Politbiuro po vneshnepoliticheskim voprosam v sentiabre–dekabre 1945 g.,” Istochnik 2 (1999), 70–85, and “‘Na etom voprose my slomaem ikh anti-sovetskoe uporstvo...’: Iz perepiski Stalina s Molotovym po vneshnepoliticheskim delam v 1946 godu,” Istochnik 3 (1999), 92–104. See, for example, the accounts in N. S. Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’—Vospominaniia, t. 2 (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999), 313–82; and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 30–31. I cross-checked the published version of Khrushchev’s memoirs with the full 3600-page, marked-up Russian transcript, which was given to me by Khrushchev’s son Sergei. I also listened to the original recordings of Khrushchev’s reminiscences, copies of which are now stored at both Columbia University and Brown University.

        21. “I. V. Stalin o rechi U. Cherchillia: Otvety korrespondentu ‘Pravdy’,” Pravda, 14 March 1946, p. 1. By war’s end, the Soviet Union not only had annexed the three Baltic states but had also acquired territory from Poland, Germany (East Prussia), Czechoslovakia (Transcarpathia), Hungary, Romania, and Finland.

        22. See, for example, Stalin’s comments in Zapis’ besedy tov. I. V. Stalin s pravitel’stvennoi delegatsiei Vengrii, 10 aprelia 1946 g., Transcript of Conversation (Top Secret), 10 April 1946, in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 293, ll. 2–16.

        23. Data cited in speech by A. A. Kuznetsov, VKP(b) Central Committee Secretary, to a closed meeting of the VKP(b) Department for Propaganda and Agitation, 9 December 1946, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 121, d. 640, l. 5.

        24. Bogdan Musial, Stalins Beutezug: Die Plünderung Deutschlands und der Aufstieg der Sowjetunion zur Weltmacht (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2010), 289–91.

        25. Azon vállalatok jegyzéke, amelyeket a szovjet hatóságok teljesen vagy részben leszereltek és gépi berendezésüket elszállitották, amelyek nem szerepelnek a jóvátetéeli listán, List Prepared for the Hungarian Minister of Industry, 1945, in Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL), Küm, Szu tük, XIX-J-1-j, 31. doboz, IV-536/5, 116/45; and Feljegyzés az ipari miniszternek leszerelt gyárakról, Memorandum to the Hungarian Minister of Industry, 27 June 1945, in MOL, XIX-F-1-b 44. doboz, ikt. sz. n., both cited in László G. Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union (Budapst: Central European University Press, 2004), 150–51. See also László G. Borhi, The Merchants of the Kremlin: The Roots of Soviet Economic Expansion in Hungary, CWIHP Working Paper No. 28 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, 2000), 8–13.

        26. Silvio Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 2 (spring 2001), 3–27, here pp. 11–17.

        27. Quoted in Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), 90. The official transcript of Stalin’s conversation with Djilas in April 1944 includes comments very similar, but not identical, to the remark transcribed by Djilas, see Zapis’ besedy I. V. Stalina i V. M. Molotova s predstaviteliami narodno-osvobozhditel’noi armii Yugoslavii M. Dzhilasom i V. Terzichem, 25 aprelia 1944 g., in AVPRF, f. 6, op. 6, P. 58, d. 794, ll. 10–18.

        28. See the discussions of individual countries in The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949, ed. Norman Naimark and Leonard Gibianskii (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

        29. The major exceptions to this rule were Władysław Gomułka and Edward Gierek of Poland, Gustáv Husák of Slovakia, and Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania.

        30. V. O. Pechatnov, Stalin, Ruzvel’t, Trumen: SSSR i SShA v 1940-kh gg.—Dokumental’nye ocherki (Moscow: TERRA-Knizhnyi klub, 2006). For a still useful assessment, see Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 279–312.

        31. Jacek Tebinka, Polityka brytyjska wobec problemu granicy polsko-radzieckiej, 1939–1945 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 1998); Keith Eubank, Summit at Teheran: The Untold Story (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 445–70; and Detlef Brandes, Grossbritannien und seine Osteuropaischen Allierten, 1939–1943 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), esp. 487–563. On the history of the Curzon Line, see Anna Rogowska and Stanisław Stępień, “Granica polsko-ukraińska w ostatnim półwieczu,” Niezależne czasopismo kulturoznawcze JI 21 (January 2001), 23–40.

        32. For valuable collections of documents and perceptive commentaries, see Powstanie Warszawskie 1944 w dokumentach archiwów Slużb specjalnych, ed. Piotr Mierecki et al. (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2007) and Na tropach tragedii—Powstanie Warszawskie 1944: Wybór dokumentów wraz z komentarzem, ed. JanCiechanowski (Warsaw: BGW, 1992). For other recent assessments of the Warsaw uprising and its implications, see Włodzimierz Rosłoniec, Lato 1944 (Cracow: Znak, 1989), esp. 172–99, and Tadeusz Sawicki, Front wschodni a powstanie Warszawskie (Warsaw: PWN, 1989). Soviet policy during the uprising has come under scrutiny in specialized Russian journals, though primarily by military officers and official military historians who want to absolve the Red Army of any blame. See, for example, the introduction to the two-part series “Kto kogo predal—Varshavskoe vosstanie 1944 goda: Svidetel’stvuiut ochevidtsy,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 3 (March 1993), 16–24; 4 (April 1993), 13–21, respectively. Each part contains a newly declassified document. For other intriguing materials from the Soviet side, see “Varshavskoe vosstanie 1944 g.: Dokumenty iz rassekrechennykh arkhivov,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 3 (May–June 1993), 85–106, which includes seven detailed situation reports transmitted in September and October 1944 by Lieutenant-General K. F. Telegin of the 1st Belarusian Front to the head of the Red Army’s Main Political Directorate, Colonel-General A. S. Shcherbakov, who in turn conveyed the reports directly to Stalin. For a recent English-language overview of the Warsaw uprising, see Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw (New York: Viking, 2004). Davies’s book is solid and well researched, but is marred by numerous factual errors. Moreover, his decision to anglicize Polish names makes his account unduly confusing (and the publisher’s relegation of three separate sets of notes to the back of the book compounds the difficulty). Fortunately, these problems are not present in a Polish translation Jak powstało Powstanie ’44, trans. Elżbieta Tabakowska (Cracow: Znak, 2005). The Polish edition corrects most of the factual errors and places the notes with the text itself, making it much easier to follow.

        33. The goal of allowing the AK to be destroyed is spelled out candidly in Instruktsiia predstaviteliu Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov Soiuza SSR pri Pol’skom Komitete Natsional’nogo Osvobozhdeniia, 2 August 1944 (Secret), in AVPRF, f. 6, op. 6, p. 42, d. 551, ll. 3–6.

        34. On these campaigns, see the documents in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 67, many of which are reproduced in NKVD i pol’skoe podpol’e, 1944–1945: Po ‘Osobym papkam’ I. V. Stalina, ed. A. F. Noskova et al.(Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia i balkanistiki, 1994).

        35. See, for example, Stalin’s comments in Zapis’ besedy tov. I. V. Stalina s predstaviteliami pol’skoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsiei vo glave s S. Mikolaichikom, 9 August 1944 (Secret), in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 358, ll. 12–16.

        36. This was especially true of Prague, which U.S. troops could have taken quickly with minimal bloodshed. Berlin was a much different matter. A rapid U.S. drive toward Berlin would have required tremendous human and material losses, something the U.S. public would have resisted so long as those costs could be borne by the Red Army instead. Moreover, from a purely military standpoint, Soviet forces advancing from the east were in a much better position to capture Berlin, having reached the Oder River in early February. A U.S. push to take Berlin would have risked major clashes with Soviet forces, detracting from the overall war effort. Understandably, these military considerations underlay the recommendations of the supreme commander of Allied Forces, General Dwight Eisenhower, who favored the Elbe River as the dividing line between U.S. and Soviet operations.

        37. For a thorough reassessment of the border changes and expulsions, drawing on new archival materials, see Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

        38. “Protokoł posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PPR z dnia 9 pazdziernika 1944 g.” in Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR, 1944–1945, ed. Aleksander Kochański (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1992), 19–20.

        39. Okupacja sowiecka ziem polskich, 1939–1941, ed. Piotr Chmielowiec (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2005); The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939–41, ed. Keith Sword (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991); and Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

        40. Piotr Eberhardt, Polska granica wschodnia, 1939–1945 (Warsaw: Spotkania, 1992). See also Materialy “Osoboi papki” Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b) po voprosu sovetsko-polskikh otnoshenii, 1923–1944 gg., ed. I. I. Kostiushko (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia i balkanistiki RAN, 1997), 133–37.

        41. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

        42. Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’, t. 2, p. 326.

        43. Zapis’ besedy tov. I. V. Stalina s rukovoditeliami Sotsialisticheskoi edinoi partii Germanii V. Pikom, O. Grotevolem, V. Ul’brikhtom, Transcript of Conversation (Top Secret), 18 December 1948, in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 303, ll. 53–79, quoted from l. 69.

        44. Zapis’ besedy tov. I.V. Stalina s rukovoditeliami Sotsialisticheskoi edinoi partii Germanii V. Pikom, O. Grotevolem, V. Ul’brikhtom, Transcript of Conversation (Top Secret), 31 January 1947, in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 303, ll. 1–23, quoted from l. 11.

        45. Zapis’ besedy tov. Molotova s Matiashom Rakoshi, Transcript of Conversation (Top Secret), 29 April 1947, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1019, ll. 8–22, quoted from l. 14.

        46. Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’, t. 2, pp. 345–46.

        47. Cf. the excellent volume edited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist Societies, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1979). On different conceptions of “political culture,” see Richard W. Wilson, “The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches,” World Politics 52, no. 2 (January 2000), 245–73; Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972).

        48. Zprávy Statního uřádu statistického, t. II, Prague, 1921, p. 2; Zprávy Statního uřádu statistického, t. VI, 1925, p. 76; Zprávy Statního uřádu statistického, t. X, 1929, p. 87b; and Zprávy Statního uřádu statistického, t. XVI, 1935, p. 72.

        49. See Bradley F. Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

        50. For a useful discussion, see R. V. Burks, “Eastern Europe,” in Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, ed. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 77–116.

        51. Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’, t. 2, p. 319. On Hungary, see Peter Kenez, Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets: The Establishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, 1944–1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956.

        52. Jan Gross, “War as Revolution,” in The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949, ed. Norman M. Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 17–40, here 24, 26.

        53. Ibid., 23.

        54. See Mark Kramer, “Introduction,” in Ther and Siljak, Redrawing Nations, 1–41, esp. 17–19.

        55. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1990). See also Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–87.

        56. Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 1939–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

        57. Stalinskie deportatsii, 1928–1953, ed. N. L. Pobol’ and P. M. Polian (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond Demokratiia—Izdatel’stvo Materik, 2005).

        58. Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

        59. See Elena Zubkova, Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: Politika i povsednevnost’, 1945–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000). See also the declassified documents compiled by Elena Zubkova in Sovetskaia zhizn’, 1945–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003).

        60. Zapis’ besedy tov. Molotova s Matiashom Rakoshi, ll. 8–22.

        61. See, for example, Zapis’ besedy I. V. Stalina s G. Georgiu-Dezh i A. Pauker, 2 fevralia 1947 g., 2 February 1947 (Top Secret), in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 903, ll. 89–95.

        62. See, for example, G. P. Murashko and A. F. Noskova, “Sovetskii faktor v poslevoennoi Vostochnoi Evrope, 1945–1948 gg.,” in Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika v gody “kholodnoi voiny” (1945–1985): Novoe prochtenie, ed. L. N. Nezhinskii (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 93–94.

        63. For relevant declassified evidence, see Volokitina, Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, t. 1, docs. 224, 226, and 227.

        64. Countless declassified materials about the Soviet campaign against underground nationalist movements (and against nationalist sentiment in general) are available in the archives of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine (Kiev and L’viv). In Moscow, the bulk of documents about this topic in the Presidential Archive and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (in fond R-9478, Glavnoe upravlenie po bor’be s banditizmom MVD SSSR, 1938–1950 gg.) are still classified, but many important items have been released since 1992. For some valuable samples of the enormous quantity of newly available documentation outside Russia, see Vsem nachal’nikam UO NKVD Latv. SSR, Report No. 1/90ss (Top Secret), 14 July 1945, in Latvijas Valsts Arhīvs (LVA), fonds (f.) 1822, apraksta (apr.) 1, lietas (li.) 244, lapa (la.) 165; Ob usilenii politicheskoi raboty, povyshenii bol’shevistskoi bditel’nosti i boevoi viuchki v istrebitel’nykh batal’onakh zapadnykh oblastei USSR: Postanovlenie TsK KP/b/u, 18 April 1946 (Strictly Secret/Special Dossier), in Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kykh Ob’ednan’ Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), f. 1, op. 16, sprava (spr.) 50, arkush (ark.) 44–50; O nedostatkakh v rabote organov MVD, MGB, Suda, i Prokuratury po bor’be s narushiteliami sovetskoi zakonnosti v zapadnykh oblastiakh USSR: Postanovlenie TsK KP/b/u, 24 July 1946 (Strictly Secret), in TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 50, ark. 92–104; O nedostatakh bor’by s narusheniiami sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti i merakh po ikh ustraneniiu: Postanovlenie No. Soveta ministrov Ukrainskoi SSR i Tsentra’lnogo Komiteta KP(b)U, 24 August 1946 (Top Secret), in TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 50, ark. 122–132; and Sekretariu TsK KP(b) Latvii tov. Kalnberzin, Report No. 00293 (Top Secret) from Lieut.-Colonel A. Boikov, head of the military tribunal of the Latvian Internal Affairs Ministry, 26 May 1948, in LVA, f. 1219s, apr. 8, li. 102, la. 86–93.

        65. Spravka o sostoianii bor’by s ostatkami bandounovskogo podpol’ia v zapadnykh oblastiakh USSR, Memorandum No. 49/a (Top Secret), May 1952, from F. Golynnyi, deputy head of the UkrCP CC Administrative Department, in TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 190, Spr. 72, ll. 81–93. See also Spravka, Informational Memorandum (Top Secret) from N. Koval’chuk, Ukrainian minister of state security, 23 April 1952, in TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 190, spr. 72, ark. 94–96.

        66. Pro seryozni nedoliky v roboty orhaniv MVS ta partiinykh orhanizatsii po likvidatsii reshtkiv band ta pidpillia ukrains’kykh burzhuaznykh natsionalistiv v zakhidnykh oblastiakh ukrains’koi RSR: Postanovka TsK KP Ukrainy, Memorandum (Top Secret) to the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, 4 December 1953 (Top Secret), in TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 190, spr. 87, ark. 174–181.

        67. “Projekt organizacji specjalnej ‘Wschód,’” 16 April 1947 (Top Secret) from Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski, Polish national defense minister, to the Polish Workers’ Party Politburo, in Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa, Gabinet Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, 17/IX/140, in Akcja “Wisła”: Dokumenty, ed. Eugeniusz Misiło (Warsaw: Archiwum Ukraińskie, 1993), 93.

        68. For an excellent account of this operation and the larger historical context, see Timothy Snyder “‘To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All’: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 2 (spring 1999), 86–120.

        69. See the lengthy, top-secret textbook compiled by Lieutenant-General V. M. Chebrikov et al., Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, No. 12179 (Moscow: Vysshaia Krasnoznamennaia Shkola Komiteta Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, 1977), 485, 486.

        70. Zapis’ besedy I. V. Stalina s G. Georgiu-Dezh, 10 fevralia 1947 g. in RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 361, ll. 67–71.

        71. For a first-rate, concise overview, see L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Problemy Vostochnoi Evropy i nachalo formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka,” in Kholodnaia voina, 1945–1963 gg.: Istoricheskaia retrospektiva—Sbornik statei, ed. N. I. Egorova and A. O. Chubar’ian (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2003), 105–36. See also N. E. Bystrova, SSSR i formirovanie voenno-blokogo protivostoianiia v Evrope, 1945–1953 gg. (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2007); and the essays in Naimark and Gibianskii, The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe. Older monographs on this subject that remain useful are Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1956); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); and R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

        72. See Mito Isusov, Politicheskiyat zhivot v Bulgariya, 1944–1948 (Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Okhridski,” 2000); Lyubomir Ognyanov, Durzhavno-politicheskata sistema na Bulgariya, 1944–1948 (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata akademiya na naukite, 1993); Vesselin Dimitrov, Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in Bulgaria, 1941–48 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Ocupaţia sovietică in România: Documente, 1944–1946, ed. Flori Stănescu and Dragoş Zamfirescu (Bucharest: Vremea, 1998). See also the relevant documents in Volokitina, Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov; and Volokitina, Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope.

        73. Isusov, Politicheskiyat zhivot v Bulgariya, 190–227, 258–342; and Ognyan, Durzhavno-politicheskata sistema na Bulgariya, 137–201; and România—viaţa politică în documente: 1945, ed. Ioan Scurtu (Bucharest: Info-Team, 1994). On collectivization in Bulgaria (a country that was predominantly agrarian in 1945), see Kalin Iosifov, Totalitarnoto nasilie v bulgarskoto selo (1944–1951) i posleditsite za Bulgariya (Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Okhridski,” 2003).

        74. Jochen Laufer, Pax Sovietica. Stalin, die Westmächte und die deutsche Frage 1941–1945 (Cologne: Böhlau-Verlag, 2009), 477–610.

        75. Sowjetische Demontagen in Deutschland 1944–1949: Hintergründe, Ziele und Wirkungen, ed. Rainer Karlsch, Jochen Laufer, and Friederike Sattler (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2002).

        76. For a comprehensive account of the Soviet role in the eastern zone of Germany, see Naimark, The Russians in Germany. See also Stefan Creuzberger, Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politische System der SBZ (Cologne-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1996). Some extremely important collections of declassified East-bloc documents regarding Soviet policy in Germany during this period have been published since the mid-1990s. See SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941–1949: Dokumenty iz Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ed. Georgii Kynin and Jochen Laufer (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996, 1999, and 2004); Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1945–1953, ed. Rolf Badstubner and Wilfried Loth (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994); SVAG: Upravlenie propagandy (informatsii) i S. I. Tiul’panov, ed. Bernd Bonwetsch, Gennadii Bordiugov, and Norman Naimark (Moscow: Rossiia Molodaia, 1994); and Das SKK-Statut: zur Geschichte der Sowjetischen Kontrollkommission in Deutschland, 1949–1953, ed. Elke Scherstjanoi (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1998). For valuable memoirs by former Soviet and East German officials, see K. I. Koval’, Poslednii svidetel’: “Germanskaia karta” v kholodnoi voine (Moscow, Rosspen, 1997); M. I. Semiriaga, Kak my upravliali germaniei: Politika i zhizn’ (Moscow, Rosspen, 1995); and Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre mit Ulbricht (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1966).

        77. Mátyás Rákosi, “Népi demokráciánk útja,” Társadalmi Szemle [Budapest] 3 (March 1952), 115–49, quoted from p. 134. Rákosi originally presented these remarks to a session of the higher party school of the Hungarian Workers’ Party on 29 February 1952. He provides a remarkably candid description of the strategy and tactics used by the Hungarian Communists in their gradual seizure of power.

        78. Zapis’ besedy tov. I. V. Stalina s B. Berutom i E. Osubka-Moravskim, 24 maia 1946 g., 24 May 1946 (Top Secret), in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 355, ll. 330–62, in Volokitina, Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, t. 1, pp. 443–63.

        79. For a meticulously documented analysis of the origins of the Cominform, see L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Kak voznik Kominform: Po novym arkhivnym materialam,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 4 (July–August 1993), 131–52. See also G. M. Adibekov, Kominform i poslevoennaia Evropa, 1947–1956 gg. (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia, 1994). The voluminous files of the Cominform, from 1947 to 1956, have been available for research since early 1994 in Fond 575 at the former Central Party Archive (now known as the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History) in Moscow. Declassified materials from the Cominform conferences held in 1947, 1948, and 1949 are available in, Soveshchaniia Kominforma, 1947, 1948, 1949: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. Grant Adibekov et al. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998).

        80. See, for example, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (winter 2005), 97–134; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 103–07; Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27–28; Scott Parrish, “The Turn toward Confrontation: The Soviet Response to the Marshall Plan, 1947,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, March 1994), 32–36; and William C. Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 215–45. For more nuanced views, see The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After, ed. Martin Schain (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

        81. L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Forsirovanie sovetskoi blokovoi politiki,” in Egorova and Chubar’ian, Kholodnaia voina, 137–86.

12

Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet–East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948–1953

Mark Kramer

The June 1948 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) summit was a landmark event for the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia was publicly denounced and expelled from the Cominform, a body created at Moscow’s behest in September 1947 in order to bind the east European Communist parties (and the French and Italian Communist parties) under the exclusive leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. Although Yugoslavia had been one of the staunchest allies of the Soviet Union after the Second World War, tensions between the two countries had been developing behind the scenes for several months, before finally reaching the breaking point in March 1948. The rift stemmed from substantive disagreements, domestic political maneuvering, and a clash of personalities that pit Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, against Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Yugoslav Communists.¹ Documents released since 1990 indicate that the animosity between the two countries was far greater than Western analysts had previously thought.

    The most serious differences between Moscow and Belgrade had arisen over policy in the Balkans.² Stalin was increasingly wary of Tito’s efforts to seek unification with Albania and to set up a Yugoslav-dominated federation with Bulgaria—an issue that figured prominently in the final meeting between Stalin and Tito in May–June 1946.³ Although the relationship between the two leaders was not yet acrimonious, it deteriorated over the next year. Stalin was especially irritated by Tito’s failure to consult with Moscow and to wait for Stalin’s explicit approval before taking any steps vis-à-vis Bulgaria and Albania. After Yugoslavia neglected to obtain Soviet approval for a treaty it signed with Bulgaria in August 1947, Stalin sent a secret cable to Tito denouncing the agreement as “mistaken” and “premature.”⁴ Other Soviet officials warned that Tito’s “proposal for a federation of Balkan countries is far-fetched.”⁵

    Tensions increased still further in the first few months of 1948 as Yugoslavia continued to pursue unification with Albania over Moscow’s objections.⁶ Under pressure from Stalin, Tito promised in January 1948 not to send a division to Albania (as Yugoslavia had tentatively arranged to do after deploying an air force regiment and military advisers to Albania the previous summer in order to prepare the country to “rebuff Greek monarcho-fascists”). This concession, however, failed to placate Stalin. Tito continued his efforts to gain more control over the Albanian Communist Party. A plenum of the Albanian party’s Central Committee in early 1948 led to the takeover of the party by pro-Yugoslav officials “under instructions from Yugoslavia.”⁷ The result was consternation in Moscow. In February 1948, Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov warned Tito that “serious differences of opinion” about “relations between our countries” would persist unless Yugoslavia adhered to the “normal procedures” of clearing all actions with Moscow beforehand.⁸ Concerns about following “normal procedures” were at least as salient as any substantive disputes in the bilateral exchanges over the Balkans.

    A few other points of contention had also emerged between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early postwar years. In particular, Tito was far more willing than Stalin to provide military and financial assistance to Communist guerrillas in “grey area” countries, notably in Greece.⁹ Even before the split became public, high-ranking Soviet officials had privately conveyed warnings to Yugoslav leaders that a militant position vis-à-vis Greece might “cause an increase in Anglo-American military intervention.”¹⁰ On other issues as well, Tito had occasionally objected to what he regarded as the Soviet Union’s excessively conciliatory policies toward the West—an ironic position in view of subsequent developments. In private conversations with Soviet officials, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders expressed alarm about what they depicted as Tito’s increasingly “anti-Soviet views and sentiments” and accused the Yugoslav leader of “hostility” and “outright Trotskyism.”¹¹

    Nonetheless, the disagreements between the two sides, important though they may have been, were hardly sufficient in themselves to provoke such a bitter and costly schism. For the most part, the Yugoslav Communists had been unstinting in their support for Stalin and the Soviet Union until early 1948. Indeed, the steadfast loyalty of Yugoslavia on almost all issues—loyalty that was spontaneous and not coerced—was evidently one of the major factors behind Stalin’s decision to seek Belgrade’s abject capitulation as an example to the other east European countries of the unwavering obedience that was expected.¹²

Initial Soviet Efforts to Reassert Control

Far from demonstrating Soviet strength, Stalin’s decision to provoke a split with Yugoslavia would ultimately reveal the limits of Soviet coercive power: economic, political, and military. The Soviet Union and its east European allies imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and adopted a number of political measures to destabilize and to precipitate the collapse of Tito’s regime. The economic pressure was both bilateral and multilateral. When Stalin decided in late 1948 to proceed with the formation of a multilateral agency that would firmly bind the Soviet and east European economies, one of his main aims was to ensure stricter “coordination of [punitive] economic actions” against Yugoslavia.¹³ The new Soviet–east European economic organization, formally established as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) at a secret conclave in Moscow on 5–7 January 1949, was designed in part to help individual member states cope with the adverse effects they might suffer as they “drastically cut their trade with...Yugoslavia”—a concern that had been raised by Bulgarian delegates at the CMEA’s founding conference.¹⁴ The assembled East-bloc delegates also agreed to devise other “joint measures” that would place an ever greater strain on the Yugoslav economy.¹⁵ Over the next few years, the CMEA countries (especially those contiguous with Yugoslavia) steadily escalated their economic warfare against Yugoslavia and tightened their bilateral sanctions. This mounting economic pressure, however, ultimately came to naught. Yugoslavia turned to the West and to the Third World for economic assistance and trade (including supplies of energy, raw materials, and spare parts), and Tito successfully rebuffed Moscow’s attempts to force Yugoslavia to pay for hundreds of millions of rubles’ worth of aid supposedly provided by the Soviet Union in the first few years after the war.¹⁶

    Soviet efforts to encourage pro-Moscow elements in the Yugoslav government, Communist party, and army to launch a coup against Tito proved equally ineffective when the Yugoslav leader liquidated the pro-Moscow factions in these bodies before they could move against him.¹⁷ The Soviet and east European governments broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, annulled the bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance they had signed with Belgrade, and inundated Yugoslavia with radio broadcasts condemning Tito as a “fascist” and a “traitor to the socialist cause.” The broadcasts also exhorted the Macedonians and other ethnic groups to “rise up against the oppressive regime” and claimed (falsely) that widespread violent turmoil had broken out in Yugoslavia and within the Yugoslav army.¹⁸ The broadcasts were intended to demoralize the Yugoslav population and to spark social disorder, but they actually had the opposite effect of uniting the country solidly behind Tito.

    Nor was Stalin any more successful when he attempted to rely on covert operations to undermine the Yugoslav government. The Soviet state security and intelligence organs devised a multitude of secret plots to assassinate Tito, including several as late as 1953 that involved a notorious special agent, Josif Grigulevich, who had been posing under aliases as a senior Costa Rican diplomat in both Rome and Belgrade. The idea was for Grigulevich (codenamed “Max”) either to release deadly bacteria during a private meeting with the Yugoslav leader or to fire a concealed, noiseless gun at Tito during an embassy reception.¹⁹ Other plots, devised as early as the summer of 1948, envisaged the use of Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, and Albanian intelligence agents acting on behalf of the Soviet Union. In addition to these covert operations directed against Tito, Soviet and east European intelligence agencies spirited a large number of saboteurs and subversives into Yugoslavia in order to foment social chaos, to disrupt economic activity, and to incite a popular uprising against Tito’s government.²⁰ Soviet-bloc officials also smuggled in huge quantities of newspapers and leaflets in the various national languages of Yugoslavia urging “all true Communists” to “expose and remove the Tito-Ranković clique.”²¹ In the end, however, all of these clandestine schemes proved infeasible or were thwarted by the Yugoslav state security forces, which remained firmly beholden to Tito.

Soviet Military Options vis-à-vis Yugoslavia

The ineffectiveness of political, economic, and covert pressure on Yugoslavia left Stalin with the unattractive option of using large-scale military force, an option he never ultimately pursued. Stalin’s hesitation about launching an invasion of Yugoslavia evidently stemmed from many factors, including the prospect that Soviet troops would encounter staunch Yugoslav resistance, the burden of deploying large numbers of Soviet soldiers when the Soviet armed forces were already overstretched, the transport and logistical problems of crossing Bulgaria’s mountainous terrain into Yugoslavia, the possibility of provoking a war with the West (a concern that became more acute after the United States and its European allies began forging closer political, economic, and even military ties with Yugoslavia), and a belief that Tito could still be ousted by nonmilitary means.²² If Yugoslavia had been adjacent to the Soviet Union or had been located in the center of eastern Europe rather than on the periphery, Stalin might have been quicker to rely on armed force. Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin’s eventual successor and a participant in the deliberations on this matter, later said he was “absolutely sure that if the Soviet Union had shared a border with Yugoslavia, Stalin would have resorted to military intervention.”²³

    It is conceivable of course that if Stalin had lived longer, he would eventually have ordered Soviet troops to occupy Yugoslavia. There is considerable evidence that in the final two years of his life he was seeking the capability for a decisive military move in Europe, possibly against Yugoslavia. Initially, from 1948 until mid-1950, the Soviet Union and its east European allies made only limited preparations for military contingencies vis-à-vis Yugoslavia.²⁴ Declassified U.S. intelligence documents reveal that, as of January 1950, the combined armed forces of the four Soviet-bloc countries adjoining Yugoslavia (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania) numbered only 346,000 troops organized in twenty-eight divisions, or roughly the same size as Yugoslavia’s army of 325,000 soldiers in thirty-two divisions.²⁵ Even though Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania had been receiving substantial inflows of Soviet-made weaponry and equipment, none of the twenty-eight east European divisions had attained a high level of combat readiness. The documents also indicate that the Soviet Union at that point had only a token number of troops still deployed in Bulgaria and Albania and only four to six ground divisions (numbering 60,000 to 90,000 troops) in Romania and Hungary, equipped with roughly 1000 battle tanks.²⁶ Moreover, only one of the Soviet units, the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, which had been relocated from Romania to Hungary in mid-1949, was actually deployed near the Yugoslav border.²⁷

    The East-bloc divisions arrayed against Yugoslavia as of early 1950 would have been sufficient for relatively limited contingencies, but they fell well short of the quantity and quality of forces needed to achieve decisive military results in the face of stiff Yugoslav resistance. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded in May 1950 that the east European armies at their existing force levels would be “incapable of waging offensive war” unless they received much greater Soviet backing. An invasion of Yugoslavia, the CIA estimated, would require “a minimum of 25–30 Soviet divisions plus overwhelming air and armored support.” Anything short of that, the agency added, “would probably result in a prolonged stalemate.”²⁸

    Nonetheless, even though Soviet and east European military preparations for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia were initially modest, the mobilization of East-bloc forces that could have been used against Yugoslavia increased drastically during the final two years of Stalin’s life. This shift, which began in late 1950, reached a feverish pace after Stalin summoned the east European Communist party leaders and defense ministers to Moscow for a meeting on 9–12 January 1951. The gathering was held in complete secrecy and was not disclosed to the public afterward. Stalin and his chief political and military aides (fellow Politburo members Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Lavrentii Beria, as well as Military Minister Aleksandr Vasilevskii and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Sergei Shtemenko) took part in the meeting, as did the principal Soviet military advisers assigned to the countries around Yugoslavia. The full stenographic transcript of this four-day conclave has yet to be released from the Russian archives, but detailed notes taken by some of the east European participants reveal that Stalin used the sessions to call for a huge expansion of all the East-bloc armed forces, including those in the countries contiguous with Yugoslavia.²⁹ Soviet leaders had been emphasizing the need for sharply increased military deployments since early 1950 in their discussions with Bulgarian and Romanian officials, and at the January 1951 conference, Stalin extended this demand to the whole Soviet bloc and laid out a much more compressed timetable—a timetable suitable for a crash war effort.³⁰

    Stalin opened the meeting on 9 January by declaring that it was “abnormal for [the east European countries] to have weak armies.” He already knew from Soviet military and intelligence personnel that the armed forces of eastern Europe were in woeful shape. This assessment was amply corroborated on 9 January when each of the east European defense ministers presented a status report indicating that his country’s military forces were “currently unable to meet the requirements of a war.”³¹ Stalin warned his guests that “this situation must be turned around” as soon as possible. “Within two to three years at most,” he declared, the east European countries must “build modern, powerful armies” consisting of a total of more than 3 million soldiers. More than 1.2 million of these troops were to be deployed in peacetime in fully “combat-ready” condition, “poised to go to war” at very short notice.³² Another 1.85 million to 2 million military reserves in eastern Europe were to be trained and equipped for rapid mobilization in the event of an emergency.³³ Stalin’s blunt remarks at the conference clearly indicated that he believed a large-scale military confrontation in Europe was coming in the near future, and that he wanted to make sure that the Soviet and east European armed forces would be successful in any campaign they might undertake. Stalin was pleased that the United States had “failed to cope with even a small war in Korea,” and that U.S. troops would “be bogged down in Asia for the next two to three years.” “This extremely favorable circumstance,” he argued, would give the East-bloc countries just enough time to complete a massive buildup of their armed forces.³⁴

    Initially, most of the east European officials were caught off-guard by the onerous task Stalin was assigning to them. The Polish national defense minister, Konstanty Rokossowski, insisted that the force levels set for Poland could not be achieved “before the end of 1956.” Poland, he said, would find it “enormously difficult” to complete such a large buildup in the short amount of time Stalin was proposing.³⁵ The Bulgarian Communist Party leader, Vulko Chervenkov, expressed similar reservations. Stalin replied that “if Rokossowski [and Chervenkov] can guarantee that there will be no war by the end of 1956, then [a scaled-back program] might be adopted, but if no such guarantee can be offered, then it would be more sensible to proceed.” This rebuke made clear to the east European leaders that Stalin was not there to bargain over the terms of the expansion and modernization of their armed forces. Although many of the east Europeans remained uneasy about the strain their countries would endure from the pace and magnitude of the envisaged buildup, they knew they had no choice but to comply with Stalin’s wishes.³⁶

    No sooner had the conference ended than the east European governments embarked on programs to fulfill the inordinately ambitious numerical goals established for them by the Soviet High Command, which also oversaw a crash buildup of the Soviet Union’s own armed forces. The Soviet troop strength had been cut precipitously after the Second World War, declining to only 2.9 million soldiers by 1948 from a wartime peak of nearly 12 million. During the final two years of Stalin’s life, the size of the Soviet armed forces nearly doubled, reaching 5.6 million troops as of March 1953.³⁷ These new forces, many of which were equipped with the latest weaponry, were almost entirely located in the westernmost portion of the Soviet Union, including hundreds of thousands of combat troops who could have been reassigned to address any possible contingency involving Yugoslavia. The number of Soviet ready reserves also sharply increased, giving the Soviet General Staff the capacity to deploy more than ten million combat troops within thirty days of mobilization.³⁸ To ensure that the expanded armed forces were maintained at the highest level of combat readiness, the Soviet Military Ministry (as the Ministry of Defense was then known) issued new guidelines in April 1951 requiring commanders at all levels to enforce strict discipline or risk severe punishment.³⁹ The sheer scale and rapidity of this peacetime buildup were unprecedented, especially in a country that had not yet fully recovered from the damage of the Second World War. The vast expansion of the Soviet armed forces in 1951–53 allowed for military deployments that would have been infeasible in 1948–50.

    In eastern Europe as well, the results of the crash buildup were evident almost immediately. By January 1952, the combined armed forces of the four East-bloc countries bordering on Yugoslavia had expanded to 590,000 troops in thirty-eight divisions, or nearly double the size of the Yugoslav army, which had not increased at all since 1950.⁴⁰ The east European armies continued to grow at a breakneck pace during the final year of Stalin’s life, reaching the target goal of roughly 1.2 million soldiers. Furthermore, the quality of the weapons deployed by the Bulgarian and Romanian armed forces (and to a lesser extent by the Hungarian and Albanian armies) improved a great deal, as the countries received new tanks and planes not only from the Soviet Union but also from Czechoslovakia, whose highly advanced arms industry was placed on war footing on Stalin’s orders from 1951 to 1953. During the final two years of Stalin’s life, as the Czech military historian Jindřích Madry has pointed out, “the Czechoslovak arms industry was brought up to maximum capacity for what was seen as an ‘inevitable war.’”⁴¹

    The sharp increases in the quantity and quality of weapons deployed by the armies of the four Communist states surrounding Yugoslavia were not matched by a comparable Yugoslav buildup. On the contrary, Yugoslavia’s military forces were no longer receiving any new armaments, spare parts, munitions, or support equipment from their erstwhile supplier (the Soviet Union) and were facing a dire situation as their existing weaponry broke down and could not be repaired or replaced. Although Yugoslavia had begun receiving small amounts of weapons and military-related equipment from the United States and a few other Western countries by the early 1950s, these items were hardly enough to make up for the debilitating loss of Soviet-made arms, communications gear, and spare parts.⁴² In early 1952, U.S. intelligence analysts reported that the Yugoslav armed forces were plagued by grave weaknesses, including the “insufficient quantity and obsolescence of much of [their] equipment,” a “lack of spare parts and of proper ammunition,” a “severe shortage of heavy weapons, particularly of antitank artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and armor,” and a “lack of experience of the [Yugoslav] general staff in the tactical and technical utilization of combined arms.”⁴³ Thus, even as the Soviet and east European armies were rapidly expanding and gearing up for a large-scale military confrontation in Europe, the Yugoslav army was declining and was increasingly unfit for combat.

    The military buildup in the Soviet bloc was ostensibly intended to deter or, if necessary, to repulse an attack from the outside, but the Soviet General Staff assumed that scenarios involving a war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were not really separable from contingency plans for an invasion of Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ Soviet and east European preparations for a massive “counterattack” against enemy forces could just as easily have been adapted for an incursion into Yugoslavia if Stalin had eventually decided to launch one. As part of the buildup, the Soviet Union provided each of the east European countries with dozens of Tu-2 high-speed bomber aircraft, which would have played a crucial role in any coordinated East-bloc move against Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ Stalin had emphasized to the other leaders at the January 1951 conference that “you will need to have a bomber force, at least one division per country initially, to carry out offensive operations.”⁴⁶ As a further boost to the east European countries’ offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union supplied large quantities of Il-10 ground-attack aircraft for airborne assault forces, which would have spearheaded an attempt to seize strategic positions in Yugoslavia, including fortifications around Belgrade.⁴⁷

    Moreover, under Soviet auspices the armed forces of the four East-bloc states adjoining Yugoslavia conducted war games in 1951 and 1952 that envisaged “forward deployments” and “large-scale offensive operations” to encircle and destroy enemy troops on Yugoslav territory. The Hungarian army in its exercises was specifically responsible for “seizing the Belgrade area” and other strategic sites in Yugoslavia.⁴⁸ This task, though depicted in the context of a counterattack against an enemy occupier, obviously would have been an integral part of any joint Soviet–east European campaign to invade and occupy Yugoslavia. The Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces conducted similar exercises near their projected entry routes into Yugoslavia.⁴⁹ The Romanian government supported its army’s preparations in June 1951 by forcibly deporting more than 40,000 civilians from the Banat and Oltenia regions along the Yugoslav border to the forbidding reaches of the Baragan Steppe.⁵⁰ This mass deportation, which was closely coordinated with leaders in Moscow, was intended to remove “hostile elements” and “Titoist sympathizers” who might otherwise hinder Romanian military operations against the “reactionary Yugoslav state.”⁵¹ The Romanian army subsequently stepped up its maneuvers in the cleared-out regions, simulating large-scale thrusts across the border. By learning how to “organize and command large-scale offensive operations in difficult conditions on the ground and in the air,” how to “concentrate forces that are superior in troop strength and equipment to break through enemy defenses,” and how to “distribute forces for the optimal structure of attack,” high-ranking East-bloc military officers gained the training they needed for a prospective invasion of Yugoslavia.⁵²

    The rapid military buildup in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and the experience derived from war games meant that, from mid-1952 until Stalin’s death the following March, the Soviet-bloc forces confronting Yugoslavia posed a daunting military threat to Tito’s regime. NATO intelligence analysts reported in late 1951 that the east European armies were acquiring “significant offensive capabilities” against Yugoslavia, even without Soviet support.⁵³ A number of highly classified U.S. intelligence assessments in the early 1950s, which kept close track of military developments in the Soviet Union and the four Communist countries surrounding Yugoslavia, warned that “the groundwork is being laid for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia” and that a full-scale Soviet and east European “attack on Yugoslavia should be considered a serious possibility.”⁵⁴ Although U.S. intelligence analysts believed that such an attack was “unlikely” in the near term, they concluded as early as March 1951 that if Soviet and east European forces embarked on a concerted offensive against Yugoslavia they would be able to occupy the country, destroy the Yugoslav army, and, over time, quell all guerrilla resistance:

    The continuing military build-up in the neighboring Satellite states (increase in armed forces, stockpiling, re-equipment, gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry, etc.) has reversed the previous balance of military strength between the Satellites and Yugoslavia and has given the Satellites the capability of launching a major invasion of Yugoslavia with little warning.…Combined Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.⁵⁵

This judgment was reinforced by the immense expansion of the East-bloc armies following the January 1951 conference.

    To be sure, the Soviet bloc’s growing capacity to invade Yugoslavia did not necessarily signal an intention to move in. U.S. intelligence agencies in 1952 deemed it “unlikely” that the Soviet bloc would embark on an all-out military attack against Yugoslavia by the end of the year. Western intelligence assessments in 1951–52 pointed out that the various signs of Soviet and east European preparations for an invasion—the “rapid increase in the capabilities of the armed forces” in the four East-bloc states contiguous with Yugoslavia, the fact that the east European “countries adjacent to Yugoslavia have evacuated the majority of the civilians from key border areas,” the unrelenting Soviet and east European “propaganda [and] psychological preparations” designed to “justify an attack on Yugoslavia,” the increased registration for compulsory military service in the four East-bloc states adjoining Yugoslavia, the “recurrent concentrations of [East-bloc] troops along the Yugoslav border,” and the increasing frequency of border incidents coupled with “rumors from Cominform circles of an impending attack on Yugoslavia”—did “not necessarily reflect a Soviet intention to launch an attack upon Yugoslavia” in the near term.⁵⁶ U.S. intelligence analysts noted that these actions might simply be part of a larger Soviet-bloc effort to gear up for an East-West war in Europe, rather than being directed specifically against Yugoslavia. The analysts also surmised that if the Soviet Union genuinely intended to invade and occupy Yugoslavia, it would wait to do so until “the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Hungarian armed forces...complete their reorganization and reach maximum effectiveness” at the end of 1953 and until the Albanian military reached a similar state in mid-1954.⁵⁷ Stalin’s death in March 1953 came well before the reorganization of the east European armies was completed.

    Thus, even though Stalin was overseeing a huge expansion of the East-bloc armed forces and “laying the groundwork” for an invasion of Yugoslavia (regardless of whether that was the main purpose of the buildup), it is impossible to say what he actually would have done if he had lived another few years.⁵⁸ Despite the Soviet bloc’s extensive military preparations, and despite Moscow’s efforts to stir fears in Yugoslavia of a Soviet–east European attack, the available evidence suggests that Stalin never firmly decided—one way or the other—about a military intervention in Yugoslavia.

Reconsolidation of the Soviet Bloc

Short of launching an all-out invasion, the Soviet Union had to put up at least temporarily with a breach in the Eastern bloc and the strategic loss of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea. Other potential dangers for Moscow also loomed. Yugoslavia’s continued defiance raised the prospect that “Titoism” would spread and “infect” other east European countries, causing the Soviet bloc to fragment and even to collapse. To preclude any further challenges to Soviet control in eastern Europe, Stalin instructed the local Communist parties to carry out new purges and political trials and to eliminate anyone who might be seeking to emulate Tito. The repressions took a particularly heavy toll in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.⁵⁹

    The political purges that swept through eastern Europe in 1949–54 differed fundamentally from the repressions that took place in 1944–48. The earlier crackdowns were targeted predominantly against non-Communists, whereas the purges in 1949–54 focused mostly on Communists, including many high officials who had taken part in the initial repressions. The show trials of Communist leaders were intended not only to root out anyone who might strive for a degree of autonomy from Moscow but also to instill a general sense of fear in society. Both of these goals contributed to the mobilization of the East-bloc countries for war. The sudden discovery of alleged Titoist and Western “spies” in the ruling organs of the Communist parties created a war psychosis and fostered the perception that no one—not even those who seemed to be unwaveringly loyal—could really be trusted. Stalin had used this same approach in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s when he wanted to secure the home front in the face of an approaching war. By early 1951, he once again believed that an armed conflict was nearing, and he therefore transferred Soviet methods to the east European countries so that they could uproot the “Titoist fifth columns” in their midst.

    Within the Soviet Union, the drive against potential “fifth columnists” and the mobilization for war entailed a violent anti-Semitic campaign, preparations for a sweeping high-level purge (perhaps targeted against Molotov, Beria, and Anastas Mikoian, another Politburo member), and ruthless counterinsurgency operations in the western areas of the country. All of these policies, to one degree or another, were adopted in eastern Europe under Soviet supervision. The pronounced anti-Semitic overtones of the east European show trials, for example, were directly patterned on Stalin’s own anti-Semitic repressions. Similarly, the armed campaigns against anti-Communist guerrillas in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and elsewhere in the second half of the 1940s were based directly on—and pursued in conjunction with—the counterinsurgency operations in the Soviet Union’s western republics.⁶⁰

    As the East-bloc Balkan countries geared up for a large-scale external military confrontation in the early 1950s, they carried out mass deportations along their borders with Yugoslavia and arrested tens of thousands of people each year. In Romania alone, 6635 people were arrested by the secret police in 1950, 19,235 in 1951, and 24,826 in 1952.⁶¹ The aim of the deportations and arrests was not only to ensure that strategically vital border areas would be free of “Titoist sympathizers” and other “enemies of the people” but also to forestall any possibility of internal disruption. These policies, like others, were modeled closely on Soviet practices and often were directly supervised by Soviet state security officials who had organized mass deportations and arrests in the Baltic republics and western Ukraine. The deportations in Romania were larger than elsewhere, but the same basic approach was adopted in all the East-bloc countries adjoining Yugoslavia.

    Stalin’s efforts to prevent a spillover from Yugoslavia and to promote a common anti-Tito front had the desired effect. Soviet influence in eastern Europe came under no further threat during his lifetime. From the late 1940s through the early 1950s, all the East-bloc states embarked on crash industrialization and forced collectivization programs, causing vast social upheaval yet also leading to rapid short-term economic growth. The entrenchment of CMEA institutions ensured that this growth could be harnessed for Stalin’s own purposes.⁶² The drastic expansion of the east European armed forces in the early 1950s required an ever greater share of resources to be devoted to the military and heavy industry, with very little left over for consumer output. However, because ordinary citizens in the Soviet bloc were largely excluded from the political sphere and were forbidden to engage in political protest, they had no choice but to endure a sharp decline in living standards and many other hardships, both material and intellectual. No conflict between “viability” and “cohesion” yet existed in the Communist bloc, for Stalin was able to rely on the presence of Soviet troops, a tightly woven network of state security forces, the wholesale penetration of the east European armies and governments by Soviet agents, the use of mass purges and political terror, and the unifying threat of renewed German militarism to ensure that regimes loyal to Moscow remained in power.⁶³ By the early 1950s, Stalin had established a degree of control over eastern Europe to which his successors could only aspire.

NOTES

        1. The origins of the Soviet-Yugoslav split are much better understood now than before 1991, thanks to newly declassified archival materials collected by Leonid Gibianskii and other researchers in Moscow, Belgrade, and other east European capitals. See, for example, Leonid Gibianskii, “The Origins of the Soviet-Yugoslav Split,” in The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949, ed. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 291–312; Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 (2007), 32–63; and L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Ot ‘nerushimoi druzhby’ k besposhchadnoi bor’be: Model’ ‘sotsialisticheskogo lageria’ i sovetsko-iugoslavskii konflikt,” in U istokov “sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva”: SSSR i vostochnoevropeiskie strany v 1944–1949 gg., ed. L. Ia. Gibianskii (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 137–63. For an insightful and more extended analysis, see A. S. Anikeev, Kak Tito ot Stalina ushel: Iugoslaviia, SSSR i SShA v nachal’nyi period “kholodnoi voiny” (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia RAN, 2002), esp. 86–206. For a good sample of the newly available documentation, see “Sekretnaia sovetsko-iugoslavskaia perepiska 1948 goda,” Voprosy istorii, nos. 4–5, 6–7, and 10–11 (1992), 119–36, 158–72, and 154–69, respectively, as well as the multitude of relevant documents in Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953, t. 2: 1949–1953 gg., ed. T. V. Volokitina et al. (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1998) and Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953, t. 2: 1949–1953, ed. T. V. Volokitina et al. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002). The materials released in the early 1990s were discussed extensively in a number of articles at the time, including I. Bukharkin, “Konflikt, ktorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt’ (iz istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskikh otnoshenii),” Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR 6 (31 March 1990), 53–57; L. Ia. Gibianskii, “U nachala konflikta: Balkanskii uzel,” Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir 2 (March–April 1990), 171–85; I. V. Bukharkin and L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Pervye shagi konflikta,” Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir 5 (September–October 1990), 152–63; L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Vyzov v Moskvu,” Politicheskie issledovaniia 1 (January–February 1991), 195–207; and the related series of articles by L. Ia. Gibianskii, “K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948–1953 gg.,” in Sovetskoe slavianovedenie no. 3 (May–June 1991), 32–47, and no. 4 (July–August 1991), 12–24; and Slavianovedenie, no. 1 (January–February 1992), 68–82, and no. 3 (May–June 1992), 35–51.

        2. For an insightful discussion of this issue, see L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Ideia balkanskogo ob”edineniia i plany ee osushchestvleniia v 40–e gody XX veka,” Voprosy istorii, no. 11 (2001), 38–56.

        3. “Zapis’ besedy generalissimus I. V. Stalina s marshalom Tito” (Secret), 27 May 1946, in Arkhiv Prezidental Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), fond (f.) 558, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 397, listy (ll.) 107–10. The secret Yugoslav transcript of these talks, from Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, f. Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije, I-1/7, ll. 6–11, was published in Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 2 (1994), 24–28, along with valuable annotations by Leonid Gibianskii. The two transcripts are complementary for the most part, rather than duplicative. For more on Moscow’s concerns about the Balkan issue, see several dozen top-secret cables and reports to Stalin and Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov in Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), f. 0144, op. 30, papka 118, d. 10.

        4. “Shifrtelegramma,” no. 37-443-506 (Strictly Secret), from Stalin to Tito, 12 August 1948, in Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, f. Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije, I-2/17, l. 70.

        5. “Kratkaia zapis’ besedy Sekretaria TsK VKP(b) tovarishcha Suslova M.A. s general’nym sekretarem kompartii Vengrii tov. Rakoshi, sostoiavshaiasia 19 fevralia 1948 g.,” Notes from Conversation (Secret), transcribed by L. Baranov, 21 February 1948, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 128, d. 1165, ll. 59–62.

        6. See the valuable collection of declassified documents from the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive in “Stranitsy istorii: Konflikt, kotorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt’ (iz istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskikh otnohenii),” Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR 6 (31 March 1990), 57–63, esp. 57 and 59.

        7. “Informatsiia o vos’mom plenume TsK Kompartii Albanii,” Memorandum (Secret) to the VKP(b) Secretariat, from N. Puklov and P. Manchkha, 15 May 1948, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1160, ll. 6–7.

        8. “Iz telegrammy V. M. Molotova A. I. Lavrent’evu dlia peredachi I. Broz Tito 31 ianvaria 1948” and “Iz telegrammy V. M. Molotova A. I. Lavrent’evu dlia peredachi I. Broz Tito 1 fevralia 1948 g,” both of which are reproduced in the valuable collection of declassified documents from the archive of the former Soviet Foreign Ministry archive in “Stranitsy istorii,” 57 and 59, respectively.

        9. For useful analyses of the Yugoslav, Soviet, and Bulgarian roles in the Greek Civil War, see Peter Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Jordan Baev, O emfylios polemos sten Ellada: Diethneis diastaseis (Athens: Filistor, 1996); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 56–7; and Artiom Ulunian, “The Soviet Union and the Greek Question, 1946–53: Problems and Appraisals,” in The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53, ed. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (London: Macmillan, 1996), 140–158. Among many examples of the Soviet leadership’s relatively cautious approach, see “Beseda tov. Zhdanova s Zakhariadisom,” 22 May 1947 (Top Secret), in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1019, ll. 35–36.

        10. “Kratkaia zapis’ besedy Sekretaria TsK VKP(b) tovarishcha Suslova M.A. s general’nym sekretarem kompartii Vengrii tov. Rakoshi, sostoiavshaiasia 19 fevralia 1948 g.,” ll. 59–62.

        11. See, for example, “Kratkaia zapis’ besedy Sekretaria TsK VKP(b) tovarishcha Suslova M.A. s chlenom Politbiuro Vengerskoi kompartii T. Revai, nakhodivshimsia v Moskve proezdom iz Stokgol’ma, gde on byl na XIV s”ezde kompartii Shvetsiia v kachestve gostia,” Memorandum (Top Secret) from L.S. Baranov to the VKP(b) Secretariat, 21 May 1948, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1165, ll. 95–99.

        12. This point is well illustrated by the documents in “Stranitsy istorii,” 57–63. See also “Krupnoe porazhenie Stalina—Sovetsko-iugoslavskii konflikt 1948–1953 godov: prichiny, posledstviia, uroki,” Moskovskie novosti 27 (2 July 1989), 8–9.

        13. “Vypiska iz osobogo protokola No. 66: Reshenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) ‘Ob ekonomicheskikh otnosheniiakh mezhdu SSSR i stranami narodnoi demokratii,’” No. 66 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), 23 December 1948, with the attachment “O tesnom sotrudnichestve mezhdu SSSR i stranami narodnoi demokratii,” in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 39, ll. 149, 199–200.

        14. “Zápis o schúzce zástupcú šesti stran u Molotova v Kremlu dne 5. letna 1949 0 9. hod. večerní,” Notes from the discussion (Secret), 5 January 1949, in Národní Archiv České Republiky, f. 100/35, svazek, archivní jednotka 1101, ll. 3, 4.

        15. See the handwritten and typed notes and marked-up draft resolutions from the secret three-day conference on 5–7 January 1949 in RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1072, d. 1072, ll. 7–15, 19–25, 33–43, 48–54; and in Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv (TsDA), f. 1–B, op. 5, arkhivna edinitsa (a.e.) 30, ll. 18–33. See also the full protocols from the meetings in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki, f. 561, op. 13, d. 3, ll. 42–55, which can also be found in TsDA, f. 1–B, op. 5, a.e. 30, ll. 4–17. For further valuable documentation from the conference, see “Zápisy z ustavjuících schúzi Rady vzajemné hospodářské pomoci a z jednání delegací s J. V. Stalinem, 1949, 5.–8. ledna,” in Karel Kaplan, Československo v RVHP, 1949–1956 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1995), 213–36.

        16. “Tovarishchu Stalinu I.V.,” Memorandum No. 12-s (Top Secret) from A. A. Gromyko, M. A. Men’shikov, A. M. Vasilevskii, A. G. Zverev, and B. P. Beshev to Stalin, 18 December 1950, with attached draft resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee and draft note to the Yugoslav government, in APRF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 910, ll. 167–74, reproduced in Volokitina, Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953, t. 2, 429–33.

        17. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952,” NIE-29/2 (Top Secret), 4 January 1952, p. 3, in Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 213: National Intelligence Estimates.

        18. CIA, “Memorandum: Analysis of Soviet and Satellite Propaganda Directed to or about Yugoslavia,” 00-F-125 (Top Secret), 1 September 1950, pp. 1–6, in HSTL. President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Box 211: Memoranda 1950–1952.

        19. For a description of the bizarre plots involving Grigulevich, see the handwritten memorandum from S. D. Ignat’ev, chief of the State Security Ministry, to Stalin, in APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 463, ll. 148–9. The full text of the memorandum is transcribed in Dmitrii Volkogonov, “Nesostoiavsheesia pokushenie: Kak sovetskii agent Maks gotovilsia k terroristicheskomu aktu protiv Tito,” Izvestiia (Moscow), 11 June 1993, p. 7, which was the first publication to mention this scheme. It is discussed far more fully in the book by the late head of the Stalin-era covert operations branch of the Soviet foreign intelligence service, Pavel Sudoplatov, Spestoperatsii: Lubianka, Kreml’, 1930–1950 gody (Moscow: Olma-Press, 1998), 528–32. On other plots to assassinate Tito, see Marko Lopušina, KGB protiv Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Evro, 2001), 69–75; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 355–58; and the first-hand observations in Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’, t. 3, p. 119.

        20. See, for example, “Protokol za zasedanieto na plenuma na TsK na BKP, sustoyal se na 16 i 17 ianuari 1950 godina,” 16–17 January 1950 (Top Secret), in TsDA, f. 1-B, op. 5, a.e. 55, ll. 15–20; and “Stenogramma ot suveshchanie na aktivistite na sofiiskata organizatsiia na BRP(k) po makedonskiia vupros,” 9 October 1948 (Secret), in TsDA, f. 214b, op. 1, a.e. 71, ll. 66–117. See also CIA, “National Intelligence Estimate: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951,” NIE-29 (Top Secret), 20 March 1951, p. 3, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 213: National Intelligence Estimates. The east European state security forces also sought to disrupt alleged rings of spies and subversives in their own countries and “turn” them so that they could be used as double agents against Yugoslavia. See, for example, “Predlozhenie otnosno: Realiziranata v D. S.—G. Dzhumaia razrabotka ‘Izmennik,’” 10 February 1949 (Strictly Confidential), in TsDA, f. 1-B, op. 7, a.e. 1560, ll. 1–4.

        21. “Informatsiia ob organizatsii nelegal’nogo rasprostraneniia na territorii Iugoslavii izdanii iugoslavskikh politemigrantov,” Memorandum No. 61ss (Top Secret) from V.G. Grigor’ian to V.M. Molotov, 22 August 1951, in RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1379, ll. 106–10.

        22. General Béla Király, the commander of Hungarian ground forces in 1949–50, later claimed that the vigorous U.S. response to North Korea’s attack against South Korea in June 1950 was the main thing that caused Stalin to abandon plans for an invasion of Yugoslavia. See Béla Király, “The Aborted Soviet Military Plans against Tito’s Yugoslavia,” in At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1984), 273–88. Király may be correct about the short-term impact of the U.S. intervention in Korea on Stalin’s calculus, but declassified materials reveal that the Soviet leader was emboldened after China intervened in the war and the U.S. military effort bogged down. At a top-secret conference in Moscow in January 1951, Stalin declared that the U.S. failure to defeat China and North Korea demonstrated that “the United States is unprepared to start a third world war and is not even capable of fighting a small war.” See the declassified notes of Stalin’s remarks at the conference, transcribed in C. Cristescu, “Strict Secret de importanţă deosebită—Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide înarmarea Romăniei,” Magazin istoric 29, no. 10 (1995), 15–23. Király’s argument is further belied by the concrete evidence of Soviet and east European military preparations for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia. Before the Korean War broke out, Soviet and east European preparations for armed intervention in Yugoslavia were minimal, whereas at the height of the Korean War, in 1951–52, the Soviet-bloc states were engaged in a massive military buildup, which would have been of great use for an invasion of Yugoslavia.

        23. Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’, t. 3, p. 118.

        24. See, for example, CIA, “Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability to Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949,” ORE 44–49 (Top Secret), 20 June 1949, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 215: O.R.E.; CIA, “The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action during 1949,” ORE 46–49 (Top Secret), 3 May 1949, p. 4, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 215: O.R.E.; and László Ritter, “War on Tito’s Yugoslavia? The Hungarian Army in Early Cold War Soviet Strategy,” Working Paper of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, February 2005. Ritter skillfully debunks the claims made by Béla Király about alleged Soviet preparations in 1948–50 for an invasion of Yugoslavia, but Ritter’s impressive analysis contains a few important shortcomings. First, he focuses so much on Király’s account that he fails to give due weight to the crucial changes that occurred in the final two years of Stalin’s life. Second, Ritter refers to East-bloc planning and preparations for a “counteroffensive” against Yugoslavia (and against Western countries that might join Yugoslavia in attacking the Soviet bloc), but he fails to acknowledge that planning and preparations for a “counterattack” would be just as useful in carrying out an invasion of Yugoslavia. Nothing about these preparations was inherently “defensive.” Third, Ritter focuses solely on Hungary and does not discuss the buildup and preparations under way in Romania and Bulgaria, two countries (especially the latter) that would have played far more important roles than Hungary in any prospective Soviet-bloc incursion into Yugoslavia.

        25. CIA, “NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952,” 4–5.

        26. Figures derived from CIA, “Possibility of Direct Military Action in the Balkans by Soviet Satellites,” Special Evaluation No. 40 (Top Secret), 29 July 1950, p. 2, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 219, Special Evaluation Reports; and “Appendix, Table 1: Soviet Forces Estimated to Be Stationed in the Satellites July 1954,” in “National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956,” NIE 12–54 (Top Secret), 24 August 1954, p. 19, in Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 1, Miscellaneous File.

        27. “Review of the Military Situation in Hungary: The Likelihood of an Immediate Offensive against Yugoslavia Discounted,” Memorandum (Secret) from G. A. Wallinger, British ambassador to Hungary, to the Foreign Office, 11 August 1950, in the National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/87865, p. 4.

        28. CIA, “Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950),” ORE 8-50 (Top Secret), 11 May 1950, p. 5, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 216: O.R.E./1950.

        29. The most extensive notes were taken by the Romanian defense minister, Emil Bodnăraş, and by the Hungarian Communist party leader, Mátyás Rákosi, both of whom recorded Stalin’s comments and provided many other details of the proceedings. Bodnăraş’s notes were declassified in the 1990s and published in a monthly Romanian historical journal. See Cristescu, “Strict Secret de importanţă deosebită,” 15–23. Rákosi’s detailed account, evidently based on the contemporaneous notes he was able to take with him to Moscow in 1956, can be found in his memoirs, Visszaemlékezések, vol. 2: 1940–1956 (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1997), 860–66, esp. 860–62. A shorter account, attributed to the Czechoslovak defense minister, Alexej Čepička, was published by the historian Karel Kaplan in Dans les archives du Comité Central (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), 164–66. See also the brief but interesting retrospective comments of Edward Ochab in Teresa Torańska, Oni (London: Aneks, 1985), 46–47. Although Ochab was not the leader of the Polish United Workers’ Party in 1951, he attended the conference in place of party leader Bolesław Bierut, who apparently was ill. Because Stalin had not yet decided how far he would go in allowing East Germany to deploy a regular army, no East German officials took part in the conference. Albania also was not represented at the conference, but Stalin and several other high-ranking Soviet officials met in Moscow in early April 1951 with the Albanian Communist leader, Enver Hoxha, and the chief of the Albanian General Staff, Bekir Baluku, and discussed the need to strengthen the Albanian armed forces, particularly by equipping them with more tanks and combat aircraft. For a summary transcript of the meeting, see “Zapis’ besedy I.V. Stalina s E. Khodzei, 2 aprelia 1951 g.,” Memorandum of Conversation (Top Secret), 2 April 1951, in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 249, ll. 90–97, reproduced in Volokitina, Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953, t. 2, 504–09. The transcript tallies surprisingly well with the account of this meeting in Hoxha’s memoirs, With Stalin: Memoirs, 2nd ed. (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1981), 201–19. According to the transcript, Hoxha told Stalin that the Albanian army already numbered 150,000–175,000 troops plus 218,000 reserves, but these figures, compared to U.S. intelligence estimates, are much too high even if the Albanian security forces are included with the army.

        30. On the earlier demands, see, for example, “Protokol za zasedanieto na plenuma na TsK na BKP, sustoyal se na 16 i 17 ianuari 1950 godina,” l. 18. Stalin provided similar “advice” to the Hungarian authorities in the last few months of 1950. See “Tovarishchu Stalinu Iosifu Vissarionovichu,” 31 October 1950 (Top Secret), letter from Mátyás Rákosi to Stalin, in APRF, f. 558, op. 1, d. 293, ll. 80–82.

        31. Cristescu, “Strict Secret de importanţă deosebită,” 18.

        32. Ibid., 17–18.

        33. Ibid., 19. These figures, which were stipulated by Soviet Military Minister Aleksandr Vasilevskii and approved by Stalin, come from the documents transcribed by Bodnăraş. I have adjusted them slightly to take account of Albania’s projected troop levels, which were not specified at the meeting.

        34. Ibid., 20.

        35. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, vol. 2, p. 861.

        36. Ibid., 862–63, 865. See also Cristescu, “Strict Secret de importanţă deosebită,” 17–20.

        37. “Spravka-doklad G. K. Zhukova o sokrashchenii vooruzhenykh sil,” Report to the CPSU Presidium (Top Secret), 12 August 1955, in Voennye arkhivy Rossii, no. 1 (1993), 280–81; and “Zapiska G. Zhukova i V. Sokolovskogo v TsK KPSS,” Report to the CPSU Presidium (Top Secret), 9 February 1956, in Voennye arkhivy Rossii, no. 1 (1993), 283–88.

        38. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Report by the Standing Group to the North Atlantic Military Committee on Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future,” M.C. 33 (Top Secret—Cosmic), 10 November 1951, pp. 21–25, in NATO Archives (Brussels), C8–D4.

        39. “Prikaz Voennogo Ministra Soiuza SSSR No. 0085,” Military Directive (Top Secretive) issued by Military Minister Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii, 30 April 1951, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, f. 2, op. 1, d. 261, ll. 27–30r. A cover note on l. 29 indicates that Vasilevskii’s directive had been approved by the VKP(b) Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers two days earlier.

        40. CIA, “NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952,” 5.

        41. Jindřich Madry, “Období zbrojení a přezbrojování. Uzlové body komunistického rozhodování o Československu po Stalinovi,” Soudobé dějiny 1, no. 4–5 (1994), 623–39.

        42. Some aspects of the Western military supplies to Yugoslavia were reported at the time—though not always accurately—in the American press. See, for example, “U.S. Arms Delivered to Yugoslavia for Defense of Her Independence,” New York Times, 20 June 1951, pp. 1, 7. For more on this issue, see Anikeev, Kak Tito ot Stalina ushel, 189–203; Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Yugoslavia Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 81–119, esp. 98–111; Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito’s Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 334–36; and Beatrice Heuser, Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–53 (New York: Routledge, 1989), 117–24, 155–72, esp. 160–64.

        43. CIA, “NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952,” 4.

        44. “O deiatel’nosti organov Severo-atlanticheskogo Soiuza v sviazi s sozdaniem atlanticheskoi armii i remilitarizatsiei zapadnoi Germaniei,” Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), forwarded by the Soviet Communist Party Politburo to the leaders of the east European countries, February 1951, in Český Národní Archiv, Archiv Ústředního vyboru Komunistické strany Československa, f. 100/24, svazek 47, archivní jednotka 1338. I am grateful to Oldřich Tůma for giving me a copy of this document. Vojtech Mastny cites the document in his first-rate analysis of Soviet and East-bloc responses to NATO during the early years of the alliance, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 35 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, March 2002).

        45. “Appendix, Table 3: Estimated Satellite Air Forces, July 1954,” in CIA, “NIE: Probable Developments in the European Satellites through Mid-1956,” 19. Bulgaria received three divisions of Tu-2 bombers totaling 120 aircraft, and Hungary and Romania each received one division of forty bombers.

        46. Cristescu, “Strict Secret de importanţă deosebită,” 20.

        47. Nicolae Balotescu et al., Istoria aviației române (Bucharest: Editura Științifică și enciclopedică, 1984), 375, 380–81.

        48. See the guidelines for the Hungarian army’s war game held on 8–12 May 1951, Report No. 02609 (Top Secret) from Endre Matekovits, 7 May 1951, divided into four parts, “Feladat tisztázása,” “Vázlat a front feladatáról,” “Köveztetések,” “Tájékoztató jelentés,” plus a planning map, in Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Magyar Néphadsereg iratai, 1951/T/24/2 őrzési egység (ő.e.), oldal 207–226, document provided by László Ritter.

        49. Mircea Chiriţoiu, Între David şi Goliath: România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa Războiului Rece (Iaşi: Demiurg, 2005), 132, 135, 138–41. See also Gheorge Vartic, “1951–1953: Ani fierbinţi din istoria Războiului Rece în relatarea generalului (r) Ion Eremia, opozant al regimului stalinist din România,” in Geopolitică şi istorie militară în perioada Războiului Rece (Bucharest: Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 2003), 84–85.

        50. Deportaţii în Bărăgan, 1951–1956, ed. Silviu Sarafolean (Timişoara: Editura Mirton, 2001), esp. the thirty-nine-page introductory essays; Rafael Mirciov, Lagărul deportării: Pagini din lagărul Bărăganului, 1951–1956 (Timişoara: Editura Mirton, 2001); and Chiriţoiu, Între David şi Goliath, 247–48. The book edited by Sarafolean includes a remarkably detailed, 590-page list of those who were deported.

        51. “Zapis’ besedy s A. Pauker,” Memorandum No. 70-k (Secret) from S. Kavtaradze, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to Soviet Foreign Minister A. Vyshinskii, 1 March 1951, in AVPRF, f. 0125, op. 39, P. 198, d. 76, ll. 234–35; and “Zapis’ besedy s A. Pauker,” Memorandum No. 166-k (Secret) from S. Kavtaradze, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to Soviet Foreign Minister, A. Vyshinskii, 11 July 1951, in AVPRF, f. 0125, op. 39, P. 190, ll. 33–36.

        52. “Feladat tisztázása,” oldal 210.

        53. NATO, “Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces,” 22.

        54. See CIA, “NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952”; CIA, “NIE: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951”; and CIA, “National Intelligence Estimate: Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29 ‘Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951,’” NIE-29/1 (Top Secret), 4 May 1951, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 213: National Intelligence Estimates. See also CIA, “National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Capabilities and Intentions,” NIE-3 (Top Secret), 15 November 1950, pp. 17–18, in HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–1953, Box 213: National Intelligence Estimates.

        55. CIA, “NIE: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951,” 5–6.

        56. See the sources adduced in notes 77, 81, 83, and 110 supra.

        57. CIA, “NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952,” 5.

        58. The quoted phrase comes from CIA, “NIE: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951,” 5.

        59. Borbi i chistki v BKP (1948–1953): Dokumenti i materiali, ed. Lyubomir Ognyanov (Sofia: Glavno Upravlenie na Arkhivite pri Ministerskiya Suvet, 2001); Mito Isusov, Stalin i Bulgariya (Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Kliment Okhridski, 1991), 171–218; George H. Hodos, Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948–1954 (New York: Praeger, 1987); “Ich habe den Tod verdient”: Schauprozesse und politische Verfolgung im Mittle- und Osteuropa 1945–1956, ed. Wolfgang Maderthaner, Hans Schafranek, and Berthold Unfried (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1991); and Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 145–202. See also Vladimir Zelenin, “Sovetsko-iugoslavskii konflikt 1948–ogo goda i Repressii v Vostochnoi Evrope,” Novoe vremia 31 (July 1989), 34–35. There is no longer any doubt that Stalin and his aides directly supervised the purges in eastern Europe, especially the most spectacular of the show trials. See, for example, the relevant documents in Volokitina, Vostochnaia Evropa, t. 2; and Volokitina, Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, t. 2.

        60. See, for example, Goryanite: Sbornik dokumenti, vol. 1: 1944–1949, ed. Nedyalka Grozeva et al. (Sofia: Glavno Upravlenie na Arkhivite pri Ministerskiya Suvet, 2001), esp. doc. nos. 99, 103, 131, 147.

        61. “Dinamica arestărilor efectuate de către organele Securităţii Statului in anii 1950–31.III.1968,” Statistical Report (Top Secret) to the director of the Securitate, 17 April 1968, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Dosar 9572, vol. 61, Foaie 1. See also Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 19–24.

        62. See Kaplan, Československo v RVHP.

        63. The notion of a trade-off between “viability” and “cohesion” is well presented in James F. Brown, Relations between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey, R-1742-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975).

Index

Abwehr (German military intelligence), 76, 103, 193

Afghanistan, 47, 49, 79–80

Akhmetchetka, 196

Alash Orda, 60–61

Albania, 13, 238, 274, 276, 278, 282, 295–96, 298–99

Albanian Communist Party, 296

Almaty, 55–57, 61, 63

American Civil War, 207

Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935), 93

Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), 75–76, 93

Antonescu, Ion, 269

Arctic, 2, 23, 279

Arkhangelsk, 174

Armenia, 168, 246, 253

Astrakhan, 174

Augustów County, 101–03

Auschwitz, 222

Austria, 22, 93, 115, 139, 267

Azerbaijan, 168, 246

Babi Yar, 194, 196, 201–02

Bach-Zelewski, Erich, 171–72, 174, 217, 219–22

Backe, Herbert, 170

Baku, 77, 168–69, 171

Bakunin, Mikhail, 23

Bammat, Haidar, 77, 82

Baranovichi Oblast, 114–15, 125–29, 209

Bartel, Kazimierz, 153

Bartov, Omer, 202

Basmachi movement, 47–49, 79

Battalions of Death of the Borderland Riflemen (Bataliony Śmiercy Strzelców Kresowych, BSSK), 103

Batumi, 77

Bechtolsheim, Gustav von, 220

Belarus

    German plans for, 9, 165, 173–74, 176, 180, 191, 197, 209–10

    postwar, 12, 246–47, 280

    prewar Soviet Belarusian lands, 11, 54, 78, 96, 105, 107, 110, 120–23, 125–28, 208–225, 235, 246, 248–49, 274

    western Belarus (prewar Polish Belarusian lands), 95–96, 99, 103–105, 108–110, 114–131, 208–225, 235, 238, 244, 251, 266, 271

Belastok. See Białystok

Belastok Oblast, 114–15, 123, 125–29, 209

Belgium, 173, 180, 218, 239, 269

Beneš, Eduard, 247

Berdychiv, 193

Berezivka, 196

Bergavinov, Sergei, 30–31

Beria, Lavrentii, 98, 109, 300, 306

Berkhoff, Karel, 200

Berlin, 76, 78, 172, 200, 213, 218–19, 222, 237, 259, 273, 283

Bessarabia, 94, 190, 192, 196–97, 238–39, 268–69

Białystok (Belastok), 97, 102, 117–18, 124

Białystok Voivodeship, 95, 97, 101–02, 104, 116, 130

Bielsk Podlaski County, 102

Bismarck, Otto von, 79, 266

Bnei Akiva, 150

Bohdanivka, 196

Bohlen, Charles, 244–45

Bolshevik’s Prague Conference (1912), 85

Borejsza, Jerzy, 145

Boris III of Bulgaria, 267

Bormann, Martin, 224

Boruta-Spiechowicz, Mieczysław, 98

Boryslav (Borysław), 117, 119, 125, 197

Boy-Żeleński, Tadeusz, 145, 153

Brauchitsch, Walther von, 170

Brest Oblast, 114–15, 125–29, 209

British India, 62, 246

Bucharest, 200

Bulgaria, 13, 76, 237, 239, 248, 250–51, 258–59, 267, 269, 273, 276, 278–79, 282, 295–96, 298–99, 305–06

Burma, 246

Bush, George H. W., 201

Canada, 114

Canaris, Wilhelm, 76

Carp, Matatias, 199

Caucasus, 12, 77–78, 82, 165–66, 168–69, 175, 192

Central Asia, 2, 35, 46–50, 62, 79, 279

Central Committee of the Communist Party Albania, 296

Central Committee of the Communist Party Belarus, 122, 126

Central Committee of the Communist Party USSR, 246

Central Staff of the Partisan Movement (Tsentral’nyi shtab partizanskogo dvishenija, TsShPD), 212–13

Chamberlain, Neville, 138

Cherkassy, 194

Chervenkov, Vulko, 301

Chicherin, Georgii, 52

China, 4–6, 15, 44–52, 54–65, 80, 83–84, 241, 243, 255, 258

Chinese Civil War, 15

Churchill, Winston, 84, 236, 239–45, 250–52, 255, 264, 272–73

Ciano, Gian Galeazzo, 172

Clausewitz, Carl von, 86

Cold War, 14–15, 21, 260, 264–65

collective farms, 3–4, 21, 25–26, 28, 30, 52, 54–57, 61, 118, 121, 127–28, 155, 167, 176

collectivization, 3–5, 7–8, 14, 16, 18, 21, 25–29, 36, 46, 49, 52–54, 57–58, 65, 81, 118, 126–28, 211, 267, 278, 306

collectivization famines, 4, 16, 19–20, 44–66, 128

Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), 284, 295, 304

Communist International (Comintern), 75, 93, 234, 242, 267

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ), 276–78, 284

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 297, 306

Council of People’s Commissars Belarusian SSR, 126–27

Council of People’s Commissars Kazakh ASSR, 55

Council of People’s Commissars USSR, 24, 30, 59, 122–23, 127–28

Crimea, 12, 192, 208

Cripps, Stafford, 236

Curzon, Gorge, 272

Czech government in exile, 247

Czechoslovakia, 13, 15, 93, 138, 238, 247, 250, 252–53, 266–67, 273, 275–79, 281–84, 302, 305

Chortkiv (Czortków), 99

Dąmbrowski, Jerzy, 101

Danzig, 93, 138

Darien, 255

Dashava, 125

Denmark, 269

deportations, 4–6, 10, 12, 19, 27–28, 33, 35, 53, 65, 106–08, 114, 150, 196–97, 211, 222–24, 235, 267, 279–81, 303, 306

Desbois, Patrick, 202

Dimitrov, Georgi, 234, 248, 259

District Bialystok (Bezirk Bialystok), 209, 214

Djilas, Milovan, 271

Dmowski, Roman, 98–99

Dnipropetrovsk, 194, 197

Dobrowolski, Jerzy, 98

Domanivka, 196

Donner, Otto, 177

Drohobych (Drohobycz), 125

Drohobych Oblast, 114–15, 126–29, 192

Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 254

Dzerzhinsky, Feliks, 23

Dzharkent Raion, 48

East Siberian Krai, 34–35

Economics Inspection Center (Wirtschaftsinspektion Mitte), 176

Economics Staff East (Wirtschaftsstab Ost), 166, 171–73, 175, 179

Eden, Anthony, 238–40, 251

Ehrenleitner, Ludwig, 220

Eikhe, Robert, 30

Einsatzgruppen, 10, 171, 191–95, 216–17

Eliava, Shalva, 57, 63–64

Erickson, John, 238

Ermolina, L. I., 33

Estonia, 7–8, 10, 81, 94, 103, 105, 110, 130, 165, 174, 197, 208–10, 214, 235, 238–39, 246, 266, 268, 280, 306

Estonian nationality (in prewar Soviet Union), 82

Evdokimov, Efim, 30

Evtushenko, Evgenii, 201

Ezhov, Nikolai, 82–84

fifth columnists, 21, 35, 306

Finland, 7, 76, 80, 82, 94, 235, 237–39, 258, 268–69, 284

Finnish nationality (in prewar Soviet Union), 20, 79–80, 82, 87

First World War, 1, 84, 92–93, 116, 164, 172, 209, 214, 218, 233–34, 249, 266, 268, 270

Fishman, Lala, 141, 147

Five-Year Plan (Soviet)

    first, 3–4, 18–20, 24–27, 33, 45–46, 51–55

    general, 121, 125

forced labor, 18–19, 24, 27, 29–31, 34, 37, 180, 194, 197, 222–24

Four-Year Plan (German), 169, 177, 212

France, 8, 22, 84, 93–94, 97, 105, 138, 152, 173, 180, 202, 234–36, 240–41, 243, 245, 267, 269, 271, 276

Franco-Prussian War, 218

French Revolution, 207

Frunze, Mikhail W., 210

Fulton, 264

General Commissariat Mykolaїv, 196

General Commissariat Volhynia-Podolia, 196–97

General Commissariat White Ruthenia, 176, 209, 213–14, 223

General Government, 103, 106, 130, 179, 190, 192–94, 210, 268

Georgia, 168, 246, 253

Gerlach, Christian, 179

German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht), 6–7, 74, 76, 87, 100, 103, 109, 140, 164, 166–78, 180, 190–91, 194, 196, 202, 207–08, 213–22, 268–70

German Democratic Republic (GDR), 282–83

German nationality (in prewar Soviet Union), 20, 80, 82, 87

German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (1934), 78, 93, 125

German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression (1939), 1, 6, 83, 94, 125, 139, 163, 234, 237–39, 244, 270, 274

German-Soviet Treaty on Borders and Friendship (1939), 6, 94–95, 235

Germany, 1–17, 21–22, 36–37, 73–74, 92–95, 100–10, 115–17, 122–26, 128, 130–31, 138–41, 145, 147, 149–50, 152, 155–56, 163–81, 190–202, 207–25, 233–60, 266–83, 307

Głowacki, Albin, 109

Gola, Andrzej, 100

Goloshchekin, Filipp Isaevich, 51, 57, 59–60, 63–64

Gomel. See Homel Oblast

Göring, Hermann, 164, 169, 172, 176–77, 179–80, 212

Gottberg, Curt von, 215–17, 220, 223–24

Grajewo County, 102

Grand Alliance, 233, 236, 238–47, 249, 254–56, 259–60, 265

Great Terror, 5–8, 14, 18, 20, 35–36, 74–75, 78, 80–83, 85

Greece, 13–14, 238, 250–51, 269, 284, 296

Greek nationality (in prewar Soviet Union), 80, 82, 87

Grigulevich, Josif, 298

Grodno. See Hrodno

Gross, Jan, 277

Grossman, Vasily, 199

Grozny, 77

Gulag, 3–6, 8, 18–38, 52, 279–80

Gusev, Fedor, 255

Haller, Józef, 152

Harriman, Averell, 84, 256, 258

Hartmann, Julius von, 218

Hashomer Hatzair, 150

Haushofer, Karl, 79–80, 86

Hess, Rudolf, 79–80, 86

Himmler, Heinrich, 172, 192, 216–17, 220, 222–24

Hitler, Adolf, 8–9, 12, 37, 80, 83, 86–87, 92–94, 117, 138, 145, 163, 167–68, 171, 173, 179, 213, 218–20, 224, 234, 237–39, 252, 256, 267–70, 275

Hollender, Tadeusz, 145

Holloway, David, 257

Holocaust, 8–11, 14, 17, 145, 190–202, 220

Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), 12, 214, 272–73

Homel Oblast, 211

Hopkins, Harry, 256–57

Horodenka, 119

Hoxha, Enver, 282

Hrodno (Grodno), 117, 124

Hryciuk, Grzegorz, 148

Hungary, 12–13, 138, 197, 250–52, 258, 267, 269–71, 273, 275–76, 278–80, 283, 299, 305

Hunger Plan, starvation policy (German), 9–10, 170–79, 210–11

Iagoda, Genrikh, 18, 24, 29, 30

Ianson, Nikolai, 24

Iglewski, Antoni “Nieczuja,” 102

Iran, 49, 76–80, 253

Israel, 14, 114, 199–201

Italy, 76, 93, 138, 222, 237, 239, 245, 251, 258, 271, 276

Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanyslaviv; Stanisławów), 195

Japan, 5–7, 15, 36, 62–63, 65, 73–87, 93–94, 164, 233, 237, 243, 255, 257–59

Jeckeln, Friedrich, 192–93

Jedwabne, 102

Jerusalem, 198

Józewski, Henryk, 101

Kabakov, Ivan, 30

Kaganovich, Lazar, 59

Kalinin, Mikhail, 32

Kamianets-Podilsky, 193, 197

Karakhan, Lev, 62

Karaszewicz-Torkarzewski, Michał, 149

Karatal Raion, 45, 61

Kashgar, 47, 62

Katyn, 8, 141, 251, 274

Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 3–5, 8, 23, 34, 44–66, 108, 150, 153, 268, 279

Kegen Raion, 54

Keitel, Wilhelm, 170, 217, 219

Kharkiv (Kharkov), 178, 194, 241

Khmelnytskyi. See Proskuriv

Khrushchev, Nikita, 275–76, 299

Kiev, 178, 194–95

Kiril of Bulgaria, 269

Kirovohrad Oblast, 192

Kliuchevskii, V. O., 18

Klotz, Alfons, 98

Koch, Erich, 224

Komi Republic, 34

Konovalets, Ievhen, 81

Korea, North 15

Korean nationality (in prewar Soviet Union), 20, 80, 83

Korean War, 15, 300

Korosten, 195

Kott, Jan, 154

Kremenchuk, 196

Kube, Wilhelm, 223–24

Kugedaev, Alen Chzhinsakhanovich, 58–59

Kulaks (dekulakization, Kulak Operation), 5–6, 19–21, 25, 27–36, 48, 56–57, 59, 78, 80–81, 87, 267

Kuldja, 50–51, 60, 63–64

Kun, Béla, 271

Kursk, 221, 242

Kuznetsov, Anatoly, 201

Kyrgyzstan, 47, 60

Lanckorońska, Karolina, 146

Langner, Władysław, 141

Lattimore, Owen, 47

Latvia, 7–8, 10, 53, 81, 94, 103, 105, 110, 130, 165, 174, 197, 208–10, 214, 235, 238–39, 246, 266, 268, 280, 306

Latvian nationality (in prewar Soviet Union), 20, 79–80, 82, 87

League of Nations, 254

Lec, Stanisław Jerzy, 145

Lenin, Vladimir, 1–3, 8, 143, 145

Leningrad. See St. Petersburg

Leonov, Sergei, 74, 81

Lepel, 212

Lida, 124

Liniarski, Władysław “Mścisław,” 102

Lithuania, 7–8, 10, 12, 81, 93, 94–97, 101, 103–05, 107, 110, 130, 138, 165, 174, 197, 208–10, 214, 235, 238–39, 246, 266, 268, 280, 306

Litvinov, Maxim, 94, 242

Liuboml, 197

Lohse, Hinrich, 224

Łomża County, 102

London, 96, 100, 240, 242–43, 251–52, 255, 259

Lozovsky, Solomon, 239

Lublin, 216, 222, 252, 255

Ludendorff, Erich, 207

Lukina, Ekaterina Sergeevna, 32

Lutsk (Łuck), 197

Luxembourg, 269

Lviv (Lwów), 8, 95, 97–101, 104, 109, 118, 121, 125, 138–56, 165, 196–97, 202

Lviv Oblast, 114–15, 122–29, 149, 153–54, 192

Lwów Voivodeship, 95–97, 116, 139

Macieliński, Emil “Kornel,” 100–01

Madry, Jindřích, 302

Maisky, Ivan, 240, 242, 255

Majewski, Tadeusz “Śmigel,” 101

Malenkov, Georgii, 300

Manaki, Takanobu, 78

Manchukao, 5, 80, 82

Manchuria, 36, 62–63, 79, 255

Mao Tse-tung, 15, 258

Marshall, George, 284

Maschler, Ilana (family), 147, 151

Mass Operation 00447, 35

Memelland, 93, 268

Merkulov, Vsevolod, 98

Michael I of Romania, 269

Mickiewicz, Adam, 153–54

Mikoian, Anastas, 3

Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 251–52, 256–57

Minsk, 209–10, 212, 215–16

Minsk Oblast, 209

Mohileu (Mogilev), 219

Mohileu Oblast, 211

Molotov, Viacheslav, 57, 59, 63–64, 85, 94, 237, 239–42, 246, 250–52, 255–56, 258–59, 275, 296, 300, 306

Mongolia, 6, 47, 49, 80–81, 85

Moscow, 6–7, 11–12, 78, 96–98, 102, 107, 140, 149, 154, 166, 171–73, 199–200, 208, 211, 215, 220, 234, 236–38, 240, 244, 247, 250–52, 254, 256–57, 259, 272–74

Mudry, Vasyl, 140

Munich Agreement, 138, 267, 276

Mussolini, Benito, 93

Mykolaїv Oblast, 192, 195

Nadvirna, 195

Napoleonic Wars, 270

Narym, 32

National Populist Union (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy), 98–99

Nebe, Arthur, 219

Nerchinsk, 23

Netherlands, 239, 269

Nikolaev. See Mykolaїv

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 260, 302–03

northern Bukovina, 90, 192, 196–97, 238, 268–69

Northern Krai, 30–32, 34–35

Norway, 269

Novhorod-Volynsky, 193

Novohrudak Raion, 125

Nowogródek Voivodeship, 95, 97, 104, 116

Obtułowicz, Adam, 104–05

Odessa, 196

Odessa Oblast, 192, 195

Okulicki, Leopold “Mrówka,” 100–01, 106

Olechnowicz, Antoni, 105

Operation “Barbarossa”, 8, 11, 164, 167, 170, 208, 214, 222, 224, 269

Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), 10, 37, 190–98, 200, 207–08, 210, 215–18, 223

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), 8, 81–82, 103, 140, 149–50, 152, 192–93, 198, 202, 281–82

Orlemanski, Stanislaus, 247

Ōshima, Hiroshi, 76

Ōshima-Canaris Agreement, 76–78

Ostrowski, Stanisław, 143

Otrwin, Ostap, 145

Palestine, 150

Pallot, Judith, 35

Pan-Slavic Committee, 250

Paris, 78, 81, 92, 96–100, 105, 149

Pasternak, Leon, 145

People’s Association of the Volhynian Youth (Ludowy Związek Młodzieży Wołyńskiej), 101

People’s Commissariat for Food Industry, 124

People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, 242

People’s Commissariat of Forestry, 35, 124

People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD) USSR, 6–7, 12, 24, 34–36, 97–110, 141, 148–52, 154, 193, 201, 211–14People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD) RSFSR, 24, 27, 50

People’s Commissariat of the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate (Narodnyi komissariat raboche-krest’ianskoi inspektsii, NK RKI), 44–45, 61

Pervomaisk, 194

Peter the Great, 23

Piatakov, Georgy, 23

Piłsudski, Józef, 83, 98–99

Pinsk (Pińsk), 117, 124

Pinsk Oblast, 114–15, 125–29, 209

pogroms, 9–10, 103, 192–94, 202

Poland, 5–8, 10, 12–13, 16, 53, 73–87, 92–110, 114–31, 138–56, 177, 179, 190, 194, 197, 199, 201, 209, 213–14, 218, 234–35, 238, 244–45, 247, 251–53, 255–56, 258, 260, 264–84, 301, 306

Polesie Obast, 209

Polesie Voivodeship, 95, 97, 104, 116–17

Polish Army, 2, 94, 98, 100, 105, 139–40, 151, 274

Polish government in exile, 96–97, 100, 105, 149, 251–52

Polish language, 153

Polish Liberation Army—Union for the Armed Struggle (Polska Armia Wyzwoleńcza—Związek Walki Zbrojnej, PAW-ZWZ), 103

Polish nationality (prewar Soviet Union), 20, 79–80, 87

Polish Organization for the Struggle against the Enemy (Polska Organizacja Walki z Wrogiem, POWW), 97–98

Polish Organization for the Struggle for Freedom (Polska Organizacja Walki o Wolność), 149

Polish provisional government (Lublin), 255–56

Polish-Soviet War (1920), 266, 270

Polish-Ukrainian War (1918/19), 96, 139

Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24, 26, 35, 117–20, 123, 127, 240, 251, 300, 306

Polotsk, 212

Poluvedko, K., 82

Ponomarenko, Panteleimon, 212

Port Arthur, 255

postwar insurgencies, 280, 282

Potemkin, Vladimir, 84

Potsdam Conference, 253, 258–59

Prague, 273

Prisoner of war (POW), 38, 99, 167, 178–80, 211, 219, 251

Proskuriv Oblast, 192, 194

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 179–80, 267

Prussia, 22

Prussia, East, 138, 208–09

Prützmann, Hans, 192

Putrament, Jerzy, 145

Qing Dynasty, 47, 50

Racziewicz, Władysław, 152

Rákosi, Mátyás, 275, 283

Red Army, 2, 6–7, 15, 35, 73, 76, 92–94, 99, 102–03, 105, 117–18, 120, 129, 141–42, 150, 152, 165, 175, 191, 193, 201, 210–15, 219, 221, 225, 238, 240–42, 246, 251–52, 266, 268–74. See also Soviet Army

Reich Commissariat Caucasia, 165

Reich Commissariat Ostland, 165, 176, 209, 213

Reich Commissariat Russia, 165

Reich Commissariat Ukraine, 165, 176, 179, 190, 194–95, 197–98, 200, 209, 212–13, 224

Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, 170

Reich Ministry for Labor, 179

Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 94, 234–37

Richter, Friedrich, 177–78

Riess, Curt, 80

Rivne (Równe), 119, 195

Rivne Oblast, 114–15, 122, 126–29, 192

Rokossowski, Konstanty, 301

Romania, 7–8, 10, 12–13, 53, 94, 150, 190, 192, 194, 196, 238–39, 250–51, 253, 258, 267–70, 273, 275–76, 278–82, 299, 303, 306

Romanian nationality (prewar Soviet Union), 82

Romanovs (dynasty), 47

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 241–45, 254–56, 259, 272–73

Rosenberg, Alfred, 167, 176, 180, 210, 212, 224

Rotterdam, 81

Rowecki, Stefan “Grot,” 100, 106

Równe. See Rivne

Różycki, Stanisław, 154, 155

Russian (October) Revolution, 1–2, 33, 50, 52, 146, 210, 249

Russian Civil War, 22, 33, 50, 59, 61, 210, 266–67

Russian Empire, 1–2, 5, 47, 172, 209, 239, 266, 270

Russian language, 63, 74, 154, 216

Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), 79

Sakhalin Islands, 23, 237, 255

San Francisco, 254, 256

Saratov, 165

Sauckel, Fritz, 180, 222

Schenckendorff, Max von, 219

Schnurre, Karl, 163

Schulenburg, Friedrich-Werner Graf von der, 237

Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), 84

Second World War, 14, 18, 21, 37, 73, 75, 86, 115, 172, 190, 209, 212–14, 233, 246, 249, 253, 259–60, 264–65, 270–72, 274, 276, 278–79, 282–83, 295, 301

Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and SD (Sicherheitsdienst), 191, 216. See also Einsatzgruppen

Semchyshyn, Myroslav, 154

Semipalatinsk, 46–47, 49, 51, 61

Semipalatinsk affair, 51–52, 54, 58

Semipalatinsk Oblast, 54

Service for Poland's Victory (Służba Zwycięstwu Polski, SZP), 97–98, 102, 106, 149

Sheng Shicai, 49, 62

Sheptytsky, Andri, 140, 198

Sheridan, Phillip, 207

Shostakovich, Dmitry, 201

Shtemenko, Sergei, 300

Siberia, 59, 78, 81, 108, 150, 171, 268, 274, 279. See also East Siberian Krai, Siberian Krai, West Siberian Krai

Siberian Krai, 30

Sikorski, Władysław, 152

Six, Franz Alfred, 171–72

Ślęczka, Franciszek “Krak,” 102

Slonim, 220

Slovak Communist Party, 276

Slovak Democratic Party, 276

Slovakia, 138, 268–69, 273, 276

Smolensk, 208, 251

Smoleński, Marian, 107–08

Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), 274–75, 283

Sokołowski, Jan, 149

Soong, T. V., 257

Sorge, Richard, 74, 78, 85

Soviet Army, 278, 280, 284, 301. See also Red Army

Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation (1943), 247

Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (1932), 78

Spanish Civil War, 74, 93

Spector, Shmuel, 199

Spychalski, J. “Maciej Samura,” 102

SS, 37, 171–72, 174, 190–96, 200, 208–10, 215–24

St. Petersburg (Leningrad), 9, 166, 171–74, 178, 240

Stalin, Joseph, passim

Stalingrad, 171, 221, 241

Stanyslaviv (Stanisławów). See Ivano-Frankivsk

Stanisławów Voivodeship, 95–97, 116, 139

Stanyslaviv Oblast, 114–15, 120, 122, 126–29, 192

state farms, 127

Stieber, Wilhelm, 79

Stoćkyj, Jaroslav, 148

Strowski, Tadeusz, 98

Sudetenland, 138, 267, 273

Sudoplatov, Pavel, 81

Sulik, Nikodem, 105

Suny, Ronald Grigor, 25

Szulc, Jan “Prawdzic,” 102

Tajikistan, 47

Taldy-Kurgan Raion, 61

Ternopil (Tarnopol), 119

Tarnopol Voivodeship, 95–97, 116, 139

Tbilisi, 77

Tehran Conference, 243–45, 247, 259, 272

Tekeli, 44

Ternopil Oblast, 114–15, 120, 122, 126–29, 192

Thomas, Georg, 168–69, 171

Tibet, 49

Tilly, Charles, 278

Tito, Josip Broz, 14–15, 282, 295–99, 305

Tobolsk, 31–32

Tomsk, 34

Totalitarian Model, 21, 36

Transcarpathia, 138, 190, 193, 253

Transnistria, 190, 192, 195–97, 199–200

Transylvania, 253

Treaty of Rapallo (1922), 92, 236

Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881), 49

Treaty of Versailles, 138, 233, 257, 266,

Treuenfeld, Karl von, 221

Trieste, 238, 253

Trotsky, Leon, 1, 74, 80

Truman, Harry S., 256, 258–59

Tukhachevsky, Mikhail, 74, 78

Turkestan, 47, 49–50, 81

Turkey, 76–80, 237, 239, 252–53

Tver, 141

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 299

USSR, 6–7, 12, 24, 34–36, 97–110, 141, 148–52, 154, 193, 201, 211–14

Ukraine

    German plans for, 9, 165–69, 175, 180, 191, 210

    postwar, 7, 10, 12, 247, 277, 280–82

    prewar Polish Ukrainian lands, 7–8, 95–101, 103, 106–07, 109–10, 114–31, 138–16, 190–202, 214, 235, 238–39, 244, 251, 266, 271, 280–81, 306

    prewar Soviet Ukrainian lands, 4, 10, 16, 53–54, 78, 82, 96, 99, 107, 114, 120–21, 123, 127–28, 143–44, 154–55, 190–202, 221, 235, 240, 246, 248, 249, 253, 274

Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraïns’ka povstans’ka armiia, UPA), 198, 202, 214

Ukrainian language, 143–44

Ulbricht, Walter, 283

Unified State Political Administration (Ob“ edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, OGPU), 23–25, 27–30, 33, 35–36, 45, 51, 54–56, 59–64

Union for Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ), 97–108, 149

United Kingdom (England, Great Britain, British Empire), 22, 47, 84, 105, 114, 152, 234, 241, 251, 254, 265, 267, 272, 276

United Nations, 241, 243, 247, 254, 256

United States, 14–15, 74, 81, 83, 199–202, 237–41, 243–45, 247, 249, 252, 254–56, 258, 260, 265, 272–73, 283, 298, 300, 302

Urals, 9, 31, 33–35, 171

Urals Oblast, 30, 34

Uzbekistan, 47, 279

Vasilevskii, Aleksandr, 300

Viazma, 211, 215

Vileika Oblast, 114–15, 125–29, 209

Vilnius (Wilno), 95–96, 104–05

Vinnytsia, 194–95

Vinnytsia Oblast, 192, 195

Vladikavkaz, 77

Volhynia Oblast, 114–15, 122, 126–29, 194, 192

Volhynia Voivodeship, 95, 97, 101, 116

Volkovysk (Wołkowysk) 124

Volodymyr-Volynsky (Włodzimierz Wołyński), 119, 197

Vologda, 30, 32

Voroshilov, Kliment, 82, 242

Wagner, Eduard, 170, 173

War Economy and Armaments Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt), 168–69

Warsaw, 12, 78, 96–98, 102, 107, 140, 149, 154, 199, 272, 274

Warsaw Pact, 260

Warsaw Uprising, 12, 251–52, 272, 274

Warsaw Voivodeship, 116

Washington, 240–41

Wasilewska, Wanda, 145, 149, 153

Wehrmacht. See German Armed Forces

Weiss, Aharon, 199

Weliczker Wells, Leon, 145–46, 150

West Siberian Krai, 32, 34–35

Wilejka. See Vileika Oblast

Wilno Voivodeship, 95, 97, 104–05, 116–17

Włodzimierz Wołyński. See Volodymyr-Volynsky

Wołkowysk. See Volkovysk

Xinjiang, 4–5, 44–65, 81, 85

Yalta Conference, 253–59, 273

Yiddish, 143–44, 154, 199

Yining. See Kuldja

Yugoslavia, 13–15, 238, 248, 250–53, 264, 266, 269, 274, 276, 278–79, 282, 284, 295–307

Zaisan Raion, 54

Zajączkowski, Wojciech, 110

Zborovsky, Mark, 81

Zdolbuniv (Zdołbunów) 119

Żebrowski, Władysław, 98

Żegota-Januszajtis, Marian, 97–98, 149

Zhytomyr, 195

Zhytomyr Oblast 192

Zolochiv (Złoczów), 125

Żymierski, Józef, 99–100

Żymierski, Michał, 100

Żymierski, Stanisław, 99–100